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The development of ideas about pain and suffering in the works of thirteenth-century masters of theology at Paris, c.1230-c.1300.

The Development of Ideas about Pain and Suffering in the Works of Thirteenth-Century Masters of Theology at Paris, *c.*1230-*c.*1300

by

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This thesis examines the ideas about pain and suffering which were put forward by masters of theology at the university of Paris between *c.*1230 and *c.*1300. The masters developed these ideas while debating a range of distinct theological issues which were treated separately in their writings and disputations. Devoting a chapter to each of these distinct theological issues, the thesis analyses how their ideas about pain and suffering were constructed and the extent to which masters developed a shared terminology and conceptual framework in order to understand pain and suffering. Furthermore, the thesis explores the way in which these ideas about pain and suffering were used to address many other longstanding theological problems.

The chapters explore the masters' attitudes to human suffering and the Passion of Christ; ideas about suffering and gender; views about penitential suffering; theories surrounding the fate of unbaptised children; the problematic area of the separated soul's suffering and ideas about the suffering of resurrected bodies in hell. In each case, it is argued that the masters generally established a consensus of opinion about the way in which suffering was expressed. This is seen particularly in terms of penitential suffering and debates about whether there was suffering in the state of innocence. On one level, therefore, the masters developed their own technical language for suffering. However, the masters developed more than a language for suffering; they also created a conceptual framework for pain and suffering which they could use to explain problematic areas of theology with greater precision and clarity. This is most evident in their discussions about the human nature of Christ; their formulation of the concept of children's limbo and their ideas about the resurrected body. Ideas about pain are thus crucial to the complete understanding of the theological work of this important group of thirteenth-century theologians.

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Donald Mowbray Bristol, June 1999

I declare that the following work is my own and was completed, without collaboration, in the Department of Historical Studies at the University of Bristol between 1994 and 1999. The views expressed in this thesis are my own and are in no way those of the University.



Donald C. Mowbray

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Abbreviations

AFH	*Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*
AHDLMA	*Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1926-)
AHR	*American Historical Review*
AQQ	*S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici quaestiones quodlibetales*, ed. R.Spiazzi (Casali, 1956).
BJRL	*Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, University of Manchester*
CCCM	*Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis* (Turnhout, 1966-)
CCSL	*Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*
CSEL	*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* (Vienna, 1866-)
DdeS	*Dictionnaire de spiritualité Ascétique et Mystique Doctrine et Histoire*, ed. M.Viller, F. Cavallera, J. De Guibert and A. Rayez, 17 vols. (Paris, 1937-95).
DTC	*Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, 16 vols. (Paris, 1903-1972).
EThL	*Ephemerides Theologicae Louvanienses*
JEH	*Journal of Ecclesiastical History*
JHP	*Journal of the History of Philosophy*
JMRS	*Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies*
JMH	*Journal of Medieval History*
Mansi	*Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, ed. J.D. Mansi, 55 vols. (Florence, Venice etc., 1759-1962).
NCE	*New Catholic Encyclopaedia*
PG	*Patrologiae cursus completus...series Graeca*, ed. J-P. Migne, 161 vols. (Paris, 1857-66).
PL	*Patrologiae cursus completus...series Latina*, ed. J-P. Migne, 221 vols. (Paris, 1844-64).
Rev.Met.	*Review of Metaphysics*
RHE	*Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*
RPL	*Revue Philosophique de Louvain*
RSPhTh	*Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*
RTAM	*Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*
SCG	Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia. Issu Leonis XIII P.M. Edita 15, Cura et Studio Fratrum Praedicatorum (Rome, 1930).
ST	Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Leonine edition vols. iv-xii, Ia, iv-v (Rome, 1888-9); 1a2ae, vi-vii (Rome, 1891-2); 2a2ae, viii-x (Rome, 1895-99); 3a, xi (Rome, 1903).
TRHS	*Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*

Introduction

This thesis examines the ideas about pain and suffering which were put forward by masters of theology at the university of Paris between *c.*1230 and *c.*1300. The masters developed these ideas while debating a range of distinct theological issues which were treated separately in their writings and disputations. Devoting a chapter to each of these distinct theological issues, the thesis analyses how their ideas about pain and suffering were constructed and the extent to which masters developed a shared terminology and conceptual framework in order to understand pain and suffering. Furthermore, the thesis explores the way in which these ideas about pain and suffering were used to address many other longstanding theological problems.

A consistent approach is applied to the material gathered in each chapter. First, the specific questions addressed by the masters are explained in terms of the broader theological issues with which they were concerned. Second, the views of the masters are compared in order to establish the extent to which they agreed on a common language and conceptual framework for understanding pain and suffering. Third, changes in the ideas of individual masters and in the ideas of the masters collectively are explored. These ideas are examined chiefly in relation to intellectual developments in the study of theology. In some instances, however, there is also a brief investigation into changes outside the university which may have had an impact upon the masters' debates. Although this is not the main

thrust of the thesis, such complementary questions will serve to enrich the overall argument.

Why is research into ideas about pain and suffering in the Middle Ages a legitimate area of intellectual inquiry? As a subject for philosophical and phenomenological study, pain has produced many interesting modern studies which have focused specifically on its inexpressibility and concentrated on the breakdown of language when it is described as a personal experience.[1] There have also been numerous valuable contributions demonstrating the importance that ideas about pain and suffering hold for the historical understanding of theological development, but these have either fallen within the realms of biblical scholarship and biblical notions of suffering,[2] or within research on modern theology which has recently been especially concerned with the impassibility of God.[3] It is therefore widely accepted that the study of pain is important as a vehicle for observing shifts in ideas and sentiments in many historical contexts. With both the philosophical problems in conveying the language of pain and the importance of suffering to theology, there are clearly valid reasons for studying pain in the Middle Ages. However, there has been no systematic study examining pain and suffering for this period. The relatively few historical studies about pain in the Middle Ages have either been overviews arguing for the inclusion of

[1] See, in particular, G. Pitcher, 'The Awfulness of Pain', *Journal of Philosophy*, 67 (1970), 481-92; E. Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (Oxford, 1985); N. Nelkin, 'Pains and Pain Sensations', *Journal of Philosophy*, 83 (1986), 129-48.

[2] See, for example, J.A. Sanders, 'Suffering as Divine Discipline in the Old Testament and Post-Biblical Judaism', *Colgate Rochester Divinity School Bulletin*, 28 (1955), 1-135; D.J. Simundson, *Faith Under Fire: Biblical Interpretations of Suffering* (Minneapolis, 1980).

[3] See especially C.S. Lewis, *The Problem of Pain* (London, 1940, repr. 1977); B. Hebblethwaite, *Evil, Suffering and Religion* (London, 1979); P.S. Fiddes, *The Creative Suffering of God* (Oxford, 1988).

research on pain as integral to research on the medieval period,[4] have concerned themselves with iconographical representations of suffering,[5] or have examined pain in only brief or general terms.[6] Other studies have treated the study of pain in an anthropological context.[7] Although valuable in their own right, such studies have produced a generalised and skewed perception of pain and suffering in the medieval period.[8] Important and relevant issues have come out of these surveys, but on their own, there is still much work to be done given the importance pain held for religious expression and explanation in the Middle Ages.

The dearth of studies on pain is all the more surprising when some core areas of research on the medieval period are observed. It is therefore worthwhile mentioning the main fields of historiography into which this thesis falls. The way in which each chapter offers new and important contributions to them is presented in detail below.

In the last decade in particular, discourse surrounding the body in the Middle Ages has become a subject of great interest amongst historians and theologians. Studies have tended to concentrate on the ascetical practices of bodily

[4] E. Cohen, 'Towards a History of Physical Sensibility: Pain in the Later Middle Ages', *Science in Context*, 8,1 (1995), 47-74.
[5] E.M. Ross, *The Grief of God: Images of the Suffering Jesus in Late Medieval England* (Oxford, 1997); M.B. Merback, *The Thief, the Cross and the Wheel: Pain and the Spectacle of Punishment in Medieval and Renaissance Europe* (London, 1999).
[6] G. Duby, 'Observations on Physical Pain in the Middle Ages', *Love and Marriage in the Middle Ages*, trans. J. Dunnett (Chicago, 1994), 168-73.
[7] E. Seifert, *Der Wandel im menschlichen Schmerzerleben* (Munich, 1960); D. de Moulin, 'A Historical-Phenomenological Study of Bodily Pain in Western Man', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, 48 (1974), 540-70.
[8] Seifert, for example, argues that pain only becomes pain when it is experienced as such. He claims that his study of facial expressions in paintings and sculptures from the Middle Ages shows that medieval people had an underdeveloped pain perception similar to patients who have

renunciation, the religious practice of female mystics, and imagery of the body, primarily in literary texts.[9] Whilst these are interesting and important routes for studying ideas about the body, only one recent study has given any detailed attention to attitudes to the body expressed by university intellectuals.[10] This comprehensive volume, *Medieval Theology and the Natural Body* has, however, neglected academic debates of masters of theology about the suffering body. Research on the suffering of the body in this context has emerged in terms of a general overview of the period.[11] This thesis thus seeks to redress the balance and amend this omission, by enhancing research on medieval theological perceptions of the body and elucidating the way in which it was understood to suffer.

This thesis also offers new insights into the study of female suffering in the Middle Ages. There have been many interesting recent studies which have examined the role of the female body and religious practice in the Middle Ages.[12] Female religious writings of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in particular

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undergone a pre-frontal lobotomy: they still feel pain, but tolerate it with indifference. See *Der Wandel*, 68-92.

[9] See, for example, F. Bottomley, *Attitudes to the Body in Western Christendom* (London, 1979); C.W. Bynum, *Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body* (New York, 1991); B. Ribémont, *Le Corps et ses énigmes au Moyen Âge* (Orléans, 1992); S. Kay and M. Rubin (eds.), *Framing Medieval Bodies* (Manchester, 1994). For attitudes to the body in Late Antiquity, see P. Brown, *Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (London and Boston, 1991).

[10] *Medieval Theology and the Natural Body*, ed. P. Biller and A.J. Minnis (York Studies in Medieval Theology, I; York, 1997). See also B.C. Bazán, 'La Corporalité selon S. Thomas', *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 81 (1983), 369-409. On Franciscan preaching about the positive view of the body in the sacrament of marriage see D.L. D'Avray, 'Some Franciscan Ideas about the Body', *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 84 (1991), 343-63.

[11] Cohen, 'Towards a History of Physical Sensibility', 47-74.

[12] E.V. Spelman, 'Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views', *Feminist Studies*, 8 (1982), 109-31; J. Price, 'Inner and Outer: Conceptualizing the Body in *Ancrene Wisse* and Aelred's *De Institutione inclusarum*', *Medieval Ethical and Religious Literature: Essays in Honour of George Russell* (Cambridge, 1986), 192-208; C.W. Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women* (Berkeley, 1987); E. Roberston, 'The Rule of the Body: the Feminine Spirituality of the *Ancrene Wisse*', *Seeking the Woman in Late Medieval and Renaissance Writings: Essays in Feminist Contextual Criticism*, ed. S.Fisher

demonstrate how the female body was used to describe and understand female religious feelings. It has been suggested that in the realms of expression for female spirituality, there was an increase in 'bodiliness' from the twelfth century onwards. This was integrated into expressions of sanctity in this period, which witnessed a plethora of seizures, swellings, cases of holy anorexia, stigmata and instances of miraculous lactation.[13] Accounts which have a bodily focus occur in a variety of genres, but ideas about the function of the body were far from consistent. For example, hagiography was sympathetic to violent bodily movements at times, but at others it interpreted them as demonic, favouring rather outward bodily control as a sign for inner, spiritual harmony.[14] Female saints were noted for mourning the bodily suffering of Christ in the Passion. Notable examples include the Franciscan tertiary Angela of Foligno[15] and the recluse Elizabeth of Spaalbeek whose practice of acting out the persecution of Christ by dragging herself about, cutting and beating herself, was described in about 1275 by Philip of Clairvaux.[16] Caroline Walker Bynum has suggested that there was an increased medieval preoccupation with physicality in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. This found its expression in the visions and practices of female mystics, who, Bynum argues, identified the female flesh with the body of the suffering Christ. The Eucharist was central to this religious devotion.

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and J.E. Halley (Knoxville, 1989); E.A. Petroff, *Body and Soul: Essays on Medieval Women and Mysticism* (New York, 1994).

[13] C.W. Bynum, 'The Female Body and Religious Practice in the Later Middle Ages', in *Fragmentation and Redemption*, 186-7.

[14] W.Simons, 'Reading a Saint's Body: Rapture and Bodily Movement in the *Vitae* of Thirteenth-Century Beguines', in *Framing Medieval Bodies*, ed. S.Kay and M.Rubin (Manchester, 1994), 12,18.

[15] See especially 'Christi summus et continuus dolor': *Acta Sanctorum*, January, i, cap. xvi (Venice, 1734), 186-234.

[16] Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast*, 256.

Consuming the body of Christ was the ultimate in religious imitation.[17] Much has thus been made of the association of female mystics with the suffering Christ. There has been much less work done on the way in which masters of theology understood gender relations within their theology.[18] Moreover, the issue of male and female suffering and its relation to gender has not received sufficient treatment. This thesis will pursue this line of inquiry and add a further dimension to ideas about female suffering.

Ideas about suffering are also essential to perceptions of life after death and there have been many histories of hell and purgatory.[19] However, these studies have tended to focus on medieval beliefs about the existence of such afterlife abodes, or they have linked the punishments to certain types of sin.[20] Conversely, the way in which university masters explained the nature of pain and suffering in the

[17] *Ibid*, 245-60. Bynum explains imitation thus: '"Imitation" meant union, fusion, with that ultimate body which is the body of Christ', 246. For a detailed discussion of women mystics, see C.W. Bynum, *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982), 170-262. On the imagery of the suffering Christ in the Eucharist, see M. Rubin, *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture* (Cambridge, 1991), 302-15.

[18] See, however, K. Børresen, *Subordination and Equivalence: The Nature and Role of Women in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas* (Washington D.C., 1981); M.T. D'Alverny, 'Comment les théologiens et les philosophes voient la femme', *La Femme dans la civilisation des dixième et treizième siècles: Actes du colloque tenu à Poitiers le 23-25 septembre 1976. Cahiers de civilisation médiévale*, 20 (1977), 105-29.

[19] See, for example, D.D.R. Owen, *The Vision of Hell* (Edinburgh and London, 1970); P. Dinzelbacher, *Visionen und Visionsliteratur im Mittelalter* (Monographien zur Geschichte de Mittelalters, 23; Stuttgart, 1981); R.K. Emmerson, *Antichrist in the Middle Ages. A Study of Medieval Apocalypticism, Art and Literature* (Manchester, 1981); M. Himmelfarb, *Tours of Hell: An Apocalyptic Form of Jewish and Christian Literature* (Philadelphia, 1983); R.Bauckham, 'Early Jewish Visions of Hell', *Journal of Theological Studies*, 41 (1990), 355-85; J. Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory*, trans. A. Goldhammer (New York, 1990); P. Camporesi, *The Fear of Hell: Images of Damnation and Salvation in Early Modern Europe*, trans. L. Byatt (Pennsylvania, 1991); A.E. Bernstein, *The Formation of Hell. Death and Retribution in the Ancient and Early Christian Worlds* (London, 1993). For Limbo see: R. Weberberger, 'Limbus Puerorum: Zur Entstehung eines theologischen Begriffes', *RTAM*, 35 (1968), 83-133; 241-259.

[20] Specific categories of sinners from the utterly reprobate in Hell to the *non valde mali* in Purgatory have been ascertained by Le Goff, *Birth of Purgatory*, 149.

afterlife has been given little consistent treatment.[21] An investigation into the development of ideas about pain and suffering is thus a new route of inquiry where histories of purgatory and hell are concerned. However, instead of exploring them as places, this thesis will focus on the way in which a language of suffering was used as a tool to understand them.

This study also contributes more generally to the history of academic study. There is evidence to suggest that during the formation of their system of ideas about pain, masters of theology created or sought to maintain positions which arose out of study of theology which was freer from intellectual and religious constraints than has previously been thought. The belief that masters of theology merely followed 'schools of thought', that is, abided by their affiliation to a particular religious order when they presented answers theological issues, is too rigid.[22] The creation of a common set of phrases to describe pain, stemming from the use of authorities, suggests that in their desire to understand suffering of the body and the soul, any absolute adherence to specific 'schools of thought' was not a basis upon which masters of theology perceived their function or position. In this way, pain, as a conceptual tool, might also be employed to unlock complex areas of dispute between masters.

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[21] A.E. Bernstein has briefly examined Aquinas' understanding and explanation of the fire of Hell and how the separated soul experiences this, but he has failed to account for this explanation or to set it within the wider context of historical and theological developments at the University of Paris. See A.E. Bernstein, 'The Invocation of Hell in Thirteenth Century Paris', *Supplementum Festivum. Studies in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller* (Medieval and Renaissance Text and Studies, 49; New York, 1987), 13-54, esp. 24-9. See also Bernstein, 'Esoteric Theology: William of Auvergne and the Fires of Hell and Purgatory', *Speculum,* 57 (1982), 509-531.

[22] For the claim that theologians followed 'schools of thought', see E. Gilson, *A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London, 1955), 327-40; E. Gilson, *La philosophie*

The parameters of this thesis require some explanation. Why are masters of theology at Paris an interesting and relevant group to be used in the study of ideas about pain and suffering? The masters of theology studied in this thesis comprise some of the most influential individuals in the medieval period and their significance has been widely acknowledged both for their role in developing theology and for their contribution to various social and political debates.[23] Moreover, the authority which masters possessed beyond the university and how this authority and view of themselves led to the creation of a discernible 'self-image' has been the focus of two recent studies.[24] Although not a major theme of this thesis, the way in which ideas about pain were affected by key events outside the university is given serious consideration.

The setting for their intellectual pursuits was the university of Paris, arguably the most important centre for the study of theology in the thirteenth century.[25] Indeed, the university was one of the first to be organised around specific rights and statutes, and the masters there enjoyed a unique position of influence and

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franciscaine (Paris, 1927); L. Veuthey, *Les divers courants de la philosophie augustino-franciscaine au moyen âge*, (Scholastica Ratione-Critica Instauranda; Rome, 1951), 629-52.

[23] For example, see J.W. Baldwin, *Masters, Princes and Merchants: the Social Views of Peter the Chanter and his Circle*, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1970); E.A.R. Brown, '*Cessante causa* and the taxes of the last Capetians: the political applications of a philosophical maxim', *Studia Gratiana* 15 (*Post Scripta*) (1972), 567-87; B. Smalley, *The Becket Conflict and the Schools* (Oxford, 1973); R. Bartlett, *Trial by Fire and Water* (Oxford, 1986).

[24] I.P. Wei, 'The Masters of Theology at the University of Paris in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries: An Authority Beyond the Schools', *BJRL*, 75 (1993), 37-63; I.P. Wei, 'The Self-Image of the Masters of Theology at the University of Paris in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries', *JEH*, 46 (1995), 398-431.

[25] For this view, see R. Avi-Jonah, 'Career Trends of Parisian masters of theology 1200-1320', *History of Universities*, 6 (1986), 47-64. On the university of Paris in general, see J. Le Goff, *Les intellectuels au moyen âge* (Paris, 1957); G. Leff, *Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (New York, 1968); A.B. Cobban, *The Medieval Universities* (London, 1975).

independence.[26] The terminal dates for this thesis reflect arguably the highpoint of intellectual activity at the university of Paris. The approximate *terminus a quo* of 1230 is important for two reasons. First, this date represents the beginning of both Dominican and Franciscan presence in the faculty of theology at Paris. In 1229, the Dominicans obtained their first chair at the university.[27] The time also marks the inception of the first Franciscan master of theology at the University of Paris, Alexander of Hales. Alexander joined the Franciscan order and held the first Franciscan chair of theology at Paris from 1231.[28] Second, this period also marks the end of the strike by secular masters at the university with the acknowlegement of the position of the mendicants in the university.[29] In two important ways, therefore, the beginning of the 1230s heralded significant changes in the faculty of theology at the university of Paris, and thus in the study of theology itself.

The *terminus ad quem* of 1300 is also approximate and has been selected for various reasons. After about 1300 there were important changes occurring in the field of theology. The emergence of a more conservative movement in the study of theology towards the close of the thirteenth century altered perceptions about the way in which theology was interpreted and expressed.[30] The tide was turning against speculation and particularly against radical philosophical explanations of

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[26] S. Menache, 'La naissance d'une nouvelle source d'autorité: l'université de Paris', *Revue Historique*, 268 (1982), 305-27.
[27] F.J. Kovach and R.W. Shahan (eds.), *Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1980), x.
[28] R.M. Huber, 'Alexander of Hales, O.F.M.: His Life and Influence on Medieval Scholasticism', *Franciscan Studies*, 5 (1945), 355-6.
[29] J. Marenbon, *Later Medieval Philosophy: An Introduction (1150-1350)* (London, 1987), 15. The dispute between seculars and mendicants persisted beyond this date, however.

theological subjects. For this reason, the changes which occurred in the fourteenth-century study of theology at Paris and beyond are only alluded to where necessary points of comparison to the thirteenth century dictate.

Apart from their chronological proximity to one another, what other factors determined the coherence of these masters of theology as a viable group to study? The masters studied in this thesis are a coherent group because they were influenced by similar changes in theological study throughout their careers. The central change which affected them all was the reception of Aristotle in the West.[31] Many of the debates studied in this thesis thus fall within an even more temporally-limited period of 1240-1270. These dates are significant because they encapsulate a time during which Aristotelian philosophy became an important element in theological debate. Various works of Aristotle, including the *Metaphysics*, had been banned as teachable texts at the University of Paris in 1210.[32] Furthermore, lecturing on the *libri naturales* was absolutely prohibited again in 1215.[33] However, by the middle of the thirteenth century, translated works of Aristotle formed an important part of theological learning and stimulated theological debate. In the 1240s, Roger Bacon was lecturing on the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics* and the full Aristotelian corpus was formally introduced to the Arts Faculty curriculum in 1255.[34] The condemnations of 1270

[30] For this argument, see G. Leff, 'The Changing Pattern of Thought in the Earlier Fourteenth Century', *BJRL*, 43 (1960), 354-72; G. Leff, 'Faith and Reason in the Thought of Gregory of Rimini (c.1300-1358)', *BJRL*, 42 (1959), 88-112.
[31] See F. van Steenberghen, *Aristotle and the West*, trans. L. Johnston (London, 1955).
[32] *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, 1200-1479, 6 vols., ed. H.Denifle and A.C Chatelain and others (Paris, 1889-1964), i, 70-1.
[33] *Ibid.*, 78.
[34] J.F. Wippel, 'The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris', *JMRS*, 7 (1977), 169-201, at 172. *Chartularium*, i, 277-9.

and 1277 by the bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, signalled the problems which Aristotle had created within the realm of theological study.[35] Chapter 5 focuses specifically on the issues surrounding these condemnations in relation to masters' debates about the suffering of the separated soul. The extent to which the Church influenced the study of theology, and consequently affected the nature and style of debate amongst masters, is a sub-theme which permeates the thesis as a whole. Moreover, the importance of Aristotle as an authority whom masters employed and interpreted in formulating their ideas about pain and suffering is central to one of the approaches applied to the source material in this study.

The choice of source material itself requires some explanation. The works which are studied in this thesis comprise *Commentaries on the Sentences*; quodlibetal disputations; disputed questions and questions in theological *Summae*. The first type of source used in this thesis are collections of theological questions known as *Commentaries on the Sentences*.[36] The commentary was the essential training piece for those who coveted the vaunted position of master of theology. Only a small elite became masters in the Faculty of Theology, but many students would listen to the bachelor lecturing on the *Sentences* before they moved out of the university and into positions in the Church hierarchy, ranging from administrators to parish priests.[37] The *Sentences* originated in Paris in the mid-

[35] See A. Zimmermann, (ed.), *Die Auseinandersetzung an der Pariser Universität im XIII. Jahrhundert* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 10; Berlin, 1976).

[36] For the tradition associated with the production of *Sentence* commentaries, see F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, 2 vols. (Würzburg, 1947); V. Doucet, 'Commentaires sur les Sentences: Supplément au Répertoire de M. Fréderic Stegmüller', *AFH*, 47 (1954), 88-170.

[37] The following are particularly useful: P. Glorieux, 'L'enseignement au moyen âge: techniques et méthodes en usage à la faculté de théologie de Paris au xiiie siècle', *AHDLMA*, 35 (1968), 65-186, esp.111-18; B.C. Bazán, J.W. Wippel, G. Fransen, D. Jacquart, *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine* (Typologie

twelfth century, composed by Peter Lombard, a pupil at the schools of Rheims and St-Victor. His work raised questions of doctrine and then set about answering them using various scriptural and patristic authorities. It was divided into four main books dealing respectively with: God; the creation and the history of the world before Christ; the Incarnation and Redemption; and the Sacraments, Death, Judgment, Heaven and Hell.[38] Between around 1233 and 1237, the work became established as the textbook[39] with which prospective masters of theology proved their credentials as theologians by commenting on the questions raised by Peter Lombard and introducing new ones of their own. The *Commentaries on the Sentences* were essentially the doctoral thesis of the thirteenth century. Although the function of the commentaries was to establish that a particular theologian was worthy of the magisterial title, many commentaries were revised by their authors at a later date, providing fuller explications to questions they had debated as bachelors.[40] Moreover, not every master felt obliged to ask the same question about the same subject. There is thus some evidence to suggest that masters debated issues which were of interest to them.

The source base of the thesis also includes disputation literature. Disputations were university exercises which were employed to debate matters of theological interest in the faculty of theology. One type of disputation examined in this thesis

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des sources du Moyen Âge occidental, 44-5; Turnhout, 1985); J. Marenbon, *Later Medieval Philosophy, (1150-1350): An Introduction* (London, 1987), esp. 20-5; M.D. Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Thought* (London, 1962, repr. 1988), 158, 164-6.

[38] Knowles, *Evolution*, 162-3.

[39] A.J. Minnis, '*De impedimento sexus*: Women's Bodies and Medieval Impediments to Female Ordination', *Medieval Theology and the Natural Body*, ed. P. Biller and A.J. Minnis (York, 1997), 109-39, at 110.

[40] These are the so-called *ordinationes*, as compared with *reportationes* which were students' notes: *ibid.*, 112.

is the quodlibetal disputation,[41] a source which has been shown to have authority beyond the schools, that is, they had social and political reasons for being debated and their conclusions were respected beyond the university.[42] These were formal disputations held only at or close to Christmas and Easter by masters of theology. Questions could be asked *a quolibet*, that is by anyone, and about any subject, *de quolibet*: hence their name. They have recently been aptly dubbed by one historian as 'Medieval Theologians' Question Time'.[43] The audience for *quodlibetal* questions included people who were not members of the university, and who expressed an interest in the authority of the masters. Questions which appear in *Commentaries on the Sentences* also appear in the quodlibets of certain masters. The two sources are thus legitimately comparable and, in some instances, demonstrate the development of thought of a particular master over time.

The third type of source material used is the disputed question. This was a question which dealt with specific areas of theology. In contrast to quodlibets, ordinary disputed questions arose out of a particular master's teaching and from

[41] For details on quodlibetal disputations, see J.A. Destrez, 'Les disputes quodlibétiques de Saint Thomas d'après la tradition manuscrite', *Bibliothèque Thomiste*, I (Le Saulchoir, 1921), 49-108; P. Glorieux, *La Littérature Quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*, 2 vols. (Kain and Paris, 1925-35); P. Glorieux, 'Le quodlibet de Pierre de Tarentaise', *RTAM*, 9 (1937), 237-80; A. Maier, 'Das Quodlibet des Thomas de Wylton', *RTAM*, 14 (1947), 106-10; L.E. Boyle, 'The Quodlibets of St. Thomas and Pastoral Care', *The Thomist*, 38 (1974), 232-56; J.F. Wippel, 'The Quodlibetal Question as a Distinctive Literary Genre', *Les genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales: Définition, Critique et Exploitation: Actes du Colloque International de Louvain-la-Neuve, 25-27 mai 1981. Publications de l'Insitut d'études médiévales*, 2nd series (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1982), 67-84; J.F. Wippel, 'Quodlibetal questions, chiefly in theology faculties', in *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, 151-222.

[42] Wei, 'Masters of Theology', 37-63; L. Meier, 'Les disputes quodlibétiques au dehors des universités', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 53 (1958), 401-42.

[43] P. Biller, 'John of Naples, Quodlibets and Medieval Theological Concern with the Body', *Medieval Theology and the Natural Body*, 3.

working with his bachelors.[44] The master himself set the agenda for these questions, rather than the audience, and decided which ones would be addressed first. Nevertheless, as with questions in *Sentence* commentaries and quodlibets, there is much cross-pollination between this type of source and the other two. However, the ordinary disputed questions often probed their subject at greater depth.[45]

The fourth type of source to be examined are questions which appear in theological *Summae*. Generally, the questions framed in *Summae* are representative of the intellectually-mature master of theology. Compared with other sources, therefore, the conclusions presented in *summae* may be used to detect individual masters' developments in thought throughout their careers.

In addition to being an ideal body of material for answering the central issues and questions set out at the beginning, the sources allow historians to answer another key question which is a central theme of this thesis: the way in which masters of theology used, interpreted and criticised different authorities. The introduction of Aristotle into theology, as was detailed above, presented theologians with many difficulties of interpretation and translation. It was no exception when they debated questions about pain and suffering. Indeed, the way in which masters of theology integrated the language and ideas of a discrete group of authorities, and more specifically Aristotle and Augustine, into their questions about pain and

[44] See B.C. Bazán, 'La question disputata', *Les genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales*, 31-49.
[45] J.F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy* (Washington D.C., 1981), xxii; Glorieux, 'L'Enseignement', 123-32.

suffering appears to have been a crucial element in developing a language and system of ideas for understanding pain itself. The source material lends itself perfectly to this type of assessment because this kind of theological literature used authorities to back up its conclusions. It is thus central as a source-base for understanding the development of ideas about pain and suffering in the thirteenth century.

The sample of masters of theology examined in this study comprises seventeen, although only seven are analysed in comprehensive depth throughout. Nevertheless, this sample of seven is a rational and adequate one for two reasons. First, it consists of the greatest and most influential theologians of the thirteenth century. Second, there is a fairly even spread of Franciscan and Dominican masters. The works of one secular master and one Augustinian canon are investigated also.[46] When conclusions about intellectual attitudes to pain and suffering are drawn, therefore, they are more or less representative of trends in the study of theology in the thirteenth century in general.

How is the thesis structured? This thesis is divided into two principal sections. The first section, which contains the first three chapters, relates to questions about pain and suffering in this life. Chapter 1 covers the development of ideas about human suffering and its relation to the body and soul and their use in explaining the suffering of Christ. As was suggested above, intellectual ideas

[46] Franciscans: Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta and Richard of Middleton; Dominicans: Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas; Secular masters: Henry of Ghent; Augustinian Canon: Giles of Rome.

about pain and suffering are useful vehicles for understanding the theology associated with the body. It is the contention of this thesis that despite the position expressed by certain 'dualist' theories, which understood body and soul to exist as separate entities, the perception of the body and soul in pain transcended such differences in intellectual perception and emphasised the importance of the psychosomatic unit in suffering. However, the way in which the body was perceived to be related to the soul is central to comprehending the way in which the body, and concomitantly, the soul, could suffer. The other important and closely-related area explored in chapter 1 is the relationship between theories of human suffering and the suffering of Christ. The hypothesis advanced here is that masters developed an intricate language for pain which enabled them to understand the complexities of the human body. They also used this language in their Christology. Pain, it is asserted, was central to understanding the humanity, divinity and body of Christ and allowed masters to form a degree of consensus amidst the raging controversies surrounding theories about the hypostatic union.

The themes and ideas about pain discussed in the first chapter are then examined in a different context in chapter 2, where the importance of gender and pain is analysed. Chapter 2 examines the idea of sex difference and notions of female and male suffering, and asks in what contexts pain and gender were linked. It then considers the position taken by masters of theology on the relations between man and woman in the contexts of Creation, State of Innocence and the Fall. Within this linear chronological structure, it is argued that male and female suffering cannot be understood without reference to notions of sex difference, nor

can sex difference be fully explained without understanding masters' ideas about pain.

Chapter 3 assesses how masters dealt with the notion of voluntary suffering in penance, whether this necessitated new ideas about the nature of suffering, and how they integrated these ideas within an overall structure of explanation for pain. The nature of penitential practice was a key part of medieval theological discussion. As far as identifying the nature of suffering which was necessary to achieve reparation for sin is concerned, little research has been done.[47] What has been written has tended to concentrate upon suffering for sin as a ritual, rather than focusing upon locating the idea of pain itself within any particular framework of explanation.[48] Chapter 3 thus locates the nature of pain and suffering in penance within the vocabulary and language masters developed to understand and explain pain in general. It argues that a new dimension to pain was created. Pain was perceived as restorative rather than destructive. However, this necessitated an extension of the language masters employed to understand suffering. It also meant that masters had to re-assess the way in which they understood the action of pain on the body. Study of their ideas about pain and suffering in penance thus not only contributes to an understanding of this sacrament, it also shows how masters used one existing set of ideas to form another.

[47] Or, rather, research has centred around the theological and sacramental differences between contrition and attrition, that is, penance informed and uninformed by grace respectively. See A. Vanneste, 'La théologie de la pénitence chez quelques maîtres parisiens de la première moitié du treizième siècle', *EThL*, 28 (1952), 24-58.

[48] For example, see G. Constable, 'Attitudes toward Self-Inflicted Suffering in the Middle Ages' *Ninth Stephen J. Brademas Sr. Lecture* (Brookline, Mass., 1982), 5-28; T. Asad, 'On Ritual and Discipline in Medieval Christian Monasticism', *Economy and Society*, 16 (1987), 159-203.

The second section focuses upon ideas about pain and suffering after death. Three chapters consider three specific areas of discussion. Clarifying the nature of pain and suffering was central to two particular aspects of punishment after death: the formation of children's limbo and the way in which the separated soul could suffer the punishment of corporeal fire. Detailed studies of these two aspects form chapters 4 and 5 respectively. Each of these chapters pursues themes about pain which interlink throughout the thesis. For example, the notion of sin which merited certain types of suffering discussed in chapter 3 is the focus for understanding the experience of children in limbo in chapter 4. Determining the links between sin and pain was what led to the definition of limbo, it is argued. Another theme which emerges in chapter 4 and permeates the entire thesis is the deliberate re-interpretation by masters of theology of one main patristic authority: Augustine. It is suggested that by clarifying their own language for pain, masters could explain an apparently contradictory position held by Augustine. It is therefore argued in this chapter that the intellectual construction of children's limbo was dependent upon the masters' systematic application of their ideas about suffering to an overall picture of the afterlife.

Chapter 5 is concerned with the immensely complicated area of discussion about the separated soul. It demonstrates that explanations of the separated soul were reliant upon the language of the corporeal, and the language of suffering allowed masters to understand the separated soul in greater depth. As with chapter 4, the attention to the language used by authorities is also explored in chapter 5. It is argued that by explaining and contextualising certain formulae associated with

pain and suffering, masters claimed the support of certain authorities for their language of pain. The case study on the suffering of the separated soul in this chapter analyses in greater depth some points of conflict in a discourse which was essentially constructed around the corporeal. In this way, developments outlined in the first chapter are explained in greater detail by focusing on an area of debate which led to much contemporary concern. Indeed, interest in the suffering of the separated soul was a source of dispute between masters of theology and certain masters of arts. The dispute was only apparent, however, because, as chapter 5 explains in its second part, it was the way of describing pain and suffering for the separated soul, an issue which was contentious long before the condemnation of 1270, that provoked masters to debate it. This chapter claims that the condemned master of arts, Siger of Brabant, although clearly heretical in other respects, was misunderstood by ecclesiastical authorities over the issue of the separated soul's suffering by hell-fire.

Chapter 6 returns to ideas about the body: the damned body. This chapter picks up on strands developed in the first chapter and views them through a different filter, that of the body in hell. It shows how, through their system for explaining pain, masters used different ways of explaining the corporeal to define the body in hell. The idea of body was associated with corruptibility and death. The bodies of the damned had to remain incorruptible and yet spend all eternity suffering the pains of hell-fire. Through their careful construction of ideas about pain, it is argued, masters created a multi-layered conceptual framework about the body and corporeality. How they applied a language of suffering to the damned body

was the crucial element in its definition. This thesis thus makes a significant, original contribution to a much-debated field of research in medieval studies.[49]

The language which masters of theology developed to understand ideas about pain and suffering was not static. The different contexts in which they addressed issues of pain necessitated constant discussion and the creation of new dimensions to their thought. This involved an intricate systematisation of theories about sense perception culled from a particular group of authorities. The language which masters developed for pain was also used as a conceptual framework to explain problematic areas of theology. This framework of ideas about pain thus provides historians with a more sophisticated and complex understanding of attitudes to the body, soul, spirituality, physicality and the use of corporeal imagery in thirteenth-century intellectual circles.

[49] For example, see C.W. Bynum, *The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336* (Washington D.C., 1995); O. Cullmann, *Unsterblichkeit der Seele oder Aufstehung der Toten?* (Stuttgart, 1964).

1

Thirteenth-Century Theological Ideas about Human Pain and Suffering and the Passion of Christ

This chapter examines the way in which masters of theology discussed pain and suffering in two closely related contexts. The first part of the chapter examines the nature of human bodily suffering according to masters of theology from about 1230 to 1285. Masters asked questions about the way in which the soul and body suffered and how the suffering of each ought to be understood. They were deemed to be important questions because certain patristic authorities had been ambiguous in their use of language concerning suffering and its relationship to the soul and body. These questions came about largely because of the impact made by Aristotelian theories about the nature of the body. This chapter will enhance and expand upon recent debates about the nature of the body in the Middle Ages and offer the new dimension of intellectual attitudes to pain and the suffering body and the use of ideas about suffering to understand the nature of the human body.

The ideas which masters developed about pain and suffering were also applied in other areas of their theology. In the second part of this chapter it is argued that masters also used a technical language for suffering when they debated the humanity of Christ. Both the human and divine natures of Christ were issues of serious debate. The charge of heresy was brought to bear on groups who denied Christ's suffering. However, the way in which masters applied their ideas about pain and suffering to

Christ's suffering enabled them, it will be argued, to understand the nature of Christ's humanity. A significant degree of consensus emerged surrounding the explanation for Christ's suffering, which, in turn, led to a consensus about how human he was. The development of theories about human pain allowed masters to explain the human nature of Christ in a way which resolved the contentious theories about the relationship between his humanity and divinity.

1. Human bodily suffering

During the twelfth century, there was much speculation by intellectuals about the nature of the body and its relationship to the soul. Indeed, the relationship between soul and body has been called 'one of the fundamental issues in medieval thought'.[1] Peter Abelard, for example, was interested in the resurrection of the body and the suffering in hell caused to the souls when separated from the body. These pains he dismissed as a mystical or spiritual, rather than literal or physical.[2] Other theological inquiries explored the reasons for God's Incarnation, a tradition which was inspired by Anselm in the *Cur Deus Homo* (1095-98).[3] In the mid-twelfth century, Peter

[1] D. Luscombe, 'Peter Abelard's Carnal Thoughts', *Medieval Theology and the Natural Body*, ed. P. Biller and A.J. Minnis (York Studies in Medieval Theology, I; York, 1997), 32.
[2] *Petrus Abaelardus. Dialogus inter Philosophorum, Judaeum et Christianum*, ed. R. Thomas (Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt, 1970), ii, 2967-3014. Luscombe, 'Carnal Thoughts', 37.
[3] *Cur Deus Homo*, Opera Omnia, 6 vols., ed. F.S.Schmitt (Rome and Edinburgh,1938-68), ii, 37-133. For the debate about the Incarnation in the face of Jewish denials, see A.S. Abulafia, 'Bodies in the Jewish-Christian Debate', *Framing Medieval Bodies*, ed. S. Kay and M. Rubin (Manchester, 1994), 123.

Lombard also debated the nature of Christ's body in his book of *Sentences*,[4] but, unlike his later commentators, he did not specifically deal with the notion of suffering, nor did he investigate the notion of the human body in isolation.

In the thirteenth century, the nature of discussion about the body and its suffering was very different to that in the twelfth century. There is, of course, one important reason for this: the works of Aristotle which discussed the nature of the body were not available in the West until the early part of the thirteenth century.[5] It is clear that the reception of these works heralded profound changes for the study of theology and philosophy,[6] and particularly in relation to ideas about the union between body and soul. The thirteenth century was a time when ideas about the body and its suffering were discussed in new ways.

Which theories about the nature of the relationship between soul and body affected masters of theology in the thirteenth century? It would appear that ideas about the

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[4] *Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis Episcopi Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae* (Specilegium Bonaventurianum iv-v, 3 vols.; Grottaferrata, 1971-81.) An excellent, recent monograph on the Lombard is M.L. Colish, *Peter Lombard, I/II*, 2 vols. (Studies in Intellectual History, 41; Leiden, New York and Cologne, 1994). On the Lombard's notions of the human body and its relation to the body of Christ, see Section ii below.

[5] The key work of Aristotle which dealt with the union of body and soul (hylomorphic composition) was *De anima*. Although the translation of this work was made in about 1150 by Gerard of Cremona, few readers in the West actually obtained it. It became popular through Arabic commentaries, although Aquinas based his commentary on the translation of the Greek version almost a century after its first appearance. See M.D. Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Thought* (London, 1988), 173-4. On hylomorphic composition and its origins, see D. Hamlyn, *Sensation and Perception* (London, 1961), 17-28.

[6] Much twelfth-century philosophy was concerned with Plato. He was highly regarded because his views, especially in the *Timaeus*, accorded with what was believed about Trinity and creation. Aristotle, on the other hand, provided more precise ways of explaining theological problems. Some historians believe that the popularity of Aristotelian thought in thirteenth-century theology was due to its ability to deal with the particular, whereas platonism offered a universal explanation of Christian truth by dissociating itself from concrete reality. For this view, see G. Wieland, 'Plato or Aristotle- a

complex relationship between soul and body emerged as a result of the existence of rival theories about human body-soul relations: neoplatonic dualist theories on the one hand and the Aristotelian-based theory of hylomorphism on the other.[7] A major opponent of the Platonic theories of dualism was the Dominican master of theology, Thomas Aquinas.[8] Aquinas did not follow the neoplatonic view of people as collections of physical things. Instead he followed Aristotle, understanding the human being as a composite of soul and body, spiritual and corporeal. Aquinas pursued the notion of unity of form, where the soul is the form of the body and the body is its matter:

> Just as the body gets its being from the soul, as from its form, so too it makes a unity with this soul to which it is immediately related.[9]

Aquinas rejected the platonic idea that the body was the instrument of the soul.[10] Rather, Aquinas argued, the soul subsists in the body, because it has a natural tendency to embodiment. It thus tends towards a body and gives it the life-giving

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Real Alternative in Medieval Philosophy?', *Studies in Medieval Philosophy*, ed J.F. Wippel (Washington D.C., 1987), 71.

[7] For further information on neoplatonic theories of the relationship between body and soul, see A. Louth, *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition. From Plato to Denys* (Oxford, 1981); J. Marenbon, *Later Medieval Philosophy: An Introduction (1150-1350)* (London, 1987), esp. 96-117.

[8] The literature on Aquinas is vast. For general accounts of his life and theology see E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. L.K. Shook (London 1957); M.-D. Chenu, *Towards Understanding St. Thomas*, trans. A.-M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago, 1964); J.A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works* (Washington D.C., 1983). On his use of platonic texts see R.J. Henle, *St. Thomas and Platonism. A Study of the Plato and Platonici Texts in the Writings of St.Thomas* (The Hague, 1956).

[9] *De Anima* 2.I.234. Quoted by B. Davies, *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford, 1992), 210.

[10] 'Plato dicens animam esse in corpore sicut nauta est in navi...Hoc autem videtur inconveniens': *SCG*, ii, cap.57, 406.

force that the body requires.[11] The soul is the form of the body in so far as it is the life-giving principle.[12] Aquinas understood that humans possess powers which are not purely bodily. The soul as intellect can act independently of the body. However, it can only do so following the abstraction of received sense images:

> While the soul is joined to the body it understands by turning to sense images; it cannot even understand itself except in that it comes to be actually understanding through the species abstracted from sense images.[13]

Thus, the body was deemed integral to human understanding and perception. The fact that the soul and the body are needed together to make up a human being means that when the body dies, the human being, properly speaking, ceases to exist. Most of the powers attributed to the soul do not remain after death, although the soul itself does not perish. Aquinas stated:

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[11] 'Anima humana habens aptitudinem et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem': *ST* 1a q.76, a.1 ad.6. Aquinas was also following Augustine. In *De Civitate Dei*, Augustine quoted Marcus Varro, who states that man is neither soul alone, nor body alone, but body and soul together: *City of God against the Pagans*, 7 vols., trans. W.C. Greene (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), vi, bk. xix, ch.iii, 117.

[12] In classical Latin *anima* literally means the 'breath of life': *A Latin Dictionary*, ed. C.T. Lewis and C. Short (Oxford, 1966), 121.

[13] *ST* 1a q.98, a.2. Quoted from Davies, *Thought of Thomas*, 214. Aquinas' theory of sense perception is drawn heavily from Aristotle. Aristotle's phrase: 'nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu' is used by Aquinas in his theory of the mind being a *tabula rasa*. Aquinas believed that during the process of sense perception the organ was altered in some way. He differed from Aristotle, in that, for Aquinas, reception of a sensible without matter is not something that happens to the sense organ, but something that happens to the faculty of soul or mind. Aquinas' theory of the process of sense perception is very complicated. A concise explanation of it is as follows: the sense organ receives a *species* of the object being sensed. This causes some kind of physical change in the sense organ. A spiritual change follows which leads to the production of *phantasmata* (sensory images). The senses and intellect are linked by the *intellectus agens*, which illumines the *phantasmata*. This is called the *conversio ad phantasmata*. The active reason then abstracts the universal concept from each particular phantasm and imposes it on the passive intellect. This is how Aquinas overcame Aristotle's problem with the conversion from potentiality to actuality in the intellect. For further information, see Hamlyn, *Sensation and Perception*, 47-51.

> Certain powers, namely understanding and will are related to the soul taken on its own as their subject of inhesion, and powers of this kind have to remain in the soul after the death of the body. But some powers have the body-soul compound for subject; this is the case with all the powers of sensation and nutrition...And so it is wrong to say, as some do, that these powers remain in the soul after the dissolution of the body. And it is much more wrong to say that the acts of these powers continue in the disembodied soul, because such powers have no activity except through a bodily organ.[14]

The importance of the soul-body unit was emphasised overtly by Aquinas. His theories were affected to a large degree by the theories of Aristotle. He was also interested in understanding the nature of suffering in both the soul and body. It seems that Aquinas was aware of arguments which certain authorities had advanced concerning the nature of suffering in the soul and body and the language used to describe this suffering. Aquinas was writing at a time when understanding the nature of both soul and body and their union was being refined. The conscious attention to, and interpretation of, words which described pain and suffering was to play a large part in this process of refinement.

The language which certain authorities used when they talked about pain and suffering was a major concern for the masters. It also directly affected the masters' views about the body and its relationship to the soul. One authority whose use of language for pain appears in debates discussed in the present chapter was Aristotle. A stock formula emerged from Aristotle, which stated : 'dolor est sensus rei

[14] *ST* 1a q.77, a.8. Translation by Davies, *Thought of Thomas*, 216.

contrariae',[15] that is, *dolor*, some kind of pain, is the perception of contrary things. What this, in effect, meant to masters was that the presence of something contrary to another thing would cause the second thing to suffer. In order to explain what was to be understood by this phrase, masters had to integrate the language of their authorities with their theories about the body.

This constant tension between theories about body and soul, and the ambiguous language which some authorities used for pain and suffering was also found in certain biblical passages, as we will see below. The use of vocabulary to describe different types of suffering was to become a key concern for the masters. Ultimately, this would lead to the development of a separate language for suffering.

To sum up the position in the early part of the thirteenth century: masters were influenced on the one hand by Platonic theories which explained the body and soul as separate entities, only united together by their operations. They were also influenced on the other by the increasing impact of Aristotle, who perceived the soul and body as inseparable components of a single unit. The debates which arose surrounding body, soul and the way in which each part suffered are thus fruitful areas of research within which to analyse the notion of body and the way in which it suffered according to masters of theology in the thirteenth century. It would thus seem appropriate to identify the main debates which affected the masters' views

[15] *Nichomachean Ethics*, l.4,c.2 (1121^{a} 2-3; 1172^{b} 9 - $1175^{a}17$.) This phrase also occurs in Galen, *De sympt.causis*, l.1,c.6, (ed. Kuhn, VII, 115.) and Avicenna's *Canon*, l.1, fen.2, doctr.2, c.19.

about the human body and also which main authorities expressed notions of pain to view the way in which masters perceived the suffering of the human body.

How, then, did masters of the thirteenth century discuss pain and suffering? What issues were they interested in and why were these issues of such importance? Ultimately, was a language for suffering forged within their debates? One master of theology who asked specifically about pain was Alexander of Hales. He was Regent Master of Theology at Paris and held the first Franciscan chair there from 1231 to 1241. Alexander used the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard for his lectures on theology, by dividing the most contentious areas into distinctions for discussion. His *Glossa in quatuor libri sententiarum Petri Lombardi* was written between 1222 and 1229, while his *quaestiones disputatae* were composed prior to 1237. He died in 1245.[16] In his disputed questions, Alexander asked whether the soul is capable of suffering by its nature.[17] He replied that the soul is naturally inclined to unite to the body, and through this union, it will suffer from the body's suffering.[18] To prove the importance of this union, Alexander quoted the eighth-century monk, John Damascene, who stated that if the body is damaged, the soul itself will not be

[16] For Alexander's life, see I. Herscher, 'A Bibliography of Alexander of Hales', *Franciscan Studies*, 5 (1945), 434-54; R. Huber, 'Alexander of Hales, O.F.M.', *Franciscan Studies*, 5 (1945), 353-65; W.H. Principe, *Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto, 1967), 13-15; C. Harkins, 'Alexander of Hales', *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, ed. J. Strayer, i (New York, 1982), 148.

[17] q.10: 'Utrum anima de natura sua prima sit passibilis': *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater' qq.60-68* (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevii, xxi, vol.iii; Quaracchi, 1960), 1412-1419.

[18] 'Praeterea, anima secundum suam naturam est unibilis corpori; et propter hanc unibilitatem compatitur corpori patienti.': *ibid.*, 1417. The same conclusion is found in an earlier set of disputed questions by Alexander: 'Item, anima per naturam unibilis est corpori, angelus autem non; hanc autem differentiam ostendit Augustinus inter animam et angelum, XII Super Genesim in glossa. Et propter hanc unibilitatem compatitur anima corpori patienti; unde Damascenus: "Anima, corpore

damaged, but it will suffer with the body.[19] This emphasis on the inclination of the soul to unite with a body was to become a tenet of Franciscan thinking after Alexander in the works of Bonaventure and Matthew of Aquasparta.[20]

The soul thus had a natural inclination to union with the body. All its experiences and suffering occur by and through this union. The body is needed by the soul in its experience of suffering. Suffering, it would seem, only happens to a conjoint of both body and soul. Furthermore, this is testament to the influence of Aristotle on Alexander of Hales. Although his question does not mention any direct source, the notion of body and soul as one implicitly denies belief in Platonic theories of dualism.

Albert the Great, German Dominican and teacher of Aquinas,[21] completed his *Commentary on the Sentences* some time towards the end of the 1240s. He asked whether Christ had a soul which was capable of suffering.[22] Albert used the issue of Christ's suffering as a pretext to discuss the nature of suffering in the soul and body. Albert did not explore the dual nature of Christ as human and divine here, but rather

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inciso, ipsa non incisa, condolet et compatitur"': *Quaestiones 'antequam esset frater'* 1-33, i (Quaracchi, 1960), 228.

[19] 'Unde Ioannes Damascenus: 'Anima, corpore inciso, ipsa non incisa, condolet et compatitur'. Propter enim unionem naturam, quod est nocivum corpori, reputatur nocivum animae, et conveniens conveniens; ergo est passibilis': q.10, 1412.

[20] H.M. Beha, 'Matthew of Aquasparta's Theory of Cognition', *Franciscan Studies*, 20 (1960), 187.

[21] Useful surveys on Albert's life and thought are F.J. Kovach and R.W. Shahan (eds.), *Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1980); G. Meyer and A. Zimmermann (eds.), *Albertus Magnus: Doctor Universalis, 1280-1980* (Mainz, 1980); A. Zimmermann (ed.), *Albert der Grosse, seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 14; Berlin and New York, 1981).

[22] 'An anima Christi fuit passibilis?': *Super III Sententiarum*, Opera Omnia, ed. P. Jammy, 21 vols. (Paris, 1651), xv, d[istinctio]15, a[rticulus] 2, 150.

the human relation of body to soul. Albert employed a familiar rubric, the Passion of Christ, under which to develop his theories about human suffering.

The objections[23] which Albert advanced denying the possibility of a passible soul in Christ were heavily indebted to the theories of Aristotle. One example was Albert's assertion that there is no *dolor*, or pain, except from the action of contrary things. Christ's soul, said Albert, never had contraries and therefore could not suffer.[24] This is a direct reference to the terminology Aristotle used to describe pain. It occurs time and again in theological treatises concerned with pain and suffering. The use of this formula was to become an important element in the explanation of pain and suffering in different contexts.[25]

Albert stated in conclusion that Christ's soul and every soul in a state of mortality, that is, when it is conjoined to a body, is capable of suffering from the suffering of the body.[26] Through this union, argued Albert, there are certain movements from the body which act upon the soul and opposite movements of the soul on the body. The movements, or *motus*, of the body on the soul occur in sensing. Here the sensible *species* received by the senses are apprehensive passive powers, where *passivae* is

[23] By 'objections' it is meant the arguments which masters either put for or against a particular question before resolving the issue within the *solutio*. They are thus not evidence of a particular master's thinking. However, occasionally it is useful to examine them to discover which issues masters felt themselves compelled to resolve.

[24] 'Non est dolor nisi ex contrario agente ad dissolutionem continui vel compositi: anima Christi nihil habuit contrarium: ergo patiebatur nihil, ita quod doloret': *ibid.*

[25] For a detailed discussion about 'contraries' see Chapter 5, 195-7.

[26] 'Dicendum, quod anima Christi et omnis anima in statu mortalitatis huius quamdiu coniuncta est corpori, passibilis est compatiendo corpori, et patiendo ex corpore': Albert the Great, *III Sent.*, d.15, a.2, 150.

derived from the Greek 'patin', to receive.[27] The *species* mentioned here are the immaterial form of the object being sensed. In this first way, they have no material impact on the body or its senses.

Albert also outlined a second way in which the soul could suffer. The other movement, which involves the soul acting upon the body, is the perception of good or evil. The perception by the soul of some evil causes a passion in the sensible part of the soul to rise, which leads to *tristitia*, or sadness.[28] The third way in which the soul can suffer the sense of pain, argued Albert, is from the dissolution of the cohesion of the body and soul's union. This is caused either by an imbalance in the humours as one gets with fevers, or by violent acts, such as stabbing and wounding.[29]

Albert's conclusions to this question emphasised the importance he attached to the body and soul being united as matter to form. This, for Albert, was what constituted the individual human being. The composite of matter and form, of body and soul was the *hoc aliquid*, a something, or being. Only God was thought to be simple; all

[27] 'Sunt enim (ut dicit Philosophus) motus quidam ex corpore venientes in ipsam animam, et quidam e contrario venientes ex anima in corpus. Ex corpore autem in anima veniunt, sicut in sentiendo....quidem recipiendo in organis corporalibus species sensibiles, secundum quod sensus proprius et communis et phantasia et caetere vires apprehensivae passivae dicuntur, secundum quod pati dicitur a graeco patin, quod sonat recipere': *ibid.* For a further discussion of *species* in sense perception see L. Dewan 'St. Albert, the Sensibles and Spiritual Being', *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays*, ed. J.A. Weisheipl (Toronto, 1980), 291-320.

[28] 'Alia etiam ratione passibilis est anima iterum secundum quod passionem diffinit Damascenus, quod est motus animae suspicatione boni, vel mali. Ex hac enim suspicatione surgit passio illata parti animae sensibili quae dicitur tristitia, vel delectatio: ex apprehensione enim boni convenientis surgit delectatio, et ex apprehensione mali inconvenientis tristitia': Albert the Great, *III Sent.*, d.15, a.2, 150

[29] 'Tertio modo dicitur passio sensus doloris ex dissolvente continuum corpus coniunctum animae, sive illa dissolutio sit ex intemperantia humorum, ut in febribus. Sive per agens violenti, ut in ictibus,

other beings must necessarily be composed, that is, be a composite being.[30] In this sense, Albert applied the human meld of matter and form to the man Christ. This is more problematic than it might at first seem. Technically, he said, there are no contraries in the soul of Christ, but because the soul is part of a composite form, it can be said to suffer in this sense, but not *simpliciter*, that is, not in itself.[31] However, this is true of any human being, not just Christ. Further on, he examined Augustine's claim that the nails and sword which pierced Christ's flesh were not stronger than the soul of Christ. Albert affirmed this belief and argued further that they are not stronger than any soul, and the soul is not touched directly. The soul understands the *species* of the passion in the body and understands them as contraries to the conjoint of body and soul itself. From this understanding suffering

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et vulneribus, et huiusmodi: et hoc modo quaeritur hic de passione et sic dicimus anima[m] Christi compassibilis esse corpori': *ibid.*, 151.

[30] L. Ducharme, 'The Individual Human Being in St. Albert's Earlier Writings', *Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays*, ed. F.J. Kovach and R.W. Shahan (Norman, Oklahoma, 1980), 133-4. Other masters had problems with this theory's implications. The difficulty for Aquinas on this issue was that although he too agreed that God was absolutely simple and all creatures were composites, he faced the difficult Aristotelian principle that matter obstructs knowledge. Aquinas deemed the knowing power to be completely immaterial. His way around this conundrum was to state that a composite did not necessarily have to be composed of matter and form. Another kind of composition was possible: essence (what something is) with existence (whether something is). This explained how immaterial entities such as angels could still be composites. See, P.V. Spade, 'Medieval Philosophy', *The Oxford Illustrated History of Western Philosophy*, ed. A. Kenny (London, 1994), 91. Aristotle had taught that the mind, or the part which knows, cannot be mixed with the body: 'It is...necessary, since its understanding extends to everything, that, as Anaxogoras says, it [soul, or mind] be uncompounded with anything so that it may command, i.e. know. For what appeared inwardly would prevent and impede what was without. Hence it has no nature and is not one, except in being potent. What then is called the 'intellect' of the soul...is not, before it understands, in any act of reality. Hence it is a reasonable inference that it is not involved in the body. Were it so, it would also have some quality either hot or cold and it would have an organ, like the sensitive faculties; but in fact there is none such': *De Anima in the Version of William of Moerbeke and the Commentary of St.Thomas Aquinas*, trans. K. Foster and S. Humphries (London, 1954), 3.4.429a 24-5, 400.

[31] 'Dicendum quod verum est, quod anima in se et secundum naturam suam non habet contrarium...sed tamen coniuntum sibi habet contarium, scilicet corpus....et haec passio est ex contrario sibi, vel eius quod sibi est coniunctum: sic enim contrarium coniuncto, est contrarium sibi in hoc statu, licet non simpliciter': *ibid.*

and the sense of pain occurs. It is, thus, *per coniunctum*, through the conjoint of body and soul, that the soul suffers.[32]

Albert was in agreement with Alexander of Hales. The soul and body suffer as a unit. However, Albert was indebted explicitly to theories of sense perception from Aristotle in his question. Bodily sense perception caused a movement acting on the soul, whilst movements of the soul, like sadness, could act on the body. Albert furthered the theory of the body-soul unit suffering to explain the action of each part of that unit. This demonstrates Albert's theology of the relationship between the body and the soul, and also how important bodily suffering is to the soul's suffering. The Aristotelian theory of matter-form relationships makes the composite pivotal for Albert in his ideas about how the human body and the human Christ suffered.

According to the masters, body and soul experienced different kinds of suffering, but each had an effect on the other. The soul could only suffer on account of its relationship to the body within the composite. However, the movement of soul on body produced different pain from that caused by movement of body on soul. Masters appear to be developing a technical language for pain which enabled them to understand the complex relationship between soul and body.

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[32] 'Ad aliud dicendum secundum Augustinus quod clavus vel gladius non fuerunt fortiora quam anima Christi, nec sunt etiam fortiora quam anima alterius: sed passione facta in corpore....anima punit seipsam. Et hoc intelligitur sic: quia anima species passionum factatum in corpore apprehendit, abstrahendo ab organo tactus, et apprehendit ut contraria coniuncto sibi, et ex illa apprehensione causatur dolor ut immediata causa sensus doloris. Unde licet gladius non scindit eam: tamen ipsa dolet causato dolore ex huiusmodi speciebus apprehensis, et immediate affligens et huiusmodi species apprehensa. Et haec solutio est salvando dictum Augustinus....licet non immediate tangat gladius animam, tamen tangit per coniunctum, ut tactus dicatur secundum quod tangit species dissolventis apprehensa: et sic sequitur ipsa alteratio doloris': *ibid.*

In the third book of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, written some time between 1252 and 1256,[33] Aquinas debated whether the human soul could suffer.[34] Like Albert, Aquinas' arguments were richly imbued with quotations from Aristotle. Aquinas, however, was much more refined than Albert in his arguments about the soul suffering through the body and which of the soul's powers are used. The soul, stated Aquinas, is an incorporeal substance; like others before him, he argued that it will only suffer in as far as it is connected to the body.[35] Strictly speaking, the soul suffers according to its sensitive parts, but because these powers are not subsisting, that is, integral to the essence of the soul, but are the forms of corporeal organs, the soul does not suffer *per se* (in itself), but *per accidens* (by association) because it is the composite that suffers.[36] The suffering of the soul was thus inseparable from the suffering of the body.

Aquinas then explained exactly how the soul suffers through the body. He elucidated two kinds of sense perception. The first is concerned with the *vires apprehensivae*, the abstracting powers of the senses. In this case, the soul receives the *species* of the thing sensed and not its material form, an argument which was seen in Albert's question. The reception is therefore spiritual and so there can be nothing contrary to

[33] This dating is according to Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino*, 358.
[34] 'Utrum anima sit passibilis': *Scriptum super III Sententiarum*, ed. M.F. Moos (Paris, 1929), d.15, q.2, a.1, quaestiuncula [hereafter q*] 2, 482-7.
[35] 'Dicendum quod ex dictis de facili potest patere qualiter in anima possit esse passio. Quia cum anima sit quid incorporeum, sibi proprie non accidit pati, nisi secundum quod corpori applicatur.': *ibid.*, 484.
[36] 'Relinquitur ergo quod pati proprie sit animae secundum partem sensitivam, ut dicitur in VII Phys. Sed quia hujusmodi vires non sunt subsistentes, sed formae organorum corporalium, ideo non

the sense. It is a perfection, and as such, cannot be called suffering, for something which leads to perfection cannot cause suffering. The sensitive appetitive powers, on the other hand, are brought into motion by the action of things themselves and not their spiritual messengers. The movement is not spiritual, and there can be things which are contrary to the soul in this movement. Thus, the soul can be said to suffer from contrary things in this way; it can also experience things which are harmonious to it.[37]

When Aquinas also considered whether there can truly be said to be suffering in the intellect, he replied that there is none in this part of the soul. The soul is moved to a greater degree by affection (*affectum*) than by the intellect. Affection is moved by things according to their real properties and the soul can thus perceive whether there is contrariety or harmony. So the soul is dependent on a certain kind of sense perception which will enable it to experience suffering. It is also only properly said to suffer in as far as it is part of the human composite. Whatever is apprehended and abstracted by the intellect is harmonious, in as far as the truth of it is grasped. Therefore in the operation of the apprehensive, or intellectual powers, there is

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dicuntur pati per se, neque anima secundum eas, sed per accidens, inquantum compositum patitur, ut dicitur in I De anima': *ibid.*, 485.

[37] 'Sed quia potentiae apprehensivae sensitivae sunt tantum in recipiendo speciem- quae quidem non recipitur in sensu per modum rei, sed per modum intentionis,- ideo in operatione harum virium est quidem aliquo modo pati, quantum ad hoc quod sunt vires materiales et quantum ad hoc quod aliquid recipitur. Et propter hoc dicitur in II De anima quod sentire est pati quoddam. Sed quia sensus non movetur a sensibili secundum conditionem moventis, cum forma sensibilis non recipiatur in sensu secundum esse materiale prout est in sensibili, sed secundum esse spirituale, quod est proprium sensui- unde non habet contrarietatem ad sensum, sed est perfectio ejus, nisi secundum quod excedit proportionem sensus- ideo non proprie dicitur pati secundum has vires, nisi secundum quod excellentia sensibilium corrumpit sensum, aut debilitat. Relinquitur ergo quod passio proprie dicatur secundum vires appetitivas sensitivas, quia hae vires et materiales sunt et moventur a rebus secundum proprietatem rei, quia non est appetitus intentionis, sed rei ipsius; et secundum hoc habet res convenientiam ad animam vel contrarietatem': *III Sent.*, d.15, q.2, a.1, q[a] 2, 485.

always pleasure, whereas the operation of the affective powers can lead to either sadness (*tristitia*), or pleasure.[38]

In line with earlier masters, Aquinas followed the argument that the composite was essential to the experience of sensation and suffering. The soul only sensed things as a consequence of its relationship to the body. He developed the notion of two different kinds of sense perception which Albert used in his question. The sense information which the soul abstracts in the intellect cannot cause suffering: this is tantamount to a perfection of sense perception and is incorporeal. However, the corporeal action of suffering on the body could cause suffering in the soul also. It is the corporeal link which makes this possible. There was a clear emphasis on the body and bodily sensation. The importance of the body was emphasised as the medium which experiences and feels according to its nature.

The soul relied on the body to experience things. Ideas about the different ways in which soul and body could suffer ran parallel to masters' theories about the way in which the body was perceived. Moreover, the use of key passages from Aristotle which described suffering acted as a blueprint which masters could use to explain what they meant by corporeality and incorporeality. The language of suffering which

[38] 'Sed in viribus intellectivae partis, quamvis non sit proprie passio, quia immateriales sunt, tamen est ibi aliquid de ratione passionis.....[sed] magis recipit anima a re secundum affectum, et vehementius movetur quam secundum intellectum...Et quia movetur affectus a re secundum proprietatem rei quam res habet in se ipsa, ideo per hunc modum contingit quod res habet contrarietatem et convenientiam ad animam sed secundum quod apprehenditur ab intellectu, omnis res habet convenientiam, inquantum apprehenditur ut verum. Et ideo in operatione apprehensivae semper est delectatio, in operatione autem affectivae est delectatio et tristitia. Et sic etiam tristitia magis proprie adhuc dicitur passio, sicut et in affectu sensibili dictum est. Et sic accipitur hic passio': *ibid.*, 486.

can be identified within these questions was enhanced by the distinction between material and immaterial aspects of sense perception. Pain was still understood as a bodily experience. The application of new theories of sense perception, from the extensive use of Aristotle in their theological debates, gave masters more control over their understanding of pain and suffering.

One of Aquinas' later works, the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*,[39] composed between 1256 and 1259,[40] also described how the soul suffers through its union with the body in a series of debates about the *passiones animae*.[41] A definite progression in Aquinas' thought can be detected in one particular question.[42] Aquinas stated that it is impossible for something incorporeal to suffer in the proper sense. If *passio* pertains to the soul it is only in as far as it is joined to the body; then it only suffers *per accidens*. Whatever suffers *per se* is a body.[43] This part goes as far as his conclusion in the *Commentary on the Sentences*. However, Aquinas then explained that the soul is united to the body in two ways, first as form (*ut forma*) in its role as life-giver to the body, and second as mover (*ut motor*), in that it performs its operations through the body. In both cases the soul suffers *per accidens*, but by two different means. When a *passio* is felt in the body and it is experienced by the soul in

[39] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, *Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P.M. Edita*, xxii.1-3, 3 vols., iii, qq.21-29 (Rome, 1976).
[40] Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino*, 362.
[41] The *passiones animae* belong to man as a unified composite of soul and body. The soul is the form of the body, so it experiences the changes undergone by the body in response to each *passio*. There are eleven categories: love (*amor*) and hatred (*odium*); desire (*desiderium*) and aversion (*fuga*); pleasure (*delectatio*) and pain (*dolor*); hope (*spes*) and despair (*desperatio*); fear (*timor*) and daring (*audacia*); and anger (*ira*).
[42] 'Quomodo anima coniuncti corpori patiatur': q.26, a.2, 751-3.
[43] 'Dicendum quod proprie accipiendo passionem impossibile est aliquod incorporeum pati, ut supra ostensum est; illud ergo quod per se patitur passione proprie accepta corpus est. Si ergo passio proprie

its role as form of the body, the soul's union with the body is weakened. The body suffers and the soul suffers also because it is joined to the body. This is called the *passio corporalis*. If, however, the *passio* starts in the soul, in its role as mover (*motor*), and ends in the body, this is called the *passio animalis*. Such passions of the soul as anger and fear are experienced in this way. The result is an alteration in the body, and this alteration causes the soul to suffer *per accidens* as a result.[44]

This is clear evidence of the development in Aquinas's thought about suffering. Aristotle's philosophy of the body as form and mover plays a large part in his discussion. Aquinas was able to define the soul's links with the body in more precise ways by developing a new vocabulary for its suffering by using the terms *passio corporalis* and *passio animalis*. The development of a consistent vocabulary for the suffering of the human composite appears to have been an important means of furthering masters' understanding of the nature of the body.

In a later question, Aquinas explored what he deemed to be ambiguities in the vocabulary for pain and suffering. In the first division of the second part of his *Summa Theologiae*, composed sometime between 1269 and 1272, during his second

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dicta aliquo modo ad animam pertineat, hoc non est nisi secundum quod unitur corpori, et ita per accidens': *ibid*, 752.

[44] 'Unitur autem corpori dupliciter: uno modo ut forma, in quantum dat esse corpori vivificans ipsum; alio modo ut motor, in quantum per corpus suas operationes exercet...Dupliciter ergo passio corporis attribuitur animae per accidens: uno modo ita quod passio incipiat a corpore et terminetur in animae secundum quod unitur corpori ut forma, et haec est quaedam passio corporalis; sicut cum laeditur corpus, debilitatur unio corporis cum anima, et sic per accidens ipsa anima patitur, quae secundum suum esse corpori unitur. Alio modo ita quod incipiat ab anima in quantum est corporis motor, et terminetur in corpus, et haec dicitur passio animalis; sicut patet in ira et timore et aliis huiusmodi peraguntur per apprehensionem et appetitum animae, ad quae sequitur corporis transmutatio...Et sic corpore transmutato per aliquam alterationem, etiam ipsa anima pati dicitur per accidens': *ibid.*

Parisian regency,[45] Aquinas dealt specifically with the *passiones animae*. In one question he asked whether *tristitia* is the same thing as *dolor*.[46] He quoted Augustine who attributed *dolor* to the body.[47] However, Aquinas noted the ambiguity shown by the apostle Paul, who used *dolor* and *tristitia* synonymously:

> However the Apostle says the opposite, *My tristitia is great and dolor continues to be in my heart. Tristitia* and *dolor* are being used for the same thing.[48]

Aquinas went on to explain that suffering can be perceived by interior perception and exterior sense perception. When interior perception occurs, then there is a kind of *dolor* called *tristitia*. When exterior perception occurs, this is called *dolor*, but not *tristitia*:

> Only that *dolor* which is caused by interior perception is called *tristitia*...thus that *dolor* which is caused by exterior perception is indeed called *dolor*, but not *tristitia*...[49]

Aquinas acknowledged Augustine's use of vocabulary. *Dolor* is used most often to refer to bodily pain,[50] whereas *tristitia* can only, according to Aquinas, be applied to spiritual, interior pain. *Tristitia*, or *dolor interior*, is caused by something which is

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[45] Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino*, 361.
[46] 'Utrum tristitia sit idem quod dolor': *ST* 1a2ae q.35, a.2.
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] 'Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit, *Tristitia est mihi magna et continuus dolor cordi meo*, pro eodem utens tristitia et dolore': *ibid.* My translation.
[49] 'Ille solus dolor qui ex apprehensione interiori causatur nominatur trisititia...ita ille dolor qui ex exteriori apprehensione causatur nominatur quidem dolor non autem tristitia': *ibid.* My translation.
[50] 'Augustinus loquitur ibi quantum ad usum vocabuli, quia dolor magis usiatur in corporalibus doloribus, qui sunt magis noti quam in doloribus spiritualibus': *ibid.*, ad.1.

directly repugnant to the *appetitus*.[51] *Dolor*, caused by an evil repugnant to the body, is, through this route, also repugnant to the *appetitus*. However, although *dolor* is generally used to mean bodily pain, it is in fact the genus of which *tristitia* is a species.[52]

In a subsequent question, Aquinas asked whether exterior suffering was greater than interior.[53] In his reply, he distinguished between the cause of each type of suffering. Exterior suffering is caused by being joined to some evil which is repugnant to the body. Interior suffering, on the other hand, is caused by being joined to evil which is repugnant to the appetite. If their causes are compared, said Aquinas, it is apparent that one pertains to the appetite *per se*, whilst the other pertains to it by association. Interior suffering is caused by something which is directly repugnant to the appetite, whilst exterior suffering results from something which is repugnant to the appetite only because it is also repugnant to the body. The *per se* relationship is greater than that by association.[54] Aquinas concluded, therefore, that interior suffering was greater than exterior.

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[51] Aquinas' use of the term *appetitus* here refers to the natural inclination which humans have towards things, or away from them. In sensation, the sensory appetite is affected, but when the will desires something intellectually, the intellectual appetite is where discrimination is made. There are, however, contradictions in Aquinas' use of this term. See A. Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind* (London and New York, 1993), 59-66.

[52] 'Si vero dolor accipiatur communiter, sic est genus tristitiae, ut dictum est': *ST* 1a2ae q.35, a.2.

[53] 'Utrum dolor exterior sit maior quam interior': *ST* 1a2ae q.35, a.7.

[54] 'Causa enim doloris exterioris est malum coniunctum quod repugnat corpori: causa autem interioris doloris est malum coniunctum quod repugnat appetitui...Si ergo comparatur causa interioris doloris ad causam exterioris, una per se pertinet ad appetitum, cuius est uterque dolor: alia vero per aliud. Nam dolor interior est ex hoc quod aliquid repugnat ipsi appetitui: exterior autem dolor, ex hoc quod repugnat appetitui quia repugnat corpori. Semper autem quod est per se, prius est eo quod est per aliud': *ibid.*

In addition to complementing earlier theories on the links between body and soul, the focus of these questions moved more to the discussion of the vocabulary of suffering. Whether certain terms may be used for different types of suffering and the ambiguity introduced by authorities were points which were highlighted in the *Summa Theologiae*. Aquinas argued that certain kinds of sense perception should only be talked about with the correct terminology. By attributing certain words to physical and mental suffering within a framework of the body-soul composite, Aquinas was able to distinguish between the elements of soul and body and discuss them with greater precision. In this way, whereas the soul was only said to suffer accidentally through the body in the early part of the thirteenth century, Aquinas placed the soul above the body in terms of how intensely it suffered.

Where masters previously emphasised the importance of the composite to suffering and highlighted the indivisibility of soul and body, the process of definition of certain specific terms for interior and exterior suffering allowed the composite to be taken apart and discussed separately. Although soul and body still depended on each other for existence and sensation, a vocabulary of pain created a new dimension and framework for analysing them as separate entities. So it would appear that the development of a language for pain and suffering was integral to understanding the nature of body and soul and their relationship.

What insights about intellectual attitudes to pain and suffering may be obtained from the foregoing analysis? Masters deemed it important to discuss whether the soul and

body could suffer because both soul and body and the relationship between them were undergoing a period of revision and definition in the mid-thirteenth century. There were various spurs which made this question of particular interest. First, Aristotle's theories about the soul-body composite contradicted the Platonic belief of the soul using the body as its instrument. Such contradictions required elucidation and these newly-acquired theories gave masters an increased level of sophistication when they discussed the human composite. Second, the issue of suffering was directly pertinent to discussions of body and soul, for it was interwoven with debates about the nature of the corporeal. It was seen at the beginning that the language used to describe suffering by one key authority, Aristotle, was imbued with bodily imagery. Moreover, the language which explained human suffering potentially threatened masters' own views about corporeality. In this way, the use of language for suffering and consequently for the soul and body, required formulation to avoid ambiguity and in order that the theories masters had developed for the body and soul were not threatened.

All masters agreed that the body and soul were necessary together to experience suffering. Indeed, in the earlier part of the thirteenth century, the theory of overwhelming dependence of the soul on the composite union is striking. All masters agreed also that whatever suffered pain properly speaking was a body. However, the way in which soul and body were linked in the composite received increasing attention. Aquinas developed his ideas on this issue during his career. Although he emphasised the accidental nature of the soul's suffering in his earlier

works, the *Summa Theologiae* demonstrates the increasing interest he attached to the suffering of the soul. The evidence for this is to be seen in the development of the language of suffering. Not only does the language help Aquinas pinpoint the links between soul and body, he also gave each part of the composite its own vocabulary for suffering.

This last statement on the use of language is directly pertinent to the increasingly complex frameworks being developed by masters to view the body composite. When Aquinas applied certain sets of words to the soul and others to the body, he was effectively using language to analyse each part of the composite separately. So, in one sense the composite was viewed as an impenetrable unit; suffering in one part was experienced in the other, for example. In another sense, each part, body and soul, could be examined separately. More importantly, however, the masters developed a technical language which could be used to describe human suffering, in both physical and spiritual terms. Ideas about suffering, which previously only had physical traits attached to them, were developed to embrace the theory of the soul-body unit. Conversely, the way in which masters used the language of suffering helped clarify their understanding about the exact relationship of body to soul with greater precision. Pain was essential, therefore, to their understanding of human beings and to understanding fundamental questions about the relationship of body to soul.

2. The human suffering of Christ

The previous section has shown how masters discussed the relationship of body to soul in new and more complex ways through developing their ideas about suffering. Suffering was also integral to their theological perceptions of Christ. Christ's physical suffering on the cross had, in theological terms, redeemed the sins of mankind in a very tangible way. The humanity of Christ and the issues surrounding his Incarnation were of keen interest. However, was the union of the soul and the body in humans essentially different from that in Christ? The problem for masters was how to explain Christ's suffering in human terms when they had to confront his divinity at the same time.[55] It is worth examining the background and theories of the composition of Christ's soul and body, and how he experienced and understood things, according to thirteenth-century theology, to put the debates about Christ's suffering in their correct context. Exactly how the human and divine elements were united and functioned in Christ were topics of fierce debate. Moreover, in their examination of the suffering of Christ with reference to their theories about human suffering, the masters needed to define the human Christ with greater precision and sought greater understanding of the reasons behind the Incarnation.

[55] Theology at this time was extremely concerned with development of the relationship between humanity and divinity in Christ, and also why the Incarnation had occurred at all: D. Goergen, 'Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas on the Motive of the Incarnation', *The Thomist*, 44 (1980), 523-38.

Theologians were aware of the difficulties that the divine nature in Christ would cause when they tried to describe what knowledge he had of his own pain, where he suffered in the soul, and to what degree of intensity. In fact, opinions about how the divine and human natures were related and how they coloured explanations of Christ's suffering, were extremely varied. There is a vast secondary literature on the subject of the hypostatic union and the theories which theologians developed to explain the human and divine natures of Christ, and his different modes of knowledge.[56] It is worthwhile exploring these theories in some depth to pinpoint exactly which issues masters of theology thought were essential to the understanding of the nature of Christ. In this way, these earlier theories can be usefully compared to the debates about the suffering of Christ in which masters took part.

Different theories about the hypostatic union and the nature of Christ emerged in the twelfth century, the main ones appearing in the *Sententiae* of Peter Lombard.[57] The

[56] V-M. Pollet, 'L'union hypostatique d'après saint Albert-le-Grand', *Revue Thomiste*, 38 (1933), 505-32; 689-724; F. Haberl, *Die Inkarnationslehre des heiligen Albertus Magnus* (Freiburg i.B., 1939); A. Vugts, *La grâce d'union d'après St. Thomas d'Aquin: essai historique et doctrinal* (Tilburg, 1946); J. Rohof, *La sainteté substantielle de Christ dans la théologie scolastique: histoire du problème* (Fribourg, 1952); A.M. Landgraf, 'Das Wissen der Seele Christi' in: *Dogmengeschichte der Früscholastik*, 2.2 (Regensburg, 1954); L.S. Vaughan, *The Acquired Knowledge of Christ according to the Theologians of the 12th and 13th Centuries* (Rome, 1957); W.J. Forster, *The Beatific Knowledge of Christ in the Theology of the 12th and 13th Centuries* (Rome, 1958); H-M Diepen, 'L'existence humaine du Christ en métaphysique thomiste', *Revue Thomiste*, 58 (1958), 197-213; W. Breuning, *Die Hypostatische Union in der Theologie Wilhelms von Auxerre, Hugos von St.Cher und Rolands von Cremona* (Trier, 1962); W.H. Principe, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century*, 4 vols. (Toronto, 1963-75); J.C. Murray, *The Infused Knowledge of Christ in the Theology of the 12th and 13th Centuries* (Windsor, Ontario, 1963); E. Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilgeschichte: Eine theologische Untersuchung der Summa Halensis (Alexander von Hales)* (München, 1964); J.T Ernst, *Die Lehre der hochmittelalterlichen Theologen von der vollkommenen Erkenntnis Christi: Ein Versuch zur Auslegung der Klassischer Dreiteilung: Visio Beatifica, scientia infusa und scientia acquisita* (Freiburg, 1971); W.H.Principe, 'St. Thomas on the Habitus-Theory of the Incarnation', *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974 Commemorative Studies*, 2 vols., i (Toronto, 1974), 381-418.

[57] *Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis Episcopi Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae*, (Specilegium Bonaventurianum iv-v, 3 vols.; Grottaferrata, 1971-81.)

issues which faced theologians about Christ centred around the main question *cur deus homo*? However, there was more than the soteriological concern that Anselm had developed in his work;[58] beginning with Peter Lombard in the twelfth century, theologians questioned whether there was a two-fold being in Christ; whether the divine nature could become flesh; if Christ was a single person or many; and ultimately whether Christ could be understood as a person at all.[59]

Peter Lombard had distinguished three theories of union in the person of Christ.[60] It is worth examining these theories in some detail, for they are central to later theological ideas about how Christ possessed knowledge and experience. The three theories have been dubbed by modern theologians the *Assumptus* theory, the *Subsistence* theory and the *Habitus* theory.[61] The *Assumptus* theory essentially meant that Christ possessed the substance of a man, that is, a complete composite of

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[58] *Cur Deus Homo*, Opera Omnia, 6 vols., ed. F.S.Schmitt (Rome and Edinburgh,1938-68), ii, 37-133.

[59] Breuning, *Hypostatische Union*, 15; Diepen, 'L'existence humaine du Christ', 197-8. On earlier ideas about the human nature of Christ, see A.-M. Dubarle, 'La science humaine de Christ selon Saint Augustine', *RSPhTh*, 29 (1940), 244-63.

[60] 'An Christus secundum quod homo est sit persona vel aliquid...Ex utraque parte quaestionis argumenta concurrunt. Quod enim persona sit, his edisserunt rationibus: Si secundum quod homo aliquid est, vel persona, vel substantia, vel aliud est; sed aliud non; ergo persona vel substantia. Sed si substantia est, vel rationalis, vel irrationalis; sed non est irrationalis substantia, ergo rationalis. Si vero secundum quod homo est rationalis substantia, ergo persona, quia haec est definitio personae: 'Substantia rationalis individuae naturae'. Si ergo secundum quod homo est aliquid, et secundum quod homo persona est. Sed e converso, si secundum quod homo persona est vel tertia in Trinitate, vel alia; sed alia non; ergo tertia in Trinitate persona. At si secundum quod homo, persona est tertia in Trinitate, ergo Deus. Propter haec inconvenientia et alia, quidam dicunt Christum secundum hominem non esse personam nec aliquid, nisi forte 'secundum' sit expressivum unitatis personae. 'Secundum' enim multiplicem habet rationem: aliquando enim exprimit conditionem vel proprietatem naturae divinae vel humanae, aliquando unitatem personae; aliquando notat habitum, aliquando causam. Cuius distinctionis rationem diligenter lector animadvertat atque in sinu memoriae recondat, ne eius confundatur sensus cum de Christo sermo occurrerit': *Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae*, (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum v, ii; Grottaferrata, 1981), liber iii, d.10, cap.1, 72-3. See Colish, *Peter Lombard*, i, 400-1.

[61] Breuning, *Hypostatische Union*, 20.

body and soul, which began to assume the nature of God. Two natures remained, but the substance of Christ was not composed of two natures. [62] This theory was upheld by Hugh of St. Victor.[63]

Adherents to the *Subsistence* theory, on the other hand, believed that the natures of divinity and humanity formed the composition of a single substance in Christ. Christ was believed to have been a person from all eternity and from the Incarnation became a man and thus a composite. The main problem which arose with this theory was that if Christ's human nature was a substance (*aliquid*), then he would have been a human person.[64] This conclusion was drawn because much of theology about what a human person comprised was based on the theory of human nature advanced by Boethius where the person was thought to comprise a single, rational nature. Thus, a person was supposed to represent one substance, not two.[65]

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[62] N.M. Haring, 'The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée, Bishop of Poitiers (1142-54)', *Mediaeval Studies*, 13 (1951), 1-40. Gilbert de la Porrée professed belief in the *Habitus* theory until, like the twelfth-century theologian John of Cornwall, he renounced this belief. On John of Cornwall: E. Rathbone, 'John of Cornwall: A Brief Biography', *RTAM*, 17 (1950), 46-60; N.M. Haring, 'The *Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam tertium* of John of Cornwall', *Mediaeval Studies*, 13 (1951), 253-300; Breuning, *Hypostatische Union*, 20ff. Secondary works tend to refer to the three main theories as 'theories one, two and three', following the order I have cited above.

[63] 'Considerandum vero est quod cum verbum et homo una sit persona in Christo; recte tamen per se dicimus verbum est persona; et iterum recte per se dicimus, homo est persona. Et recte dicimus, quod simul homo et verbum non duae sunt sed una persona. Quia enim verbum et ante assumptum hominem persona fuit; et post assumptum hominem persona fuit; et post assumptum hominem persona esse non desinit, ideo recte per se dicimus verbum est persona': *De Sacramentis*, ii, 1 *PL* 176, 411.

[64] Haring, 'Gilbert de la Porrée', 32-3.

[65] 'Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia': Boethius, *Liber de persona et duabus naturis*, c.iii, *PL* 64, 1343. Colish notes that Boethius presented theologians of the twelfth century with many problems because he advanced six different ways of defining human nature: *Peter Lombard*, i, 92.

The problems that the first two theories created engendered the development of the *Habitus* theory which held sway amongst theologians for some time. This third theory denied the union of body and soul in Christ that would form a man's substance, for this would entail the creation of a human person. The body and soul were said to cover the Word, just as a piece of clothing covers a person.[66] Hence the use of the term *habitus* to describe this theory. In the Aristotelian sense, the human nature of Christ was related to the Word like a *habitus* is related to a substance.[67]

Masters were clearly at the centre of debate surrounding these different theories. For example, in terms of his response to the various theories of the hypostatic union, Aquinas began by defending the second theory, although his thought changed over time. In the *De Unione Verbi Incarnati*, written around 1272, Aquinas argued that there was one *esse* in Christ *simpliciter*, but two *secundum quid*. Christ was one because of the unity of the supposit, or hypostasis and two because of his two natures, the human and the divine.[68] However, by the time Aquinas was writing the *tertia pars* of the *Summa Theologiae*, he had changed his mind. No longer was there an *esse* in Christ *secundum quid*. There was only to be one *esse*, and the Word had

[66] Breuning, *Hypostatische Union*, 23; Haring, 'Gilbert de la Porrée', 34-5.

[67] Habitus is one of the Aristotelian *kategoriai* designating a kind of quality of a thing, which could include its natural capacity, colour, or emotion: Aristotle, *The Categories*, ed. H.P. Cook (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), ch.viii, 63-79. The phrase is also linked to the Pauline text: 'Habitus inventus est ut homo': *Paul's Letter to the Philippians* 2:7. This was expanded to a greater degree by Peter Lombard: '*Habitu inventus est ut homo*, manifeste ostendit Deum dici factum esse hominem vel esse hominem secundum habitum...Deus enim filius semetipsum exinanivit, non formam suam mutans, sed formam servi accipiens; neque conversus aut transmutatus in hominem, amissa incommutabili stabilitate, sed in similitudine hominum factus est ipse susceptor, verum hominem suscipiendo, et habitu inventus est ut homo': *Sententiae in IV Libris distinctae*, lib.3, d.6, cap.6, 56-7.

[68] Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas*, 310-12; Diepen, 'L'existence humaine', 197-202. Diepen says that the particular question where Aquinas defines the *simpliciter* against the *secundum quid*, was a *reportatio* and therefore not necessarily what Aquinas believed. However, there is no evidence to suggest that *reportationes* of a certain master are **not** the conclusions of that master either.

been subsumed into God-created human nature. Furthermore, Aquinas was vehemently opposed to the *Habitus* theory. It had already been condemned at the Council of Tours in 1170 by Alexander III, who had once put his faith in it.[69] Aquinas attacked the *habitus* theory on the basis that it denied the existence of Christ as an *aliquid* and relegated him to something qualitative.[70] He argued that those who deny the humanity of Christ are heretics because if the soul and body are not united to form a human substance (*aliquid*) then this would mean that Christ was divine substantially, but human accidentally.[71]

Charges of heresy played an important role in determining which questions were asked about the nature of Christ. One major reason for the care taken by masters over these various theories was to prevent the recurrence of various branches of monophysite heresies. The most well known of these was probably Eutychianism.[72] This heresy held that there is only one nature (*physis*) in Christ after the hypostatic union. Exponents of this heresy were mainly keen to avoid admitting that there were two persons in Christ, as opposed to two natures, which would lead to the charge of

[69] Haring, 'Gilbert de la Porrée', 37; The text of the council can be found in Mansi, xxii, 119-20. John of Cornwall describes the action of Alexander III: 'Item Papa Alexander IIIus precipit in quadam decretali *Cum Christus* quod quilibet qui negauerit Christum esse aliquid secundum quod homo, excommunicetur': Rathbone, 'John of Cornwall', *RTAM*, 17 (1950), 52.

[70] 'Ut quidam dicunt, opinionem eorum qui dicebant Christum, secundum quod est homo, non esse quid, sed qualiter se habens': *III Sent.*, d.2, expositio textus. See Principe, 'St. Thomas on the Habitus Theory', 382.

[71] 'Differt etiam a primis duabus quantum ad comparationem harum duarum substantiarum ad tertiam; quia ponit has duas substantias conjunctas Verbo accidentaliter, sicut vestis conjungitur homini, et sicut Angelus assumit corpus, ut in eo videatur': *III* Sent., d.10, a. q., 218. See Principe, 'St. Thomas on the Habitus Theory', 384.

[72] Eutyches was a fifth-century monk from Constantinople who embroiled himself in theological controversy to avoid the spread of Nestorianism. He was condemned for his heresy at the Council of Chalcedon in 451. See G. Owens, 'Eutychianism', *NCE*, vol.5, 642-3.

Nestorianism.[73] However, accusations of heresy were also made against those who claimed that Christ's nature meant that he could not suffer. The *Summa Halensis*, or Halesian *Summa*, attributed to Alexander of Hales, though not authored by him,[74] draws attention to some early heresies which claimed that Christ assumed a body without a human soul, so that he could not experience suffering. This was one belief of Arianism. Aquinas attacked a number of heretical positions, attributing to them the taint of Arianism. However, in many cases, it was just convenient shorthand for positions that contradicted the faith.[75]

In the early thirteenth century, there was a much more present danger from another type of heresy, which denied the possibility of Christ's suffering: Catharism. Its doctrines denied the possibility that Christ suffered in the flesh and that Christ was divinely created.[76] This led preachers such as Jacques de Vitry to compile sermons emphasising the passibility of Christ's soul.[77] In addition, treatises against the

[73] Also a fifth-century heretic, Nestorius distinguished between the human and divine natures of Christ without denying their union. See 'Nestorianism', *NCE*, vol. 10, 346-7.

[74] *Alexandri de Hales Summa Theologica*, 4 vols.(Quaracchi, 1924-1948). On the development of the *Summa* and the former view, now discredited, that it immediately fell into disuse upon its compilation, see M. Gorce, 'La somme théologique d'Alexandre de Hales est-elle authentique?', *New Scholasticism*, 5 (1931), 1-72. On the manuscript tradition surrounding the *Summa* and the importance this held for its uses, see *Alexandri de Hales Summa Theologica*, iv, Liber Tertius, Prolegomena, xxx-xxxi.

[75] P.Worrall, 'St. Thomas and Arianism', *RTAM*, 23 (1956), 208-59; 24 (1957), 45-100.

[76] Later on in the century Raymond de l'Aire of Tignac gave a graphic account of Christ's conception. According to this Cathar peasant, Christ was created 'through fucking and shitting, rocking back and forth and fucking, in other words through the coitus of a man and a woman, just like the rest of us': E. Le Roy Ladurie, *Montaillou: Cathars and Catholics in a French Village, 1284-1324*, trans. B. Bray (London, 1978), 144. See M.D. Lambert, *The Cathars* (Oxford, 1998), esp. 25-31.

[77] 'Contra hereticorum perfidiam qui Cristum uere incarnatum et uere passum negant: Dicunt igitur Patareni [i.e. Cathars] Cristum non uere incarnatum, nec uere passum, contra quos Iohannis in epistola canonica: Qui negat Cristum in carne uenisse, hic est anticristus. Et ipse Cristus ait: Palpate et uidete quoniam [Vulgate= quia] spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me uidetis habere. Et Apostolus ait de Cristo: Qui factus est ei ex semine Dauid secundum carnem. Cum autem dixerit Cristus: Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem, patet quod habuit animam. Quomodo autem fatigatus

Cathars were compiled by inquisitors and the claim that Christ had not suffered for human sins appeared among the list of condemned, heretical positions.[78] The issue of heresy still seems to have been a concern for masters in the middle of the thirteenth century. In his Commentary on the third book of *Sentences*, Bonaventure argued that Christ had flesh capable of experiencing real pain, or *dolor*.[79] He then stated that certain heretics repeat the ancient error of the Saracens that although Christ was seen to be suffering, he did not actually have *dolor* and the sense of suffering.[80] If this is so, argued Bonaventure, it not only destroys faith in Christ, but renders void any chance of human redemption. If Christ did not actually suffer, then he is not a mediator, but a deceiver.[81] Exactly who Bonaventure referred to as heretics here, is not clear.

The issue of Christ's human nature and how it was linked to and affected his divine nature was clearly a subject of unresolved debate and also an area which provoked

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[fo.147^{rb}] esset ex itinere, nisi ueram humanitatem haberet? Certum est enim quod apud diuinitatem non est transmutacio nec uicissitudinis obumbracio.': Jacques de Vitry, *Sermones feriales et communes*, Liège, Université de Liège, Centre d'Information et de Conservation des Bibliothèques, MS 347, ff.147ra-47^{rb}. This is an extract from a collection of sermons by Jacques de Vitry, currently being edited by Dr Carolyn Muessig in the Department of Theology at the University of Bristol. I am indebted to her for this reference.

[78] See, in particular, Moneta of Cremona, *Adversus Catharos et Valdenses Libri Quinque* (Rome, 1743), esp. 256-7. Moneta of Cremona was a Dominican friar who composed his treatise in 1241 and apparently gained fame from it. He was a professor at the University of Bologna and may also have been an inquisitor. See W.L. Wakefield and A.P. Evans, *Heresies of the High Middle Ages. Selected Sources Translated and Annotated* (New York and London, 1969), 307-29.

[79] 'In ipso [Christo] enim fuit caro passibilis et perforabilis...fuit etiam virtus sentiendi, secundum quam anima compatitur corpori laesio': *III Sent.*, d.16, a.1,q.1: 'Utrum in Christo fuerit vera passio doloris', 345-7.

[80] 'Nam si aliquis aliter dicat, secundum quod quidam haeretici dicunt, et est error antiquus Saracenorum, quod Christus, etsi videretur pati et dolore, non tamen veraciter habuit': ibid., 346.

[81] 'Non solum evacuat fidem Christi et Christi Evangelium, sed etiam evacuat redemptionem nostram et dicit, Christum non esse Christum': *ibid.*

accusations of heresy. Understanding Christ's humanity and his suffering were thus issues which were closely linked.

i. Christ's human nature and suffering

The following three questions demonstrate that there were two ways in which Christ's human nature was discussed: directly in terms of his nature, and in terms of his suffering. What analysis of the two different kinds of question intends to show is that describing Christ's nature in terms of his suffering displays remarkably less ambiguity than discussing his nature in terms of the hypostatic union. This will be followed up in the next section with a more in-depth study of Christ's human and divine natures specifically found in questions about the suffering of Christ's soul. When masters debated the way in which Christ suffered, they discussed whether he suffered in the way they understood humans to suffer. This was the crunch where their theories of soul-body interaction and union confronted their faith.

Albert the Great examined the nature of Christ within a traditional framework: the nature of the union between humanity and divinity. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, he debated whether Christ took on the common, that is, human, species.[82] Albert stated that in Christ there is a twofold composition: the first is natural and the second by the grace of union to the divine. One is also proper and the other

[82] 'An in Domino Iesu est communem speciem accipere?': *III Sent.*, d.2, a.5, 15-16.

improper, in terms of calling it a union.[83] The composition which is properly a union is the union of soul and body. The result of this union is what Albert terms the *forma totius*, which is what constitutes man (*homo*), or humanity if it is referred to in the abstract.[84] Therefore, Christ was a true *homo*, or part of the human species in the sense that he had this natural composition and is one being, or supposit, in the human species.[85]

However, although Christ was part of the human species, the divine composite is not really a composite in human terms, argued Albert. It is only a composite to the extent that there is one position, or idea, related to another. He explained this phrase in the following way: in the case of Christ, his whole human nature was related to his divinity. However, one defining characteristic of every composite is its imperfection in composition. The divine cannot partake in such a compositional imperfection. Albert's explanation is rather unclear on this point, but it seems that he understood the union between human and divine natures to be by some sort of association. In any case, it is not strictly a proper composite union.[86]

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[83] 'In Domino Iesu...quod intelligantur in Christo esse duae compositiones, quarum una est naturalis, alia gratia unionis': *ibid.*, 15

[84] 'Propria vocatur compositio prima, quae est ex anima et corpore...et hanc compositionem sequitur forma totius quae est homo, vel humanitas si abstractiue liceat loqui de ipsa': *ibid.*

[85] 'Et talem consequentem formam habuit Dominus Iesus propter compositionem naturalem, propter quam est verus homo, et suppositum unum in specie hominis': *ibid.*

[86] 'Alia autem compositio est in Christo, quae non vere compositio est nisi compositio exponatur, quod sit unius cum altera positio et haec est totius humanae naturae cum deitate...Et hoc ideo oportet ponere quia omnis componentis ratio, est ratio partis et imperfecti respectu formae compositionis: divinitas autem nec in se nec posita cum alia potest cadere in rationem partis et imperfecti: unde ipsa non est componens aliquod proprie, sed posita secum trahit in aliquem actum sui suppositi: et ideo humana natura posita secum in supposito fuit per societatem suppositi diuinae naturae': *ibid.* The use of the term *ratio* here is problematic. Ducharme suggests that it may mean 'ultimate reality', in that the *forma partis* gives the ultimate reality and being to the composite: I. Ducharme, 'The Individual Human Being in St. Albert's Earlier Writings', *Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays*, ed. F.J. Kovach and R.W. Shahan (Norman, Oklahoma, 1980), 137.

This question shows the difficulty masters had in explaining Christ's human nature. On the one hand, they wanted to portray Christ as a real member of the human species, but his divinity made the proper union of the composite impossible. So the body of Christ was similar to the human body in one respect, but different in another. The theory of composition determined both these similarities and differences. Like humans, Christ had a kind of composite which was based on the union of body and soul. Unlike humans, his second form of composition was the union of human and divine natures. Distinguishing more than one level of union between body and soul permitted discussing Christ's humanity and divinity simultaneously.

In his Commentary on Lombard's *Sentences*, completed in the early 1250s, the Franciscan master Bonaventure of Bagnoregio[87] considered the union of Christ's body and soul in relation to the suffering he felt in his soul. He debated whether Christ's suffering was more intense in the sensitive or rational part of his soul.[88] Bonaventure distinguished between the *dolor passionis* of Christ and the *dolor compassionis*. The former was experienced more by the sensitive part of Christ's soul, whilst the latter was to a greater degree in its rational part. Bonaventure went on to explain that the *dolor passionis* begins in the flesh and reaches the soul

[87] Important introductions to Bonaventure are: J.G. Bougerol, *Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure* (New Jersey, 1964); E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure*, trans. I. Trethowan and F.J. Sheed (London, 1938); J.F. Quinn, *The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy* (Toronto, 1973).

[88] 'Utrum dolor fuerit intensior in parte rationali animae Christi, an in parte sensuali': *III Sent.*, d.16, a.2, q.3, 357-9.

through the sensitive part first and then attacks the other powers, whereas the *dolor compassionis* starts in the reason and is experienced subsequently by the sensitive part of the soul.[89] Bonaventure concluded that the *dolor compassionis* of Christ is greater than his *dolor passionis*. This is because Christ chose to be separated from his body rather than see man separated from God. The other sign of his great suffering was that he wept for the sins of mankind, but did not weep for the physical pains which were inflicted upon him.[90]

Although this question does not tackle precisely the same issue as Albert's question about whether Christ was part of the human species, the definition of the union between body and soul through suffering explains Bonaventure's thought on how 'human' Christ was. In terms of his suffering, then, Christ experienced pain in a similar way to humans. Suffering beginning in the body was also felt in the soul, whilst internal suffering emanated outwards to have an effect on the body.

The nature of Christ was thus described by his suffering. The two different terms used for different types of pain in Christ are crucial for they are analogous to the terms used to describe the two kinds of human suffering. The *dolor passionis* can be compared with the *passio corporalis*, which Aquinas also used in relation to human

[89] 'In Christo duplex dolor fuit...Nam dolor passionis et carnis primo attingebat animam secundum sensualitatem, et deinde secundum alias vires. Dolor vero compassionis primo erat in ratione, et ex ratione redundabat in sensualitatem': *ibid.*, 358.

[90] 'Unde multo plus compassio Christi excessit aliorum compassiones quam passio passiones, sicut fuit in eo maior excellentia dilectionis quam passionis respectu aliorum...quod maluit animam suam a corpore separari, quam quod nos essemus a Deo separati. Aliud vero signum est, quod flevit pro peccatis nostris, sed non flevit pro poenis corporis sui': *ibid.*, 359.

suffering,[91] and likewise the *dolor compassionis* and the *passio animalis* are comparable. This suggests very strongly that the ideas used to understand human suffering were also used to explain the nature of Christ.

It has already been seen above which theories of the hypostatic union Aquinas accepted and rejected at various points in his career - in his *Sentence* Commentary, for example. In a different work, Aquinas asked about the nature of Christ with reference to his human passions. After debating and discussing the different passions of the soul, Aquinas then asked whether such passions were in Christ.[92] He argued that these passions are in sinners in one way, in the just in another, and in other ways in the perfect and the imperfect. They are also in Christ the man in one way, and in the first man and the beatified in another. They are not, however, in God or the angels, for they have no sensitive appetite, which is the *motus*, or movement behind these passions.[93] What Aquinas seems to have been arguing was that, as a man, Christ will experience these passions of the soul in some way.

Furthermore, argued Aquinas, the passions of *dolor*, *tristitia* and *timor* and all those passions which are concerned with evil cause more suffering than those which are concerned with good, such as joy and love. He added later on that Christ did not only possess the passions related to goodness, but also those related to evil because

[91] See above, 38.
[92] 'Utrum huiusmodi passiones in Christo fuerint': *De Veritate*, q.26, a.8, 774-78.
[93] 'Dicendum quod passiones istae aliter sunt in peccatoribus, aliter in iustis et perfectis et imperfectis, aliter in Christo homine, aliter in primo homine et beatis; in angelis enim et Deo omnino non sunt, quia appetitiva sensibilis in eis non est, cuius sunt motus huiusmodi passiones': *ibid.*, 775.

he had a body which was capable of suffering. In this way, Christ could have possessed the passion of fear and sadness from imagining harm done to him.[94]

In the same way that Bonaventure had done for Christ before him, Aquinas used the context of the passions of the soul, which included pain, to discuss his nature. This demonstrates that there were other means than the theories used to discuss the hypostatic union to understand the nature of Christ. The emphasis appears to have centred around aspects of his humanity. Pain and suffering played a central part in clarifying this.

Defining Christ's nature was clearly a crucial element in theological debate. The theories devised to explain the nature of the hypostatic union are testament to this. However, the theories themselves had led to inconclusive solutions, and opinions were divided about them. Masters used other ways in which to discuss the nature of Christ. One important area, it appears, was how Christ suffered or experienced human passions.

In some respects it was argued that Christ possessed human nature and a human body. This was further defined by explanation of the way in which his body suffered. The vocabulary of suffering created for Christ of the *dolor passionis* and *dolor compassionis* functioned in the same way as *passio corporalis* and *passio*

[94] 'Et inde est quod dolor et tristitia et timor et aliae huiusmodi passiones quae sunt respectu mali habent rationem passionis magis quam gaudium et amor et alia huiusmodi quae sunt respectu boni...Sed hoc interest quod in Christo non solum fuerunt passiones respectu boni, sed etiam respectu

animalis in humans. This section demonstrates that ideas about suffering could be used to elucidate Christ's human nature and supplement other kinds of theory. Explaining Christ's suffering, it seemed, made the differences between his human and divine natures more clear-cut.

ii. Conflict between Christ's human suffering and his divinity

In the previous sub-section it was shown how masters employed notions of suffering to understand the nature of Christ in different ways. However, they needed also to confront Christ's union with the divine. The difficulties which masters faced in expressing the union between human and divine natures in Christ were closely allied to the problems of accurately clarifying the nature of his union to the divine. The following section thus explores the idea that masters engaged in debate about whether pain could reach the superior part of Christ's reason, where he was joined to the divine, in order that they could distinguish between and explain the complex relationship within the hypostatic union. It is further argued that ideas about pain were indispensible for the masters as a means by which to debate and ultimately comprehend both the humanity and divinity of Christ.

Debates surrounding the suffering of Christ in the superior part of his soul obviously caused the nature of the soul itself to be debated. The Dominicans and Franciscans had differing ideas about the soul's composition, including the thorny issue of the role of the reason, or rational soul. The Franciscans almost without exception upheld

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mali; habebat enim corpus passibile, et ideo ex imaginatione nocivi naturaliter passio timoris et

a theory of plurality of forms in the soul. That is, they believed the human soul to comprise vegetative, sensitive and rational forms. [95] Aquinas and Albert the Great, on the other hand, held that there was only one substantial form in the human soul. It was united to prime matter to form the human composite. This theory originated in Aristotle and also Avicenna.[96] Apart from this difference over forms, all masters believed that the rational part of the soul existed on two levels. First was the *ratio superior* which considered eternal things and whose object was contemplation. It was directed towards the ultimate understanding of the physical and spiritual cosmos and its main goal was *sapientia*. The *ratio inferior* was understood to be concerned with concrete things, things of which knowledge was immediate and temporal. Its object was *scientia*.[97] So the reason was concerned with two different types of experience or knowledge: the eternal and the worldly. Although much has been made of the differences between Dominicans and Franciscans over the issue of the unity or multiplicity of forms in the soul,[98] the distinction between inferior and superior parts of the reason was a much more significant issue for masters discussing Christ's suffering and whether his suffering was human. So when masters disputed the nature of suffering in Christ's soul, they were also establishing their theories about the human soul and where it was related to the divine soul in Christ.

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tristitiae et huiusmodi in eo poterant esse': *ibid.*, 776.

[95] D.A. Callus, 'Origins of the Problem of Unity of Form', *The Thomist*, 24 (1961), 258.

[96] *Ibid.*

[97] M.-D. Chenu, 'Ratio Superior et Inferior: Un cas de philosophie chrétienne', *RSPhTh*, 29 (1940), 84-9, at 85. Aquinas debated whether there existed a superior and inferior part to the soul: 'Utrum ratio superior et inferior sint diversae potentiae': *De Veritate*, q.15, a.2, 483-89.

[98] See D.A. Callus, 'The Problem of the Plurality of Forms in the Thirteenth Century: The Thomist Innovation', *L'homme et son destin d'après les penseurs du moyen âge, Actes du Premier Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale 1958* (Louvain and Paris, 1960), 577-85.

Many masters appear to have been interested in the way in which Christ suffered in his soul. For example, Alexander of Hales debated whether the soul of Christ was capable of suffering in all its parts.[99] He divided passion into three forms: joy; inordinate joy; and a punitive form.[100] The superior reason can be considered in two ways, said Alexander: of its nature, that is, in as far as it is a power of the soul in itself and joined to a body; and as reason, that is, in as far as it understands through choice and consideration. If the superior reason of Christ is considered *ut natura*, then it had the possibility of suffering. But his superior reason *ut ratio* is necessarily disposed to joy, from its union with God.[101] In his *Gloss on the Sentences*, Alexander argued that punitive passion, which he called *tristitia*, or sadness, is not present in the superior part of Christ's soul, for this part of the soul is involved in the continual contemplation of God. *Tristitia* is present in the inferior part of the reason only.[102]

Alexander thus considered that the suffering which he termed *tristitia* was not present in the superior part of Christ's soul, but only the inferior part. The division

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[99] 'An passibilis anima Christi secundum omnem sui partem': *Quaestiones 'antequam esset frater'*, q.16, disp. ii, membrum 3, 244-7.

[100] 'Respondeo: Passio dicitur multipliciter. Uno modo dicitur passio gaudium; alio modo gaudium inordinatum; tertio modo dicitur poenalitas. Secundum ergo quod passio gaudium dicitur, possibilis fuit ad passionem secundum omnem vim animae suae Christus; et sic dicitur passio a 'patin', quod est informatio': *ibid.*, 245-6.

[101] 'Superior portio rationis consideratur dupliciter: quia ut est 'natura', scilicet ut est quaedam potentia animae in se, secundum se carni unita, et apprehendens ex cognitione innata....Vel dicitur ratio ut 'ratio', scilicet quando apprehendit cum electione et deliberatione. Dico ergo quod ratio superior in Christo, ut natura fuit possibilis ad quoddam pati; sed ratio ut ratio disposita fuit ad passibilitatem quae est gaudium; vel non tantum etiam disposita, sed habuit necessitatem ad gaudium, propter unionem cum deitate': *ibid.*

[102] 'Dicendum quod Christus non habuit tristitiam secundum superiorem partem rationis, quoniam secundum illam continue contemplabatur Deum patrem; sed habuit tristitiam secundum partem rationis inferiorem': *Glossa in IV Sententiarum in librum tertium* (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica, xiv; Quaracchi, 1954), 152.

of parts of the soul allowed him to explain both the presence of suffering and its lack due to Christ's union with the divine. The language which masters used to understand pain was thus applied to the soul. The functions of the different parts of the human soul enabled masters to explain Christ's suffering in one part and his joy from union to God in another.

Albert the Great advanced the thesis that the superior reason and the inferior reason were divided;[103] the superior part considered some of the suffering, whilst the inferior part considered other parts of the suffering.[104] It should also be pointed out here, however, that despite treating a question which other masters had discussed, Albert was obliged to address this issue on account of an external influence. He stated that it was preached by a certain abbot that Christ's soul was not capable of experiencing suffering in its superior part. Moreover, Albert claimed that this abbot was duly condemned for heresy in Paris by the university of masters.[105] So the issue concerning Christ's suffering and the superior part of his soul was evidently a matter of serious contention.

[103] 'An anima Christi secundum se totum sit passibilis?': *III Sent.*, d.15, a.3, 152.

[104] 'Ad aliud dicendum, quod hoc non est necessarium quia licet tota patiatur, ut est natura hominis: non tamen patiuntur omnes vires, ita quod ferantur ad considerationem passionis ut occupentur et detineantur circa illam: quia per hanc considerationem vires divisae sunt, et quaedam feruntur in superiora, quaedam autem in inferiora': *ibid.* See Haberl, *Die Inkarnationslehre*, 127-39.

[105] 'Dico, quod anima secundum se totam passibilis est in corpore: fuit enim praedicatum, quod Christi anima non fuisset passa secundum partem superiorem a quodam abbate: sed Pariis ab universitate Magistrorum pro haeresi condemnatum est': *III Sent.*, d.15, a.3, 151-2.

Bonaventure asked the same question as those masters described above,[106] but argued it in slightly different terms. Bonaventure stated that the common position of the masters was that the suffering of Christ did not only remain in his senses, or in the inferior reason, but extended to the superior reason. In the same way as human souls are affected in all their parts, Christ's soul, when joined to his body, would suffer completely, even in the superior part, explained Bonaventure. However, Christ was also able to experience the joy of fruition (with God) in the superior part of his soul following his union with God. Bonaventure agreed that it is difficult to understand how there can be joy and pain in the same part of Christ's soul at the same time.[107]

Bonaventure broke down his explanation of this difficult concept into three parts. First, Christ's joy of fruition and *dolor passionis* are not contrary to one another because they are not related to each other and are not in Christ's soul in the same capacity. That is, the joy of fruition is in the superior part of the soul *per se*, whilst the *dolor passionis* is there *per accidens*. The joy of fruition is in Christ's soul by the grace of union with God, whilst the *dolor* is resident from the natural conjoining of Christ's soul to his body. So, each can be present because they are not contrary

[106] 'Utrum anima Christi passa fuerit secundum superiorem portionem rationis': *III Sent.*, d.16, a.2, q.2, 355-7.

[107] 'Dicendum, quod secundum communem sententiam magistorum passio Christi non solum stetit in sensualitate nec tantum pervenit ad rationem inferiorem, sed extendit se usque ad superiorem portionem. Sicut enim anima nostra ex coniunctione sui ad corpus infectum tota corrumpitur et tota inficitur secundum omnem sui vim et secundum omnem partem, scilicet tam superiorem quam inferiorem; sic anima Christi ex coniunctione sui ad corpus patiens et afflictum tota patiebatur et affligebatur, ut per illam passionem et dolorem illum tota peccatrix anima curaretur. Et sic dolor fuit et passio in Christo secundum supremam rationis partem, quamvis in ea fuerit gaudium fruitionis. Licet autem hoc teneatur tanquam verum, difficile tamen est ad intelligendum, qualiter in anima Christi secundum eandem potentiam et secundum eundem statum potentiae fuerit dolor et gaudium;

affections.[108] Second, not only are the joy and suffering not contrary to one another, one is 'material' in respect of the other. By this Bonaventure meant that they can exist together. He compared the situation to a penitent who suffers and at the same time derives joy from this suffering. Likewise, the soul of Christ suffered according to the nature of the suffering body. However, his soul also derived joy from this passion and compassion.[109] Third, Christ was able to turn towards God and at the same time direct himself towards humans. The one did not impede the other. In the same way, one part of his soul can enjoy the union with God and experience suffering from his body simultaneously and repeatedly.[110] Bonaventure thus described how one kind of joy and a kind of suffering were not mutually exclusive, nor self-contradictory in their simultaneous presence.

Like Albert, Bonaventure argued that Christ could experience pain in all parts of his soul. However, he added a new dimension to his argument which gave it a greater degree of refinement. Christ, he argued, could experience joy in his soul at the same time because joy and pain were present in the soul for different reasons. The

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immo fuerunt simul, nec iterum, quod maius est, dolor intensus valde fecera, gaudium esse minus perfectum': *ibid.*, 356.

[108] 'Ad haec autem intelligenda tria oportet supponere, quae sunt vera et probablia, videlicet quod gaudium fruitionis et dolor passionis non sunt affectiones contrariae, quia non sunt respectu eiusdem nec omnino eodem modo insunt eidem, sed unum inest per se, alterum per accidens: quia gaudiun inest propter coniunctionem gratuitam ipsius cum Deitate, sed dolor propter naturalem coniunctionem ipsius cum carne; et quia non sunt affectiones contrariae, possunt in anima esse secundum eandem partem': *ibid.*

[109] 'Altera suppositio est, quod non tantum huiusmodi dolor et gaudium non sunt contraria, sed unum est materiale respectu alterius; et ideo simul eidem inesse poterant, sicut in viro poenitente videmus, quod simul dolet et de dolore gaudet. Sic et anima Christi secundum naturam corpori patienti compatiebatur, tamen de illa passione et compassione laetebatur': *ibid.*

[110] 'Sicut simul et semel poterat perfecte converti ad Deum et converti ad nos ita quod una illarum conversionum alteram non impediebat nec retardabat; sic potuit secundum eandem partem animae simul et semel gaudere in Deo et compati corpori suo, ita quod nec dolor a gaudio, nec gaudium a dolore pateretur aliquam diminutionem sive remissionem': *ibid.*

language for pain was central to this argument. *Dolor passionis*, the pain which was experienced in the soul through its union in the body, was completely different from the divine joy which was present in the soul *per se*. The two were not contrary to one another and could thus be present simultaneously.

Furthermore, the language of pain was applied to stress Christ's humanity. The links between human souls and Christ's soul were firmly drawn. If humans could suffer in all parts of the soul, then so could Christ. Suffering was thus a key indicator of humanity. Moreover, it was the expression of pain as a precise idea which enabled masters to explain the dual presence of joy and suffering in the soul.[111]

In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas tackled the question of whether Christ could suffer in the superior part of his reason.[112] He distinguished between *dolor* and *tristitia*. Aquinas divided the kind of suffering into external and internal. The external pain he called *dolor*, the internal, *tristitia*. *Dolor* can extend to the superior part of the reason, because it extends to all the powers of the soul who have their root in its essence. However, it can only strictly be perceived through the sense of touch, explained Aquinas.[113] *Tristitia*, on the other hand, can only be present in the reason, by showing what is repugnant to the will. The object of the superior reason is the eternal good, which can in no way be repugnant to Christ's will. So there can be

[111] The comparison of Christ to a penitent is important in this. For a further discussion of pain and joy in penance, see Chapter 3, p.000.

[112] 'Utrum dolor usque ad superiorem rationem pervenerit': *III Sent.*, d.15, q.2, a.3, q°2, 493-500.

[113] 'Loquendo de dolore proprie dicto, sic quantum ad laesionem quae est materiale in ipso, se extendit in Christo ad omnes potentias animae, secundum quod in essentia animae radicantur, ad quam etiam laesio corporis pervenit, secundum quod est forma eius; sed quantum ad perceptionem

no *tristitia* in Christ's superior reason. However, *tristitia* may be present in the inferior reason which is concerned with temporal things.[114]

In the *Quaestiones de Veritate*, Aquinas also argued that there could be some element of corporeal suffering in the superior part of the soul, in as far as the soul is united to the body by its essence; in this essence all the potency has its root. The wounding of the body can extend to all the parts of Christ's soul in this sense. However, there is no way in which *tristitia* can be present in the superior part of Christ's soul, because the object of the superior part of the soul is the eternal.[115] Once again, the language employed to describe pain and suffering allowed masters to understand the nature of Christ and to clarify the ideas about his soul. The way in which ideas were used for Christ's suffering also emphasised his human nature.

Sometime between 1279 and 1287, Matthew of Aquasparta asked whether the suffering caused in the passion of Christ remained in the senses or the inferior part of the reason, or whether it extended to the superior part.[116] Like other masters

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laesionis quae est formale in dolore, sic consistit in solo tactu cuius solius est percipere laesivum inquantum laedit scilicet inquantum corporaliter conjungitur': *ibid.*, 497.

[114] 'Tristitia non potest esse in ratione sicut in subiecto, sed solum sicut in ostendente id quod est voluntati repugnans...Obiectum autem superioris rationis sunt bona aeterna, ex quibus nihil erat contrarium voluntati Christi. Unde in ratione superiori...non poterat esse tristitia in Christo; poterat autem esse, quantum ad rationem inferiorem cuius obiectum sunt res temporales': *ibid.*

[115] 'Unitur autem anima corpori per suam essentiam; in essentia vero animae omnes potenitiae radicantur, et secundum hoc illa laesio ad animam et ad omnes parte eius in Christo pertinebat, etiam ad superiorem rationem secundum quod in essentia animae fundatur...Ex obiecto autem superioris rationis in anima Christi nulla ratio tristitiae accidere poterat, scilicet ex parte aeternorum quibus perfectissime fruebatur; et ideo tristitia animalis in superiori ratione animae Christi esse non potuit': *De Veritate*, q.26, a.9, 780. Aquinas put forward an almost identical argument in *ST* 3a, q.46, a.7.

[116] 'Utrum dolor in passione Christi stetit tantum in sensualitate vel in parte rationis inferiori, aut attigit partem superiorem', *Quaestiones selectae de Christo et de Eucharistica* (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, ii; Quaracchi, 1957), q.5, 210-13.

before him, Matthew distinguished between two types of suffering which could pertain to the soul. However, Matthew believed both could reach the superior part of the reason.[117] The first kind of pain, which comes through the body, Matthew described as being present in the superior part of the soul by its nature, *ut natura*. This is because this external pain causes a movement in the soul according to nature, rather than according to reason, when it perceives harm done to the body to which it is united by nature.[118] The other kind of suffering, *tristitia*, is not only present in the superior part of the soul by nature, but also by reason, argued Matthew. Christ's apprehension of the injustice done to him by the Jews caused him to suffer, as well as the compassion he felt for the sins of the human race and the dishonour done to God. The suffering of compassion, stated Matthew, was greater than his own suffering. He explained that the superior part of the soul is not only concerned with eternal things, but also reflects and makes judgements upon inferior things.[119]

The disagreement between masters over this issue appears to have concerned differing views about the nature of the superior part of the soul. Apart from Albert, who did not specify the kind of suffering which could exist in the superior part of the

[117] 'Dicendum quod in anima Christi, etiam quantum ad partem superiorem, duplex fuit dolor: unus ex passione et laesione corporis; alius ex semetipsa': *ibid.*, 210.
[118] 'Iste dolor attigit partem superiorem rationis non ut ratio est, sed ut natura. Dicitur autem moveri ratio non ut ratio, sed ut natura, quando apprehendens corporis nocumentum, cui naturaliter colligata est, et afflictionem sensualitatis, quae quidem sensualitas aut est aliquid animae intellectivae, aut ei anima intellectiva naturaliter est unita, dissentit et renititur': *ibid.*, 211.
[119] 'Alius dolor fuit in parte superiori, vel in anima quantum ad illam partem, ex ipsa; et iste dolor vocatur tristitia....Et iste utique dolor fuit in parte superiori, non solum ut natura, sed ut ratio. Apprehendens enim passionem suam ut iniuste sibi a Iudaeis illatam, utique displicebat sibi nequitia Iudaeorum; considerans nihilominus et attendens passionis causam, quoniam pro peccatis hominum expiandis et abolendis, utique dolebat et compatiebatur humano generi, et maior et intensior erat dolor compassionis quam passionis; attendens nihilominus Dei inhonorationem, multo magis afficiebatur. Quod autem iste dolor, qui vocatur tristitia, fuerit in parte superiori, apparet....ad partem

soul with any degree of precision, Matthew was the only master who believed that one function of the superior part of the soul was also to consider inferior things.

In a subsequent question Matthew debated whether the suffering in the superior part of Christ's soul could lessen his joy derived from his union with God.[120] He concluded that neither interior nor exterior *dolor* in any way diminished the joy of Christ's union with God. He gave four reasons for this. First, Christ can be in different states of being simultaneously, without them being contrary to one another.[121] Secondly, following Bonaventure, Matthew argued that the joy of union and the suffering for human wickedness are not contrary in themselves. Christ's joy was in his reason *ut ratio*, whilst his suffering was also in his reason, but *ut natura* according to the natural inclination of soul to body.[122] Third, he repeated another argument of Bonaventure: suffering was the material part of joy in Christ in as far as the suffering has an element of joy: the expiation of sin for humankind. Here Matthew made a comparison with the suffering penitent.[123] However, it is the fourth

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superiorem spectat non solum respicere illas rationes aeternas, sed illas de inferioribus consulere et secundum illas de inferioribus iudicare': *ibid.*, 211-12.

[120] 'Quaestio est utrum dolor qui fuit in anima Christi quantum ad partem superiorem, diminuerit vel remiserit gaudium fruitionis': *Quaestiones selectae de Christo*, q.6, 213-17.

[121] 'Iste autem uterque dolor in parte superiori existens, in nullo diminuit aut remisit gaudium fruitionis. Et hoc quatuor conditionibus manifestari potest. Primo propter diversitatem statuum...Sicut igitur Christus fuit in duplici statu sine contrarietate et repugnantia, ita et cognitionem et affectionem habuit utrique statui respondentem sine omni repugnantia, ita quod una illarum cognitionum seu affectionem aliam non impediebat. Quemadmodum ergo simul convertebatur ad superiora et inferiora, ita simul Deo fruebatur, et corpori patienti et eis pro quibus patiebatur compatiebatur': *ibid.*, 214-5.

[122] 'Istae enim affectiones in Christo non fuerunt contrariae; et ideo nec se mutuo expellebant aut remittebant...Gaudium enim est in ratione ut ratio, sed dolor in ratione ut natura, propter naturalem inclinationem et colligationem ad corpus': *ibid.*, 215.

[123] 'Dolor enim est materia gaudii in Christo. Etsi enim corpori patienti compatiebatur et condolebat humanae infelicitati, tamen de isto dolore gaudebat, dum per hoc pro peccatis nostris satisfaciebat et voluntatem Patris implebat. Huius exemplum est de poenitente, qui dolet et flet ex recordatione divinae offensae, sed gaudet se dolore et flere propter spem veniae; et ideo quanto crescit dolor, tanto amplius crescit gaudium': *ibid.*, 216.

argument which demonstrates why this question was so important an issue. Matthew explained that there is one supposit or being in Christ in which two natures, the human and divine, exist. Therefore the divine being suffers and gains joy according to human nature. Christ assumes both joy and suffering at the same time. Matthew said that it is no great wonder that Christ exercises joy and suffering simultaneously; rather the miracle exists in the fact that they have been assumed by him at all.[124]

As Bonaventure had argued before him, Matthew explained how joy from union to the divine and suffering were not contrary in themselves. Matthew applied the same method of argumentation as Bonaventure by attributing joy to the soul *ut ratio* and the physical suffering which was present in the soul *ut natura*. However, Matthew did not explain how *tristitia* existed simultaneously with joy in the soul, although, in the previous question, he had argued that it was present *ut ratio* in the superior part of the soul. Instead, in this particular question, he conflated the two types of suffering and considered them as one.

There were some definite areas of agreement and disagreement between masters over this issue. Albert and Matthew of Aquasparta apparently agreed in principle, but Albert's failure to distinguish between external and internal suffering makes it difficult to perceive exactly where the two masters agreed. However, this lack of clarification may have led Bonaventure and Aquinas to distinguish clearly between

[124] 'Quarto hoc manifestatur per comparationem ad divinum suppositum. Gaudere et tristari affectiones sunt suppositi; in Christo autem unum tantum fuit suppositum, in quo utraque natura substantificabatur. Unde suppositum divinum erat quod tristabatur et laetabatur, licet secundum naturam humanam. Illud ergo suppositum, quod assumpsit humanam laetitiam et tristitiam, non est

different types of pain. The language which masters developed for describing human suffering was also applied to this contentious issue about the superior reason. Explaining how one kind of suffering could be present whilst another could not, not only helped to explain Christ's human and divine natures, it also addressed fundamental questions about the nature of the soul. Matthew of Aquasparta developed his different notion of the superior part of the soul within this same framework.

A clear vocabulary for suffering emerged which helped masters understand how the human and divine elements of Christ interacted. Suffering it seems, was pivotal to defining the border between Christ's humanity and divinity. The language which was developed for suffering was used to debate unresolved ideas about different parts of the soul. In ascertaining the way in which Christ's soul suffered, masters were also re-assessing their understanding of the human soul. For example, Matthew of Aquasparta's explicit reference to the dual natures in Christ and how they responded to suffering is strong evidence suggesting that masters used their notions of pain as a tool or theory at a time when ideas about the hypostatic union had lacked any consensus. Defining a language for Christ's suffering was an alternative route in the formulation of christological theory.

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mirum si simul potui tristari et laetari. Maius enim fuit miraculum quod istam assumpsit, quam quod ista simul exercuit': *ibid.*, 216.

Conclusion

The evidence gathered in this chapter demonstrates that issues of pain and suffering were integral to the study of theology in the thirteenth century. Masters of theology asked questions about the way in which humans suffered and they also concentrated in a similar fashion on the suffering of Christ. There were various reasons why pain was an important focus within their theological treatises. First, masters debated issues of suffering within the context of the human body and soul, a subject which was afforded much attention and discussion in the thirteenth century. Second, the suffering of Chirst was closely associated with notions of his humanity and divinity, which had been a matter of serious dispute for centuries. Thus, issues of pain were at the centre of two key debates in theology.

Within their debates, masters displayed certain areas of agreement and disagreement. For example, in the belief that the soul and body relied upon one another for the experience of suffering, all masters were in agreement. Indeed, their notion of the composite structure of body and soul allowed masters to explain how the soul suffered when pain was thought to pertain only properly to the body. Masters also used their theories of body-soul relations when they discussed the issue of Christ's Passion. Here, there was more dispute as to the precise nature of Christ's suffering. This was due to difference of opinion about the nature of the superior and inferior parts of the human soul. However, the most important point which emerges out of

disputations on the suffering of Christ was the way in which masters were able to form some kind of consensus of opinion on Christ's human and divine natures, which other theories had not managed to produce. Ideas about pain were thus important tools in clarifying the nature of the human body and soul and both the human and divine natures in Christ.

However, pain was only able to play a central part of these theological areas because masters deliberately constructed a language for understanding suffering and developed a conceptual framework to support it. This was effected in various ways. First, masters were conscious of the vocabulary used by key theological authorities and thus sought to develop different types of pain. Second, their theories about the relationship of body and soul permitted the creation of different concepts for pain. These different pains thus had a function which ran parallel to the actions and relationship in the soul-body composite and, moreover, the language which they constructed for pain added considerable depth to their comprehension and explanation of both the human soul and body. Third, masters also appeared to used their typology of pain for humans to explain the suffering of Christ. In this way, they were more readily able to explain Christ's Passion, a central tenet of theological treatises, in more sophisticated ways. Furthermore, a language for suffering provided masters with a new and pertinent focus on Christ's humanity.

Ideas about pain and suffering were thus not static areas of debate, but pivotal axes for masters of theology when they discussed important subjects in theology. The

language they devised for understanding pain was developed continually in order to clarify these areas. Ideas about pain, it would seem, helped underpin theological works in the thirteenth century.

2

Gendering Pain: Theological Ideas about Female and Male Suffering

Pain and suffering were key topics of discussion in theological treatises. Understanding them was essential to explaining the complex relationship of body and soul. Pain was a human experience, but did it, according to thirteenth-century theological perceptions, pertain to both sexes equally? This chapter examines three areas of theology in which masters of theology discussed the nature of males and females: creation, the state of innocence and the Fall. In each context, it is to be determined to what extent masters linked pain and gender. It must also be discovered whether the links between them were more pronounced in certain contexts than others. It is also asked to what extent pain at the Fall affected perceptions of sex difference. Indeed, it may have been the presence or absence of sin at the Fall which played an important part in establishing the differences between male and female in theological treatises.

The three areas of inquiry have been chosen because they follow the theological history of humankind. They also form part of the logical sequence within many works of medieval theology. The hypothesis with which this chapter proceeds is that throughout this theological timescale, masters were reliant upon their ideas about pain and suffering to explain the differences between man and woman. The thesis may be defended that they used 'gendered' notions of pain to clarify these differences. However, they also modified their conceptual framework of pain and

suffering to define similarity between males and females, and to describe the 'ungendered' body: a body without sin.

Creation

As was seen in the first chapter, pain was integral to human experience and also an important medium which masters of theology used to explain the nature of the human composite, and to distinguish between the divine and human natures in Christ. In their questions about creation, masters did not use pain as a focal point for discussion. However, in both the state of innocence and the Fall, issues about pain were integral to their theories about sex difference. It is necessary, therefore, to pursue briefly some arguments which masters used to understand the creation of man and woman, which will demonstrate how they initially constructed ideas of sex difference without reference to pain. This will be subsequently juxtaposed with their use of pain as a tool for defining sex difference in both the state of innocence and the state of sin.

When the masters examined the moment of creation, they were forced to confront the creation of both man and woman. Biblical exegesis and the traditions which were associated with the creation of man and woman dictated the framework in which creation was discussed to some extent. For example, the passage in Genesis which stated that man was created in God's image[1] led to a tradition of asking whether woman also partook in God's image.[2] In earlier

[1] 'God created man in his own image; in the image of God he created him': Genesis 1:27.
[2] See, in particular, C. Horowitz, 'The Image of God in Man - Is Woman Included?', *Harvard Theological Review*, 72 (1979), 175-206; M.T. d'Alverny, 'Comment les théologiens et les philosophes voient la femme', *La Femme dans la civilisation des Xe et XIIIe siècles: Actes du*

centuries it was believed that woman had not been created in the image of God. Such beliefs attained canonical status which decreed that women cover their heads as a mark of respect.[3] Historians have given much attention to this method of analysing the differences between male and female.[4] As for research on thirteenth-century theologians' attitudes to whether the image of God also pertained to woman, one study in particular has demonstrated that Bonaventure argued for the absence of sex difference in the soul. This study has shown that Bonaventure perceived the image or likeness of God in man to be spiritual, or otherwise God would have been corporeal. Moreover, the image of God was believed to be in the highest part of the human soul where there was no gender distinction. In this way he could argue that both man and woman were created equally in the image of God, and both sexes were termed *homo*.[5] Aquinas, on the other hand, believed that although both man and woman possessed the image of God, man took part in this image in a superior way to woman. He used an analogy of the differences between superior and inferior angels to exemplify this.[6] For masters, however, whether or not woman played a greater or lesser part in the image of God is not, therefore, a useful means of ascertaining how the

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colloque tenu à Poitiers le 23-25 septembre 1976, Cahiers de civilisation médiévale, 20 (1977), 105-29.

[3] See 'Mulier debet': *Decretum Magistri Gratiani*, ed. E. Friedberg, Corpus Iuris Canonici, i (Leipzig, 1879, repr. Graz, 1959), C. 33, q.8, c.19, 1255-6.

[4] See, especially, L. Reynolds, 'Bonaventure on Gender and Godlikeness', *Downside Review*, 106 (1988), 171-94; P. Bird, 'Male and Female, He Created Them: Genesis 1:27 in the Context of the Priestly Account of Creation', *Harvard Theological Review* 74, no.2 (1981), 129-59.

[5] Reynolds, 'Bonaventure on Gender', 182-5. Despite the belief that the image of God was common to both sexes, masters still argued that only men could receive holy orders because it was necessary for a man to represent Christ. Christ, after all, had taken on the male form. See A.J. Minnis, '*De impedimento sexus*: Women's Bodies and Medieval Impediments to Female Ordination', *Medieval Theology and the Natural Body*, ed. P. Biller and A.J. Minnis (York Studies in Medieval Theology, I; York, 1997), 116-20; F. Cardman, 'The Medieval Question of Woman and Orders', *The Thomist*, 42 (1978), 582-99.

[6] E.C. McLaughlin, 'Equality of Souls, Inequality of Sexes: Women in Medieval Theology', *Religion and Sexism: Images of Women in the Jewish and Christian Traditions*, ed. R. R. Ruether

masters differentiated between the sexes. Sex difference can instead be detected in questions concerning creation of the female body, for masters of theology believed, following Aristotle, that males and females differed materially, but not in essence. Therefore, it was argued that men and women possessed the same substantial form of the soul and only differed from one another accidentally.[7]

If we accept that masters believed in the accidental, physical differences between males and females, then it is unsurprising that their discussions about creation focused sharply on the physicality of the creation. What questions did masters ask with reference to gender in the context of human creation? It seems that masters were concerned with the production of woman's body and how it was possible that it came from the rib of man. It is worth briefly investigating their theories about the creation of woman in this regard, for although they do not use concepts of pain to understand the female gender, issues of pain arise as a direct consequence. Moreover, it would seem that masters sought to understand the nature of physical difference at creation as an important prelude to debating the nature of suffering in other parts of their theological systems.

So, what were the circumstances surrounding woman's physical creation? The questions of two masters, Bonaventure and Aquinas are to be studied with this question in mind. Bonaventure asked where woman's body came from.[8] He spent a large proportion of his question describing many reasons which supported the belief that woman was formed from the rib of man. Some metaphorical

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(New York, 1974), 218; K. Børresen, *Subordination and Equivalence: The Nature and Role of Women in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas* (Washington D.C., 1981), 136-7.

relationships were used by Bonaventure to explain the creation of woman and her relationship to man. These included the metaphorical relationships between God and the soul, Christ and the Church, and the superior and inferior reason.[9] However, although woman always played the second partner in her relationship with man, she was nevertheless afforded an equality of association. By this, Bonaventure meant that woman conferred certain elements of support on man, whilst he supported her in other ways. It was for this reason that woman was created from the rib of man and not just from any bone in his body.[10]

In his discussion of the creation of woman, Bonaventure further pursued a line of questioning which was directed towards the issue of suffering which was caused to Adam. He asked whether the loss of a rib caused Adam pain. Or did it happen when he was asleep and not cause him pain? Bonaventure explained that if it had caused Adam pain, he would have had *poena* before *culpa*. If it had not caused Adam pain, it would have been a greater manifestation of God's power.[11] Although the presence of these questions appears to deviate from the main issue, it suggests that the issue of pain was never far from the masters' minds when they discussed the human body. Indeed, pain was one major focus when masters

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[7] Reynolds, 'Bonaventure on Gender', 173.

[8] 'Unde fuerit corpus mulieris': *II Sent.*, d.18, a.1, q.1, 431-4.

[9] 'Consonat enim nihilominus his quae significantur per mulierem et virum. Per virum namque et mulierem significantur Deus et anima, Christus et Ecclesia, superior portio rationis et inferior': *ibid.*, 432.

[10] 'Quia igitur forti vinculo et singulari mulier coniungitur viro et e converso, ideo unus sexus productus est de altero. Quia vero illa coniunctio dat viro quietationem, ideo producta est de viro dormiente. Rursus, quia vir dat mulieri fortitudinem et sustentationem, hinc est, quod mulier dicitur esse facta de osse. Et quia in omnibus his quaedam aequalitas mutuae societatis, ideo formata est mulier de osse non quocumque, sed de costa et eius latere': *ibid.*

[11] 'In separatione illius [i.e. the rib] aut fuit aliqua laesio et afflictio, aut non. Si sic, ergo Adam ante passus est poenam, quam committeret culpam. Si non: ergo ita bene potuit fieri de latere vigilantis, sicut de latere dormientis. Item, maiori potentiae attestatur separare partem a toto ab homine vigilante sine dolore quam a dormiente: magis igitur fuisset manifestata Dei potentia, si

came to discuss Adam in the state of innocence. This will be explored at length in the following section.

Aquinas was another master who deliberated about the reasons why woman ought to have been created from man's rib.[12] He also argued that woman ought to have come from man's rib because she could not come from his head: that would signify dominance; nor from his feet, which would make her servile.[13] So Aquinas appeared to follow the notion of equality of association too. He too established a metaphorical relationship between the flowing of blood from Christ's side at the crucifixion and the creation of woman from man's side.[14] On this level alone, the creation of woman was related to the suffering Christ.

It appears that in their discussions of the physical creation of woman, masters did not think that any suffering was caused. How, then, did they construct sex difference in their discussions of creation without reference to pain? It was clear that the earlier theory that man and woman differed as to their participation in the image of God was an issue which masters had resolved in terms of the creation of souls. The souls of both man and woman were created *ex nihilo* by God. The image was present in the soul and so, despite Aquinas's belief that man partook of God's image in a more superior way, sex difference *per se* did not apply

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absque dolore produxisset mulierem de latere Adae vigilantis, quam cum produxerit de latere dormientis': *ibid.*

[12] 'Utrum mulier debuerit formari de costa viri': *ST* 1a, q.92, a.3.

[13] 'Dicendum quod conveniens fuit mulierem formari de costa viri. Primo quidem ad significandum quot inter virum et mulierem debet esse socialis conjunctio; neque enim mulier debet dominari in virum et ideo non est formata de capite; neque debet a viro despici, tanquam serviliter subjecta et ideo non est formata de pedibus': *ibid.* See J. Cadden, *Meanings of Sex Difference in the Middle Ages: Medicine, Science and Culture* (Cambridge, 1993), 193.

[14] 'Secundo propter sacramentum; quia de latere Christi dormientis in cruce fluxerunt sacramenta, id est sanguis et aqua, quibus est Ecclesia instituta': *ibid.*

regarding God's image. Both man and woman were created in his image. This discounted one possible level of sex difference. Instead, masters used the physical creation of the female body from the male rib as a tool to differentiate between males and females in other respects, that is, to elucidate symbolic representations of the relationship between the Church and the soul, for example. Woman's physical creation from the rib of man was different from man's creation directly from God. This enabled masters to distinguish between man and woman more precisely. Sex difference may therefore be perceived through the filter of woman's physicality. The body was the locus of gender difference between man and woman.

In their account of creation, masters did not engage with ideas about pain directly. However, the issue of woman's creation from man permitted masters, such as Bonaventure, to frame questions about suffering in the state of innocence and whether there could be pain before the presence of sin. This context thus merits more detailed attention.

Innocence

The state of innocence was the state of existence after creation and before the Fall. Despite the lack of sin there, masters were interested in debating whether there was any kind of corruptibility or suffering before the descent into sin. This was in part due to their belief in the corruptible and mortal nature of the created human body.[15] Authorities such as Aristotle also believed that all mortal bodies

[15] See Chapter 1, 28-43.

were capable of corruption. So, new theories about the nature of the body led to specific debates asking whether Adam could suffer before the presence of sin, for example. Such debates also clarified what masters meant by the influence of sin on human suffering.

However, there is a further aspect to the masters' disquisitions about suffering in the state of innocence. Certain questions were asked about Adam; specifically, whether his body could suffer and corrupt. Other specific questions were asked of Eve: whether she would suffer the pains of childbirth and whether her virginity was corrupted. Masters thus appear to have grouped their questions according to gender distinction; and the way in which each of the first parents suffered seems to have been the factor which differentiated them. However, the state of innocence came before the Fall and thus the bodies of the first parents were untainted by sin. It would appear then that the masters used post-Fall categories as a means for discussing the bodies of the first parents. In fact, the masters did not define sex difference by suffering for the state of innocence. On the contrary, it is argued that their conclusions about suffering in the state of innocence explained the nature of the bodies that were ungendered before the state of sin. With this in mind, masters would have supported the patristic view that just as there was an equality in experience of punishment or reward in the next life, there could also be a similar equality in experiences in the state of innocence.[16] It would seem useful, therefore, to explore these questions according to their

[16] See St. Basil the Great, *De hominis structura*, l.22, *PG* 30,345.

division between the first parents. For this reason, they are examined under the headings 'Adam' and 'Eve'.

i. Adam

The Halesian Summa, compiled in about 1250 by students of Alexander of Hales,[17] hence its name, asked whether Adam was capable of suffering from the reception of external impressions in the process of sense perception.[18] The first part of natural *passio* which comes from external impressions is harmonious to nature and that which is unnatural is destructive to nature, argued the authors of the Summa. The second part of natural passion is concerned with the perfection of being, such as in the reception of sensible *species* in the sensitive organ, and intelligible *species* in the intellect. These impressions from the exterior can be said to cause passibility in the first parents.[19] The other way in which passibility occurs is from an unnatural passion. This passion occurs with the reception of

[17] It certainly contains elements of Alexander's original and authentic works, but it was almost certainly compiled by John of La Rochelle and others in around 1250. Gilson maintains that it is of interest because the works of others in it are all from the same 'doctrinal school': E. Gilson, *A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London, 1955), 327. For the comparison of the Halesian Summa with another collection of theological questions, see I.P. Wei, 'Guy de l'Aumône's 'Summa de diversis quaestionibus theologie'', *Traditio*, 44 (1988), 275-323.

[18] 'Utrum primis homo fuerit passibilis per impressionum extrinsecarum receptionem': *Summa Theologica* (Quaracchi, 1928), Tract. 3, q.1, t.1, cap.2, 633-6.

[19] 'Respondeo quod est passio vel passibilitas proveniens ex impressione relicta ab extrinseco duplex, scilicet naturalis sive consona naturae et innaturalis sive destructiva naturae. Prima autem est duplex, quia quaedam ea quae sunt ad salvationem esse, quaedam ea quae sunt ad perfectionem esse. Ea quae sunt ad salvationem esse respicit passio quae relinquitur ex operibus generativae et nutritivae...Ad ea quae sunt ad perfectionem esse refertur passio quae est ex receptione specierum sensibilium in organo sensitivae et ex receptione specierum intelligibilium in intellectu. Huiusmodi autem passiones, quae erant consonae naturae, poterant relinqui ab extrinseco in primis parentibus in statu primo, et respectu huiusmodi passiones erant passibiles': *ibid.*, 634

contraries. Furthermore, they lead to corruption and alteration of the senses.[20] Adam was in no way susceptible to this kind of passion.

In terms of suffering, or passibility, Adam was only capable of receiving the kind of passion which amounted to a reception of data in the senses. Thus, masters appear to have used suffering as a way to describe the nature of the human body in the state of innocence. Their language of suffering helped differentiate between passibility that was destructive and passibility that was not. As far as gender distinction is concerned, the question may have been asked of Adam, but the authors of the Halesian Summa applied their solution to both parents. In this sense, gender does not appear to have affected their ideas about suffering or the nature of the body before sin.

Bonaventure debated whether the body of Adam, before sin, was capable of being corrupted.[21] He noted that Adam had a mortal body in the state of innocence. All mortal bodies were believed to be corruptible by necessity, which would mean that his body could be corrupted.[22] However, Bonaventure circumvented this belief by distinguishing between something which was called immortal from its relation to the act of dying, and something which was immortal with regard to the potential of dying. In other words, Bonaventure created a

[20] 'Alio modo est passibilitas a passione innaturali...et haec passio, ut dictum est, est cum contrarietate receptibilis et recepti; haec autem est a contrario alterante et abiciente a substantia...Secundum autem quod dicit potentiam dispositam dispositione coniuncta, propinqua vel remota, nequaquam, sed impassibilis': *ibid.*

[21] 'Utrum corpus Adae, ipso non peccante, posset dissolvi': *II Sent.*, d.19, a.2, q.1, 464-6.

[22] 'Adam in statu innocentiae habeat corpus mortale, sicut dicit Augustinus et Magister in littera, ergo corruptibile; sed 'omne corruptibile de necessitate corrumpetur, sicut vult Philosophus, quamvis non omne generabile de necessitate generatur': ergo, corpus Adae corruptem fuisset, esto quod in statu innocentiae permansisset': *ibid*, 464.

distinction between the actual dissolution of the human body and the possible dissolution of the human body. This distinction itself came from Aristotle, and Bonaventure acknowledged him here.[23] In the case of Adam, if the corruption referred to is actual, then the proposition is false. It is impossible for innocence and death, or the *poena* of corruption, to co-exist, because the presence of the order of divine justice prevents such disorder in the universe.[24] However, if the proposition that the body of Adam would dissolve in the state of innocence is phrased in terms of a possibility, then it was true.

The emphasis of this question was somewhat different to that in the Halesian Summa. Bonaventure focused on the nature of corruptibility. All mortal bodies were corruptible. This included Adam's body in the state of innocence. However, the distinction between actual corruptibility and potential corruptibility allowed Bonaventure to explain the nature of the body in the state of innocence. Bonaventure only applied the question to Adam. He did not consider the nature of Eve's body in the same way.

Masters were thus involved in applying their knowledge of act and potentiality to their ideas about suffering and corruption. Bodies without sin had the potential to suffer and corrupt, whereas sinful bodies were corrupted in actuality. The presence or absence of sin was the deciding factor here.

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[23] 'Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod quemadmodum, iuxta verbum Philosophi, haec est duplex: aliquid est nunc immortale, quia adverbium potest determinare hoc quod est immortale ratione actus moriendi, vel ratione potentiae; ita et locutio praecedens: utrum corpus hominis esset dissolubile, sive posset dissolvi, ipso non peccante, distingui debet': *ibid.*, 465.

[24] 'Si autem ablativi illi referantur ad actum, qui est dissolvi, sic locutio falsa est. Est enim sensus, quod Adam posset dissolvi in statu innocentiae, ita quod simul esset innocentia et mortis sive

Aquinas turned his attention to the same issue in his *Commentary on the Sentences*.[25] He concluded that the word for suffering could be construed in two ways: commonly (*communiter*) and properly (*proprie*). In the first case, suffering is the reception of something by some means. Everything which receives lacks that which it receives and thus is in potential in relation to it. By this Aquinas meant that there was a state of potentiality before the senses received something external to them. Nothing is absolved from this kind of suffering or passibility, except that which is pure act, namely God, stated Aquinas. So every creature is called passible because it is receptive of some perfection. Adam is 'passible' to such a reception. The second type of suffering concerned the change of something from one nature to the other. This could be, for example, when water is heated, or when a body becomes ill, but not, however, when it changes from a state of ill-health to being well again. Aquinas thought that Adam's body could only be passible in this sense if he were to sin, which he could not do in the state of innocence.[26]

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corruptionis poena; hoc est impossibile, providente ordine divinae iustitiae, quae nullam inordinationem in universo sustinet': *ibid.*

[25] 'Utrum corpus Adae fuerit passibile': *II Sent.*, d.19, q.1, a.3, 488-90.

[26] 'Respondeo dicendum, quod 'pati' dicitur dupliciter: uno modo communiter, alio modo proprie. Communiter dicitur pati quidquid recipit aliquid quocumque modo; et sic cum omne recipiens careat eo quod recipit et sit in potentia ad illud, et e contrario omne quod est in potentia ad aliquid sit receptivum alicujus; a tali passibilitate nihil absolvitur, nisi illud quod est actus purus, scilicet Deus; omnis enim creatura passibilis dici potest, secundum quod alicujus perfectionis receptibilis est...Dicitur ideo proprie dicitur 'pati' secundum quod passio sequitur alterationem qua aliquid transmutatur ab eo quod est sibi secundum naturam: sicut si aqua calefiat...et si corpus animalis infirmetur, non autem si sanetur. Primo ergo modo, accepta passione, corpus Adae passibile erat; sed secundo modo accepta, tunc dicendum est, corpus ejus fuisse passibile secundum quid, scilicet si peccaret; et impassibile simpliciter, sicut de mortali et immortali dictum est supra': *II Sent.*, d.19, q.1,a.3, 488-9.

Aquinas applied both methods used in the previous two questions. He separated the terms used for suffering and then demonstrated whether each was related to the body of Adam actually, or only potentially. Like Bonaventure, he only mentioned Adam in his question. The body of woman was not discussed directly. More important for masters appears to have been the way in which the body in the state of innocence received experiences. The language of suffering was refined in order to define the nature of bodies without sin.

In his unfinished *Summa Theologiae*, which was composed some time in the 1270s,[27] Albert the Great addressed a similar question.[28] Albert considered what was meant by passibility. He divided his definition into two. In the first sense, passibility could refer to the Greek *patin* which meant 'to receive'. In other words, anything which receives an action from something which is acting is called 'passible'. Albert termed this passible in its *genus* sense (*in genere*). The second sense of passible is when an action is received from an agent which is contrary to the recipient. This will lead to dissolution, just as Aristotle said that every passion subverts substance.[29] Adam was susceptible to the first kind of passibility, argued Albert, but not the second. Adam was passible on account of his own nature, but impassible to the dissolution from contrary things in that he

[27] *Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays*, ed. F.J. Kovach and R.W. Shahan (Norman, Oklahoma), xiii.

[28] 'Utrum corpus Adae fuerit passibile, vel impassibile, et qua passibilitate?', *Summa Theologiae*, ed. P. Jammy (Paris, 1651), v, 2 pars, tractatus xiv, q.83, 408-10.

[29] 'Ad primo quaesitum dicendum, quod passio dupliciter dicitur. Dicitur enim a Graeco patin quod est recipere: et sic omne quod actionem recipit ab aliquo agente, passibile dicitur, et hoc est passibile in genere. Dicitur etiam passibile quod recipit actionem agentis contrarii quod agit ad dissolutionem, secundum quod dicit Arist. in topic. quod omnis passio magis facta abiicit a substantia': *ibid.*, 409. See Aristotle, *Topica. Translatio Boethii, Fragmentum Recensionis Alterius, et Translatio Anonyma* (Brussels and Paris, 1969), vi, c.6, 128.

was protected by the tree of life.[30] Albert went on to elucidate the three states of man distinguished by Augustine. In the state of innocence, there is a possibility of dying by nature and if he sins; in the state of sin, dying is a necessity, because sin is present. Lastly, after resurrection, dying is impossible. The possibility of dying in the state of innocence does not cause any suffering in Adam *simpliciter*, but only *secundum quid*.[31] In other words, Adam could not suffer in actuality. He could only suffer potentially. Other conditions, such as sin, were required in order for there to be actual suffering.

Albert's way of explaining the nature of Adam's 'suffering' in the state of innocence was very similar to that of Aquinas. He also used the bipartite description of a general sense of the term passibility and the act-potentiality dichotomy. He also only applied his conclusion to Adam. Eve was not mentioned.

These questions demonstrate that suffering was talked about in new ways. Theories of act and potential were applied to ideas about suffering to analyse the sinless body. Furthermore, apart from the authors of the Halesian Summa, such discussions focused on the body of Adam. However, these were not the only

[30] 'Primo ergo modo corpus Adae in primo statu fuit passibile: secundo modo non. Et sicut Augustinus dicit, ex natura propria habuit passibilitatem, ex ligno autem vitae habuit impassibilitatem, ita quod non patiebatur a contrario ad dissolutionem substantiae': *Summa*, q.83, 409.

[31] 'Dicendum quod Augustinus distinguit tres status hominis. In primo habuit posse mori ex natura et sub conditione si peccaret. In secundo, post peccatum scilicet, necessitatem moriendi propter peccatum habuit...In tertio statu, post resurrectionem scilicet habebit impossibilitatem moriendi...Unde mors qua potuit mori in primo statu non induxit in Adam passionem simpliciter secundo modo dictam, sed secundum quid': *ibid.*

questions asked about pain and corruption in the state of innocence. Other questions were asked about the nature of Eve's suffering.

ii. Eve

In the 1270s Albert the Great debated whether the first woman experienced the burden of pregnancy, and whether she suffered when giving birth in the state of innocence.[32] In answering whether Eve experienced the burden of carrying a child (*gravitas gravida*), he distinguished between *gravitas* as a burden and *gravitas* as a kind of punishment (*poena*). Eve experienced the first kind, argued Albert, but not the second, in that the first parents are protected by the tree of life from the suffering caused to the body by burden of a child.[33] In the third section of the question, Albert stated that it is true that the birth of children in the state of innocence occurs without *dolor*. Augustine clearly said this, argued Albert, and it would be impious to contradict him regarding those things which concern faith and customs. Albert went on to explain that in the state of innocence there is no pain *in partu* and no laceration, but only extension and expansion.[34]

The issue of pregnancy and giving birth was thus clearly an important focus for analysing the nature of woman in the state of innocence. Although this question was obviously specific to woman, the way in which her experience was described

[32] 'Et utrum cum gravitate fuisset gravida, vel sine gravitate? Et utrum cum dolore puerpera, vel sine dolore?': *Summa Theologiae*, tract. xiv, q.84, 410-12.

[33] 'Ad id quod quaeritur ulterius, dicendum quod est gravitas oneris tantum, et est gravitas inducens poenam. Secundum primum modum non fuisset gravida sine gravitate, sed secundum modum. Ad id quod contra obiicitur, dicendum, quod sicut ab aliis poenis corpora primorum parentum gratia innocentiae et virtute ligni vitae praeseruebantur a dolore pressiuo': *ibid.*

[34] 'Ad id quod ulterius quaeritur, Utrum sine dolore fuisset puerpera? Dicendum quod sic: quia hoc Augustinus aperte dicit, cui contradicere impium est in his quae tangunt fidem et mores.

by Albert used similar formulae to the discussions about Adam. So, on the one hand there were specific pains for males and females, but on the other hand, their experiences of them were analysed in similar terms.

Other questions which focused on the corruption, or suffering, of woman concerned whether virginity[35] was preserved, after sexual contact, in the state of innocence. The thematic basis of such questions is similar to that asked by Albert above. For example, Bonaventure asked whether, through coitus in the state of innocence, the integrity of the body was corrupted.[36] He argued that sexual intercourse in the state of innocence would have caused the virginal membrane to open, but this would have been without *poena* or filth.[37] Bonaventure admitted that the proposed question has more to do with curiosity than utility, but given that it came from the writings of Augustine,[38] it had been included.[39] Bonaventure considered Augustine's supposition that there could be a union between man and wife and no resulting corruption of integrity as unintelligible, for if there were no corruption, then there could not have been a union. The

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Dicendum quod in illo statu parte fuisset sine dolore et sine lacerationes, per solam extensionem et laxationem': *ibid.*

[35] Interest in the ideas of virginity has its roots in the ascetic religious movements of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The debate about whether virginity was superior to marriage took its provenance from the writings of St. Jerome, St. Paul and Augustine. Jerome maintained that the the flesh was evil and the only way to live truly was in a state of virginity, which caused him to comment 'marriage fills the earth, virginity heaven'. The eleventh century saw the great theologian Peter Damian espouse Jerome with new vigour. He claimed that Christ had entered the world without breaking Mary's hymen and that virginity could conceivably be restored. See *Adversus Iouinianum*, i, 13.16, in C.N.L. Brooke, *The Medieval Idea of Marriage* (Oxford, 1989, repr. 1994), 62-74; J.M. Bugge, *Virginitas: An Essay in the History of a Medieval Ideal* (The Hague, 1975).

[36] 'Utrum in coitu in statu innocentiae fuisset integritatis corruptio': *II Sent.*, d.20, a.un., q.4, 482-3.

[37] 'In status innocentiae, si vir uxorem cognovisset, fuisset claustrorum apertio, tamen sine poena et foeditate': *ibid.*, 482.

[38] *De civitate Dei*, xiv, c.26.

[39] 'Dicendum, quod proposita quaestio plus habet curiositas quam utilitas: quia tamen habet ortum ex verbis Augustini, ideo introducta est': *ibid.*

corruption of bodily integrity can be understood in three ways, said Bonaventure: the opening of the virginal membrane, the suffering of punishment, and the filth of pleasure. The first came from nature, the second was a punishment, and the third is from the fault of corruption. The first kind of corruption would occur in the state of innocence, but not the other two because the generative power would not be corrupted or infected. Physical actions in the state of innocence, after all, would obey reason.[40]

Sexual intercourse in the state of innocence would mean a physical breach, but this would not lead to the loss of virginity because the sexual act itself would occur without filth or punishment. Bonaventure developed the notion of corruption by distinguishing between three different corruptions. In this way, he could apply certain notions of corruption to the female body in the state of innocence and separate them from those which would occur in a state of sin. Although the question asked about the corruption of virginity in general, the answer is definitely centred upon the woman. However, like the previous question, the female body was believed to corrupt to a certain extent only. This is similar to the way in which masters used their ideas about the potential suffering of Adam's body. So, at one remove, gender could be distinguished in terms of

[40] 'Propter explanationem illius verbi, quod dicit, quod maritus commisceretur uxori sine ulla corruptione integritatis; quod quidem non videtur esse intelligibile. Si enim mulier permaneret integra, nunquam esset viri ad mulierem carnis commixtio. Propter quod intelligendum est, quod integritatis corruptio tria dicit, scilicet claustorum apertionem, poenalem passionem et foedam delectationem. Primum est naturae, secundum est poenae, tertium vero est corruptionis vitiosae, quae tenet medium inter culpam et poenam. Si igitur vir uxorem cognovisset in tempore naturae institutae, fuisset ibi claustrorum apertio sicut ostendunt rationes secundo inductae; non tamen fuisset ibi poenalis passio ac foeda delectatio, quia vis generativa nec esset corrupta nec esset infecta; immo obedirent rationi illa membra': *ibid.*, 483.

suffering, whilst, at another, the experience of suffering demonstrated common ground between the sexes.

Somewhat later in his career, Albert the Great debated the same question. He asked whether Eve could have conceived in the state of innocence and yet still have remained incorrupt and a virgin.[41] He used the distinctions made by William of Auxerre on the three kinds of corruption resulting from sexual congress: the unbroken succession of the division of the body, that is, the body's perpetual corruption; the filth caused by the itching of concupiscence and a libido, which corrupts the body and mind; and the impurity in the mixing with a foreign nature.[42] If Eve conceived through sexual intercourse with Adam, she would not be subject to the first two corruptions because the first parents used their sex organs according to the order of reason, argued Albert. Eve would, however, be subject to the third corruption. The mixture of semen from another with her would mean that she was unable to remain pure.[43] Albert contended that it was the privilege of the virgin Mary to conceive without corruption, but her conception was occasioned by the Holy Spirit, and not by male semen.[44]

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[41] 'Utrum Eva in primo statu concepisset et peperisset incorrupta et virgo permanisset?': *Summa Theologiae*, tract. xiv, q.84, 410-12.

[42] 'Ad primo quaesitum satis bene responderunt antiqui, scilicet Praepositiuus et Guillel. Altis. distinxerunt enim triplicem corruptionem, scilicet continuitatis, foeditas, et impuritas. Continuitas quae est in diuisione corporis. Foeditas quae est in pruritu concupiscentiae et libidinis, quae foedat et mentem et corpus, in quae ratio descendit sub delectatione carnis...Impuritas, quae est in susceptione naturae alienae, sicut aurum quando immixtum sibi fuerit aliquid alienum': *ibid.*, 411.

[43] 'Dicunt ergo, quod si Eva conuenisset cum Adam per coitum, non incurrisset primas duas corruptiones: quae sic usi fuissent primi parentes genitalibus membris ad ordinem rationis...Sed incurrisset omni modo corruptionem impuritatis: quia oportuit, quod conciperet ex semine alieno sibi permixto: et sic pura non remansisset': *ibid.*

[44] 'Dicendum quod privilegium singulare beatae Virginis est in hoc, quod manens in omni puritate mentis et corporis, non ex semine alieno, sed de Spiritu sancto concepit: Eva autem de semine viri': *ibid.*

It would seem that suffering and corruption were described in different ways in order to account for their existence in the state of innocence. Issues of suffering and corruption were also used to show where the differences lay between the state of innocence and the state of sin. In the state of innocence, woman experienced the impurity of sexual intercourse, but nothing else. Are issues of gender difference important here? It would appear that they are. Even though the questions which applied to sexual function and virginity applied to both parents by implication, the masters only talked about this suffering in relation to women. Despite attributing a limited degree of corruption to woman in the state of innocence, masters discussed three types of punishment for woman in order to discuss her suffering.

In one way, therefore, the masters analysed men and women separately in the state of innocence, whilst in another they analysed them in similar terms. That masters asked certain questions of Adam and others of Eve suggests that they applied a framework of sex difference, using suffering as a tool to define it. However, on one level, suffering according to gender difference in the state of innocence was only apparent. Despite having different bodies, both man and woman experienced pain in the same way and to the same degree of intensity. Furthermore, masters deployed a sophisticated set of arguments to explain the differences between potentiality and actuality in the suffering of man and woman. In this sense, the body was ungendered in terms of suffering. The way in which suffering itself was meant to occur was similar for both sexes.

On another level, however, masters' ideas about sex difference can be construed through the types of pain that man and woman were to receive. Given that these questions were debated with the sinful body in mind, the terms of reference used by masters when they discussed Adam and Eve meant that they attributed certain types of pain or punishment to each, and specifically to woman. In this sense, gender difference regarding pain and suffering depended on the type of pain, rather than the way in which it was experienced. This notion will be examined in further detail with respect to the Fall.

Fall

The Fall from the state of innocence denoted the onset of corruption, illness, suffering and death. Pain was identified with all of these.[45] The cause of the Fall was the sin of pride from a desire to be like God.[46] The decay of the body was a result of the loss of original justice, which ensured an existence of perfection in the state of innocence.[47] In the Middle Ages, there was no agreement about whether man or woman was more responsible for this descent into sin and death.[48] Both, however, were to be punished for it. Two key passages of Genesis described the punishments which woman and man would inherit from the first parents.[49] These passages formed the basis of much biblical exegesis and

[45] E. Cohen, 'Towards a History of European Physical Sensibility: Pain in the Later Middle Ages', *Science in Context* 8,1 (1995), 57.
[46] See Børresen, *Subordination and Equivalence*, 206-8.
[47] On the role of original justice in theological systems, see C. Vollert, 'The Two Senses of Original Justice in Medieval Theology', *Theological Studies*, 5 (1944), 3-23.
[48] I. Maclean, *The Renaissance Notion of Woman: A Study of the Fortunes of Scholasticism and Medical Science in European Intellectual Life* (Cambridge, 1980), 15.
[49] 'Mulieri quoque dixit multiplicabo aerumnas tuas et conceptos tuos in dolore paries filios et sub viri potestate eris et ipse dominabitur tui...Ad Adam vero dixit quia audisti vocem uxoris tuae et comedisti de ligno ex quo praeceperam tibi ne comederas maledicta terra in opere tuo in laboribus comedes eam cunctis diebus vitae tuae. Spinas et tribulos germinabit tibi et comedes hebas terrae.

debate.[50] Masters therefore debated the nature of both male and female pains which were a result of the Fall. To establish how masters linked pain and gender, the following three questions are posed in this section: what kind of suffering was specific to woman? What pains were specific to man? What pains were common to both? In addition to these questions, an investigation will be made to ascertain whether masters perpetuated the traditional view of man as spirit and woman as flesh[51], or whether the body composite played a greater role in their discussions. Furthermore, with regard to the previous section, the assignation of types of pain in the state of sin might also be distinguishable from the way in which they were experienced.

The Halesian Summa differentiated between the types of suffering attributed to the first parents.[52] First, it dealt with the punishments of woman, which were on three levels: an increase in the hardship of conception; pain in childbirth; and female subjection to the power of man. These different punishments were related to the rational and sensible parts of the soul. The punishment which pertained to the rational part of the soul was the woman's subjection to man. The punishments relating to the sensible part of the soul were believed to be twofold:

In sudore vultus tui vesceris pane donec revertaris in terram de qua sumptus es, quia pulvis es et in pulverem reverteris': Gen. 3:16-17.

[50] See, for example, *Biblia Latina cum Glossa Ordinaria. Facsimile Reprint of the Editio Princeps of Adolph Rusch of Strassburg 1480-81*, 4 vols. (Turnhout 1992), i, fo.29^{rb}.

[51] The idea of the woman being associated with the flesh had a long heritage: Augustine had perceived man as the form or mind, whilst woman was equated with matter. The roots of this notion stemmed from middle platonism, the epitome of which was the philosopher Philo Judaeus. He allegorised Genesis and interpreted the man as *mens* and the woman as *sensus*. See, in particular, R.H. Bloch, *Medieval Misogyny and the Invention of Western Romantic Love* (Chicago and London, 1991), 27; R.A. Baer, *Philo's Use of the Categories Male and Female* (Leiden, 1970), 38-44; E.V. Spelman, 'Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views', *Feminist Studies*, 8 (1982), 109-31.

[52] *Summa Theologica*, Liber 2, pars 2 (Quaracchi, 1930), 224-6.

one according to increase, in the sense that hardship and suffering will increase; and the other concerning magnitude, which is the result of the pain caused in childbirth.[53]

In the act of generation of human beings, which is central to the conservation of the species, stated the Summa's authors, there exists a twofold suffering: first in the carrying of the foetus and second in the act of birth itself. The first corresponds to the growth of the child and the other to the consummation of the act of generation. At first there is pleasure and there is no *poena*. However, in terms of the act which corresponds to the conservation of the individual, the woman must be necessarily under the domination of another. This *poena* designates the woman's servitude to man.[54]

So three types of suffering were believed to pertain to woman as a result of original sin. The first amounts to suffering in the carrying of the foetus and in the act of childbirth itself. The second involves hardship in conception, during which woman's sexual pleasure will lead to suffering. These first two punishments were physical. Thirdly, woman was subjected to the power of man: a punishment of the soul or reason. These ideas clearly came from Genesis 3:16. The Halesian Summa interpreted them and attributed some types of suffering to the body and

[53] 'Et ponuntur tres ex parte mulieris: multiplicatio aerumnarum in multitudine conceptuum, dolor in partu et subiectio sub potestate viri. Est enim duplex vis animae cognoscitiva: rationalis et sensibilis. Quantum ad rationalem sumitur poena subiectionis; quantum ad sensibilem duplex poena: una secundum multiplicationem, cum dicit: *Multiplicabo aerumnas*; altera secundum magnitudinem, cum dicit: *In dolore paries*': *ibid.*, 224-5.

[54] 'Nam iuxta actum generationis, qui est ad conservationem speciei, duplicem poenam contrahit: in portando foetum et in pariendo, quorum unum pertinet ad progressum, alterum ad consummationem. In initio vero est delectatio, et ibi videtur esse sine poena...Ex parte vero actus qui est ad conservationem individui...subesse scilicet alterius dominationi necessario; et haec est illa poena quae designatur, cum dicitur: *Sub potestate viri eris*': *ibid.*

others to the reason. In this case, the authors of the Summa did not consider woman to be completely related to the flesh.

What kinds of suffering did the Halesian Summa attribute to man? Man was given some particular punishments of his own.[55] There were certain punishments for man which were due to the loss of good and others which followed the presence of evil. As far as the first set of punishments was concerned, these were divided into three elements: first was the loss of power following the removal of the tree of life; the second part of this loss of good was the expulsion from the place of pleasure, that is, the state of innocence; and the third part was the prohibition from returning there. The first part corresponded to a punishment of the body, the second to a punishment of the soul, and the third part to both body and soul together.[56]

As far as man's punishment due to the presence of evil was concerned, the authors of the Halesian Summa distinguished between the afflictions of life and death. In life, the various elements in the relevant passages of Genesis were explained. Man was to experience difficulty in providing subsistence. Man's work caused him hardship, in the cultivation of land. And his lack of achievement is to be confirmed by the fruitlessness of his labours. Punishment in

[55] 'De poenis peccati ex parte viri': *ibid.*, cap.2, 226.

[56] 'Significantur autem ibi plures poenae: quaedam enim sunt in ablatione boni et quaedam poenae sunt in positione mali...Ablatione vero boni dicitur quantum ad causam conservationis vitae, quantum ad locum voluptatis. Primum est impotentia sumendi de ligno vitae propter prohibitionem; secundum est expulsio de loco voluptatis; tertium est prohibitio reditus...Prima poena ex parte corporis; secunda ex parte animae: voluptas enim ex parte animae attenditur; tertia ex parte totius': *ibid.*

respect of death involved the necessity of dying and incineration, which referred to the scriptural account of returning to the ashes from which mortality came.[57]

Man thus experienced the physical detriment of *labor*. His failure to provide subsistence and the fruitlessness of such labours caused him suffering and were his punishment for original sin. Man also experienced the knowledge that death would come and that his body would be incinerated. However, the authors of the Halesian Summa also expressed the belief that there were other pains which man would experience which involved being banished from the state of innocence. Some of these pains pertained to the body, some to the soul and others to body and soul together. Despite discussing these latter punishments under the suffering of man, they must have been applied to woman also. The Halesian Summa is unclear on this point.

The Halesian Summa followed the vocabulary used for suffering found in Genesis. The authors of the Summa interpreted the relevant passages of Genesis within the structure of their answers. They explained that men and women were to suffer different kinds of pain. The pains which signalled the differences between the sexes were both physical and spiritual. Thus, masters used pain to determine sex difference. Moreover, it was based on the ultimate theological authority: the Bible.

[57] 'Quantum autem ad positionem mali distinguuntur poenae tum in vita, tum in morte...In vita vero distinguitur quantum ad initium sustentationis, quantum ad progressum et quantum ad consummationem...In primo laborandi difficultas, quae est in excolendo terram; in secundo infructuositas...in tertio victus parcitas, ad quem victum alia duo tendunt. Poena vero quae respicit mortem, duplex est: moriendi necessitatis et incineratio': *ibid.*

On the punishments or afflictions to be inflicted upon the first parents, Aquinas tackled two questions in his *Summa Theologiae*. In the first, he explored the pains which were common to both sexes, by asking whether death was the punishment for the sin of the first parents.[58] He concluded that if someone is deprived of a gift because of guilt, then the loss of this gift amounts to a punishment for guilt. In their first disposition, humans possessed the gift of being bound to God which had the corollary that the human mind was subjected to God, the inferior powers of the soul were under the control of the rational mind, and the body was controlled by the soul. However, Aquinas explained that the human mind fell away from its subjection to God which had the result that the inferior powers of the soul were not under complete control of the reason. Thus, there is a rebellion of the carnal appetite against reason. Life and the safety of the body comprise the subjection of body to soul. However, death, illness and all corporeal defects arise as a consequence of the collapse of this relationship between soul and body.[59]

In the following question Aquinas asked whether it was fitting that particular punishments of the first parents were determined in scripture.[60] Aquinas separated his explanation of the punishments into two: the first parents will suffer

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[58] 'Utrum mors sit poena peccati primorum parentum': *ST* 2a2ae, q.164, a.1, 334-5.

[59] 'Respondeo dicendum quod, si aliquis propter culpam suam privetur aliquo beneficio sibi dato, carentia illius beneficii est poena culpae illius...Homini in prima sui institutione hoc beneficium fuit collatum divinitus, ut quandiu mens eius esset Deo subiecta, inferiores vires animae subiicerentur rationali menti, et corpus animae subiicerentur. Sed quia mens hominis per peccatum a divina subiectione recessit, consecutum est ut nec inferiores vires totaliter rationi subiicerentur, unde tanta est rebellio carnalis appetitus ad rationem: nec etiam corpus totaliter subiicerentur animae, unde consequitur mors, et alii corporales defectus. Vita enim et incolumitas corporis consistat in hoc quod subiiciatur animae...unde, per oppositum, mors et aegritudo, et quilibet corporalis defectus, pertinet ad defectum subiectionis corporis ad animam': *ibid.*, 334.

[60] 'Utrum convenienter particulares poenae primorum parentum determinentur in scriptura': *ST* 2a2ae, q.164, a.2, 336-8. See Børresen, *Subordination and Equivalence*, 214-5.

the loss of participation in Paradise and they will not return to the state of innocence. The second punishment is further sub-divided: Aquinas explained that the first parents were punished according to the body and soul. According to the body, which pertains to the difference between the sexes, there is one kind of punishment for women and another for men. The female punishment is twofold, according to her union to man. It comprises the bearing of children and the responsibility of tasks relating to domestic relations. The bearing of children also has two aspects to it: the disgust in having to carry a child and the pain sustained when giving birth. In terms of domestic behaviour, woman is punished in as far as she is subjected to the domination of man.[61]

Man has certain specific punishments too, and Aquinas categorised them in three areas which corresponded to the relevant passages in Genesis. Essentially each punishment involved tasks which were necessities of life. The first punishment to face the man was the sterility of the earth; the second punishment was the anxiety caused by labour, and the third was that he was impeded in his cultivation of the land.[62]

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[61] 'Et ideo dupliciter puniti fuerunt. Primo quidem, quantum ad hoc quod subtractum fuit eis id quod integritatis statui competebat, scilicet locus terrestris Paradisi: quod significatur Gen.III cum dicitur: Et emisit eum Deus de Paradiso voluptatis...Secundo autem puniti fuerunt quantum ad hoc quod attributa sunt eis ea quae naturae conveniunt tali beneficio destitutae. Et hoc quidem et quantum ad corpus, et quantum ad animam. Quantum quidem ad corpus, ad quod pertinet differentia sexus, alia poena attributa est mulieri, alia viro. Mulieri quidem attributa est poena secundum duo propter quae viro coniungitur: quae sunt generatio prolis, et communicatio operum pertinentium ad domesticam conversationem. Quantum autem ad generationem prolis, punita fuit dupliciter. Primo quidem, quantum ad taedia quae sustinet portando prolem conceptam: et hoc significatur cum dicitur: *Multiplicabo aerumnas tuas et conceptos tuos*. Et quantum ad dolorem quem patitur in pariendo: et quantum ad hoc dicitur: *In dolore paries*. Quantum ad domesticam conversationem, punitur secundum hoc quod subiicitur dominationi viri, per hoc quod dicitur: *Sub viri potestate eris*': *ibid.*, 336-7.

[62] 'Sicut autem ad mulierem pertinet ut subdatur viro in his quae ad domesticam conversationem pertinent, ita ad virum pertinet quod necessaria vitae procuret. Et circa hoc punitur tripliciter. Primo quidem, per terrae sterilitatem, cum dicitur: *Maledicta terra in opere tuo*. Secundo, per laboris anxietatem, sine quae fructus terrae non percipit: unde dicitur: *In labore comedes de ea*

Aquinas then described further punishments of the soul which were not gender-specific, and thus pertained to both sexes. There were three aspects to this suffering of the soul. The first punishment was the confusion caused by the rebellion of the flesh to the spirit. The second pain of the soul was caused by the rebukes of personal guilt. Lastly, knowledge of future death completed the punishments for the soul after the Fall.[63]

Aquinas agreed with the authors of the Halesian Summa to the extent that there were certain types of suffering specific to man and other types of suffering specific to woman. In addition, he associated woman's suffering with her union to man. So woman suffered because of man. However, he also elucidated subsequent punishments which were not gender-specific. These were punishments of the soul caused by the rebellion of the flesh to the soul's rational powers. Aquinas also reinforced the notion that bodies of men and women were different. These differences were demonstrated by specific gender-based types of suffering. However, there was also suffering which was not contingent upon gender. This suffering was not physical, but spiritual which conformed to the belief that there was no gender difference in the soul. The definition of particular gendered pains in the body helped define the masters' notions of sex difference.

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cunctis diebus vitae tuae. Tertio, quantum ad impedimenta quae proveniunt terram colentibus: unde dicitur: *Spinas et tribulos germinabit tibi*': ibid., 337.

[63] 'Similiter etiam ex parte animae triplex eorum poena describitur. Primo quidem, quantum ad confusionem quam passi sunt de rebellione carnis ad spiritum...Secundo, quantum ad increpationem propriae culpae...Tertio, quantum ad commemorationem futurae mortis': *ibid.*

The passages of Genesis attributed the punishment of *dolor* to woman and *labor* to man. Masters did not dwell on these differences in vocabulary. *Dolor* was also used generically by them to discuss suffering in an ungendered context. Instead, both the Halesian Summa and Aquinas interpreted the meanings of these types of suffering. From the foregoing analysis, it would appear that gender distinction could be made by the physical pains attributed to each sex at the Fall, whereas the punishments which applied to the soul were not gender-specific.

Conclusion

Masters were keen to define notions of gender and gender difference. Women and men possessed different bodies and this became the focus for understanding gender difference; gender was not present in the human soul. The deployment of physical motifs of suffering and punishment to define the difference between male and female was an important development here. Masters interpreted their biblical authorities in a way which emphasised the physical differences between the sexes. Specific, gender-based suffering was the hallmark of these differences.

Sin and the corruption of the body was effected through sexual intercourse. It was this physical corruption which led to certain types of suffering for men and women. However, where suffering was related to the soul, the suffering was equal for men and women. Such suffering comprised a rebellion of the flesh to the rational powers of the soul, which led to the subsequent descent into carnal depravity and specific physical punishments for each sex.

In the state of innocence, however, gender difference was not an issue. Masters did not think sex difference important here because the soul and body were united to one another in perfect harmony. Therefore, masters had to develop a new notion of body. Although bodies in the state of innocence did not possess the stain of sin, they were mortal and thus capable of corruption. Masters used different ways of talking about suffering to determine the nature of these bodies. The development of the theory of 'potential suffering' was the epitome of their construction of a mortal, ungendered and incorruptible body.

However, masters still framed their questions about suffering in the state of innocence according to gender. They asked certain *questions of Adam and others* of Eve. This is testament to their viewing of pre-Fall questions through post-Fall categories. The Fall affected notions of gender difference. Woman was faced with the burden and pains of childbirth. She was also subject to the power of man. Man's suffering entailed the hardship of work and his failure to succeed at it. However, there were also pains which both sexes had in common. These involved suffering of the soul. There was no gender distinction here.

What does this contribute to our understanding of thirteenth-century attitudes to pain in this life? Issues of pain and suffering helped masters understand notions of sex difference. We cannot understand their attitudes to pain without gender; and we cannot fully understand their ideas about sex difference without reference to pain. Physical pains were pains which were linked to gender. However, there is a distinction to be made between the different types of suffering attributed to man and woman, and the way in which they experienced them. The relationship

of body to soul and how this determined suffering was the same for both sexes. So while pains of certain types could determined sex difference, the experience of established common ground between the sexes.

3

Pain as a Restorative Power: Voluntary Suffering and Satisfaction for Sin

The importance which theologians attached to painful means of redemption from sin was, it seems, immense. Christ as a model of suffering to be imitated is most often associated with the fifteenth century and most particularly with Thomas à Kempis.[1] However, the links between human and divine suffering were of especial interest to theologians in the thirteenth century. A framework of explanation was required which would encompass the suffering of humans, on the one hand, and the divine on the other. Where Christ was concerned, theologians performed a delicate balancing act to resolve apparent contradictions within his human and divine natures, and to account for his voluntary acceptance of suffering for the sins of humankind. This was outlined in chapter one. However, when it came to human suffering, taken on in a voluntary capacity, masters had another set of issues which necessitated attention. First, suffering was repugnant to both body and soul. Second, the suffering of soul and body were different and each experienced pain in its own way and to its own degree of intensity. Third, how could suffering prevent disorder in the soul and body when pain itself caused disruption and corruption? These issues clearly required clarification if suffering were to be afforded beneficial status to a sinner. Suffering voluntarily had been part of penitential practice for centuries and it appears that it required more detailed explanation and even justification. How the soul and body are joined, and how they are related to the will when pain is

[1] Thomas à Kempis, *Of the imitation of Christ: four books* (London, 1990).

present are themes which form the core of theological questions on contrition, fasting and bodily castigation. It is for these reasons that questions on penance and questions on fasting are to be considered together in this chapter. Ultimately, both areas of discussion involved reaching the goal of re-ordering the soul and body, and returning to the simple good that is God. Moreover, how the theology of voluntary suffering addressed issues of pastoral care and the improvement of sinners' souls, in life and after death, is a persistent and crucial undercurrent in the masters' questions.

Historiography of Penance

Before examining the questions which masters asked about certain aspects of penance, it seems worthwhile to review the immense body of existing literature on medieval penance, to gauge what level of treatment the theme of penitential suffering has been given. There have been many studies of the history of penance since Henry Charles Lea's magisterial three volume work in the late nineteenth century.[2] The common position taken by historians of penance following Lea was that public penance and the practice of tariff-imposing, impersonal penitentials, were replaced by a personal, introspective private penance

[2] H.C. Lea, *A History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences in the Latin Church*, 3 vols. (London, 1896). The major accounts are: O.D. Watkins, *A History of Penance*, 2 vols. (London, 1920); N. Paulus, *Die Geschichte des Ablaßes im Mittelalter: Vom Ursprung bis zur Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Paderborn, 1922); B. Poschmann, *Die abendländische Kirchenbuße im frühen Mittelalter* (Breslau, 1930); E. Amanne, 'Pénitence', *DTC*, vol.12 (1933); J.A. Spitzig, *Sacramental Penance in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries* (Washington D.C., 1947); P. Anciaux, *La théologie du sacrement de pénitence au XIIe siècle* (Louvain, 1949); B. Poschmann, *Penance and the Anointing of the Sick*, trans. F. Courtney (London and Freiburg, 1964); C. Vogel, *Le pécheur et la pénitence au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1969). More recent studies include: T.N. Tentler, *Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation* (Princeton, 1977); M.C. Mansfield, *The Humiliation of Sinners. Public Penance in Thirteenth Century France* (Ithaca and London, 1989).

contingent upon annual, private confession to the parish priest, the institutional culmination of which was the canon *Omnis utriusque sexus* of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.[3] The long-standing theory held by historians following Lea argued that, before the ninth century, penances were harsh and prescribed for offences without the personal needs of the individual being taken into account.[4] The genesis of private penance thereafter fitted neatly into the twelfth-century framework of the growth of the individual and the ethic of intention, replacing public ritual humiliation.[5]

This theory has been discredited most recently by Mary Mansfield, who argues that recent historiography of penance has been unduly concerned with the theological categorisation of penance, to the exclusion of explaining its actual practice.[6] This is partly due to the viewing of pre-scholastic developments in penance through scholastic categories, which Mansfield calls 'unconsciously teleological'. Furthermore, she criticises thirteenth-century theologians for failing to elucidate a theology of private penance: theologians, according to Mansfield, did not construct satisfactory definitions of their terms which could

[3] Lea, *Auricular Confession and Indulgences*, ii, 81-101; Poschmann, *Penance and the Anointing*, 156f.; Tentler, *Sin and Confession*, 16-17; J. Tambling, *Confession: Sexuality, Sin, the Subject* (Manchester, 1990), 35. Mansi, xxii.1007-1010.

[4] This rather simplistic view of the penitentials has been dismissed by P.J. Payer who maintains that there are strong elements of continuity between the penitentials and later, more 'personal' *summae*: 'The Humanism of the Penitentials and the Continuity of the Penitential Tradition', *Mediaeval Studies*, 46 (1984), 340-354. For source material on the *libri poenitentiales*, see J.T. McNeill and H.M. Gamer, (eds.), *Medieval Handbooks of Penance* (New York, 1938, repr., 1990).

[5] The link between private penance and the ethic of intention is to be found particularly in Vogel, *Pécheur et Pénitence.*

[6] Mansfield, *Humiliation of Sinners*, 9.

be easily translated into other media such as confessors' manuals, nor did they distinguish between interior and exterior penance to an adequate degree.[7]

Other recent histories of penance have considered whether the nature of pain was important to masters in their theological treatises. Thomas Tentler, for example, claims that theologians were preoccupied with the presence or absence of grace in their examination of penance and, moreover, that they avoided distinguishing and explaining the reasons and motivations behind the pain of penance because these emotions could easily lead the penitent into error.[8] However, the reason for Tentler's claim may lie in the inherent complexity of the theological problems discussed in treatises and questions on penance. Disentangling the role of the priest in the penitential system from other aspects, such as penance as a 'condition' of remorse or penance as sacrament, are thorny issues which cloud analysis of issues of suffering, and which also exceed the parameters of this thesis.[9]

Instead, it is argued in this chapter that thirteenth-century masters of theology had a more coherent and carefully constructed explanation of the role of voluntary suffering than has hitherto been appreciated. To this end, questions on

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[7] *Ibid.*, 20-37.

[8] 'St. Thomas did not spend a great deal of time exploring the nature of perfect sorrow: he did not meticulously define the proper motives of contrition or distinguish it psychologically from imperfect contrition. Indeed, he explicitly warned against examining the reasons for sorrow, "because a man cannot easily measure his own emotions"': T.N. Tentler, *Sin and Confession*, 24-5. See also A. Vanneste, 'La théologie de la pénitence chez quelques maîtres Parisiens de la première moitié de XIIIe siècle', *EThL*, 28 (1952), 42.

[9] There was some ambiguity over which part of penance had what meaning, following the problematic phrase introduced by Peter Lombard: 'Quid in actione penitentiae sit sacramentum et res'. Some held that exterior penance was the sacrament of interior penance (contrition), whilst others believed that contrition was equal to sacrament and *res*. See Vanneste, 'Théologie', 32-7;

the voluntary assumption of contrition are to be considered alongside debates about the voluntary mortification of the flesh, abstinence and fasting. The relationship between bodily affliction and its concomitant spiritual effects sheds light on the way in which masters understood the relationship between body and soul in suffering, and how this in turn could lead to reparation for sins which had been committed.

1. Penitential Suffering

Many questions which masters of theology asked about penance involved discussing the nature of contrition. Masters wanted to know what contrition was because it was an essential part of penance. Contrition involved suffering for sin. The nature of this suffering was important for masters because it was voluntary, but the idea of accepting pain voluntarily went against the framework masters had constructed for understanding pain and suffering. It thus seems pertinent to analyse the way in which pain was treated in a voluntary sense in questions on contrition. How masters developed their ideas of pain is central to the way in which penance was understood. Two main areas appear to have been central to defining the nature of contritional suffering. First was the way in which masters understood the relationship between suffering and the will. Second, masters investigated the extent to which the penitent should suffer. These themes are examined under two subsections: the role of the will and degrees of suffering. Analysis of the conclusions in these sections will provide evidence that, contrary

R.Ohlmann, 'St. Bonaventure and the Power of the Keys', *Franciscan Studies*, 6 (1946), 293-315; 437-65; esp. 307-14.

to the claims of Thomas Tentler, masters were indeed interested in the nature of pain and sought to define it in terms of the motivations of the sinner.

i. Role of the Will

Since the twelfth century, it had been presumed that contrition alone sufficed to remit sins which had been committed. This presented some difficulties in assigning the correct role of the priest and his powers to 'bind and loose' the sinner, according to the power of the keys.[10] Masters were thus keen to define the nature of contrition and how the will was involved within it. Albert the Great, for example, asked what the proper definition of contrition was.[11] His actual response was very brief[12] but we can learn much about the way in which he related pain to the will when he answered his many objections. For this reason, some key objections and their responses are considered together. In the first key objection and its reply, the main issue appeared to be the nature and function of the will itself. In the objection it was argued that as the will was part of the rational soul, and there was no pleasure there, neither would there be suffering in the will.[13] Albert replied to this objection by arguing that the will is not divided into two parts, deliberating and natural, as some have written. The will suffers in

[10] For example, Abelard contended that if contrition was motivated by love of God, this would suffice to annul sin. See Poschmann, *Penance and Anointing*, 159-60; Tentler, *Sin and Confession*, 19-20.

[11] 'Quid sit contritio propria diffinitione?': *IV Sent.*, d.16, a.7, 312-14.

[12] Albert argued that all of the descriptions in his question sufficed to describe the nature of contrition: 'Dicendum, quod omnibus his descriptionibus satis bene describitur contritio et in fine dicemus penes quid differunt': *ibid.*, 313.

[13] 'Non videtur Philosophicum dictum esse, quod voluntas dolet: sic enim dicunt Damasc., Gregorius Nazianzenus et Aristot. Omnis voluntas in ratione est: et si rationalis non est, voluntas non est. Dicit enim Aristot.in 7. Ethicorum, quod omnis delectatio est generatio vel motus in sensibilem animam: ergo nulla delectatio est in rationali...ergo nulla tristitia est in voluntate': *ibid.*

its nature from contraries to that nature and gains joy from things harmonious to it.[14] So the will was understood to suffer according to its own nature.

However, the main difficulty in assigning pain to the will was the apparent paradox of possessing both joy and suffering at the same time. Albert explained that joy from the pursuit of desire and pain are not present in the will for the same reason and thus are not contrary to one another. Voluntary suffering is made by the will and Albert explained this suffering in two distinct ways. It is pain in as far as it punishes fault and voluntary to the extent that it cures and expels sin.[15] In other words, Albert meant that voluntary suffering was punitive on the one hand, and purgative on the other.

In a further objection, Albert examined the nature of the will and the nature of suffering which pertained to it. As far as the nature of the will was concerned, Albert stated that nothing could be afflicted unless it had contraries in itself. However, the will, as part of the rational soul, does not have contraries in itself, so it cannot be afflicted by pain in itself. On the type of pain itself, Albert put forward the argument that pain which is generally destructive of sin, stems from every sin, whereas pain which is in the sensitive part of the soul does not always come from sin. Thus, it cannot destroy sin.[16]

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[14] 'Nec dicimus hoc esse soluendum, ut quidam scripserunt, scilicet quod voluntas duplex est: ut diliberans, et ut natura...Quia hoc omnino nihil est: quia voluntas ut natura dolet de contrariis naturae, et gaudet de conuenientibus eidem': *ibid.*

[15] 'Gaudium de assecutione voliti et dolor non secundum unam rationem se habent ad voluntatem: et ideo non sunt contraria: quia iste dolor est factus a voluntate, et est dolor inquantum est punitiuus delicti, et voluntarius inquantum curatiuus et expulsiuus peccati': *ibid.*, 314.

[16] 'Nihil dolore potest affici secundum se, nisi quod habet contrarium secundum se: sed voluntas secundum se accepta prout est pars animae rationalis, non habet contrarium secundum se: ergo dolore non afficitur secundum se...Dolor qui est generaliter destructiuus peccati, est de omni

In his reply to the above objection Albert argued that something which is simply spiritual does not have contraries in being, but to the extent that it is ordered to something, it can possess a contrary to that ordering. Albert illustrated this argument by explaining that the rational soul has sin, and this sin is contrary to the soul's union and ordering to God.[17] The use of the concept of ordering permitted Albert to explain how the soul could possess contraries. This ordering of the soul towards God is a theme which will be examined later in this chapter.

Albert thus found ways to define the nature of voluntary pain. Pain in the will is seemingly paradoxical. One kind of pain is in the part of the soul which deals with sense perception, whilst the will is in the rational part of the soul. But Albert defined the precise nature of the will and argued that another kind of pain which has beneficial aspects can be present in the will at the same time as pleasure.

Compared with other notions of pain seen in previous chapters, the pain of contrition was directly related to the will rather than to the interaction of soul and body. It was also a general pain capable of expelling sin. Thus, a new type of suffering was defined. This definition helped to elucidate the complex process involved in the remission of sin.

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peccato: dolor autem in sensibili anima acceptus, non est de omni peccato: ergo non est destructiuus peccati': *ibid.*, 312.

[17] 'Dicendum, quod simpliciter spirituale non habet contrarium in esse, sed prout ordinatur ad aliquid, potest habere contrarium ordini illi: et hoc modo anima rationalis habet contrarium peccatum, quia contrariatur coniunctioni et ordini ad Deum': *ibid.*, 312.

Some years after Albert had tackled this issue, Bonaventure asked what contrition was in its substance.[18] His reply was clear and succinct. He argued that just as sin was performed by the agreement of the rational will, so it is destroyed through the discord of the rational will. He then used a quotation from Augustine which stated that discord of the will generated *dolor*. In this way, said Bonaventure, contrition is *dolor* in essence. He further explained that *dolor* can be defined in two ways: first, it is itself discord of the will; second, it is the passion which arises as a consequence of this discord, which prompts a human to burst into tears. The discord is the essence of contrition, whilst this passion is its effect.[19]

Thus, Bonaventure also focused on defining the precise nature of contritional pain, so he agreed with Albert in the premise of his question. Contrition amounted to pain in as much as it signified discord in the will. Bonaventure used the authority of Augustine to back up this claim. However, it was not a pain of the senses. The pain which resulted from the discord in the will is the pain required to destroy sin. This discord is also pain in two ways: in itself as the discord, and the passion which results in the senses from this discord.

Thus, for Bonaventure, the pain of contrition was not a pain of the senses, but nevertheless contritional pain could cause pain in the senses. This supported the

[18] 'Quid sit contritio quoad suam substantiam': *IV Sent.*, d.16, p.1, a.1, q.1, 383-5.

[19] 'Dicendum, quod sicut peccatum perpetratur per consensum, sic econtra deletur et destruitur per dissensum voluntatis rationalis; et quia dissensus ab ea re, quam impossibile est non esse, generat dolorem, sicut dicit Augustinus: ideo dicendum, quod contritio est dolor per essentiam. Sed attendendum, quod dolor dicitur dupliciter: uno modo ipse dissensus voluntatis, alio modo passio resultans in sentientem ex illo dissensu, per quam prorumpit homo in lacrymas; et ille dissensus est de essentia contritionis, sed illa passio est effectus eius': *ibid.*, 383.

masters' understanding of the links between soul and body. The movement of pain from one to the other displayed this. Contritional pain was not the same as pain of the senses. Nevertheless, the two were clearly linked.

Aquinas addressed similar issues when he asked whether contrition was an act of virtue.[20] He argued that, according to its proper name, contrition did not signify an act of virtue, but rather a certain corporeal passion. He then proceeded to argue that just as the capacity of the will to do evil introduces evil *ex genere*, so the annihilation of this will introduces good *ex genere* because it involves a detesting of the will which commits sin. Aquinas then stated that in contrition there were two kinds of suffering for sin: one in the sensitive part of the soul, where it is a passion; and the other in the will itself. The first kind of suffering was not essential to contrition, but rather an effect of it. The virtue of penance afflicts exterior punishment on the body as repayment for the sin committed against God. This kind of suffering can pertain to contrition in as much as it is a part of the sacrament because the sacraments are not only in interior acts, but also in exterior and sense-related things. Bonaventure also argued that there could be a kind of suffering in the will when the state of will was given the name of a passion. This suffering was displeasure caused by some evil.[21]

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[20] 'An contritio sit actus virtutis': *IV Sent.*, d.17, q.2, a.1, q°2, 857-61.

[21] 'Dicendum quod contritio secundum proprietatem sui nominis non significat actum virtutis, sed magis quamdam corporalem passionem...Sicut enim inflatio propriae voluntatis ad malum faciendum importat, quantum est de se, malum ex genere; ita illius voluntatis annihilatio et comminutio quaedam de se importat bonum ex genere; quia hoc est detestari propriam voluntatem qua peccatum commissum est... Dicendum quod in contritione est duplex dolor de peccato. Unus in parte sensitiva, qui passio est. Et hic non est essentialiter contritio, prout est actus virtutis, sed magis effectus ipsius...Enim poenitentiae virtus exteriorem poenam suo corpori infligit ad recompensandum offensam quae in Deum commissa est officio membrorum...Sed tamen hic dolor potest pertinere ad contritionem, inquantum est pars sacramenti; quia sacramenta non solum in interioribus actibus, sed etiam in exterioribus et in rebus sensibilibus, nata sunt esse. Alius dolor

Like the other masters before him, Aquinas also clarified the nature of contrition by determining what kinds of suffering were present. There is pain in the will itself, which is proper to contrition. And pain which is in the sensitive part of the soul. But this is a non-essential pain and an effect of the first. However, Aquinas focused more closely on the exterior pain which would be inflicted on the body as a result of penance. He argued that this was fitting, given that the sacraments are concerned with both interior and exterior acts.

Contrition could have physical as well as spiritual attributes. Types of pain were distinguished which made discussion about contrition in penance more accessible. The links between types of pain were also considered. There is thus clear evidence that there was a definite interest in understanding the precise nature of pain in penance. In this case, Tentler's theory that masters did not explore the nature of suffering in penance is wrong.

The masters were agreed that there were two types of pain. The pain caused by the discord of the will was most important in contrition. Discord of the will was the essential part of contritional suffering. It was thus essential to penance. They also developed the idea of the involvement of physical suffering in penance. It was linked to the pain of the will, but played a secondary role.

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est in voluntate, qui nihil aliud est quam displicentia alicujus mali, secundum quod affectus voluntatis nominatur per nomina passionum': *ibid.*, 861-2.

Although there were separate pains, the links between body and soul meant that interior pains had effects on the body, and vice-versa. However, these pains were still distinguishable from one another. The will had its own particular pain which was different from other sorts of pain. Its presence in the will was not contradictory. So creating a new type of pain, contritional pain, and explaining how it differed from other kinds of suffering, helped explain the nature of penance and expulsion of sin. Suffering was thus afforded beneficial, purgative attributes.

ii. Degrees of suffering

When discussing contrition, masters were interested in the kind of suffering which was required and how perfect that suffering should be. There was much debate about the differences between contrition and attrition. In earlier centuries, the states of contrition and attrition denoted whether the soul felt a greater or lesser degree of affliction respectively. However, by the thirteenth century, the difference between these two states of existence represented a penance informed by God's grace (contrition) and uninformed penance (attrition).[22] Moreover, the role of the priest in the sacrament of penance was closely linked to the role of contrition or attrition in the penitent. At Oxford, Duns Scotus reconciled the two by arguing that perfect contrition was an exception, and that an attrite sinner was sufficient to begin a period of penance.[23] The issue of whether attrition could

[22] Poschmann, *Penance and Anointing*, 164.
[23] Tentler, *Sin and Confession*, 26.

become contrition was hotly debated, and a general consensus emerged that it could not, given that it was uninformed by God's grace.[24]

It has been overlooked, however, that masters also addressed questions about the degree to which a penitent had to suffer in order for sin to be remitted. Such questions focused sharply on the extent and kind of suffering which was involved. For example, Bonaventure asked whether it was necessary for the pain of contrition to be the greatest.[25] He replied that pain could mean displeasure of the reason or a passion in the senses resulting from this displeasure. With regard to the second of these, Bonaventure argued, it is not necessary to suffer more greatly as a result of sin than from temporal things. Such dolor does not follow love, but follows its affection and the affection of experiential cognition.[26] By this, Bonaventure meant that it was only associated as an effect of the destruction of sin.

Bonaventure was quite definite that to repent for sin, there was no reason for the pain of the senses to be greater than that for temporal things.[27] Nevertheless, he went on to compare suffering in contrition, which we have seen as 'displeasure of the reason' with other kinds of pain, and whether there is a preference for other kinds of suffering. In the present state of suffering and detesting sin, argued

[24] For example, 'An attritio possit fieri contritio': Aquinas, *IV Sent.*, d.17, q.2, a.1, q[a]3, 856-62; 'Utrum attritio possit fieri contritio': Richard of Middleton, *IV Sent.*, d.17, a.1, q.2, 241.
[25] 'Utrum necesse sit, dolorem contritionis esse maximum': *IV Sent.*,d.16, p.1, a.2,q.1, 387-9.
[26] 'Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur de quantitate doloris, dolor potest dici displicentia rationis, vel passio ex hac resultans in sensualitatem...Talis enim dolor non consequitur amorem, sed consequitur ipsam affectionem, et affectio experimentalem cognitionem': *ibid.*, 387.
[27] 'Si hoc secundo modo accipiatur; dico, quod non est necesse magis dolore de peccato quam de re temporali': *ibid.*, 387.

Bonaventure, where one must choose between sinning and tolerating *poena*: one is bound to choose punishment or suffering over sin. He argued that to prefer punishment to sin is a perfect virtue. However, it is dangerous and foolish to seek this kind of preference from someone infirm or of oneself, for this can put man into temptation. Thus, said Bonaventure, no confessor should ask this of someone who confesses to him. If the penitent offers himself and says he would rather be dead than have sinned, it is to be a cause for joy and the sign of a good will. In comparison to other pains, the *dolor* of contrition has predominance.[28]

Following the terminology for contritional pain outlined in the previous subsection, Bonaventure again distinguished between contritional suffering and other kinds of pain. Contritional suffering was deemed to be greater in comparison to other kinds of suffering. It could also lead to other kinds of suffering, for example in the senses. However, there is an important distinction made between actual contritional suffering (displeasure of reason) and subsequent supplementary suffering of the senses. This is evidence that a clear framework for discussing contrition in penance was emerging.

[28] 'Si vero de comparatione et praeelectione quaeratur; respondent aliqui et faciunt in hoc vim, quia potest intelligi respectu praeteriti vel futuri. Sed ego non video in hoc vim, quia iusta voluntas et vere poenitens ita detestatur praeteritum peccatum, ut futurum, ne fiat; et ita est peccatum velle peccasse, sicut velle peccare. Ideo de peccati praecedentis dolore et detestatione dicendum, quod in casu, in quo oportet praeeligere vel consentire in peccatum sive complacentiam peccati, vel tolerantiam poenae, quilibet tenetur praeeligere sive magis eligere poenam quam velle peccare vel pecasse. Praeter casum necessitatis dico, quod praeeligere omnem poenam est perfectae virtutis...sed praeeligere culpam alicui poenae, hoc est iniquitatis, si est cum deliberatione et plena voluntate, quia omnis talis voluntas est iniqua, quae peccatum vult vel absolute vel conditionaliter. Unde periculum est et stultitia quaerere hoc ab aliquo infirmo, vel etiam a se ipso, quia hoc est hominem ponere in tentationem; unde nullus confessor debet hoc ab aliquo, qui sibi confitetur, quaerere. Sed si poenitens se offerat et dicat, se malle mortuum esse quam pecasse...gaudendum est, quia hoc est signum bonae voluntatis...In comparatione ad alios dolores dico, sicut de amore, quod oportet, quod habeat praedominium': *ibid.*

Whether the pain of contrition was greater than any other pain in nature was also debated by Aquinas.[29] He differentiated between two sorts of suffering in contrition. One is in the will itself, which is nothing other than displeasure for past sin. This kind of suffering in contrition excedes all others, for however much something is pleasing, so much the contrary of it is displeasing. The divine end is pleasing above all things and thus sin which detracts from this end ought to be most displeasing above all.[30]

The other kind of *dolor* exists in the part of the soul involved in sense perception. This suffering arises as a result of the first pain, either from the necessity of nature, according to which the inferior powers follow superior motion, or from choice, in which the penitent himself arouses *dolor* so that he suffers from sin. In neither of these cases, argued Aquinas, is this secondary suffering the greatest of pains. The reason for this is that the inferior powers are more vehemently moved by objects which are close to them, than they are from the overflow of pain from the superior powers. The nearer the operation of the superior powers to the inferior object, so much greater is their movement. Thus, there is greater *dolor* in the sensitive part of the soul from wounding of the senses than that which overflows into the senses from the reason. Similarly, the deliberation of the corporeal overflows into the senses to a greater extent than the consideration of the spiritual. It follows from this that the suffering in the

[29] 'An contritio sit major dolor qui esse possit in natura': *IV Sent.*, d.17, q.2, a.3, q[a]1, 872-3.
[30] 'In contritione est duplex dolor. Unus in ipsa voluntate, qui est essentialiter ipsa contritio, quae nihil aliud est quam displicentia praeteriti peccati. Et talis dolor in contritione excedit alios dolores, quia quantum aliquid placet, tantum contrarium ejus displicet. Finis autem super omnia placet, cum omnia propter ipsum desiderentur. Et ideo peccatum quod a fine ultimo avertit, super omnia displicere debet': *ibid.*, 872.

sensitive part from the displeasure of the reason as a result of sin is not greater than other pains present in it.[31]

Aquinas differentiated between contritional suffering as discord of will and subsequent suffering of the senses, agreeing on this paradigm with Bonaventure. Aquinas was also building on his previous distinction, as seen in the previous section. But he believed that suffering which was discord of the will exceeded all others. The pain of the senses emanated from this discord, either from the necessity of nature or from choice of the penitent. However, the other kinds of suffering which were caused directly to the senses were felt more keenly there than the pain which overflowed into the senses from the discord of the will. The discord felt in the will thus also had physical aspects because of the links between body and soul. Inherent in this was the idea of overflow from the will into the senses.

The two different types of suffering accrued in the practice of penance were also analysed for their potentially harmful effects. Bonaventure asked whether it was possible for the *dolor* of contrition to be excessive.[32] He explained that when contrition is the displeasure of reason, it cannot be excessive. When, however, it

[31] 'Alius dolor est in parte sensitiva, qui causatur ex primo dolore, vel ex necessitate naturae, secundum quod vires inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum; vel ex electione, secundum quod homo poenitens in seipso hunc dolorem excitat et de peccatis doleat. Et neutro modo oportet quod sit maximus dolorum. Quia vires inferiores vehementius moventur ab objectis propriis, quam ex redundantia superiorum virium. Et ideo quanto operatio superiorum virium est propinquior objectis inferiorum, tanto magis sequuntur earum motum. Et ideo major dolor est in sensitiva parte ex laesione sensibili quam sit ille qui in ipsa redundat ex ratione. Et similiter major qui redundat ex ratione de corporalibus deliberante quam qui redundat ex ratione considerante spiritualia. Unde dolor in sensitiva parte ex displicentia rationis proveniens de peccato, non est major doloribus qui in ipsa sunt': *ibid.*, 872-3.

[32] 'Utrum possibile sit, in dolore contritionis esse excessum': *IV Sent.*, d.16, p.1, a.2, q.2, 389-90.

is a passion overflowing into the senses, it can be excessive. The second kind of suffering which overflows into the senses is scarcely or never excessive, but one can experience only so much of it because human frailty cannot suffer without great detriment. It is necessary therefore to be temperate. However, Bonaventure conceded that someone who is not temperate, because this person is not directed towards temperance, but seized by a fervour, does not sin because they are directed towards licit things. If the sinner does not practice temperance, either through the affection of joy or the consolation of hope, then the goals of virtue and contrition are transcended. Contrition, like charity, is so called because it is informed by grace. The suffering of contrition can never be excessive because the displeasure of sin can never be extended to excess when it is out of correct consideration.[33]

The distinction between two types of pain allowed masters to ask this question and provide a sophisticated answer. Masters could talk about grace-informed contrition and still explain the potentially excessive effects. The excess lay in the associated suffering in the senses if temperance is not practised. Links between soul and body were crucial in explaining the nature of suffering. Also, pastoral concerns could be confronted by explaining the nature of suffering in both will

[33] 'Contritio quoad displicentiam rationis non potest esse nimia, sed quoad passionem redundantem in sensualitatem posset habere excessum...Quantum autem ad passionem redundantem in sensualitatem, vix aut nunquam est nimia; tamen posset esse tantus dolor, quod humana infirmitas non posset sufferre sine magno detrimento; et tunc dico, quod temperandus esset. Sed esto, quod non temperaret quis, quia non adverteret et raperetur a fervore; non credo, quod in tali casu peccaret, quia daret operam rei licitae...Si autem non temperaret vel per affectionem gaudii, vel per consolationem spei; credo, quod transcenderet metas virtutis, et ita contritionis. Contritio enim, sicut caritas, nominat quid informatum gratia. Unde dolor contritionis, manens contritionis, non potest esse nimius, quia displicentia peccati nunquam tantum potest intendi, quod possit esse nimia, cum sit ex consideratione recta': *ibid.*, 389-90.

and body. In certain ways, therefore, masters linked the theology of penance to its practice within their theological treatises.

Aquinas inquired about the same issue some years later.[34] In a similar way, he found that the *dolor* in the reason resulting from displeasure for sin committed against God cannot be excessive, just as the love of charity to which this displeasure is directed cannot be excessive. Sensible suffering, on the other hand, can be excessive in the same way as affliction of the body can be excessive.[35]

Like Bonaventure, Aquinas argued that pain in the reason resulting from displeasure for sin could not be excessive. Aquinas, however, introduced the idea of comparison with the love of charity which also cannot be excessive. Both this pain and charity are informed by grace. Suffering of the senses which results can be excessive, just as bodily affliction can be excessive. A conscious distinction between physical suffering directly affecting the senses, and physical suffering as a result of the overflow from the discord in the soul was made. Masters were thus adhering to a system of pain which they had applied in other areas of theological discussion.

A third master to debate whether contritional suffering could be excessive was Richard of Middleton.[36] Richard was a Franciscan and was a bachelor of the

[34] 'An possit esse nimis magnus contritionis dolor': *IV Sent.*, d.17,q.2, a.3, q.2, 874-5.
[35] 'Dicendum quod contritio ex parte doloris qui est in ratione, scilicet displicentiae, quo peccatum displicet inquantum est offensa Dei, non potest esse nimia: sicut nec amor caritatis, quo intenso talis displicentia intenditur, potest esse nimius. Sed quantum ad dolorem sensibilem potest esse nimia: sicut etiam exterior corporis afflictio potest esse nimia': *ibid.*, 874.
[36] 'Utrum possit esse nimis magnus dolor in contritione': *Super Quatuor Libros Sententiarum*, 4 vols. (Brixiae, 1591, repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1963), iv, *IV Sent.*, d.17, a.1, q.8, 246.

Sentences in 1283, during which time he played a part in the Franciscan commission examining Jean-Pierre Olivi.[37] Richard distinguished between the kind of suffering essential to contrition, that is, the displeasure caused by the transgression of the divine law, and the non-essential suffering of physical pain. The first he deemed not to be excessive, for it is motivated directly by charitable love of God.[38] For the physical suffering in contrition, Richard essentially followed the argumentation offered by Bonaventure and Aquinas before him. However, he added a distinction: if the penitent out of the most vehement love of God, so greatly suffers for his sins, from which is caused such vehement suffering in the sensitive appetite, that it corrupts the harmony of the body necessary for life, this is not excessive according to custom, nor does it detract from the perfection of penance. The exception to this is when the penitent deliberately wills suffering which leads to death. This, Richard considered, would be excessive.[39]

Consistent with the beliefs of other masters, Richard also argued that the discord of the will could not be excessive because it was motivated directly by charitable

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[37] E. Amann, 'Richard de Mediavilla', *DTC*, 13.2 (1937), 2669-75; For his life and works, see E. Hocedez, *Richard de Middleton, sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine* (Paris and Louvain, 1925); J. Reuss, 'Die theologische Tugend der Liebe nach der Lehre des Richard von Mediavilla', *Franziskanische Studien*, 22 (1935), 11-43.

[38] 'Dolor in contritione quo ad displicentiam voluntatis rationalis nimius esse neutiquam potest, quo ad corporis vero afflictionem, et appetitus sensitivi passionum, aut vix, aut nunquam est nimius. Respondeo, quod in actu penitendi duplex est dolor, unus essentialis penitentiae, et hoc est in voluntate rationali. Est enim quaedam voluntatis displicentia qua sibi displicet peccatum inquantum est transgressio legis diuinae et quia haec displicentia directe causatur ex charitatiua Dei dilectione, qua nimis intendi non potest, ideo haec displicentia non potest esse nimis magna': *IV Sent.*, d.17, a.1, q.8, 246.

[39] 'Si penitens ex vehementissimo Dei amore, tam vehementer doloret de suo peccato, quod ex hoc causaretur in appetitu sensitiuo tam vehemens dolor, quod corrumperet harmoniam corporis necessarium ad vitam, non esset excessus in genere moris, nec perfectioni penitentiae derogans, sed concordans, nisi forte hominis voluntas directe, et ex intentione ferretur ad procurandum talem passionem ad hoc, vt ipse moreretur: et sic credo, quod intelligunt illi qui dicunt, quod in dolore, qui est in appetitu sensituo potest esse excessus': *ibid.*

love of God. However, Richard added that if a penitent corrupted the harmony of the body through vehement love of God, this should not be regarded as excessive, unless the penitent were will suffering which would lead to death. So suffering caused by the link between body and soul could be excessive, but not pain which was directly related to the will. Furthermore, the pain of contrition was related to love or charity. This was a clear focus on its motivation.

Masters asked about contrition because the conceptual framework they had created for pain, as seen in previous chapters, viewed pain as destructive to the human body. It was thus potentially pardoxical to speak of willing pain. For masters, it was essential therefore to understand the role of the will in suffering and how it pertained to contrition within the sacrament of penance. Masters also had pastoral concerns in their discussions of penance. They warned against penance being too severe. Masters were indeed concerned about the motivation of penitents. How penitents should suffer in order to overcome sin was vigorously debated by them. This is clear evidence that masters were interested directly in the nature of penitential suffering. It also demonstrates that far from only being concerned with the presence or absence of grace in penance, masters did indeed discuss the nature of suffering and penitential motivation. In this case, Tentler's theory fails to stand up to scrutiny.

The masters were all in agreement that the will could suffer and needed to suffer in contrition. They overcame the apparent pardox of willing suffering by explaining that this suffering would expel sin. They warned that if suffering was too great, the physical pains caused by discord in the will would be damaging, or

even fatal, to the penitent. They also all agreed that suffering and joy could be present in the soul of a penitent at the same time because they were present for different reasons.

It appears that penitential suffering could be understood only with a clear understanding of the links between the soul, the will and the body. The pain caused by discord in the will was believed to overflow into the senses. It was this mechanism which permitted masters to explain how penitential suffering could be excessive, for example. It also allowed masters to attribute physical characteristics to contrition. The pain of contrition existed properly in the will. It was different from other sorts of pain. Its main goal was the expulsion of sin. However, like other pains in the soul-body composite, it could have effects on the senses too. These, however, were different from other physical afflictions. So, a further aspect to the typology of pain was created. Contritional pain was different from other sorts of pain which had been explained by masters in that it had beneficial effects. Distinguishing the pain of contrition from other types of suffering, whilst still keeping it in a familiar conceptual framework of suffering, allowed masters to understand the nature of penance and penitential suffering more precisely. Moreover, it enabled masters to explain an important aspect of penance in terms of its most important element: the way in which the penitent ought to experience remorse for sin.

2. Bodily Affliction: Fasting and Castigation of the Flesh

Despite the many questions which masters asked about contrition and penance, they were also interested in accounting for the positive outcome of suffering through the practice of fasting or mortification of the flesh. The relation of physical chastisements to the expulsion of sin had a long history in Christian religious practice. The ascetic practices of repeated genuflexions, immersions in cold water, the wearing of hairshirts, and flagellation are common themes in medieval monastic treatises and *vitae*.[40] The origins of such practices are to be found in monastic rules, especially the *Regula Magistri*, upon which the Rule of St. Benedict is largely based, in which certain practices were to be performed at strict times of the day. Early medieval ecclesiastical texts prescribed corporeal chastisements for children, monks and minor clerics, and Augustine advocated the imposition of *disciplina* for serious offences.[41] To purge their bodies from sin, monks engaged in ritual flagellation until they produced blood.[42] Flagellation was practised in this way most notably by the monks of Peter Damian at Fonte-Avellana every Friday. Other ascetic practices were often aimed at the imitation of Christ's suffering and followed the example set to Christians by the early Christian martyrs.[43] However, the personal hold on self-inflicted suffering gave

[40] G. Constable, 'Attitudes toward self-inflicted suffering in the Middle Ages', *Ninth Stephen J. Brademas Sr. Lecture* (Brookline, Mass., 1982), 13; T. Asad, 'On Ritual and Discipline in Medieval Christian Monasticism', *Economy and Society*, 16 (1987), 159-203.
[41] L. Gougaud, *Dévotions Pratiques et Ascétiques du Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1925), 176-7; Augustine, Sermon 82.2, *PL* 38, 506.
[42] Peter Damian, 'De laude flagellorum', *PL* 145, 679-86. See P.Bailly, 'Flagellants', *DdeS*, v (1964), 392-408; G. Bareille, 'Flagellants', *DTC*, vi.1, 12-19.
[43] H. Mursurillo, *The Acts of the Christian Martyrs* (Oxford, 1972).

way to suffering expressed by groups such as the Flagellants in the thirteenth century, whose actions reflected the social and political climate of the time.[44]

There were thus many different treatises in which voluntary physical chastisement was related to reparation for sin. The masters were no exception when they addressed questions about this subject. Indeed there appear to have been two main areas of inquiry concerning reparation for sin. The first consisted of questions about the nature of good works which would make amends for sin; and whether it was necessary for such works to be painful. Second, masters were compelled to address how the physical suffering of fasting or other kinds of mortification of the flesh were linked to an improvement in the union between soul and body. Each issue is explored in the subsections below.

i. Reparation for sin through pain

How did masters link 'painful works' to achieving reparation for sin which had been committed? Bonaventure asked which works ought to make satisfaction for sin.[45] He argued that satisfaction should occur through painful or punitive works for four reasons. First, making amends for sin involved returning the respect for God which had been taken away by this sin. Man must pay more respect back than was taken away. For this reason, it must not be through good works, but rather, he must purge himself through the assumption of *poena*. Second, there

[44] J. Henderson, 'The Flagellant Movement and Flagellant Confraternities in central Italy, 1260-1400', *Religious Motivation: Biographical and Sociological Problems for the Church Historian*, ed. D. Baker (Studies in Church History, 15; Oxford, 1978), 147-60; G. Dickson, 'The Flagellants of 1260 and the Crusades', *JMH*, 15 (1989), 227-67.
[45] 'Per qualia opera debeat fieri satisfactio': *IV Sent.*, d.15, p.2,a.1, q.3, 364-5.

should be a reordering of disorder. The disorder caused through *culpa* is best ordered in *poena*. Third, Bonaventure argued that someone who is weakened by the heat of pleasure will be cured by the cold of pain. Fourth, Bonaventure stated that the sinner can pay back the debt incurred by sinning through punishment.[46]

Various key themes result from analysis of the above question. It would seem that masters laid emphasis on painful works as the means of making reparation for sin. This kind of pain was purgative and caused the re-ordering of the disorder which had been caused by sin. More will be said about the precise relationship between physical suffering and re-ordering of the soul to the body below. Another important theme was the use of a contrary disposition to cure an infirmity. The pain of self-inflicted suffering was believed to cure the pleasure of sin.

Aquinas asked directly whether amends for sin could be made through painful works.[47] He argued that reparation is made in respect of past offence and in order to protect from future guilt. For both of these, painful works ought to be practised. Recompense, argued Aquinas, is a making equal by the offender to the person against whom the offence was committed. To make recompense, something should be subtracted from the sinner in honour of God. Aquinas

[46] 'Dicendum, quod satisfactio est per opera poenalia. Et huius ratio est quadruplex. Prima est, quia ibi est honoris ablatis redditio; unde honorem istum debet homo reddere amplius, quam si non abstulisset; et ideo requiritur, ut non tantum Deo famuletur per operationem bonam, verum etiam se ipsum deiiciat per poenam assumtam. Secunda ratio est, quia ibi est prius deordinati reordinatio; et quia deordinatum per culpam optime ordinatur in poena, ideo etc. Tertia ratio est, quia ibi est infirmati curatio; quia infirmatus per delectationis calorem curatur per poenalitatis algorem, et ideo etc. Quarta ratio est, quia ibi est debiti absolutio; et quia peccator est debitor poenae, ideo debet per poenam satisfacere': *ibid.*, 365.

[47] 'Utrum satisfactio possit fieri per opera poenalia': *IV Sent.*, d.15, q.1, a.4, q[a] 1, 659-61.

reasoned that a good work does not subtract anything from the person performing it, rather it perfects him. Such a subtraction can only be made by good works if they are painful. Thus for a work to make amends for sin, it is necessary that it is good, so that it is in respect of God, and painful, so that something is taken away from the sinner.[48]

Aquinas agreed with Bonaventure that painful works would be sufficient for reparation of the sin committed. Aquinas argued that something had to be taken away from the sinner to make recompense. Suffering did this. Also, painful works would stop the penitent from falling into the same sinful position again. The physical side of suffering was thus closely linked to reparation. Pain also seemed to have a preservative nature: undergoing such physical punishment could mitigate against similar sins in the future.

Richard of Middleton tackled a similar question some years later.[49] He agreed with other masters that satisfaction could be made through painful works, even if they end up being pleasureable through the fervour of charity. Richard stated that a painful work could be understood in two ways: with regard to the type of work, and with regard to the person who performed it. As far as the former was concerned, Richard maintained that the work is directed towards the punishment

[48] 'Dicendum...quod satisfactio, ut dictum est, respectum habet ad praeteritam offensam pro qua recompensatio fit per satisfactionem; et etiam ad futuram culpam, a qua per eam praeservamur. Et quantum ad utrumque exigitur quod satisfactio per opera poenali fiat. Recompensatio enim offensae importat adaequationem quam oportet esse ejus qui offendit ad eum in quem offensa commissa est...Recompensatio fiat, quod aliquid subtrahatur a peccante per satisfactionem quod in honorem Dei cedat. Opus autem bonum, ex hoc quod est hujusmodi, non subtrahit aliquid ab operante, sed magis perficit ipsum. Unde subtractio non potest fieri per opus bonum, nisi poenale sit. Et ideo, ad hoc quod aliquod opus sit satisfactorium, oportet quod sit bonum, ut in honorem Dei sit; et poenale, ut aliquid peccatori subtrahatur': *ibid.*, 660-1.

[49] 'Utrum satisfactio debeat fieri per opera poenalia': *IV Sent.*, d.15, a.1, q.3, 196.

for past guilt, and the preservation from incurring more in the future. He quoted Aristotle, who said that *poenae* are medicines: they are not only curative, but also preservative. With regard to the person who performed the work, the work did not have to be painful. Although the works performed may be punitive according to their genus, frequently through fervent charity, they are delightful when performed.[50]

Like Bonaventure and Aquinas, he argued that painful works and the performance of them were both appropriate for past guilt and future preservation from sinning. However, he also added that the actual performance of such works might lead to pleasure rather than pain. This was explained as being the result of the charitable fervour of the performer.

However, mitigation from sin could be effected through the assumption of physical suffering. The links between physical affliction and the spiritual improvement of the soul were explained in terms of the system of pain which masters had created. Reparation for sin could thus be attained through suffering of the will in contrition and through the physical burden of painful works. The masters had devised a framework which explained how this was possible.

[50] 'Per poenali opera prorsus fieri satisfactio debet, licet satisfacienti non poenalia, sed delectabilia per charitatis feruorem quandoque euadant. Respondeo, quod opus poenale dupliciter potest intelligi, aut ratione generis operis, aut ratione operantis: loquendo de opere penali primo modo dicto, satisfaciendum est pro peccato per opera poenalia, et propter emendationem culpae preteritae, et preservationem a future culpe enim debetur pena. Poenae etiam secundum Philosophus 2 ethicorum c.3 medicinae sunt, scilicet non tantum curatiue, sed etiam praeseruatiue: loquendo de opere penali, secundo modo non oportet, quia frequenter opera, quantum est ex suo genere poenalia, ratione feruentis charitatis in operante sunt ei delectabilia, et sic procedebat': *ibid.*

ii. Suffering and conversion in the re-ordering of soul to body

This subsection brings together aspects of both the first section and the preceding subsection. Referring back to earlier strands about the will and its relationship to suffering, and subsequently how the will's suffering is related to suffering of the body, it examines questions which were concerned with how physical pain could help the soul re-order itself to the body. Sin, after all, was the main factor which had caused disorder in the relationship between soul and body.

The disorder present in the body-soul composite was frequently explained as a 'conversion', or turning away from the divine, unchanging good to changeable, worldly goods. The phrase 'conversio ad bonum commutabile' came from Augustine[51] and was cited by theologians when they talked about the different kinds of pain and punishment due for sin. 'Conversion' of this sort was closely related to the way in which the human will could determine a person's salvation or damnation and how re-ordering of the soul by such a 'conversion' might lessen its own suffering.

The concept of the incorruptible and unchangeable was an important concern for Augustine when he discussed the nature of the will and its relation to God. In *De libero arbitrio*, Augustine described the will as an intermediate good. When this good adheres to the immutable good, which is common to all, then man will lead a happy life. The will commits sin by turning away from immutable and common goods, and turning or converting to its own private good, which is something

[51] *De libero arbitrio*, *PL* 32, 1240.

either external to, or lower than, itself. It converts to its own private good when it desires to be its own master; it converts to external goods when it concerns itself with the affairs of others or what does not concern it; and it converts to goods lower than itself when it loves bodily pleasures.[52] He concluded:

> Evil is an aversion to the immutable good, and a conversion to changeable goods. This aversion and conversion result in the just punishment of unhappiness, because they are not compelled, but committed voluntarily.[53]

The conversion and aversion described by Augustine determined the nature of human beings and explained why they should be punished in specific ways. This was a particularly useful framework of explanation when theologians defined the kind of suffering to which unbaptised infants would be subject in Limbo.[54]

Bonaventure used this means of explanation when he asked whether fasting attains satisfaction for sin.[55] Fasting is a work of reparation (for sin), he argued, when it is painful and causes liberation from punishment. It is pleasing to God, for there is a re-ordering of the body and spirit, so that the body no longer stubbornly opposes the spirit. God is not pleased by the affliction of the flesh nor

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[52] 'Voluntas ergo, quae medium bonum est, cum inheret incommutabili bono eique communi, non proprio, sicuti est illa de qua multum locuti sumus et nihil digne diximus veritas, tenet homo vitam beatam...Voluntas autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono et conversa ad proprium bonum aut ad exterius aut ad inferius, peccat. Ad proprium convertitur, cum suae potestatis vult esse, ad exterius, cum aliorum propria vel quaecumque ad se non pertinent cognoscere studet, ad inferius cum voluptatem corporis diligit': *De libero arbitrio* 2, 196-200, *CSEL*, 74 (1956), 86-7.

[53] 'Malum sit aversio eius ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad mutabilia bona; quae tamen aversio atque conversio quoniam non cogitur, sed est voluntaria, digna et iusta eam miseriae poena subsequitur': *ibid.*, 87. My translation.

[54] See chapter 4 below.

[55] 'Utrum ieiunio contingat satisfacere': *IV Sent.*, d.15, p.2, a.2, q.2, 372-3.

its mortification in itself, but in as far as the spirit is punished in the flesh. Bonaventure supported this argument by quoting Augustine who wrote that pain is not of the flesh, but of the soul in the flesh.[56]

There was thus a clear relationship between the affliction of the body or flesh and its effects on the soul. The compositional relationship of body and soul made the explanation of the benefits of pain in fasting easy to understand. Suffering can also re-order the bonds between body and soul. Physical pain usually destroys the body-soul relationship. In the case of fasting, however, it was believed to re-align it and allow the sinner to move towards God. Different kinds of pain could thus have radically different effects.

Aquinas was also interested in the positive effects of fasting. In the *Summa Theologiae*, he debated whether fasting was an act of virtue.[57] He stated that fasting has three main aims: first, to keep the concupiscence of the flesh in check; second, to allow the mind to rise freely and contemplate sublime things and third, to make amends for sin. Here, Aquinas provided a quotation from Augustine which explained how fasting purged the mind and caused the senses to lift up, whilst the flesh was subordinated to the spirit.[58]

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[56] 'Dicendum, quod ieiunium est opus satisfactorium...est, inquam, satisfactorium liberando a poena, cum sit poenale; et Deo est placitum, quia corporis et spiritus est reordinativum: ut corpus spiritui non repugnet contumaciter...dicendum, quod Deo non placit afflictio carnis sive eius maceratio secundum se, sed in quantum in ea punitur spiritus- quia 'dolor non est carnis, sed animae in carne', ut dicit Augustinus': *ibid.*, 373.

[57] 'Utrum ieiunium sit actus virtutis': *ST* 2a2ae, q.147, a.1, 153-4.

[58] 'Assumitur enim ieiunium principaliter ad tria. Primo quidem, ad concupiscentias carnis comprimendas...Secundo, assumitur ad hoc quod mens liberius elevetur ad sublimia contemplanda...Tertio, ad satisfaciendum pro peccatis...Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, in

Like Bonaventure, Aquinas argued that fasting would give the mind freedom to raise itself to the contemplation of sublime things. He also stated that fasting would lead to reparation for sin. The relationship between soul and body was improved by the physical affliction of fasting. A beneficial nature of suffering was clarified which amounted to a new dimension to the masters' system of ideas for pain.

Matthew of Aquasparta debated whether maceration or affliction of the flesh was an act of virtue, a praiseworthy or meritorious act.[59] Matthew claimed that affliction or castigation of the flesh is virtuous and worthy of praise if it is done for the right purpose, with the right intention and practised discretely and rationally; man must not mortify the flesh so that it is destroyed in the process.[60] The more the flesh is subjected to the spirit and sensuality to reason, maintained Matthew, the more the mind is subject to God. Through affliction, the flesh and sensuality are brought under reason, and the mind is thus subjected to God.[61] Moreover, said Matthew, the desires of the flesh oppose those of the spirit: those of the flesh incline downwards and those of the spirit incline upwards. Therefore, the more the desires of the body are diminished, the more spiritual desires are elevated. The entire grounds for the virtue of this bodily affliction is the turning

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quodam sermone de *Orat. et Ieiun.*: "Ieiunium purgat mentem, sublevat sensum, carnem spiritui subiicit"': *ibid.*, 153.

[59] 'Utrum maceratio sive afflictio carnis sit actus virtutis sive sit actus laudabilis vel meritorius': *Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima Separata, De Anima Beata, De Ieiunio et De Legibus* (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, xviii; Quaracchi, 1959), q.1, 365-86.

[60] 'Ergo carnis mortificatio et afflictio sive castigatio est actus virtutis et laudabilis, si fiat eo fine, ea intentione qua debet, et eo modo, id est et discrete et rationabiliter, ut sic homo carnem mortificet quod non exterminet': *ibid.*, 372-3.

[61] 'Quanto autem magis subicitur caro spiritui et sensualitas rationi, tanto magis mens Deo subicitur. Sed caro...et sensualitas...per carnis macerationem et afflictionem rationi subduntur; igitur et mens per consequens ipsi Deo': *ibid.*, 374.

away from the flesh and its desires, and the conversion or elevation into God through desire.[62]

Matthew then further elucidated the link between the spiritual and the physical within the 'supposit'. When he talked about a 'supposit', Matthew meant man composed out of soul and body. Thus, by affliction of the flesh, the man who has committed sin is punished and through this affliction, that which has sinned is punished. Alternatively, says Matthew, because the soul is the perfection of the body and united to the body, according to this union, every punishment of the body overflows into the soul, which necessarily suffers with the body. However, Matthew gave a third explanation, which pinpointed the differences between voluntary and involuntary suffering. He quoted Anselm, who argued that just as one does not sin except by willing it, so one is not afflicted or punished except by the will. Nothing is painful unless it is contrary to the will, and although the *poena* of mortification is voluntary according to the rational will, it is involuntary according to the natural and sensual will, for the body and soul always suffer together.[63]

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[62] 'Desideria enim carnis et desideria spiritus contraria sunt: desideria carnis inclinant deorsum, desideria spiritus elevant sursum. Igitur quanto magis diminuuntur et remittuntur desideria carnis, tanto magis sublimantur desideria spiritus...Sed tota ratio virtutis est averti a carne et desideriis carnalibus et converti sive ferri sursum in Deum per desiderium': *ibid.*, 375.

[63] 'Dicendum quod, quia unum suppositum est homo compositus ex anima et corpore, ideo, afflicta carne, affligitur homo qui peccatum commisit, ac per hoc punitur ille qui peccavit. Vel dicendum quod, quia anima est perfectio corporis et corpori colligata, propter colligantiam animae et corporis omnis poena corporis redundat in animam, quae necessario corpori compatitur. Vel tertio dicendum quod, ut dicit Anselmus, 3 capitulo *De conceptu virginali*, sicut in omnibus non peccat nisi voluntas, ita nec affligitur vel punitur nisi voluntas...nec est aliquid poenale, nisi quia contra voluntatem; et quamvis poena mortificationis sit voluntaria voluntate rationis, est tamen involuntaria voluntate naturae et sensualitatis: compatitur enim semper anima corpori': *ibid.*, 379.

Matthew answered in greater detail than the previous two masters and, indeed, devoted a series of disputed questions to fasting and the mortification of the flesh. His key argument was that affliction of the flesh is meritorious if it is done for the right reason and with prudence. Like previous masters, Matthew accentuated the way in which affliction of the flesh would cause flesh and spirit to be re-ordered and sensuality to be brought under the control of reason. In this way, the soul could come closer to God. Affliction of the flesh will allow the soul to do this. Matthew also dealt with areas which have emerged as key themes in this chapter: the soul and body is one, a composite. Both soul and body have their part to play *in sinning, and so they will both suffer in the reparation for that sin.* The mechanism of 'overflow' (*redundantia*) which allows suffering of the will to be experienced in the senses also works the other way around. Suffering from physical affliction is experienced in the will. However, Matthew then made a further distinction between voluntary and involuntary suffering. Nothing, argued Matthew, is painful unless it is contrary to the will. Pain of mortification of the flesh is not contrary to rational will, because this wills the suffering, but it is contrary to the natural and sensual will.

Physical suffering could have beneficial effects, especially where the union of the human body and soul was concerned. Under certain circumstances, pain would be destructive to this union. When pain was deleterious, the union between soul and body could even be destroyed. However, fasting and the practice of painful works for the reparation of sins committed against God were physical pains which could have a restorative power on the human composite. Instead of causing destruction and disorder, they led to improvement and order. The soul

was encouraged through such practices to return to God. This, after all, was its natural desire.

Conclusion

The masters were presented with an essentially paradoxical position. Their system of ideas and language for pain and suffering in this life hinged on the destructive nature and deleterious effects of pain on both the soul and the body. Any voluntary acceptance of suffering would go against this system according to which pain occured against the human will. To understand the nature of voluntary suffering, which was so important when they came to debate penitential practices, masters had to expand the framework which they had developed to understand pain and create a new dimension to it. Only by developing their ideas about pain in new and different ways in terms of new theories about the relationship of suffering to the will and to the bonds between body and soul could pain be described as a restorative power.

Masters asked questions directly relating to the concept of contrition in penance. This was a form of voluntary pain. They also asked questions about the intensity and amount of contrition needed in order to expel sin. In this way, masters were able to explain the nature and amount of suffering required to complete practices of contrition. In terms of the nature of voluntary suffering, masters tackled various questions about whether certain painful works were enough to repair sins which had been committed. They also determined the nature of fasting and other types of mortification of the flesh with reference to the role which suffering

played. In each of these areas masters addressed and developed their ideas about pain and suffering to develop the concept of voluntary suffering as a beneficial power.

Understanding the nature of the will was central to explaining what voluntary suffering was. In previous chapters the concept of repugnance to the will was a crucial point defining what pain was and how it functioned in the human composite. The idea of willing pain and suffering necessitated a further branch of explanation within their complex framework. In questions on contrition, masters clarified the apparently paradoxical relationship between the will and pain by attributing a special kind of pain to the will. The object of this pain in the will was to expel sin. It differed from other sorts of pain. However, it could still have effects on the body. Masters could still understand voluntary suffering therefore within existing models of explanation for pain.

Theories about the relationship between body and soul meant that spiritual suffering would also cause suffering in the senses. However, the difference where voluntary suffering was concerned was that the physical pain would also cause a re-ordering of soul and body. Masters argued that the sinful soul-body composite was disciplined and harmonised as a result of this kind of physical suffering. So where some kinds of suffering could lead to a collapse in the relationship between soul and body, voluntary suffering strengthened it.

Masters formulated a new branch to their language for understanding voluntary pain. Voluntary pain was a different kind of suffering compared to others. It was

closely related to pleasure, as the beneficial effects of its presence were experienced. It was also attributed a complex co-existence with the will. Masters used the language which they developed to understand what pain was to differentiate voluntary pain from involuntary. However, they also placed voluntary suffering within their typological structure for pain in general. Voluntary pain, like other pains, whether physical or spiritual, could cause other sorts of suffering in the body composite. So, although the object of their existence differed, the mechanisms and way in which they were experienced were similar.

4

The Intellectual Development of Limbo: Pain, Children and Original Sin

Some types of pain and suffering were related to the presence of sin and guilt, as the previous chapter highlighted. Much of this hinged on the presence of the human will and the suffering which the will deserved for its misguided actions. But how were the masters to understand the suffering of those who lacked free will? Masters turned their attention to the fate of children who had died only with the stain of original sin. This caused problems for them on two levels. First, original sin did not involve the use of the individual's free will and it was not clear which punishments were deserved by those who only possessed this sin. Second, the masters were faced with an authority in Augustine, who advocated the damnation of unbaptised children. The masters used their ideas about pain and suffering to explain Augustine's position and defend their own. The link between individual sin and the experience of pain in the afterlife necessitated a development in the topography of the otherworld. This development culminated with the construction of limbo in both its physical and experiential aspects.

1. The fate of infants: historical and theological background

i. Augustine, Pelagianism and Origenism

The thirteenth century inherited centuries of debates which focused on what happened to children when they died. The fate of infants who died unbaptised was a particularly hotly debated issue in the final years of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth century. Whether these infants were to be punished in hell or saved became the focus of a series of debates about how sin was transferred from Adam and Eve, the nature of free will, and the origins of the human soul. One recent study has suggested that the source of disputes over the fate of the unbaptised and the reasons for infant baptism has much to do with a reaction to the theories of Origenism. One main tenet of Origenism was that the soul was said to have 'lived' before it was born, and creation was based upon merits accrued by the soul before birth. Thus, one main cause for dispute over the nature of sin and punishment after death might be the failure of theologians to produce a consistent doctrine regarding the creation of the human soul.[1]

During the same period, Augustine discussed children and their fate when they died. He believed in the inherently sinful and evil nature of children, who were born into a world inherited from Adam and Eve. He emphasised in particular the drives of children which included importunity, jealousy, anger and

[1] E.A. Clark, *The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian Debate* (Princeton, 1992), esp. 194-244. Clark argues that Augustine's controversy with the Pelagians was an arena in which the determinist theories of the creation of the human soul, as held by Origen, were debated in new and different ways.

aggressiveness.[2] In the first book of his *Confessions*, Augustine aired the negative perception of children which was held at this time:

> Who can recall to me the sins I committed as a baby? For in your sight [God] no man is free from sin, not even a child who has lived only one day on earth...It can hardly be right for a child, even at that age, to cry for everything, including things which would harm him; to work himself into a tantrum against people older than himself and...to try his best to strike and hurt others who know better than he does, including his own parents, when they do not give in to him...This shows that, if babies are innocent, it is not for lack of will to do harm, but for lack of strength.[3]

Sin was thought to be present in the limbs of infants and it was the suffering caused by this sin which made the child scream when being baptised.[4] This sin required immediate destruction. Baptism, then, was fundamental for Augustine in exorcising the stain of original sin from the child. It also meant a great deal more than this. The human soul was believed to be created in the image of God, and was therefore always trying to return to its Creator.[5] Baptism was equated with the idea of self-sacrifice, of offering oneself to God and identifying oneself with Christ. It was also a rite of passage by which the individual became a member of a community, with Christ as its head. In the *City of God*, Augustine wrote:

> It immediately follows [from baptism] that the whole redeemed community, that is to say, the congregation and fellowship of the saints, is offered to God as a universal sacrifice, through the great Priest who offered himself in his suffering for us- so that we might be the body of so great a head...This is the sacrifice of

[2] S. Shahar, *Childhood in the Middle Ages* (London and New York, 1992), 14.
[3] Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin (Harmondsworth, 1961), bk.I, c.7, 27-28.
[4] Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum*, *CSEL* 42, I.26-7.
[5] P.Cramer, *Baptism and Change in the early Middle Ages c.200-c.1150* (Cambridge, 1993), 88.

> Christians who are many making up one body
> in Christ.[6]

Augustine's intellectual inquiry over the problem of infant baptism concerned the apparent paradox of the universal Church practice of baptism and the inability of the infant to make a personal conversion to Christianity. However, although unbaptised infants were innocent, they could not individually voice their commitment to Christianity and they were still involved in the sin of the first man. In this way, the fate of damnation was consistent with this stain of sin if they died before reaching the font.[7] In comparison, fifth-century sermons on the Feast of the Holy Innocents contain many allusions to the theory that these children were saved due to their innate ignorance of what was happening to them. They were sanctified by grace, not by merit, for they had had no opportunity to use their free will. This was a further reaction to the Origenist position that souls committed sins in heaven before they were born.[8]

Augustine's view was influenced to a great extent by the Pelagian movement. Pelagianism has received the name of its supposed originator, Pelagius, who was a renowned ascetic in Rome from about 390, though there is some evidence to suggest that 'Pelagian' doctrines were in circulation some decades before this.[9]

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[6] Augustine, *The City of God*, trans. H. Bettenson (Harmondsworth, 1972 repr., 1984), bk.10, c.6, 379-80.

[7] E.R. Fairweather, 'Saint Augustine's Interpretation of Infant Baptism', *Augustinus Magister Congrès International Augustinien*, Paris 21-24 septembre 1954, 3 vols. (Paris, 1954), ii, 897-9.

[8] P.A. Hayward, 'Suffering and Innocence in Latin Sermons for the Feast of the Holy Innocents, c.400-800', *The Church and Childhood: Papers Read at the 1993 Summer Meeting and the 1994 Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society*, ed. D. Wood (Studies in Church History, 31; Oxford, 1994), 67-80.

[9] In particular the works of Ambrosiaster, Paulinus of Nola and Rufinus the Syrian are important here: Clark, *Origenist Controversy*, 198-207. For details on the main Pelagian authors and doctrines see A. Soulignac, 'Pélage et Pélagianisme', *D de S*, xii:2, 2889-2942. For the social and political circumstances surrounding the rise of Pelagianism, see P. Brown, 'Pelagius and His Supporters: Aims and Environment', *Journal of Theological Studies* n.s. 19 (1968), 93-114; P. Brown, 'The Patrons of Pelagius: The Roman Aristocracy between East and West', *Journal of Theological Studies* n.s. 21 (1970), 56-72.

Pelagius denied the idea that there was a *tradux peccati* from the first parents, Adam and Eve. Furthermore, if Adam's sin were to affect everyone, Pelagius argued, then Christ's righteousness would also save non-believers. So we ought not to believe in an unjust sin, imputed for the actions of someone else, when God came to save our own sins.[10] Nevertheless, he did not actually condemn infant baptism in itself, for it contained many positive attributes including spiritual illumination and the citizenship of Jerusalem. However, it was not to be performed for the reason of remitting sin, as he believed there was no sin to be remitted.[11] It was Pelagius's disciples, Caelestius and Julian of Eclanum, who developed the idea of Pelagianism proper. Using the phrase of John 14 verse 2: 'In domo Patris mei, mansiones multae sunt', they put forward the view that there existed an intermediary place in which unbaptised children who had died remained happy and shared more or less in the goods of the elect.[12] This position was strongly condemned by the Synod of Carthage between 411-412, and it was also strongly opposed by Augustine.

Augustine believed that the fate of unbaptised children after death was damnation, which involved not only privation of the vision of God, but also punishment through hell-fire. The most often quoted work in which his ideas were transmitted was the *De Fide ad Petrum*, actually written by Fulgentius of

[10] Clark, *Origenist Controversy*, 210.
[11] N.P. Williams, *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin: A Historical and Critical Study* (London, New York and Toronto, 1929), 317-346.
[12] Augustine gives evidence of the Pelagian position in *De Anima et Eius Origine*, Bk.1, c.9: 'Non baptizatis parvulis nemo promittat inter damnationem regnumque coelorum, quietis vel felicitatis cujuslibet atque ubilibet quasi medium locum. Hoc enim eis etiam haeresis Pelagiana promisit: quia nec damnationem metuit parvulis, quos nullum putat habere originale peccatum; nec sperat eis regnum coelorum, si non perveniunt ad Baptismatis sacramentum': *PL* 44, 481. See also J. Bellamy, 'Baptême', *DTC*, ii.1 (Paris, 1932), 364.

Ruspe, but attributed in the Middle Ages to Augustine.[13] Unbaptised children were, according to this work, subject to eternal suffering. In Augustine's *Enchiridion*, however, he added a corollary: the *poena* of the children was deemed to be the mildest (*mitissima*). What this mildest punishment entailed was left unexplained and it stimulated much of the debate and speculation in the Middle Ages.[14] However, in his assertion that the children should be damned, Augustine was in line with many of the Christian Fathers.[15]

The masters of the thirteenth century thus inherited a highly contentious series of debates about the fate of unbaptised children. One of their main authorities, Augustine, believed that children would be damned, but in some ambiguously lesser way than others in hell. To deny punishment for original sin, on the other hand, would attract the charge of heresy. The masters thus required a closer definition of original sin and its relation to the individual and that individual's punishments.

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[13] B. Leeming, 'Is their baptism really necessary?', *The Clergy Review*, 39 no.4 (1954), 193-212, at 203. Augustine also discussed the fate of infants who have not been baptised in *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, c.16,20: 'Infantes non baptizati lenissime quidem, sed tamen damnatur. Pena peccati Adae gratia corporis amissa. Potest proinde recte dici, parvulos sine Baptismo de corpore exeuntes in damnatione omnium mitissima futuros': *PL* 44, 120.

[14] 'Mitissima sane omnium poena erit eorum qui, praeter peccatum quod originale traxerunt, nullum insuper addiderunt; et in ceteris qui addiderunt, tanto quisque ibi tolerabiliorem habebit damnationem quanto hic minorem habuit iniquitatem.': Augustine, *Enchiridion* 23,93, *CCSL* xlvi (Turnhout, 1969), 99.

[15] See St. Basil, *Homilia in sanctum baptisma*, xiii, *PG* 31,427; Gregory of Nyssa, *De baptismo*, *PG* 46,424B and Gregory of Nazianus, *In sanctum baptisma*, xl, *PG* 36,390.

ii. Original Sin: thirteenth-century attitudes

The nature of original sin and its implications for children who had died before they had had the opportunity to be baptised continued to be debated in the thirteenth century. The important relationship of free will and sin acted as the focus for many questions. Aquinas, for example, discussed the added implication of the links between free will and individuality. This, in itself, was an important prerequisite to discussions about the fate of the unbaptised, for suffering was related to the sins of the individual. Understanding the nature of individuality was thus crucial to determining whether the unbaptised would be damned or saved after death.

The *Summa Contra Gentiles*, begun probably in the third year of Aquinas's first Parisian regency, that is, sometime in 1258-59, was a work for missionaries to aid their combat against the errors of the infidel.[16] Chapter 52 of the fourth book of this work considered the communal nature of man in relation to original sin. Sin can pertain to a human in two ways, argued Aquinas: first as an individual; and, second, man's participation in the species makes many men seem like one man.[17] Actual sin leads to the taking away of some personal goods, that is: grace and the ordering of the parts of the soul. However, the sin of the first man did not only cause these things to be taken away from him personally, but also led to the

[16] For a fuller description of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and its contents, see J.A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas Aquino: His Life Thought and Works* (Washington D.C., 1983), 129-34.

[17] 'Non enim est inconveniens quod, uno peccante, peccatum in omnes dicimus per originem esse propagatum, quamvis unusquisque ex proprio actu laudetur vel vituperetur...Aliter enim est in his quae sunt unius individui, et aliter in his quae sunt totius naturae speciei': *SCG*, iv, c.52, 164 .

privation of a good pertaining to a common nature.[18] This idea of privation will be discussed at length later on.

Original sin was also discussed by Aquinas in the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*. Although the precise date of the disputed questions is uncertain, they were probably disputed in Rome in 1266-67, or in Paris in 1269-70. The work contains sixteen questions about the causes and varied nature of evil, and a detailed account of the seven deadly sins.[19] The fourth question is specifically concerned with original sin. Aquinas stated that due to the transferral of sin from the first parents a single man can be understood in two ways: in one sense as an individual and singular person, and in another sense as part of a "college".[20] By this he meant that the human being can be understood as part of a large community of sinners stemming from the transgression of Adam in the Garden of Eden. Both states of man involve a state of voluntariness in their own way. The individual man is made by the acts he himself performs according to his own free will. This is what distinguishes him as an individual. The man as part of a college can have an act pertain to him, even though he did not perform it of his own free will. Rather, the act is performed by the whole college, by many members of the college, or by the principal of that college. Aquinas gave an example from Aristotle: it is like saying that when the ruler of a city performs a certain act, that

[18] 'Peccata igitur actualia, quae communiter ab hominibus aguntur, adimunt aliquod bonum personae peccantis, puta gratiam et ordinem debitum partium animae: unde personalia sunt, nec, uno peccante, alteri imputatur. Primum autem peccatum primi hominis non solum peccantem destituit proprio et personali bono, scilicet gratia et debito ordine animae, sed etiam bono ad naturam communem pertinente' : *ibid.*

[19] Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas*, 212.

[20] 'Et ideo simpliciter dicendum est quod peccatum traducitur per originem a primo parente in posteros. Ad cuius euidentiam est quod aliquis homo singularis dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo secundum quod est quedam persona singularis, alio modo secundum quod est pars alicuius

the city itself has performed it.[21] Further on in the same question, Aquinas suggested that no individual could have any *culpa* (guilt) from the sin transferred through the generations from Adam because this would require use of the will. However, if mankind is understood as one single man, then there is guilt on account of the actual sin of the first parents, Adam and Eve.[22] Aquinas provided a useful analogy here: when murder is committed by the movement of a hand, the hand is not in itself considered culpable, for it is necessarily moved by something else. However, it is part of the whole man who acts by will, and as part of the whole, it bears some responsibility.[23] The relationship of suffering to the presence of *culpa* is a common theme in these questions, and one which we shall have cause to examine later on in this chapter. The belief that there was a common sin, original sin, for all which detracted from the individuality of the sinners was an issue which gained universal assent. So, Aquinas was typical of thirteenth-century attitudes to original sin in this respect.

Original sin formed a community of which all human beings were members to begin with. Children dying with the stain of original sin were thus part of this

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collegii': *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*, Opera Omnia, Issu Leonis XIII, P.M. Edita (Paris, 1982), xxiii, q.4, a.1, 105.

[21] 'Et utroque modo ad eum potest aliquis actus pertinere: pertinet enim ad eum in quantum est singularis persona ille actus quem proprio arbitrio et per se ipsum facit, set in quantum est pars collegii, potest ad eum pertinere aliquis actus quem per se ipsum non facit nec proprio arbitrio, set qui fit a toto collegio vel a pluribus de collegio vel a prinicipe collegii, sicut id quod princeps civitatis facit dicitur civitas facere, ut Philosophus dicit.' The reference is to Aristotle, *Ethics*, ix, c.9.

[22] 'Si ergo consideretur iste defectus hoc modo per originem in istum hominem deriuatus secundum id quod iste homo est quedam persona singularis, sic huiusmodi defectus non potest habere rationem culpe, ad cuius rationem requiritur quod sit voluntaria. Set si consideretur iste homo generatus ut quoddam membrum totius humane nature a primo parente propagate ac si omnes homines essent unus homo, sic habet rationem culpe, propter voluntarium eius principium quod est actuale peccatum primi parentis.': *ibid.*, 106.

[23] 'Sicut si dicamus quod motus manus ad homicidium perpertrandum, secundum quod manus per se consideratur, non habet rationem culpe, quia manus de necessitate mouetur ab alio; si autem

'community of sin'. Moreover, because they possessed no actual sin, they could only strictly be understood in this communal sense and were denied individuality. This was an important development in assessing the fate of the unbaptised. They had not sinned as individuals and thus could not be placed in hell or purgatory. The unbaptised required a separate location in the topography of the afterlife.

2. The Intellectual Development of Limbo

Theologians of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, for the most part, refused to countenance a separate place in the afterlife for children who had died unbaptised. Anselm denied the existence of any middle place for the punishment of the unbaptised. He considered that their damnation was according to the justice of God.[24] Hugh of St. Victor also claimed that children could not be saved because they possessed no belief.[25] Towards the close of the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth centuries, the position of unbaptised children after death was compared to that of the pagan fathers. This group of worthy pagan unbaptised had the special dispensation of occupying a place on the edge of hell. Unbaptised children were not distinguished from these pagans at this time. Their common association was the fact that they had not been baptised as Christians.[26]

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consideretur ut est pars totius hominis qui voluntate agit, sic habet rationem culpe, quia sic est voluntarius.': *ibid.*

[24] R. Weberberger, 'Limbus Puerorum: Zur Entstehung eines theologischen Begriffes', *RTAM*, 35 (1968), 85.

[25] *Summa sententiarum*, *PL* 176, 132. See Weberberger, 'Limbus Puerorum', 97.

[26] See J. Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory*, trans. A. Goldhammer (London, 1984), 220-1; C. Daniell, *Death and Burial in Medieval England* (London, 1997), 10.

Children who had died unbaptised all possessed the stain of original sin, as was outlined in the previous section. This led to the development of their own separate place in the afterlife from the mid-thirteenth century onwards. First, the development of the idea of a physical place separate from heaven and hell was mooted. In the fourth book of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Albert the Great asked what was to be understood by the term the bosom of Abraham.[27] Albert stated that the bosom of Abraham could be understood in two ways: specifically (*proprie*) and generally (*communiter*). Generally, it is the resting place of the fathers who will be beatified, that is, worthy pagan fathers who will achieve the eternal life in heaven at the time of Judgement. Specifically, *sinus* signifies that place on the edge or rim of hell between hell itself and the abode of the elect. It is also called *limbus*, because limbo is the edge of a piece of clothing.[28] It is in the upper edge of hell and at a distance from the hell of the damned.[29] Albert was probably the first master to use the term *limbus* as such and to associate it with unbaptised children.

In his *Sentence Commentary*, Aquinas distinguished between limbo and hell, arguing that they were separate places. Limbo was equated with the abode of the pagan fathers.[30] In the Supplement of the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas asked

[27] 'Quid dicatur sinus Abrahae: et an paruuli decedentes sint in aliqua miseria': *IV Sent.*, d.1, a.20, 21.
[28] 'Dicendum quod sinus dicitur proprie et communiter. Communiter est requies beatorum patrum...Proprie autem dicitur locus in ora inferni sequstratus ad habitationem electorum...Unde etiam limbus vocatur. Limbus ora est vestimenti, sicut locus ille in ora fuit inferni': *ibid.*
[29] 'Dicendum quod iste locus est in ora inferni superior, et longe ab inferno damnatorum': *ibid.*
[30] 'Utrum limbus inferni sit idem quod sinus Abrae': *Divi Thome Aquinatis Super Quarto Sententiarum*, 4 vols. (1520), iv, fos.581va-582va.

whether the limbo of the fathers was the same as hell.[31] He differentiated between the two in terms of both their pains and their location. In hell, argued Aquinas, there is pain of the senses. Such pain is not present in the father's limbo. This is because the pain in hell is eternal whereas the fathers are only detained for a time. As far as the location of each part is concerned, Aquinas stated that they were in all probability in the same place, but the fathers were somewhat higher. Moreover, because souls in hell were divided according to different levels of guilt, the fathers, whose level of guilt was lowest of all, occupied the highest and least dark place of all those punished. [32]

In the following question, Aquinas debated whether the limbo of the children was the same as the limbo of the fathers.[33] He argued:

> The limbo of the fathers and the limbo of children, without any doubt, differ as to the quality of punishment or reward. For children have no hope of the blessed life, as the fathers in limbo had, in whom, moreover, shone forth the light of faith and grace. But as regards their situation, there is reason to believe that the place of both is the same; except that the limbo of the fathers is placed higher than the limbo of children, just as we have stated in reference to limbo and hell.[34]

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[31] 'Utrum limbus sit idem quod infernus damnatorum': *ST* 3a, Supplement, q.69, a.5. Although the Supplement was a posthumous compilation, many of the questions, including this one, are identical copies of questions from Aquinas' commentary on the *Sentences*.

[32] 'Si ergo consideretur limbus patrum et infernus secundum locorum qualitatem praedictam, sic non est dubium quod distinguuntur. Tum quia in inferno est poena sensibilis, quae non erat in limbo Patrum. Tum etiam quia in inferno est poena aeterna, sed in limbo Patrum detinebantur sancti temporaliter tantum. Sed si considerentur quantum ad situm loci, sic probabile est quod idem locus, vel quasi continuus, sit infernus et limbus, ita tamen quod quaedam superior pars inferni limbus Patrum dicatur. Existentes enim in inferno secundum diversitatem culpae diversam sortiuntur et poenam...Unde et sancti Patres, in quibus minimum erat de ratione culpae, supremum et minus tenebrosum locum habuerunt omnibus puniendis': *ibid.*

[33] 'Utrum limbus puerorum sit idem quod limbus patrum': *ST* 3a, Suppl. q.69, a.6.

[34] 'Dicendum quod limbus Patrum et limbus puerorum absque dubio differunt secundum qualitatem praemii vel poenae; pueris enim non adest spes beatae vitae, quae Patribus in limbo

The *limbus puerorum* was then, according to Aquinas, to be placed physically below the *limbus patrum*, but above hell. Unlike the pagan fathers, the children in limbo would remain there for eternity. This was a crucial distinction between the two places, for it determined the nature of their punishments. Their experience there, however, was to differ significantly from the damned in hell. The genesis of the idea of the *limbus puerorum* was based theologically on the punishment due for original sin.

But it is clear that, for the masters, an association based around sin was only one part of the separation from other souls in the afterlife. The real development of children's limbo hinged on defining the experiences of suffering which awaited them there. However, masters were confronted with the existence of one of their main authorities who had argued categorically for the damnation of the unbaptised: Augustine.

i. Debates about physical suffering

Masters had developed a rational basis for claiming that unbaptised children deserved to be placed in a separate abode in the afterlife. But they also required the support of authorities. However, their key authority surrounding this topic was in conflict with the masters' own views on the fate of children who died unbaptised. It is necessary therefore to examine questions which were concerned

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aderat, in quibus etiam lumen fidei et gratiae refulgebat. Sed quantum ad situm probabiliter creditur utrorumque locus idem fuisse, nisi quod requies beatorum adhuc erat in superiori loco quam limbus puerorum, sicut de limbo et inferno dictum est': *ibid.* Translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London, 1921), 15.

with whether infants in limbo would suffer particular types of pain there. Such an examination will demonstrate how they re-interpreted Augustine, making him a viable authority for their creation of limbo as a concept and a place. Furthermore, how masters applied and developed their ideas about pain and suffering to the case of limbo will show the importance of a defined set of terms for talking about pain to new developments in theological systems.

The legacy Augustine bequeathed to the eleventh and twelfth centuries was one of harshness in attitude towards the unbaptised. Gratian quoted the *De Fide ad Petrum* in his *Decretum*,[35] and clerics such as Guibert of Nogent (d.*c.*1125) voiced contemporary attitudes. In *Monodiae*, Guibert recounted a vision his mother had, in which she saw Guibert's dead father:

> She then asked him where he was staying. He indicated that the place was located not far away, and that he was detained there. She also asked how he was. Baring his arm and his side, he showed both of them so torn, so cut up with many wounds that she felt great horror and emotional distress as she looked. The figure of a little child was also there, crying so bitterly that it troubled her greatly when she saw it...Now, the crying of the child and the wounds on his arm have meaning. When my father in his youth was separated from lawful intercourse with my mother...some evil counsellors appealed to his youthful spirit with the vile advice to find out if he could have intercourse with other women. In youthful fashion he took their advice, and, having wickedly attempted intercourse with some

[35] 'Firmissime tene, non solum homines ratione utentes, verum etiam parvulos qui sive in uteris matrum vivere incipiunt, et ibi moriuntur: sive iam de matribus nati, sine sacramento baptismi quod datur in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti, de hoc seculo transeunt, sempiterno igne puniendos: quia et si peccatum propriae actionis nullum habet originalis tamen peccati damnatione carnali conceptione ex nativitate traxerunt': Gratian, *Decretum*, ed. E. Friedberg, Corpus Iuris Canonici (Leipzig, 1879-81), i, 1362.

> loose woman unknown to me, he begat a child which at once died before baptism. The rending of his side is the breaking of his marriage vow; the cries of that distressed voice indicate the damnation of that evilly begotten child.[36]

Although Guibert still believed in the damnation of unbaptised children, attitudes were beginning to change. In his *Expositio in Epistulam Pauli ad Romanos*, Abelard interpeted Augustine's notion of the 'poena mitissima' as the 'carentia visionis dei', that is the lack or privation of the vision of God.[37] However, such a punishment also included the presence of internal, ever-lasting suffering. The theological language and framework for understanding pain and suffering was to prove crucial not only to the construction of limbo as a place, but also to the re-interpretation of Augustine, who believed in the eternal damnation of children, as a viable authority for masters when they discussed limbo.

The thirteenth century, in contrast to the twelfth, portrayed children in a much more positive light. The innocence, weakness and ignorance of children was emphasised and the aspect of sinfulness was played down. The reception of Aristotle in Europe in the thirteenth century may have had something to do with this as his view of children is much more positive.[38] However, the thirteenth

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[36] Guibert of Nogent, *Self and Society in Medieval France. The Memoirs of Abbot Guibert of Nogent*, trans. J.F. Benton, (Toronto, Buffalo and London, 1984 repr. 1991), bk.I, c.18, 94.

[37] Peter Abelard, *Expositio in Epistulam Pauli ad Romanos*, l.ii. See R. Weberberger, 'Limbus Puerorum', 106.

[38] S. Shahar, *Childhood in the Middle Ages* (London and New York, 1992), 15. In the *Nichomachean Ethics*, book 3, chapter 2 Aristotle talked about the difference between appetite (*concupiscentia*) and anger, and between the will and choice. Children, like animals, have voluntary action, but not choice. There seems to be a tone of forgiveness in this: 'Choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as voluntary; the latter extends more widely. For both children and other animals share in voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts done on the spur of the moment we describe as voluntary but not as chosen. Those who say it is appetite or anger or wish or a kind of opinion do not seem to be right. For choice is not common to irrational creatures as well, but appetite and anger are.': *The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. J.Barnes, 2

century still had to grapple with the debates which had raged in Rome some eight centuries before. Masters constructed a separate place for the unbaptised after death. Physically, they were to be separate from the damned in hell and the elect in heaven. The creation of limbo, however, was reliant upon the definition of suffering.

However, opinion among theologians in the thirteenth century was divided as to what the Augustinian notion of *mitissima poena* entailed. For example, in 1246 Albert the Great examined a series of questions on the fate of unbaptised infants.[39] In one of the articles, Albert asked whether these children will be punished by a pain of the senses.[40] He argued that original sin does not deserve the punishment of the senses, but the mildest punishment of all, which is the loss of the vision of God. Original sin is the smallest sin, smaller even than venial sin, because it is less voluntary. In comparison to other sorts of sin in which the will plays an intrinsic or universal part as regards its first movement, original sin is voluntary from its relation to the fountain of nature, that is, it is not an individual expression of the will.[41] It seems therefore, that the pain of the senses was related to the individual rather than the communal nature of humanity's lapse into sin.

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vols. (Princeton, 1984), ii, 1755. In his book on *Rhetoric*, Aristotle argues for the importance of children to the community in general: 'Possession of good children and of many children is clear enough. Applied to a community, they mean that its young men are numerous and of good quality: good in regard to bodily excellences, such as stature, beauty, strength, athletic prowess; and also in regard to excellences of the soul, which in a young man are temperance and courage. Applied to an individual, they mean that his own children are numerous and have the good qualities we have described': *ibid.*, bk. I, ch.5, 2163.

[39] *Quaestiones*, Opera Omnia ad fidem codicum...Wilhelmo Kübel praeside, ed. W. Kübel and H. Anzulewicz, xxv, ii (Aschendorff, 1993), 139-45. Parallel discussions by Albert are to be found in *De Resurrectione*, Opera Omnia ad fidem codicum...Bernardo Geyer praeside, ed. A.Ohlmeyer, I.Backes, W. Kübel, xxvi (Aschendorff, 1958), tract.iii, q.7, aa.1-3, 318-9.

[40] 'Utrum pueri puniantur poena sensibili': *Quaestiones*, a.3, 142-3.

[41] 'Dicendum, quod peccato originali non debetur poena sensibilis, sed mitissima poena, sicut dicit Augustinus, quae est carentia divinae visionis, sed non poena materialis ignis vel vermis

Albert was suggesting by his arguments that physical suffering in the afterlife was related to the individual. The children in limbo could not really be understood as individuals because they had died whilst only possessing original sin. In this sense they would not experience physical pain. Such claims reinforced the notion that the unbaptised should be communally separate from others in the afterlife. Individuality depended upon movement of the will. The unbaptised children had not used their will and so were denied individual status.

In the early 1250s Bonaventure tackled the issue of whether the unbaptised infants would be punished by material fire.[42] He concluded that the children would not experience the pain of fire, but would lack the vision of God and be put in a 'low place'.[43] However, opinion about this is divided, stated Bonaventure. Those who follow divine justice most rigorously hold that children do in fact burn in material fire, but to a lesser extent than those who have committed actual sin. This is how the *mitissima poena* of Augustine is interpreted by such people. It is not *mitissima* absolutely, but in relation to the suffering of others.[44] The second position is less harsh. Children who have died with original sin lack the justice and grace of the holy spirit. They are put in the vile place due to the filth of their flesh, but they have not had the pleasure of sin

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conscientiae. Est enim minimum peccatum; minus enim veniali, quia habet minus de voluntario. In aliis enim est propria voluntas vel universalis quoad primus motus...Sed originale non propria voluntate vel universali vel particulari est voluntarium, sed voluntate fontis naturae': *ibid.*, 142.

[42] 'Utrum parvuli decedentes in solo originali puniantur poena ignis materialis': *II Sent.*, d.33, a.3, q.1, 793-795.

[43] 'Parvuli decedentes in peccato originali non sentiunt poenae ignis acerbitatem, privantur tamen Dei visione et ponuntur in loco vili': *ibid.*, 793.

[44] 'Quidam enim, attendentes rigorem divinae iustitiae ac sententiae...dicunt quod parvuli cremabuntur igne materiali, longe tamen minus quam illi qui peccaverunt peccato actuali...*Mitissimam* enim illam vocat poenam non absolute, sed respectu aliorum': *ibid.*

in spirit or in the flesh. They cannot, therefore, experience the punishment of material fire.[45] This explanation is accepted, says Bonaventure, by the masters in general.[46]

Bonaventure was in agreement with Albert that unbaptised children would experience the loss of the vision of God. However, he showed where the point of debate among masters lay: some interpreted the *mitissima poena* of the unbaptised as a less intense suffering in hell-fire, than the damned would experience. Bonaventure also added the idea of a disgusting physical place for the unbaptised, for their flesh was still regarded as unclean.

The bodies of the unbaptised were to experience some physical detriment. An unbaptised body was regarded as unclean and deserved to be placed in an location that was low both physically and in terms of dignity. However, this fact alone did not merit the same punishment of fire as the damned would experience in hell. The state of existence of the unbaptised, therefore, has less of a connection with the filth of their flesh than with the lack of free will, according to Bonaventure.

In a series of questions in his *De Malo*, Aquinas went into some detail about the kind of punishments due to unbaptised children.[47] Aquinas asked whether

[45] 'Quia vero in carne fuit foeditas, ideo ponuntur in loco vili, utpote infernali; sed quia non habuerunt in se actualem delectationem peccati, nec in spiritu nec in carne, ideo non sentiunt poenae ignis acerbitatem': *ibid.*, 794.
[46] 'Hunc modum dicendi magis approbant magistri communiter': *ibid.*
[47] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*, q.5, aa.1-3, 129-136.

original sin is due *poena sensus*.[48] He stated the common perception of this issue: children dying only with original sin are not due *poena sensus*, but rather *poena damni*: privation of the vision of God, (the *carentia visionis dei*). This is defensible for three reasons. First, actual sin is fault (*vitium*) of the person, whereas original sin is the fault of nature. Grace and the divine vision are above human nature and thus the privation of both of these is not due only to someone who has committed actual sin, but also to someone who has original sin.[49]

The second reason is that *poena* is proportionate to *culpa* (guilt, or fault). Aquinas explained the differences between mortal and original sin with reference to the theory of the 'conversion to changeable goods'.[50] Mortal sin involved a deliberate rejection of the divine, which is unchanging, and a conversion to worldly goods, which are changeable. In terms of the pain received for this sin, privation of the vision of God corresponded to the rejection of the divine, whilst the *poena sensus* corresponded to the 'conversion'. In original sin there is no conversion because the children have been unable to use their free will. There is

[48] 'Utrum peccato originali debeatur pena sensus', q.5, a.2, 133-5.

[49] 'Dicendum, quod sicut communiter dicitur, peccato originali non debetur pena sensus set solum pena dampni, scilicet carentia visionis diuine. Et hoc uidetur rationabile propter tria: primo quidem quia persona quelibet est alicuius nature suppositum; et ideo ad ea que sunt nature per se immediate ordinatur, ad ea uero que sunt supra naturam ordinatur mediante natura. Quod igitur detrimentum aliquod patiatur aliqua persona in his que sunt supra naturam, potest contingere uel ex uitio nature uel etiam ex uitio persone; quod autem detrimentum patiatur in his que sunt nature, hoc non uidetur posse contingere nisi propter uitium proprium persone. Ut autem ex premissis patet, peccatum originale est uitium nature, peccatum autem actuale est uitium persone. Gratia autem et uisio diuina sunt supra naturam humanum, et ideo priuatio gratie et carentia uisionis diuine debetur alicui persone non solum propter actuale peccatum, set etiam propter originale': *ibid.*, 134.

[50] This is explained in detail in Chapter 3, 129-31.

only a rejection, or something which comes very close to it: the abandoning of the soul by original justice.[51]

The third reason is that *poena sensus* is not due someone who has a disposition (*habilis*) to commit a certain act. Aquinas gave the example that someone who is diposed to steal is not punished for this reason,but for the act of stealing. However, disposition to privation without any act deserves some sort of loss: just as someone who is unlearned (*non habet scientiam litterarum*) is unworthy of being promoted to the dignity of the episcopacy. In original sin, there is *concupiscentia*, or desire: in children, there is a revealed propensity to have this disposition, in adults it is demonstrated by the act of desire. Thus, a child who dies with original sin, is not deserving of *poena sensus*, but only *poena damni*. The latter punishment was merited because the child was not fit to be led to the divine vision on account of the privation of original justice.[52]

One of the main difficulties in discussing such an issue was the language used for suffering. Aquinas pointed this out on two occasions in this particular question. He explained that if we were to use similar terms to the church fathers, such as Gregory the Great, then it would be difficult not to attribute physical

[51] 'Secundo quia pena proportionatur culpe; et ideo peccato actuali mortali, in quo invenitur aversio ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad bonum commutabile, debetur pena dampni, scilicet carentia visionis divine respondens aversioni, et pena sensus respondens conversioni. Set in peccato originali non est conversio, set sola aversio, vel aliquid aversioni respondens, scilicet destitutio anime a iustitia originali': *De malo*, q.5, a.2, 134.

[52] 'Tertio quia pena sensus numquam debetur habituali dispositioni: non enim aliquis punitur ex hoc quod est habilis ad furandum, set ex hoc quod actu furatur; set habituali priuationi absque omni actu debetur aliquod dampnum: puta, qui non habet scientiam litterarum ex hoc ipso indignus est promotione ad episcopalem dignitatem. In peccato autem originali inuenitur quidem concupiscentia per modum habitualis dispositionis que paruulum facit habilem ad concupiscendum, ut Augustinus dicit adultum autem actu concupiscentem. Et ideo paruulo

suffering to the unbaptised. Gregory used the word *tormentum*, and this signified punishment of the senses.[53] However, Aquinas resolved this difficulty in the authorities by explaining the nuances of vocabulary. Quite often, he argued, *species* of words are used, such as *tormentum*, *supplicius* and *cruciatus*, which really refer to the genus word *poena*. The saints use this way of speaking, said Aquinas, to counter the errors of the Pelagian heretics who maintained that unbaptised children lacked sin and did not deserve any *poena* at all.[54]

Although Aquinas agreed with both Albert and Bonaventure before him that the unbaptised should lack the vision of God and not receive the punishment of hell-fire, a significant development can be seen in the rational basis for this claim. Aquinas directly related punishments of the afterlife to individual guilt and an individual's action in turning away from God and towards worldly pleasures. The punishment of physical suffering thus required personal action and decision-making. Aquinas explained that the unbaptised had the disposition to act in this way potentially, but they did not actually act. Masters used this idea of potentiality to explain how all the dead shared the same characteristics, but unbaptised children possessed them in a different way. The use of this formula of 'potentiality' has been seen already in a previous chapter.[55]

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defuncto cum originali non debetur pena sensus set solum pena dampni, quia scilicet non est ydoneus perduci ad uisionem diuinam per priuationem originalis iustitie': *ibid.*

[53] 'Set tormentum nominat penam sensus. Ergo peccato originali debetur pena sensus': *ibid.*, 133.

[54] 'Dicendum quod nomen tormenti, supplicii et iehenne et cruciatus, vel si quid simile in dictis sanctorum inveniatur, est large accipiendum pro pena, ut ponatur species pro genere. Ideo autem sancti tali modo loquendi usi sunt, ut detestabilem redderent errorem Pelagianorum qui asserebant in parvulis nullum peccatum esse nec eis aliquam penam deberi': *ibid.*

[55] See Chapter 2, 82-7.

The Augustinian canon Giles of Rome addressed the same issue in his *Commentary on the Sentences* some time in the mid-1270s.[56] He compared original sin to actual sin in a general sense. Generally, actual sin corresponds to the turning away from the immutable good and the turning towards a changeable good. In the punishments meted out for this, the turning away merits the *poena damni*, which is the loss of the vision of God, and the conversion deserves *poena sensus*, pain of the senses. Giles gave his reasons for this: firstly, turning away from the divine light deserves the privation of the vision of that light. Secondly, the sinner himself converts to the changeable, and thus it is correct for this conversion to the changeable and created good to be punished by the pain of material fire.[57]

In original sin, Giles continued, there is a turning away from the unchangeable good because there is a lack of original justice which orders us towards this good, but there is no conversion to a changeable good. Such sin merits the *poena damni*, but not the *poena sensus* because there is no personal guilt *per se*. There is, however, natural guilt *per se*. If there is any personal guilt, it is in as far as nature infects the person. This is not through the application of evil, but rather through the subtraction of some good in original justice.[58]

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[56] 'Utrum decedentes in originali tantum doleant de eo quod carent visione divina': *Egidio Romano Archiepiscopus Biturciensis Ordinis Sancti Augustini in Secundum Sententiarum* (Venice, 1482), ii, d.33, q.1, no foliation.

[57] 'In omni peccato actuali generaliter loquendo est aversio ab incommutabili bono et conuersio ad commutabile. Auersioni ergo respondet pena damni. Conuersioni respondet pena sensus. Nam quia peccator se auertit a divino lumine dignus est quod careat visione diuini luminis...Sed quia peccator se conuertit ad commutabile bonum et ad creaturam...dignus est quod...a materiali igne et pena sensibili puniatur': *ibid.*

[58] 'Sed in peccato originali est ita auersio ab incommutabili bono quia est carentia originalis iustitie que nos subiciebat et ordinabat ad illud bonum quamvis non est ibi conuersio ad commutabile bonum, propter quod tale peccatum sic meretur penam damni, quod non meretur penam sensus, meretur enim penam damni ex eo quod est culpa. Sed non meretur penam sensus

The punishment of mortal sin required a pain which corresponded to its conversion to changeable pleasures. The soul's concern with the changeable and the worldly meant that it deserved a punishment commensurate with such a sin: material hell-fire. The rejection of the divine, unchanging good demanded the deprivation of its vision. Both kinds of punishment faced the damned in hell, and which was to afflict them more was also a subject for debate among masters.[59] However, unbaptised infants only received partial punishment for original sin. Aquinas and Giles both stressed the kind of punishments due to the movement of the will in sin. Aquinas explained that unbaptised children had no opportunity to exercise their free will, and therefore would not have been able to make the conversion to changeable pleasures. This is one main reason why children in this case will not suffer from the pain of fire, for that required the conversion of the will to the mutable good which arises in actual sin. Giles maintained that the pain of sense was merited for the act of changing to the sensible, and moving away from the spiritual.

The masters adopted the theory of changeable and the unchangeable good when they discussed whether unbaptised children would be damned. This theory originated with Augustine, and it was reworked by masters and used by them to prove that children were not to be damned. So, Augustine's own terminology was effectively being used against him. The move towards worldly pleasures was

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quia non est culpa actualis et personalis per se. Sed est culpa naturalis per se. Si autem est culpa personalis, hoc est inquantum natura inficit personam; sed ista infectio ut patet per habita non est per appositionem alicuius mali per se loquendo, sed solum per subtractionem alicuius boni in originalis iustitia': *ibid.*

[59] See Chapter 6 below.

the way in which physical punishment was merited. Unbaptised children were unable to make this move, so the masters argued that they should not receive physical punishments after death. The body only came into the equation when there was the presence of free will. Although the unbaptised would possess bodies, 'bodiliness' was not an issue of overwhelming importance to their state after death. The reason for this was that sin was punished through the body by the *poena sensus*, and the unbaptised did not experience this pain at all.

In the 1280s, Richard of Middleton questioned whether children dying unbaptised would be susceptible to a punishment of the senses.[60] He argued that children who had experienced neither the spiritual, nor the carnal pleasures of sin could not be punished through the senses. They would, however, be punished by the *poena damni*, for they had died without grace, without which they may not possess the vision of God; and because they inhabit filthy flesh, they occupy an ignoble place, although some say that this will be on the surface of the earth.[61] Richard also has something to say about the bodies of unbaptised infants. Their bodies are not impassible by the resisting action of virtue, which pertains to the gift of impassibility. On the contrary, divine providence disposes that they lack punishment.[62]

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[60] 'Utrum paruuli decedentes ante baptismum puniantur pena sensibili': *II Sent.*, d.33, a.3, q.1, 414-5.

[61] 'Respondeo, quod paruuli decedentes ante baptismum non puniuntur poena sensibili, quia nunquam habuerunt in se actualem delectationem peccati, nec in spiritu nec in carne. Punientur autem pena damni, quia sine gratia gratum faciente decedunt, sine qua visio Dei non potest haberi, quia etiam feditatem in carne habuerunt, ideo locum obtinebunt ignobilem, quamuis aliqui dicant, quod habitabunt in superficie terre': *ibid.*, 414.

[62] 'Corpora paruulorum non erunt impassibilia ab exteriori agente virtute resistentis, quod spectat ad dotem impassibilitatis. Sed per carentiam penam inferentis, hoc diuina prouidentia disponente': *ibid.*, 415.

Richard thus agreed that the unbaptised would not receive sensual punishment when they had experienced no sensual aspects of sin. Unlike his predecessors, however, Richard did not debate the involvement of the will in relation to suffering. His answer was more concerned with the state of the bodies of the unbaptised. The bodies of those who had died unbaptised, although tainted with the stain of original sin, were not subject to physical suffering like those on earth. They were impassible to hell-fire. However, the bodies of the unbaptised did not possess the gift of impassibility which the elect received in heaven, but another kind of protection from divine providence.

In general, however, it appears that the masters were in agreement that physical suffering was related to the presence or absence of free will. It seemed that children in limbo possessed no free will and therefore no individuality; they only had the stain of original sin and consequently had no chance to exercise their will for good or ill. All masters agreed also that the loss of the vision of God was the common punishment for unbaptised children. The difficulty which confronted masters was how to interpret the meaning of the term *mitissima poena*, which had been introduced by one of their most revered authorities, Augustine. Bonaventure suggested that the reason for confusion over the issue of physical suffering and the unbaptised was disagreement about how to interpret this Augustinian term. However, in terms of their punishment, children had made no personal movements of the will against God, but only had the potential to do so. In this case, masters were all in agreement that the punishment by hell-fire was not appropriate.

Masters such as Aquinas were also sensitive to the types of words used for suffering, and conscious that some words might be misleading. A vocabulary for suffering was not sufficient for the masters on its own. It needed to be explained according to the subject, location and reason for suffering. In defining the role of the will in relation to suffering, masters gained greater control over their knowledge of sin, suffering and the positions of those in the afterlife. Furthermore, Aquinas used the issue of the Pelagian heresy to explain the ambiguities of language which had been created by key theological authorities.

The nature of physical punishment in the afterlife was also clarified by the masters' language for understanding suffering. The body was deemed to be the focus for punishment of individual sins and the individual's movement away from God. Unbaptised children lacked the sin-filled bodies of the damned and although they still possessed unclean flesh, the nature of their bodiliness was only addressed in any detail by one of the masters. This is further evidence to support the relationship between the movement of the will and the effects this would have on the body. Where free will was lacking, the status of the body and its pains appeared to hold less importance.

b. Debates about internal suffering

Although the masters ruled out the presence of material fire in limbo, a privation of the vision of God was understood to lead to internal suffering. Moreover, in the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas stated that the *poena damni* was the greatest of

all punishments.[63] The lack of the divine vision, it was posited, might cause internal, or spiritual suffering in the unbaptised, as it did in the damned. The case centred around whether the unbaptised possessed any understanding of their state in limbo, for understanding and interior suffering were closely linked. The examination of a clearly defined set of questions by masters on this issue sheds light on the relationship between understanding and internal pain, and further increases our understanding of the way in which masters constructed limbo. How, then, was the issue of internal suffering in limbo debated by the masters?

Alexander of Hales determined the difference between the pagan fathers and the children in limbo and what they would understand. He came to the conclusion that both groups were unjoined and separated from God, but the fathers felt and understood this separation which caused them suffering, whilst the children did not have any understanding of it at all.[64] Alexander thus argued that unbaptised children would neither feel the separation from God, nor would they understand it. In this way, he appeared to be suggesting that they actually experienced no suffering at all.

[63] 'Patet etiam ex parte poena sensus quantum ad vermem conscientiae, licet forte quantum ad poenam ignis non sint improportionabiles poenae. Patet etiam ex parte poenae damni, quia peccatum mortale meretur carentiam visionis divinae, cui nulla alia poena comparari potest, ut Chrysostom dicit': *ST* 1a2ae q. 88, a.4.

[64] 'Sed quaeretur in quo differt status parvulorum in limbo inferni a statu antiquorum patrum. Dicendum quod utrique sunt inconiuncti Deo et separati. Sed antiqui patres hoc discernebant et sentiebant; ideo pro dilatione patriae dolebant. Sed pueri non hoc sentiebant nec discernebant': Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quattor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 12-15; Quaracchi, 1951-57), ii, d.33, 318.

Albert the Great asked whether children would have some misery from lacking the divine vision.[65] He replied briefly and succinctly that there would be some sort of misery attached to the loss of the divine vision which the unbaptised would experience and this amounted to a type of hopelessness. In this way, argued Albert, unbaptised infants could not be protected from every misery, although he underlined his statement that they would receive neither the punishment of fire, nor of the worm of conscience.[66]

There appears to have been some difference of opinion between Alexander and Albert. Alexander emphasised the lack of knowledge the unbaptised infants would have of their situation. Albert, however, believed that the unbaptised would possess enough understanding to feel hopelessness in their loss of the vision of God. There was thus disagreement about the situation of children in limbo with regard to interior suffering.

Bonaventure provided a detailed analysis of this particular question.[67] He stated that the unbaptised will lack any interior suffering, but they will still possess powers of understanding. He pointed out that neither scripture, nor the saints tackled this particular question and therefore the doctors of theology had conflicting opinions about it.[68] Bonaventure was thus articulating the

[65] 'Quid dicatur sinus Abrahae: et an paruuli decedentes sint in aliqua miseria': *IV Sent.*, d.1, a.20, 21.
[66] 'Dicendum quod miseria est in pueris, scilicet desperatio visionis Dei: et ideo non ab omni miseria proteguntur: tamen bene concedi, quod pueri non habent ignem nec vermem': *ibid.*
[67] 'Utrum parvuli decedentes in solo originali puniantur aliquo dolore interiore': *II Sent.*, d.33, a.3, q.2, 795-97.
[68] 'Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod quia super hac quaestione nec expresse loquitur Scriptura, nec expresse eam Sancti determinant; ideo doctores theologiae hic opinantur contraria': *ibid*, 796.

discrepancies over this issue which existed in key authorities. He highlighted three positions. First there are certain persons, probably including Alexander of Hales, as seen above, who denied that unbaptised children possessed either understanding or interior suffering. Bonaventure said he found it hard to imagine that a soul separated from the body does not have use of reason and cannot know itself, for its cognition is naturally given to it when it does not possess the impediment of corporeal union. The second position he provided is that these same souls have both understanding and *dolor*. Bonaventure argued that they cannot have internal suffering which is the worm of conscience, a reference to Isaiah,[69] because they have no remorse for the abandoning of any good due to their own neglect.[70] The third position was Bonaventure's own. The children who have died with original sin have a middle position between those who have grace and those who have actual guilt. In this way, the unbaptised communicate, or participate, with the beatified in that they lack any exterior or interior affliction, and they communicate with the damned in that they lack the divine vision and are deprived of corporeal light. They remain in a uniform state, where they do not progress, nor decline,where they do not become happy, or sad, but hold perfectly to the medium.[71]

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[69] 'Vermis eorum non morietur et ignis eorum non extinguetur, et erunt ad satietatem visionis omni carni': Isaiah 66:24.

[70] 'Quidam enim volunt dicere, quod parvuli carebunt et cognitione et dolore...Sed quia difficile est intelligere, quod anima separata non habeat usum rationis et non cognoscat ea saltem, quorum cognitio est ei naturaliter inserta, cum ex parte corporis impedimentum non habeat; ideo alii aliter opinantur, quod animae parvulorum et habebunt cognitionem et habebunt etiam dolorem. Scient enim, propter quid factae sunt, et scient, se illo bono merito originalis culpae esse privatas; et propterea dolorem habebunt, et affectiones doloris in eis alternabuntur. Attamen non habebunt dolorem, qui mereatur dici vermis, quia non habebunt remorsum, quod perdiderint illud bonum propter propriam negligentiam et contemptum': *II Sent.*, d.33, a.3, q.2, 796-7.

[71] 'Decedentes enim in solo originali quasi medium tenent inter habentes gratiam et culpam actualem; et quoniam status retributionis debet respondere statui vitae praesentis, in tali statu debent animae parvulorum poni, ut quasi medium teneant inter Beatos et aeternis ignibus cruciatos. Quoniam igitur Beati carent malo poenae sensibilis et cum hoc habent Dei visionem,

Bonaventure thus alluded to the conflict between masters of theology over this issue, as seen in the above analysis of Alexander of Hales and Albert the Great. Bonaventure took the issue further by rejecting both the theory that unbaptised children possessed no understanding and the idea that they would receive some misery from lacking the divine vision. Instead, he mooted an experientially-defined middle place for the unbaptised, that is, a place which held the middle point between heaven and hell in terms of the experiences which the unbaptised would have. On the one hand, they would partake in some of the goods of the elect, whilst on the other receiving the privation of God's vision like the damned.

Aquinas debated the same question, but deliberately focused on the use of Augustine to support his argument.[72] Aquinas noted that some authors believed that children in limbo would experience some kind of suffering or interior affliction as a result of their loss of the divine vision, although he argued that this suffering would not stem from the worm of conscience because the unbaptised are not conscious themselves of the power to avoid original guilt. But, he argued, there would be no point in taking away exterior pain if interior pain was

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damnati e contrario sunt in tenebris et puniuntur poena sensibili; parvuli secundum rectum ordinem divinae aequitatis debent communicare in uno cum damnatis, et in alio cum Beatis. Sed non possunt communicare cum Beatis in habendo divinam praesentiam, quia tunc in nullo communicarent cum damnatis; praesentia enim visionis Dei non stat cum poena sensibili. Ideo cum Beatis communicant in hoc, quod carent omni afflictione exteriori et interiori; cum damnatis vero in hoc, quod privantur visione Dei et lucis corporalis....Ego respondeo, quod divinae iustitiae aequitas et immutabilis in eodem statu quantum ad corpus et quantum ad animam, sive quoad cognitivam et quoad affectivam, perpetualiter eos consolidat, ut nec proficiant nec deficiant, nec laetentur nec tristentur, sed semper sic uniformiter maneant...et perfectissime teneant medium inter superfluum et diminutum. Secundum hanc igitur positionem concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod parvuli non sentient spiritualem dolorem': *ibid.*, 797.

[72] 'Utrum patiantur afflictionem interioris qui cum solo originali decedunt': *De Malo*, q.5, a.3, 135-6.

attributed to them, this being a much greater penalty, and it would go against Augustine's notion of the children's punishment as *mitissima.*[73]

Thus, Aquinas also denied the belief that the unbaptised would have internal suffering from loss of the vision of God. Children do not possess an inordinate will, that is, a will capable of sin, before they have the use of reason. So, neither will they have this will after death. The inordinate will always exists when someone suffers from the lack of something that cannot be obtained. Thus, because unbaptised children in limbo know that they can never attain the glory of heaven, they do not suffer from this loss.[74]

Richard of Middleton also debated whether children who had died unbaptised would experience spiritual suffering.[75] Richard believed that unbaptised children had consciousness before and would have after the resumption of their bodies at resurrection. However, they would experience no external or internal suffering. For they would realise that they could not know God, nor possess free will which they could use to merit the vision of God in a natural way.[76] However, Richard

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[73] 'Dicendum, quod aliqui posuerunt quod pueri sentient aliquem dolorem uel afflictionem interiorem ex carentia uisionis diuine, licet iste dolor non habet in eis rationem uermis conscientie, quia non sunt sibi conscii quod in eorum potestate fuerit culpam originalem uitare. Set nulla ratio esse uidetur quare subtrahatur ab eis exterior pena sensus, si attribuitur eis interior afflictio, que est multo magis penalis et magis opponitur mitissime pene, quam Augustinus eis attribuit': *ibid.*, 135.

[74] 'Unde cum pueri ante usum rationis non habeant actum inordinatum uoluntatis, neque etiam post mortem habebunt. Non est autem absque inordinatione uoluntatis quod aliquis doleat se non habere quod numquam potuit adipisci...Quia igitur pueri post mortem sciunt se numquam potuisse illam gloriam celestem adipisci, ex eius carentia non dolebunt': *ibid.*, 136.

[75] 'Utrum paruuli decedentes ante baptismum pena spirituali puniantur': *II Sent.*, d.33, a.3, q.2, 415-6.

[76] 'Paruuli decedentes ante baptismum habent sui status cognitionem, et habebunt etiam post corporum resumptionem. Nec tamen habent, nec habebunt aliquam afflictionem, nec exteriorem, ut ante ostensum est, nec interiorem: ipsi enim sciunt se ex naturalibus non posse Deum videre, nec se habuisse usum liberi arbitrium per quem se disponere potuissent ad merendum Dei visionem': *ibid.*, 415.

did enter a caveat at the end of his question. He did not believe that the unbaptised would suffer from nothing at all, unless divine providence were to take away all suffering.[77]

This last statement by Richard is significant when the time-frame in which he was writing is taken into account. Many rational explanations concerning theology began to attract suspicion, especially in the period following the condemnations of 1270 and 1277 by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris. Indeed, by the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries, the tide in theology was turning. More conservative approaches of explanation were favoured. [78] In the case of the unbaptised in limbo, at least one theologian, Gregory of Rimini, followed Augustine to the letter and argued that the souls of unbaptised children would be tortured by material fire.[79] Although Gregory was exceptional in this case, this move towards a more literal interpretation of authority was symptomatic of the time.

The masters strove for a common position in respect of their main authority, Augustine. Rational frameworks of explanation about the fate of the unbaptised in limbo were used to alter and in some cases bypass literal interpretations of the saint. The evidence clearly demonstrates that masters strove to reconstruct an

[77] 'Quod autem de nullo doleant non credo, quod praedicta consideratio huius sufficiens causa potest esse, nisi adesset diuina prouidentia ab eis excludens dolorem': *ibid.*

[78] For the thesis that theology changed from being speculative to a more conservative approach dedicated to glorifying God, see G. Leff, 'The Changing Pattern of Thought in the Earlier Fourteenth Century', *BJRL*, 43 (1960), 354-72.

[79] G. Leff, *Gregory of Rimini: Tradition and Innovation in Fourteenth Century Thought* (Manchester, 1961). See also G. Leff, 'Faith and Reason in the Thought of Gregory of Rimini (c.1300-1358)', *BJRL*, 42 (1959), 88-112.

apparently conflicting authority and show how his idea of *mitissima poena* could be embedded within their own frameworks for understanding pain and suffering.

The experiential definition of the place for unbaptised children was based upon their previous ideas about suffering. The unbaptised could not exercise free-will. This meant that they had not deliberately moved towards the changeable goods of this world. Masters equated such a movement with the external pain of fire. Thus, the children were protected from this pain. They were also devoid of interior suffering. Thus, by the middle of the thirteenth century, it was clear that masters had defined the location of limbo in terms of its experiences. The unbaptised held a middle place between the damned and the elect in terms of their suffering. In fact, it was a state of neither delight, nor suffering: limbo was neutral in terms of experience. Children in limbo were thus identified by their suffering, or, rather, their lack of it. This, crucially, defined their communal otherness in the afterlife.

3. Beyond the university: societal concern with the fate of the unbaptised children and the authority of masters

To what extent did the authority of masters impinge upon the ideas about the fate of unbaptised children held by those outside the university? There appear to have been various superstitions about dead children throughout the Middle Ages. Folk tradition told of dead, unbaptised and usually murdered children, who would rise

from the dead to haunt their families, or even kill them.[80] It was also thought that walking over such a child's grave would give rise to a skin disease known as the 'grave-merels' or grave-scab.[81] Such fears led to the practice of posthumous baptism and more sinister practices. The penitential of Burchard of Worms written between 1008 and 1012 described the penance due for a practice common at the time:

> Have you done what some women do at the instigation of the devil? When any child has died without baptism, they take the corpse of the little one and place it in some secret place and transfix its little body with a stake, saying that if they did not do so, the little child would arise and injure many? If you have done or consented to, or believed this, you should do penance for two years on the appointed days.[82]

Recent work done on a particular type of university disputation, the quodlibet, has demonstrated that they had a function which was far more practical and relevant to society than their seemingly high theological nature would suggest. Certain quodlibets contained questions about the fate of the unbaptised which dealt with practicalities, or which voiced particular concerns of the community. For example, Henry of Ghent was asked whether a child dying before baptism could be buried in the church cemetery. [83] Henry answered that the purpose of a cemetery is to look after the bodies of the members of the Church, with

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[80] This was also a belief held in medieval Byzantium. See J. Baun, 'The Fate of Babies Dying before Baptism in Byzantium', *The Church and Childhood: Papers Read at the 1993 Summer Meeting and the 1994 Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society*, ed. D.Wood (Studies in Church History, 31; Oxford, 1994), 124.

[81] B.Kellum, 'Infanticide in England in the Later Middle Ages', *History of Childhood Quarterly*, I (1973-4), 380.

[82] J.T. McNeill and H.M. Gamer, *Medieval Handbooks of Penance. A translation of the principal libri poenitentiales and selections from related documents* (New York, 1938, repr. 1990), 339.

[83] 'Utrum parvulus iste moriens ante baptismum debeat sepeliri in coemeterio': Henry of Ghent, *Opera Omnia V Quodlibet I*, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1979), q.24, 177-8.

reverence, until they are resurrected. The Church presumed the souls of the unbaptised to be damned. They were never members of the church through the sacrament of regeneration, that is, baptism, and thus may not be buried there.[84] These children were effectively being excluded from the community. The authority of the masters was sought to sanction this exclusion.

Other questions demonstrated the fear that children dying whilst being carried to the baptismal font, would not be saved.[85] For example, Henry of Ghent was asked whether such a case might merit salvation, or whether the child would be damned.[86] He replied that we must not judge divine power. For, according to natural law, the child cannot be saved except through the faith of his or her parents; in the law of Moses the child is saved by circumcision within eight days; and in evangelical law, according to the usual working of divine grace, that child can in no way be saved except by ablution from baptismal water.[87] Other religious communities also addressed this issue, but with a different emphasis. In thirteenth-century Byzantium, for example, it was the parents who were deemed guilty if their child died before baptism.[88] So, in contrast to the West, Byzantine

[84] 'Dicendum breviter quod coemeterium non est nisi ad reverenter custodiendum corpora filiorum ecclesiae in terra usque, quorum animae requiescunt cum Deo in caelis secundum quod aestimatur...Quare , cum ecclesia supponit animam dicti parvuli damnatum, corpus eius in coemeterio sepeliri non debet, maxime ea de causa, quod per sacramentum regenerationis numquam ecclesiae membrum fuit': *ibid.*

[85] Henry of Ghent, 'Utrum parvulus delatus ad baptismum, morte praeventus, damnetur.': qdl.1, q.22, *ibid.*, 175-6; Raymond Rigauld, 'Utrum puer qui portatur ad baptismum, si moriatur et nunquam baptizatus, damnetur': qdl.6, q.10, ms.Todi 98, fos.29c-32c.

[86] 'Utrum parvulus delatus ad baptismum, morte praeventus, damnetur': qdl.1, q.22, 175-6.

[87] 'Dicendum ad hoc...quod sicut in lege naturae non salvabatur parvulus nisi in fide parentum, in lege Moysi a die octavo per cirumcisionem, sic in lege Evangelii secundum communem cursum divinae gratiae nullus salvatur nisi ablutus aquis baptismi': *ibid.*, 176.

[88] Baun, 'Fate of Babies', 124.

parents whose child had died before being baptised were excluded from the religious community on earth along with their dead children in limbo.

The comparison to Jewish practice concerning circumcision within an eight-day period after birth was one used frequently by theologians in their discussions of baptism and original sin. The Jews believed that even if the child died before circumcision, it might well be saved from damnation by the faith of the parents. This was an issue which clearly concerned the masters. The idea that one could be saved without baptism and through the good intention of one's parents was deemed to be heretical. For example, the early fourteenth-century inquisitor's register of Jacques Fournier, Bishop of Pamiers, contains a confession from a certain Johannes Rocas.[89] When asked about the sacrament of baptism, Rocas replied that children who die unbaptised have not done any evil or any good, because they have been unable to do either. They will be saved, but Jewish and Saracen children will be damned. When asked why this is the case, he answered that children of Christians will be saved because they are born of good, faithful parents, just as a good tree bears good fruit. Jewish and Saracen children, however, are damned because they are bad and born of evil parents.[90] Henry of Ghent had a similar quodlibetal question put to him, that is, whether there are equal punishments for the child of Christian parents dying without baptism, and

[89] *Le Registre de l'Inquisition de Jacques Fournier Evêque de Pamiers 1318-25*, ed. J.Duvernoy, 3 vols. (Toulouse, 1965), ii, 241-44.

[90] 'Dixit tamen quod pueri non babtisati qui in tali etate decedunt, licet non malum alicui nec bonum fecerint quia non potuerunt, propter etatem salvantur; set Iudeorum et Sarrecenorum perduntur per eum, ut credit. Dixit tamen quod pueri christianorum, quia sunt nati de bonis parentibus, sunt boni et salvantur, licet moriantur antequam babtisentur, quia bona arbor bonum fructum facit, set pueri Iudeorum et Sarracenorum pereunt quia mali sunt, quia de malis parentibus est natus': *ibid.*, 244.

a Saracen child.[91] Henry answered that the punishments will in no way be related to the faith of the parents, but their lot will be equal: the privation of the divine vision.[92]

This demonstrates a concern which went much further than the university disputation chamber. Henry of Ghent's reply to this question unified the fate of unbaptised children from different religious communities. In so doing, he crossed the boundaries of differing religious communities. Whatever the beliefs of a religious community, as far as Henry of Ghent was concerned, the fate of their unbaptised children would be the same. Henry's questions demonstrate how masters thus also pronounced upon issues about limbo which were of concern to all in society. The opinions and authority of masters clearly carried considerable weight outside the university. The sources presented here, unfortunately, do not permit any further assessment of the impact of university debates on other areas of society.

Conclusion

Masters of theology used their ideas about pain and suffering to create and define children's limbo. Understanding the nature of suffering which was attached to original sin was crucial in this definition. Debates surrounding the fate of unbaptised children were not new. In fact, denying that the unbaptised suffered

[91] 'Utrum parvulus iste aequalem poenam sustineat pro suo originali cum parvulo sarraceni': qdl.1, q.23, 177.
[92] 'In parvulis omnibus originale peccatum aequale est et aequalis poena ei debetur in omnibus, poena damni scilicet...Et ideo, cum, iam dictum est, parvulo decedente sine baptismo, in nullo

in any way was synonymous with the Pelagian heresy. However, Augustine's position that these children would be damned did not agree with the masters' theories about pain and its relationship with sin. Masters explained that mortal sin, a deliberate move on the part of the will, deserved the pain of fire. Children who died before they were baptised had not had any chance of using their free will; so they could not be punished by the pain of fire. Indeed, Gerard of Abbeville even asked whether children who had been baptised and yet not used their free will could be damned.[93]

Masters reworked Augustine as an authority. They interpreted his notion of *mitissima poena* as the loss of the divine vision. In this way they could remain respectful to a key patristic authority on the one hand, whilst not actually following Augustine's belief in the damnation of unbaptised children on the other. Masters thus also had to debate whether privation from the divine vision would cause any internal suffering. Here, there was a little more variance of opinion than over the issue of hell-fire. Some masters, such as Alexander of Hales, writing in the earlier part of the thirteenth century, believed that these children would suffer no interior suffering because they were ignorant of their position. However, Bonaventure and Aquinas were clear that they did have consciousness of their situation, but that this would not lead to interior affliction, for this was greater than punishment by fire. Instead, the unbaptised held the middle ground in terms of their experiences in the afterlife. Thus, it was the

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suffraguntur secundum communem legem merita aut fides parentum, aequalis erit damnatio et poena parvuli fidelis discedentis sine baptismo et Sarraceni': *ibid.*

[93] 'Utrum parvuli baptizati ante usum liberi arbitrii possint dampnari': ms. BN.Lat. 16297, fo. 160^{rb}-160^{va}. For a transcription of this ms., see appendix I.

precise definition of pain and suffering, based on masters' notions of sin and the individual, which were at the heart of the creation of limbo as a place.

5

Anima Separata: Masters of Theology and the Controversy surrounding the Suffering of the Separated Soul

In previous chapters, the pain experienced in and by the soul has been considered in terms of the embodied soul, that is, the soul as part of the human composite. However, masters of theology followed the widely-held belief that when the body died, soul and body were separated until resurrection. The suffering of the resurrected body is the focus of the following chapter. This chapter examines the period between death and resurrection, during which the separated souls of the damned reached hell and experienced its torments. As we have seen in earlier chapters, sense perception and the reception of pain and suffering depended upon activity within the human composite. Masters developed a distinct vocabulary and set of ideas to understand and explain the action of pain on the human body and soul. Therefore, the soul without the body presented a different set of challenges to this system. In the first section of this chapter, therefore, theories about the separated soul and the questions masters asked concerning its nature are considered in order to ascertain how they understood and described the soul when it was separated from the body.

One issue which seems to have been high on masters' agendas was how the separated souls of the damned in hell could suffer the torment of corporeal fire. This was very important for two reasons. First, the theory of the composite did not permit easy discussion of a soul without its co-element in the composite: the

body. Second, the issue had a long history in the writings of patristic and more modern authors who described the suffering of the separated soul in different ways. This presented masters with various challenges. On the one hand, they were compelled to discuss and resolve differences between their authorities. On the other hand, masters sought to incorporate the language which their authorities used for suffering within their own framework for discussing pain. This process will be discussed in the second section.

The third section investigates the question of whether the separated soul could suffer from corporeal fire in the light of the Paris Condemnations of 1270. The denial that the separated soul could suffer in this way was one of the condemned theses. This section suggests that this thesis ought not to have been included among the other condemned positions, as the master of arts who was condemned for it actually followed an orthodox line which masters of theology had already formulated some decades before. Moreover, it demonstrates the influence which ideas emanating from the faculty of theology had on the faculty of arts. Ultimately, the question about the suffering of the separated soul appears to hold greater importance as an issue to be explained within the masters' conceptual framework for pain than it does as a challenge to the masters' authority from the arts faculty at the University of Paris.

1. Theories about the separated soul in the thirteenth century

i. Thirteenth-Century Theories on the Nature of the Soul

Thirteenth-century theology witnessed differing interpretations of the human soul. This stemmed from two main traditions which offered different accounts of the soul's relationship with the body and to the soul in a state of separation from the body. As far as the soul's relationship to the body was concerned, Plato and the Neoplatonists taught that the soul used the body as its instrument, just as a pilot uses his ship.[1] Augustine received this tradition, probably through Victorinus, and this christianisation of Plato held favour in the Middle Ages, especially amongst the Franciscan school at Paris.[2] The reception of more of Aristotle's texts, through the activities of the Toledo translators and especially William of Moerbeke, led to a greater interest in his works, especially in the faculty of arts at the University of Paris.[3] In contrast to Plato, Aristotle described the soul as the form of the body.[4] This essentially followed Aristotle's concept of the inter-relationship of potency and act, and its consequent bearing on matter and form. The combination of soul and body was the same as that of matter and form. The soul (as form) potentially has life. When combined with the body

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[1] See chapter 1, 24.

[2] There is no certainty that Augustine read Victorinus. There do appear to be other parallels: the central theme of the *Confessions* is the soul's longing to return to God. This appears to be analogous to the Neoplatonic idea of return to the One seen in Plato and more clearly in Plotinus. For a fuller explanation of Neoplatonism, see A. Louth, *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition From Plato to Denys* (Oxford, 1981), esp. 132f.

[3] See J. A. Weisheipl, 'The Parisian Faculty of Arts in the Mid-Thirteenth Century: 1240-1270', *American Benedictine Review*, 25 (1974), 200-217.

[4] *II De Anima*, 412^{a}18-20: 'Now given that there are bodies of such and such a kind, viz. having life, the soul cannot be a body; for the body is the subject or matter, not what is attributed to it. Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it. But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above

(matter) its potency is converted into act.[5] This is what comprises the complete human composite.

As we have noted in previous chapters, Aquinas followed Aristotle in his view that the soul is the form of the body. However, Aquinas also understood the soul to be a complete reality in its being and its *species*,[6] and claimed that the soul had a unity of form. The second of these positions led to significant discussion. The availability of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *libri naturales* stimulated debate about whether the soul had singular or multiple forms and thus masters held different views about the soul's composition in this respect. Aristotle was not the only source of this debate. Giles of Rome claimed that it was Avicenna who was responsible for the theory of the unity of substantial form.[7] The translation of Avicenna's *De anima* by Dominic Gundissalinus proved to be the cornerstone of debate over the unity or plurality of forms in the soul.[8] Aquinas argued for a

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characterised': *The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. J. Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1984), i, 656.

[5] J. Marenbon, *Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350). An Introduction* (London, 1987), 96.

[6] 'Substantia autem est quid completum in suo esse et in sua specie': *ST* 1a 76,1 ad 5.

[7] Giles of Rome held Avicenna responsible for the phrase: 'Quod in quolibet compositio sit una forma substantialis tantum': D.A. Callus, 'Origins of the Problem of Unity of Form', *The Thomist*, 24 (1961), 120-49, p.262. See also: D.A. Callus, 'The Condemnation of St. Thomas at Oxford', *Aquinas Society of London*, no.5 (1946), 3-38. For Giles of Rome's condemnations of various positions concerning the composition of the soul, see Giles of Rome, *Errores Philosophorum*, ed. J. Koch, trans. J. Riedl (Milwaukee, 1944).

[8] This debate is very well known. It blew up in the 1270s and 1280s in Paris and Oxford. The debate centred around whether the powers or attributes of the soul, vegetative (for growth), sensitive (for sensing) and intellectual (for understanding and the intellect), were separate, substantial forms of the soul, remaining separate in the composite; or whether forms passed away when a more perfect form was created. Given that humans were a combination of matter and form, two basic theories emerged. They can be summed up as follows: The Avicennan-Aristotelian position of the unity of substantial form believed firstly that prime matter was completely passive, and possessed no actuality; secondly, there was a *privatio*, which entailed the passing away of the previous form; thirdly, the substantial form was the root of actuality and the determining principle of a thing. If there is one soul and one substantial form, then all other forms are accidental. In the case of humans, the intellectual form is the substantial form of the soul, but the sensitive and vegetative forms exist virtually within it. The opposing view, thought to be neoplatonist in origin and particularly held by Avicebron in his *Fons Vitae*, taught that prime matter contained some actuality, that there was not a stripping (*privatio*) of the previous forms,

succession of forms in an embryo by which process one would corrupt to allow another superior form to take its place until God introduced the rational soul. He thus argued that one substantial form was the source of multiple perfections which come from inferior forms.[9] This was an important and virulent debate which ran through most of the thirteenth and the early part of the fourteenth centuries. It demonstrates that there were radically different theories about the composition and functions of the human soul. The nature of the soul within the body was thus a much discussed topic in theological circles.

ii. Sense Perception and the Separated Soul

The nature of the soul separated from the body was also an issue of importance for the masters, particularly when they came to discuss intellectual processes and sense perception. For example, at different points in his career, Aquinas had various theories about how the separated soul could understand. His main

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and finally that the substantial form only determined the composite partially. See Callus, 'Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form', 258-61; Callus, 'The Problem of the Plurality of Forms in the Thirteenth Century: The Thomist Innovation', *L'homme et son destin d'après les penseurs du moyen âge, Actes du Premier Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale 1958* (Louvain and Paris, 1960), 577-85; J. F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A Study in Late Thirteenth Century Philosophy* (Washington D.C., 1981), 314-337; B.C. Bazán, 'La Corporalité selon S. Thomas', *RPL*, 81 (1983), 379-403.

[9] Bazán, ' La Corporalité', 390-392. Bazán argues that the soul is the corporeality of man. The soul is the substantial form which makes the human being. The physical body to which it joins must be prime matter, which is pure potency. The soul, as substantial form, actualises the body, that is the soul-body composite. As it is the actuality of the composite, it could also be seen as its actuality. Bazán appears to be arguing this from the position of a modern philosopher, and he offers no proof that Aquinas himself thought this. However, Aquinas did argue against the existence of a *forma corporeitatis*. He believed that the first actualisation of prime matter is the substantial form. If the first actualisation were this *forma corporeitatis*, then a man would not be a man in essence, but only by accident. This position was attacked vehemently by John Peckham in the 1280s. His conclusion was that if one denied the existence of this corporeal form, then the body of Christ would not be one and the same before and after the crucifixion, nor would religious relics or the Eucharist be identical to what they represented. Peckham thus argued for a plurality of forms: J.A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino*, 288-90.

concern centred around whether it required phantasms, which were produced when the soul was united to the body, in the process of intellection.[10] In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas suggested that phantasms were not needed and the separated soul could understand by divine infusion.[11] However, in the *Quaestiones de anima* he maintained that phantasms were intrinsically necessary to the intellectual activity of the soul and not extrinsically as Plato and Avicenna had maintained.[12] Thus, there were also a variety of difficulties in explaining the soul's activities when it was separated from the body.

However, it was not only the intellectual processes of the separated soul which presented difficulties. Masters also faced problems when they discussed whether sense perception could occur in the separated soul. Aristotle had taught that the sentient subject was changed by the object sensed.[13] This implied that sense perception within the separated soul would cause the soul itself to change. As the separated soul was an incorporeal substance, this was an impossible position to maintain. Masters therefore began trying to understand how it was that sense perception could occur at all without the presence of the soul-body composite.

For example, in the 1240s, Albert the Great asked whether it was true that separated souls lacked senses and affections.[14] Albert argued that there are three

[10] For further information on the process of turning to phantasms to understand, see chapter 1, 25-7.
[11] *III Sent.*, d.31, q.2, a.4: A.C. Pegis, 'The Separated Soul and its Nature in St. Thomas', *St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274-1974 Commemorative Studies* (Toronto, 1974), 139. See also A.C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Toronto, 1934).
[12] *Ibid.*, 145.
[13] II *De Anima*, 416^{b}-418^{a}.
[14] 'An verum sit, quod animae priventur sensibus et affectibus?': *IV Sent.*, d.44, a.43, 862-3.

ways of considering the virtues of the sensible soul: act, being and root or origin. In the first case, after death, there are no senses because the acts of hearing, seeing and imagination are not present. They do not remain in the second case either, because the being of organic virtue is in the organ itself, which is also lacking after death. Senses are present in the third case, however, because the substance of the rational soul is the root of all the rational and sensible powers. It remains and thus so do its powers.[15]

Albert thus sought to explain which elements would remain after the body had died and the soul was separated from it. He was willing to accept that there was some essence of the senses left even when the soul was separated from the body.

In a quodlibetal question disputed at Christmas 1258, Aquinas asked whether a soul separated from the body had action of its sensitive powers.[16] He argued that it was impossible for sensitive powers to have any action in the separated soul. He explained his answer by comparing man to beast. The operation of the sensitive powers is perfected in the same way in both man and in animals. A man sees in the same way as a horse. The act of the sensitive power in an animal is not a sensitive function in itself, rather it happens through the medium of an organ. If the sensible soul in an animal were to have a function in itself, it would

[15] 'Dicendum quod virtutes animae sensibilis et ipsa anima sensibilis possunt tripliciter considerari, scilicet in actu, in esse, et in radice. Et primo quidem modo non manent post mortem, scilicet quoad audire, videre et imaginari et huiusmodi. Secundo modo iterum non manent: quia esse virtutis organicae est in organo...Tertio autem modo manent: quia substantia animae rationalis est radix omnium suarum virium rationalium [et] sensibilium. Et quia illa manet, ideo etiam vires istae manebunt': *ibid.*, 863.

[16] 'Utrum anima separata a corpore habeat actus senstivarum potentiarum': AQQ, qdl. 10, q.4, a.2, 203-4.

have subsistence and it would be incorruptible. This is unfitting and so it is impossible that the sensitive power either in animal or in man possesses its own act, every act of the sensitive power is through the union of body and soul. Aquinas also denied the Platonic theory on the soul that the sensitive soul can have two actions: one through the body which does not remain after death, and the other which acts through itself and remains after death.[17]

Unlike Albert, Aquinas appeared to deny all possibility that there were any sensitive powers remaining in the separated soul. He used his position to argue against theories which were directly influenced by Plato. It would seem from this point of view that the functions of the sensitive soul were thought to be wholly reliant upon the body and soul together. This is evidence that some masters were denying dualist theories which taught that the soul drove the body.

In 1269-70, however, Aquinas changed his belief about the powers which remained in the separated soul.[18] He began by arguing along the same lines as the question in the quodlibets. Here too he attacked the 'platonic' theory that the sensitive soul has its own functions and operations in itself. However, Aquinas's ultimate conclusion added another dimension. He stated that no function of the

[17] 'Dicendum, quod impossibile est in anima separata alicuius potentiae sensitivae actum esse...Operatio namque potentiae sensitivae eodem modo perficitur in homine et bruto; eodem enim modo videt homo per oculum quo equus. Actus autem sensitivae potentiae in bruto non est ipsius sensitivae per se, sed mediante organo. Si enim per se haberet operationem anima sensitiva in bruto, per se haberet subsistentiam; et sic esset incorruptibilis...Unde, cum sit hoc inconveniens, impossibile est quod in bruto vel in homine potentia sensitiva habeat aliquem actum proprium, sed omnis actus eius est coniuncti. Unde in anima separata remanere non potest. Quidam tamen dicunt, animam sensitivam habere duos actus: unum quem exercet organo mediante, qui post mortem non manet...et propter hoc Plato ponebat animas etiam brutorum esse incorruptibiles: hoc enim de necessitate sequitur, quod tamen isti non concedunt': *ibid.*, 204.
[18] 'Utrum potentiae sensitivae remaneant in anima separata': *De anima*, q.19, 245-52.

sensitive part of the soul can only be in the soul in terms of operation. The composite obtains its sight and hearing and every feeling through the soul. It is clear, argued Aquinas, that the powers of the sensitive part of the soul are present in the composite just as in a subject, but they are from the soul as from their origins. Therefore, when the body is destroyed, the sensitive powers are destroyed, but they remain in the soul as in their place of origin. This, explained Aquinas, is what is meant by the opinion which states that sensitive powers remain in the separated soul as if in its origin only.[19]

Aquinas thus developed his position slightly and essentially adopted Albert's position. He followed the theory that there could be some element of the sensitive powers remaining because they have their root in the soul. This was an important development. Masters avoided following the platonic idea that the soul possessed some sensitive powers independent of the body composite. This ran contrary to their theories about sense perception and the arrangement of the body-soul composite. However, there was a need to explain how the soul could receive sense information when separated from the body. Recognising that the soul was the root of sensitive powers was one way in which the soul could be said to possess some powers of the senses. Theories about sense perception in the body composite meant that their language for describing it was dependent upon the language of the corporeal. However, these tentative arguments were

[19] 'Manifestum est igitur quod nulla operatio partis sensitivae potest esse animae tantum ut operantis. Compositum igitur est videns et audiens et omnino sentiens sed per animam; unde et compositum est potens videre et audire et sentire, sed per animam. Manifestum est igitur quod potentiae partis sensitivae sunt in compositio sicut in subjecto; sed sunt ab animae sicut a principio. Destructo corpore, destruuntur potentiae sensitivae; sed remanent in anima sicut in principio. Et hoc est quod alia opinio dicit, quod potentiae sensitivae manent in anima separata solum sicut in radice': *ibid.*, 249-50.

unsatisfactory when masters came to discuss the punishment of the separated soul in hell.

2. Suffering and the Separated Soul

Early Christian doctrine believed that, after death, the soul would become separated from the body until the end of time, at which point it would be re-united with its body.[20] Those souls which ended up facing the torments of eternal damnation were to experience the various sufferings of extreme heat from hell-fire, extreme cold and the gnawing anguish of the worm of conscience.[21] A significantly large number of questions asked by masters of theology concern whether and how the separated soul could suffer from material fire. It is notable that masters focused on the issue of punishment by fire in itself and did not set their questions in the context of either hell or purgatory. However, the question applied to the punishment by fire in both places. There appear to be two reasons for their interest here. First, as seen in the previous section, there was much theorising on the precise way in which the separated soul experienced sense

[20] In the patristic period, it was believed that those destined for heaven would spend time sleeping in a *refrigerium* until God returned to reign over an earthly kingdom. The early Christians, like their Jewish contemporaries, thought that the person slept whole until resurrection. However, Christian theologians of late antiquity viewed the soul as immortal and separable from the body. It was the body that was to rise again. See C.W. Bynum, *The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336* (Washington D.C., 1995), 13-14; O. Cullmann, *Unsterblichkeit der Seele oder Aufstehung der Toten?* (Stuttgart, 1964).

[21] For the early history of hell and its punishments, see A.E. Bernstein, *The Formation of Hell. Death and Retribution in the Ancient and Early Christian Worlds* (London, 1993); M. Himmelfarb, *Tours of Hell: An Apocalyptic Form of Jewish and Christian Literature* (Philadelphia, 1983); R.Bauckham, 'Early Jewish Visions of Hell', *Journal of Theological Studies*, 41 (1990), 355-85. For the visionary experiences of the torments of hell and purgatory, see in particular, P. Dinzelbacher, *Visionen und Visionsliteratur im Mittelalter* (Monographien zur Geschichte de Mittelalters 23; Stuttgart, 1981); D.D.R. Owen, *The Vision of Hell* (Edinburgh and London, 1970).

information. Material fire's action on the soul thus needed explaining. Second, and more important for this chapter, is that masters' theories about pain and suffering were constructed around the interaction between body and soul within the body composite. Certain patristic and classical authorities who described suffering in hell used language which was neither consistent with masters' theories about the separated soul, nor with the masters' own technical vocabulary or conceptual framework for understanding pain. These two factors were crucial in motivating discussion about this issue.

The conundrum which concerned the suffering of the separated soul was certainly not new in the thirteenth century. It had troubled theologians for centuries and different solutions had been offered to explain how material fire could punish when the body was absent. The theories of three theologians are examined: Augustine (354-430), Gregory the Great (*c.*540?-604) and Hugh of St. Victor (d. 1141). The first two have been chosen because their theories were often cited by masters in the thirteenth century. The third theologian was an important predecessor to thirteenth-century thought.[22]

i. Augustine

Augustine addressed the issue of the separated soul's suffering in hell by comparing the soul to a corporeal substance. He maintained that the soul had a certain likeness to a body. Indeed, Augustine understood the soul to possess

[22] Apparently Hugh was known as the 'new Augustine' and Aquinas revered his works: D. Knowles, *Introduction to Medieval Thought* (London and New York, 1988), 130.

certain sensory powers which would enable it to experience the fire of hell. He explained this by stating that one cannot deny that the soul could possess a likeness to a body because during sleep it perceives itself walking or sitting, going to and fro, which would not happen if it did not have a certain likeness to a body.[23] Augustine thus believed that the separated soul could suffer from material fire, but the imagery which explained the way in which the soul suffered was dependent on the corporeal. This was a trait which the masters were to adopt to some degree in the thirteenth century.

ii. Gregory the Great

In his *Dialogues*, written in the late sixth century, Gregory the Great debated with his interlocutor Peter[24] whether the incorporeal spirit could experience corporeal fire.[25] Gregory asked Peter if the incorporeal spirit of a living person was held in the body could it not also be held after death in corporeal fire? Peter replied that the incorporeal spirit is held in the body because it gives the body life. To this Gregory retorted, that if the incorporeal spirit can give life in this way, why should it not endure punishment sense in a place where it is mortified. The spirit

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[23] '[Animam] habere posse similitudinem corporis et corporalium omnino membrorum quisquis negat, potest negare animam esse, quae in somnis videt vel se ambulare, vel sedere, vel hac atque illac gressu aut etiam volatu ferri ac referri, quod sine quadam similitudine corporis non fit': *De Genesi ad Litteram*, xxii, cap.33, *PL* 34, 481. See A.E. Bernstein, 'Esoteric Theology: William of Auvergne and the Fires of Hell and Purgatory', *Speculum*, 57 (1982), 518. For my refutation of Bernstein's theory that esoteric theology moved towards an incorporeal treatment of hell and hell-fire, see chapter 6 below.

[24] Peter the Deacon was a Roman associate of Gregory. See J.M. Petersen, *The Dialogues of Gregory the Great in their Late Antique Cultural Background* (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Studies and Texts, 69; Toronto, 1984), 20.

[25] 'Qua ratione credendum sit ut incorporeos spiritus tenere ignis corporeus possit': Gregory the Great, *Dialogorum Liber*, iv, cap. xxx, *PL* 77, 365-368. See also, Saint Gregory the Great, *Dialogues*, trans. O.J. Zimmerman (New York, 1959), 225-6.

is held in the sense that it is tormented by the fire through seeing and feeling. The spirit sees the fire punishing itself and whatever perceives itself burning is actually burnt. Invisible burning and pain are transferred from the visible fire so that the incorporeal mind is punished by both corporeal fire and incorporeal flames.[26]

Gregory the Great thus believed that the soul separated from the body could experience suffering from material fire in the sense that it 'saw' itself punished in the flames. Understanding the suffering in this way caused both corporeal and mental suffering to the soul.

iii. Hugh of St. Victor

Hugh of St. Victor's *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, composed in the early twelfth century, was one of the first attempts to provide a comprehensive account of all areas of theological study. Despite examining the theory put forward by Gregory the Great, Hugh's own position on this particular issue was quite tentative. He claimed that God was able even without material elements to give the sense of pain to souls which were tortured.[27]

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[26] 'Gregorius. Si viventis hominis incorporeus spiritus tenetur in corpore, cur non post mortem, cum incorporeus sit spiritus, etiam corporeo igne teneatur?
Petrus. In vivente quolibet idcirco incorporeus spiritus tenetur in corpore, quia vivicat corpus.
Gregor. Si incorporeus spiritus, Petre, in hoc teneri potest quod vivicat, quare non poenaliter et ibi teneatur ubi mortificatur? Teneri autem spiritum per ignem dicimus ut in tormento ignis sit videndo atque sentiendo. Ignem namque eo ipso patitur, quo videt; et qui concremari se aspicit, concrematur...ex igne visibili ardor ac dolor invisibilis trahitur, ut per ignem corporeum mens incorporea etiam incorporea flamma crucietur': *ibid.*

[27] 'Poterat ergo Deus etiam sine elementis etiam materialibus animabus cruciandis sensum doloris dare': Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, ii, pars xvi, cap. iii, *PL* 176, 585.

There were thus various differing theories which existed to explain the way in which the separated soul could suffer from material fire, but there was no consensus among these authors as to how it might occur. The thirteenth century thus inherited essentially conflicting accounts of the soul's experiences in purgatory and hell.

iv. Thirteenth-century masters

In the late 1240s, Albert the Great asked whether demons could suffer from corporeal fire.[28] Although the question was about demons, he applied the body of his answer to incorporeal substances in general. Corporeal fire can be understood in two different ways, argued Albert. First, as a vindictive instrument of divine justice for sin committed against God; and second, in terms of a corporeal element. In the first sense, the corporeal fire has the incorporeal power of afflicting even a nature nobler than itself, provided that it is under the stain of sin. The second sense does not exist. Albert also replied to the claim that a spiritual substance is not susceptible to the *species* of material fire. He argued that the intellectual substance is not properly said to be hot, but 'scorched', unless it is called hot through the *intentio*, that is the *species*, of heat. This is improperly said because the *intentio* is spiritual. However, Albert stated that perhaps it can be said that as the fire is an instrument of divine justice it can imprint something of its quality on the intellectual substance.[29]

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[28] 'An ignis corporeus cruciat daemones': *IV Sent.*, d.44, a.37, 858-9.

[29] 'Ignis ille corporeus potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet ut instrumentum divinae iustitiae vindicantis peccatum commissum contra Deum; et ut elementum corporeum. Et primo quidem modo habet corporeus ignis vim incorpoream affligendi etiam naturam nobiliorem se, dummodo sit sub peccato. Secundo autem non habet...In veritate substantia intellectualis non propria dicitur

Although the subject matter concerned the incorporeal separated soul, or another incorporeal substance such as a demon, the language used was heavily reliant upon corporeal imagery to explain how they suffered from material fire. However, fire could also have a painful effect in as far as it was an instrument of divine justice. What this meant precisely was not elucidated any further by Albert in this question.

In a detailed answer to this question,[30] Bonaventure analysed some of the philosophical arguments that had been put forward to tackle such a tricky issue. The first group of philosophers Bonaventure assessed were those who denied that the separated soul could suffer. They believed that since it was incorruptible, it must also be impassible. Bonaventure rejected this theory as a manifest error. Second, he explained that more modern philosophers, such as the Arabic philosopher Algazeli (d. 1111), understood the separated soul as suffering from loss or privation. If original sin, which is simply privation of justice, requires the *poena damni* and the loss of eternal beatitude, actual sin, which does not simply comprise privation, but also disordinate pleasure, also requires some kind of afflictive punishment. For this reason, there existed a third argument which concerned the idea that the soul could suffer as if in sleep, a theory which came from Augustine.[31] According to Augustine, the soul could experience acute

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calida, sed magis proprie dicitur adusta etiam quam calida, nisi dicatur calida per intentionem calidi apprehensam: et hoc est improprie dictum, quia illa intentio est spiritualis. Vel forte potest dici, quod ut ignis est instrumentum diuine iustitiae, potest imprimere qualitatem suam in substantiam intellectualem': *ibid.*, 859.

[30] 'Utrum ignis inferni affligat spiritum': Bonaventure, *IV Sent.*, d.44, p. 2, a.3, q.2, 931-5.

[31] Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, xii, cap. 33, *PL* 34, 481.

suffering from images of fire in sleep. Although, there was no *passio corporalis*, there could be *passio animalis*. However, Bonaventure argued that the fire of hell needed to have real action on the soul, not merely imaginary.[32]

Bonaventure's own answer about the suffering was split into two discrete parts. In the first case, he described how the soul could perceive the action and heat of fire. In the composite, he argued, there were two ways in which the fire had action: natural passion which resulted in the heating of the body, which is true passion; and *passio animalis* which was a change in the sense resulting from the soul's movement. If the body can still be heated and burn when it is separated from the soul, then the separated spirit is also still able to suffer from the *passio animalis*. These explanations are according to the order of nature, explained Bonaventure. The other way in which the soul could suffer when separated from the body was according to the order of divine justice. In this case, the soul was said to be indissolubly bound to the fire, as if in a prison. Bonaventure stated that this was not against nature, for the soul was joined to the human body to give it life, although one is spiritual and the other corporeal, and feelings of love begin

[32] 'Aliqui enim philosophorum negaverunt simpliciter spiritum incorporeum posse cruciari, attendentes ad eius incorruptibilitatem, pro eo quod senserunt, omne incorruptibile esse impassibile. Sed iste est error manifestus...Et ideo aliorum philosophorum modernorum positio fuit, quod substantia spiritualis dolore potest et pati, non per actionem alicuius, sed potius per privationem...Et ista positio fuit Algazelis...Si enim originali peccato, ubi est pura privatio iustitiae, debetur poena damni et carentia beatitudinis aeternae; actuali peccato, quod quidem non tantum consistit in privatione, immo etiam in deordinata delectatione, non tantum debetur aeternae beatitudinis carentia, immo etiam poena aliqua afflictiva. Et ideo alii sumere volunt rationem ex parte naturae ipsius animae, quem modum sumere possumus ab Augustino in duodecim super Genesim, ubi ostendit, quod anima pati potest, corpore non patiente, etiam acerbissimus passiones, sicut et ibi probat per exempla in somnis...cum separata erit, pati poterit in illis et per illas, praesente igne infernali; quia, quamvis ibi non sit passio corporalis, est tamen ibi passio animalis sive spiritualis, quae vera passio est et vera afflictio, ac per hoc vera punitio. Sed nec istud fideli animae sufficit, pro eo quod credimus...quod poena illa infernalis sit per veram ignis actionem, non per phantasticam imaginationem': *ibid.*, 933-4.

from this union. Therefore, in joining to fire and accepting punishment from it horror and pain arise from the union.[33]

This explanation also involved extending the meaning for pain. Bonaventure examined the way in which pain was described by two authorities: Aristotle and Augustine. Following Aristotle, he acknowledged that suffering is caused by division of parts.[34] However, this is not the general definition; it is merely that kind of *dolor* which comes to the soul from the flesh.[35] However, the other definition involves an aversion to things which are displeasing to us.[36] Bonaventure did not provide the full reference to Augustine here, but the quotation comes from book 14 of *De civitate Dei*:

> Dolor est dissensus ab his rebus quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt.[37]

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[33] 'Cum enim ignis agit in compositum ex anima et corpore, ibi duplex est passio: una naturalis, et haec est calefactio corporis; alia animalis, et haec est immutatio sensus. Prima passio est vera passio, quia est ab igne ut vere agente; secunda passio est ab anima se ipsam movente et ab igne occasionem praebente...Sicut ergo, postquam separatur anima, corpus potest pati ab igne passione naturali, quia potest calefieri et inflammari, et hoc per naturalem potentiem utriusque; sic spiritus pati potest passione animali et ab igne praesenti immutari naturali potentia ignis et animae. Duo igitur sunt ibi per ordinem naturae, alia duo per ordinem divinae iustitiae. Quod enim ignis animae indissolubiliter alligetur, et anima in eo recludatur ut in carcere, divinae iustitiae est...Et quamvis sit illud divinae iustitiae, hoc non est contra ordinem naturae...quod sicut anima in hominis conditione iungitur corpori ut dans ei vitam, quamvis illus sit spirituale, et hoc corporale, et ex illa coniunctione vehementer concipit ad corpus amorem; sic ligatur igni ut accipiens ab eo poenam, et ex illa coniunctione vehementer concipit horrorem ac per hoc et dolorem': *ibid.*, 934.

[34] Bonaventure claimed that this quotation came from Aristotle, when it actually is to be found in Augustine. Aristotle's phrase is rendered in Latin as follows: 'Dolor est distantia naturalium partium.': Aristoteles Latinus, *Topica. Translatio Boethii, Fragmentum Recensionis Alterius, et Translatio Anonyma* (Brussels and Paris, 1969), vi, c.6, 129. Augustine, on the other hand, quite clearly uses the phrase quoted. It is quoted elsewhere by others and correctly attributed to him. It is to be found in *De Libero arbitrio*, *PL* 32, 1305.

[35] 'Ad illud quod obiicitur de dolore, quod est divisio partium; dicendum quod illa non est definitio generalis, sed solummodo doloris, qui est animae ex carne.'

[36] 'Sed illa quam assignat Augustinus, "dolor est dissensus ab his rebus" ': *ibid.*, 935.

[37] *De civitate Dei*, 14, ch.15, *PL* 41, 424.

Bonaventure explained that this second definition of suffering equates to the impediment of the operations of the soul, rather than the cutting of the body. This is seen in the case of paralytics in whom parts can be cut without affliction. The reason for this, he suggested, is that the soul does not have any powers of operation in that part, because they have been impeded there. The powers of the soul which are its parts, can be impeded and disturbed in certain situations. In this respect, the separated soul can be said to experience pain.[38]

Bonaventure's answer to this issue was significantly more complex than Albert's. He was aware of various theories surrounding the suffering of the separated soul which were both traditional and contemporary to him. He also agreed that the separated soul could suffer, but did not include the theory that the intellectual substance was essentially 'scorched'.

The corporeal played a significant role in describing the way in which fire had action on the separated soul. However, developing the meaning and sense of words for pain also facilitated masters' explanations. Language used by authorities required close analysis and explanation. New terminology for pain was developed by adapting existing vocabulary. For example, *passio corporalis* and *passio animalis* were types of pain which masters employed to explain suffering in the human composite. It appears that these models of suffering were consistently applied when masters discussed suffering.

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[38] 'Ut enim ostendit Augustinus in vigesimo primo de *Civitate Dei*, dolor potius venit ex impedimento operationis animae quam ex corporis sectione, sicut patet in paralyticis, in quibus est partium sectio sine afflictione, quia anima in illis non habet operationem, quae ibi impediatur; et quoniam potentiae animae, quae sunt eius partes, quodam modo possunt in suis operationibus

Defining the concept of *passio* was central to a question in Aquinas's *Quaestiones de Veritate*, composed in the period 1256 x 1259.[39] He attempted to explain how it is that the separated soul can suffer.[40] He argued that *passio* has two meanings: one general and one specific.[41] In its general sense, *passio* is the reception of something by whatever means; this is the significance of the word from the Greek to receive. Specifically, *passio* is the reception of something through movement.[42] Movement is always between contraries: everything which is received in suffering (*in patiente*) is contrary to that which is subverted by suffering.[43] Let us look a little more closely at this idea of subversion. A few

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inquietari et impediri occasione accepta; hinc est, quod spiritus dolere potest affligi': *IV Sent.*, d.44, p.2, a.3, q.2, 935.

[39] *Quaestiones Disputate de Veritate*, Issu Leonis XIII, 3 vols. (Rome, 1972-1976), iii, q.26, a.1: 'Qualiter anima separata a corpore patiatur', 745-51.

[40] M.-D. Chenu highlights the fact that words change in sense from one author to another particularly when discussing the concept of *passio*: *Towards Understanding St. Thomas*, trans. A-M Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago, 1964), 120. Aquinas also distinguished different senses of this word in his *Quaestiones de Anima*. Question 6 dealt with whether the soul is composed of matter and form. In answer to the fifth objection, Aquinas argued that one can attribute the concept of *passio* and *actio* to immaterial and material forms. The word *passio* is used for both, but they are not the same thing: 'Ad quintum dicendum quod passio quae est in anima quae attribuitur intellectui possibili non est de genere passionum quae attribuuntur materiae, sed aequivoce dicitur passio utrobique, ut patet Philosophum in III *De Anima*, cum passio intellectus possibilis consistat in receptione secundum quod recipit aliquid immaterialiter': *Quaestiones de anima* (Toronto, 1968), q.6, 113.

[41] 'Sciendum est igitur quod nomen passionis dupliciter sumitur: communiter et proprie': *De veritate*, q.26, a.1, 747.

[42] The term *motus* is very difficult to render adequately in English, and indeed may mean different things in different contexts. In the Blackfriars' translation of Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*, xx (London, 1975), the glossary describes *motus* variously as 'either local motion, or the passing from potentiality into actuality, or from one state to another.': 158. It could also conceivably have something to do with the movement of the *appetitus* towards or away from something. In this case it seems to be this latter definition, whereby the *appetitus* will move away from suffering, for it is against its natural inclination. This sense also appears in Albert the Great, *De sacramentis, S. Albertis Magni, Opera Omnia, Ordinis Fratrum Praedictorum*, i-xli (Aschendorff, 1954-), xxvi, De paenitentia, pars 2, q.1, a.2: 'Quae sit differentia inter contritionem et attritionem', 82-3. Albert explained that 'in contritione enim movet timor initialis, in attritione autem timor servilis', 82.

[43] 'Communiter quidem dicitur passio receptio alicuius quocumque modo et hoc sequendo significationem vocabuli, nam passio dicitur a patin graeco, quod est recipere. Proprie vero dicitur passio secundum quod actio et passio in motu consistunt, prout scilicet aliquid recipitur in patiente per viam motus; et quia omnis motus est inter contraria, oportet illud quos recipitur in patiente, esse contrarium alicui quod a patiente abicitur': *De veritate*, q.26, a.1, 747.

lines further on, Aquinas stated that 'every *passio* subverts substance'.[44] Although he himself did not acknowledge it, the phrase came from Aristotle's *Topics*.[45] Properly speaking, *passio* is the reception of something, but it is also a kind of subversion and something which leads to alteration, but the word is extended according to the use of language in order that something which is hindered from doing something, is said to be suffering.[46] This was an essential element in the theological understanding of sense perception. This particular phrase from Aristotle was a source of great difficulty when applied to the separated soul, for it meant that an incorporeal being would have to be altered. The use of Aristotle in this way presents just as many problems as it did for those who accepted Averroes' interpretations of him on other issues.

The concern for Aquinas was how this could be applied to the separated soul. It seems that only bodies can suffer in this way, because contraries only exist in them. The soul, being incorporeal, cannot be altered or subverted in this way and thus does not suffer like a body. Aquinas therefore gave a third definition of *passio* for the way in which the soul can suffer: by the impediment of its operations.[47]

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[44] 'Omnis passio abicit a substantia': *ibid.*

[45] 'Omnis enim passio magis facta abicit a substantia...Simpliciter autem dicendum, secundum quae alteratur habens, nichil horum differentia illius, omnia enim huiusmodi cum magis fiunt abiciunt a substantia': *Topica*, vi, c.6, 128. Aristotle was discussing the differences (*differentia*) between genus and species and how things are classed. Things cannot have other things as their *differentia* which cause alteration or which subvert substance.

[46] 'Quia ergo passio proprie accepta est cum quadam abiectione...ampliatur nomen passionis secundum usum loquentium, ut qualitercumque aliquid impediatur ab eo quod sibi competebat, pati dicatur': *De Veritate*, 747.

[47] 'Passio vero secundo modo accepta non invenitur nisi ubi est motus et contrarietas. Motus autem non invenitur nisi in corporibus, et contrarietas formarum vel qualitatum in solis generabilibus et corruptibilibus...Unde anima, cum sit incorporea, hoc modo pati non potest...Tertio vero modo quo nomen passionis transumptive sumitur, anima potest pati eo modo quo eius operatio potest impediri': *ibid.*, 748. *Transumptive* here signifies the use of *passio* in a

Aquinas and Bonaventure used the same method for explaining the suffering of the separated soul. The impediment of the soul's operations and functions was the third definition of *passio*. Both Aquinas and Bonaventure used the corporeal language of authorities, respectively Aristotle and Augustine, to create a model for explaining the pain of a separated soul.

The language of the corporeal and the language of suffering were closely related. Masters re-interpreted the terms which their authorities used to describe suffering and placed them within their own vocabulary and set of ideas for suffering. New terms also emerged to explain how incorporeal substances such as the separated soul were related to physical ideas about pain and suffering.

Although written over a decade after the *Quaestiones de veritate*, Aquinas' quodlibet of Christmas 1269 shows very little difference in its answer to the same question. Aquinas only added his criticism of the opinion that the separated soul could receive knowledge of the fire which would cause suffering. He argued that this would amount to a perfection of perception and would not be punitive. Aquinas then divided his definition of *passio* into two distinct areas: the first was by means of the reception of contrary forms, just as water suffers from fire in the sense that it is heated by it. However, the separated soul cannot suffer in this way, stated Aquinas, because it can be neither heated nor dried. The second definition of *passio* amounted to anything which deprived something of its

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transumptive or metaleptic sense, that is using it as a substitute for another meaning than it usually has.

proper action or inclination, just as a man suffers when he is detained and cannot go where he desires. The soul suffers from corporeal fire by this method of detention. Aquinas acknowledged Augustine's use of this terminology in the *De civitate dei.*[48]

Matthew of Aquasparta also tried to define *passio* in the context of the separated soul suffering. His *Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima Separata*, written in the 1280s, comprise various questions on the nature of the separated soul. Question 6 examined whether the separated soul can truly suffer from corporeal fire.[49] An examination of Matthew's objections to the question precedes discussion and analysis of his solution. Although he proceeded to reject these positions in his conclusion, there are so many objections which are against the thesis that they are worth examining carefully, to understand exactly which issues masters felt compelled to address. His first objection stated that the separated soul could not possibly suffer from corporeal fire. If it were to happen, said Matthew, then it would have to be either by natural virtue or supernatural virtue. It cannot be by natural virtue because every *actio* and *passio* occurs through contraries, but fire is not contrary to the soul. It cannot occur by supernatural virtue either, for the virtue is either spiritual or corporeal. The spiritual virtue cannot act in something

[48] 'Quosdam qui dicunt, quod anima separata a corpore...potest accipere cognitionem a rebus sensibilis. Sed si etiam haec opinio esset vera, tamen pati sentiendo et intelligendo est perfici, non puniri...Et haec quidem passio dupliciter esse potest. Uno modo per receptionem formae contrariae, sicut aqua patitur ab igne in quantum calefit...hoc modo separata anima non potest pati ab igne corporeo, quia nec calefieri potest nec desiccari...Alio modo dicitur pati omne illud quod quocumque modo impeditur a suo proprio impetu vel inclinatione...sicut dicimus hominem pati, cum detinetur vel ligatur ne vadat quo vult: et ita per modum ligationis cuiusdam anima patitur ab igne corporeo, ut Augustinus dicit, in XXI *de Civitate Dei*': AQQ, 34.

[49] Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones Disputatae de anima separata*, (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, xviii; Quaracchi, 1959), q.6: 'Quaestio est de anima separata, utrum vere patiatur ab igne infernali', 93-119.

corporeal, and the corporeal virtue cannot act in the soul.[50] Again this idea of contraries is expressed in relation to *passio*. The problem for Matthew, as for Aquinas, was to demonstrate the existence of contrary things to the separated soul.

In another objection, Matthew explained that some passions impinge on the soul as a result of its union with a body. The example he cited was *dolor*:

> which is the perception of continual division as Augustine says in *III De libero arbitrio*.[51]

Other passions have an effect on the body by virtue of its union with the soul, for example blushing from shame.[52] In other words, within a soul-body union, some passions are experienced by the soul through the body, and such a passion is *dolor*; others are experienced by the body through the soul, such as blushing. However, in no way may the body suffer from passions which are brought to it by its union with the soul, when it is separated from the soul. Likewise, the soul cannot suffer from passions which it experiences by its union with the body. *Dolor* is one of these.[53] The objection offered a definition of those passions

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[50] 'Si enim anima separata ab igne infernali patitur et ignis ille agit in animam separatam, aut agit virtute naturali aut supernaturali...quod enim non agat virtute naturali, videtur, quoniam omnis actio et passio, quae est a virtute naturali, est per naturam contrarietatis; ignis autem ad animam nulla est contrarietas. Quod non virtute supernaturali, ostenditur, quia illa virtus aut est corporalis aut spiritualis...nulla corporalis virtus potest agere in spiritum. Nec spiritualis, quia virtus spiritualis in re corporali esse non potest': *ibid.*, 93.

[51] 'Item, aliquae sunt passiones quas contrahit anima ex unione sui cum corpore, sicut dolor, qui est sensus divisionis continui, ut dicit Augustinus, III *De libero arbitrio*' The reference to Augustine is from c.23 of the third book on Free Will, *PL* 32, 1303-1305: 'Quid est enim aliud dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel corruptionis impatiens?'

[52] 'Aliquae sunt passiones quas contrahit corpus ex unione sui cum anima, ex cuius affectione immutatur, sicut rubendo ex verecundia': Matthew of Aquasparta, q.6, 95.

[53] 'Sed corpus nullo modo potest pati passiones quae sibi conveniunt ex unione sui cum anima ab anima separatum; ergo nec anima potest pati passiones quae conveniunt sibi ex unione cum corpore a corpore separata, sed dolor est huiusmodi, ut visum est': *ibid.*

which required the presence of a body to be experienced. *Dolor* is amongst these passions that cannot be experienced by the separated soul. In another of his objections, he explains how *passio* is a 'movement of alteration'. When something suffers from another thing it is changed by that thing. The soul cannot be changed by corporeal fire, argued Matthew, and so it does not suffer from this fire.[54] So in strict terms, Matthew's objections demonstrated that suffering required a body to be present. The language he adduced from authorities supported this claim. Nevertheless, this language required application to an incorporeal substance.

In his reply to this question, Matthew discussed three defintions of *passio*, reception, change and metaphor. Reception is feeling or understanding in some way as suffering. Change refers to something which is caused by a contrary, for everything passible is corruptible. The third definition is metaphorical and refers to a state by which a thing's natural operations are impeded.[55] Matthew then applied these three definitions to the case in hand. The first definition was not applicable to separated souls, for even if they could receive corporeal fire, the *species* would be intellectual and this will not cause affliction, but delight. This conformed to the idea that the intellectual knowledge of sensible *species* is not the cause of suffering, but the cause of pleasure. The second definition also did not apply because nothing is the contrary of corporeal fire, and the separated soul

[54] 'Passio est motus alterationis; omne igitur quod patitur ab aliquo, alteratur ab illo; sed anima nullo modo potest ab igne corporeo alterari; ergo nec pati': *ibid.*, 96.

[55] 'Quidam enim posuerunt quod triplex est passio: una per receptionem, sicut dicimus quod sentire et intelligere est quoddam pati...Alio modo per transmutationem, et ista est per naturam contrarietatis, et omne quod est sic passibile est corruptibile. Tertia est passio metaphorice dicta per naturalis operationis impeditionem': *De anima separata*, q.6, 102.

is unchangeable due to its complete incorporeality.[56] It would appear, then, that the explanation hinged on the final definition. According to Matthew of Aquasparta, the separated soul suffers by being impeded from performing its natural operations. It is violently detained as if in prison and indissolubly bound, by divine justice, to this corporeal fire.[57]

Matthew of Aquasparta's conclusion ran along the same lines as Bonaventure and Aquinas before him. He agreed with them that the only way in which the soul could suffer pain from corporeal fire was in the sense that it was deprived of its natural functions. Like previous masters, he also challenged the language used by Augustine to describe pain in general and then applied it specifically to the separated soul.

The issue of the separated soul and its punishment by corporeal fire provoked much discussion amongst masters of theology. All masters agreed that the existing methods for describing sense perception were unsatisfactory and incorrect when an incorporeal substance was the subject matter. They all examined and refuted notions of experiencing sense information when the body was not present. Instead, there appears to have been a solid consensus that the soul would suffer on account of some kind of union to the material fire, and pain

[56] 'Primo modo non potest dici quod spiritus separati ab igne corporeo crucientur, quoniam aut non recipiunt aliquid a corpore aut si recipiunt, cum illa receptio sit tantum speciei intellectualis, non erit ad afflictionem, sed potius ad delectationem. Nec secundo modo, quia nullam habet contrarietatem ad ignem corporeum, nec spiritus separatus est transmutabilis, cum sit omnino incorporalis': *ibid.*, 103.

[57] 'Sed patitur tertio modo, scilicet per naturalis operationis impeditionem...spiritus in loco indissolubiliter alligetur et violenter velut in carcere detineatur. Ergo pro tanto dicitur spiritus separatus ab igne infernali pati et cruciari, quia illi igni, divina iustitia faciente, indissolubiliter alligatur, propter quam alligationem et arctationem in suis operationibus naturalibus impeditur': *ibid.*

would arise from the inability of the soul to perform its natural functions. This theory also had the backing of authority in Augustine.

The language which masters had at their disposal used terms and vocabulary which applied to corporeal natures. Where the separated soul was concerned, such language did not properly apply. For this reason, certain short formulae from the works of Augustine and Aristotle were used to criticise loose application of language for suffering and reinforce the view that pain, properly speaking, occurred only in the body composite. Once this was established, the language for pain was extended to include the separated soul. The belief in the union of body and soul in the composite explained the union of corporeal to incorporeal. A further union, that of the incorporeal soul to corporeal fire, explained how the separated soul could suffer from this fire. In the soul-body composite the soul was able to perform its functions properly; in the 'soul-fire composite' the soul was hindered from its natural operations. In this sense, a new form of suffering for the soul was created.

3. Suffering of the Separated Soul : the Paris Condemnation of 1270

On 1 April 1272 the faculty of arts at the University of Paris issued the statute *Noverint universi*. This statute prohibited masters and bachelors in the faculty of arts from disputing questions which were purely theological or which contained

elements of both philosophy and theology.[58] This was tacit agreement by the faculty of arts that the activity of their members had provoked in 1270 the condemnation of thirteen theses by the bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier. This was followed some seven years later by a more haphazard, blanket condemnation of 219 heretical theses. Why did these condemnations come about? In the prologue to the list of 219 condemned theses, Tempier attacked a master in the arts faculty, Siger of Brabant, and others for holding what has been dubbed by historians the 'double truth' theory:

> For they say that they [certain philosophical doctrines] are true according to philosophy, but not according to the Catholic faith, as if there were two contrary truths...'[59]

One of the main issues which provoked the condemnation of 1277 was that certain masters of arts were offering contradictory truths, according to faith, on the one hand, and according to philosophy on the other. This was a claim levelled against masters of arts in the 1270 condemnation also.

One of the thirteen condemned positions in 1270 was the belief that the separated soul could not suffer from corporeal fire. It was argued in the previous section that this issue aroused interest amongst masters of theology because it did not conform to their own theories about suffering. Did external factors, in this case a challenge from the faculty of arts, influence the theories put forward by masters

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[58] J.A. Weisheipl, 'The Date and Context of Aquinas' *De aeternitate mundi*', *Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens*, ed. L.P. Gerson (Toronto, 1983), 239-271, at 258.

[59] 'Dicunt enim ea esse vera secundum philosophiam, sed non secundum fidem catholicam, quasi sint due contrarie veritates': *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis sub Auspciis Consilii Generalis Facultatem Parisiensium*, ed. H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, i (Paris, 1889), 543.

previous to 1270? This section argues that the conclusion offered to the question of the separated soul suffering from corporeal fire by one of the condemned masters of arts, Siger of Brabant, was similar to that given by masters of theology some decades earlier. It also explores other attitudes of the so-called Averroists to demonstrate how certain condemned theses were also being debated in similar ways by masters of theology.

i. Averroism

The emergence of a movement which has been variously termed 'Latin Averroism' or 'Radical Aristotelianism' in the faculty of arts at the University of Paris, presented a challenge to some deep-rooted positions held by the masters of theology. The phrase 'Averroism' comes from a Latinisation of the name of the Arabic philosopher Ibn-Rushd,[60] whose exegesis on Aristotle's *De anima* was available in the West by the middle of the thirteenth century.[61] The chief exponents of this movement were Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. Siger, a young master in the Picard nation of the Faculty of Arts, is first mentioned on 27 August 1266 in a report by Simon of Brion, papal legate, about a dispute between the nation of the French and the other three nations.[62] Thereafter, it is

[60] 'Latin Averroism' was coined by P. Mandonnet in his *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme Latin au XIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1899). F. van Steenberghen objected to this phrase claiming that the Arts' Masters were influenced by others as well, and in fact that Siger represented proponents of 'Integral Aristotelianism'. See J.A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino*, 272; S. MacClintock, 'Heresy and Epithet: An Approach to the Problem of Latin Averroism', *Rev.Met.*, 8, 1-3 (Sept.1954- Mar.1955), 1:176-99; 2: 342-56; 3: 526-45.

[61] F. Copleston, *History of Philosophy*, ii (London, 1950), 437.

[62] P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant* (Louvain, 1911), 80-1. Siger was probably born around the early 1230s, and from his name he clearly comes from what is now Belgium. Apart from his prominence in the 1270 Condemnations, little is known of him. For a long time it was thought Siger of Brabant and Siger of Courtrai, a Thomist, were the same person. He was murdered by his demented secretary in 1284: Knowles, *Evolution of Medieval Thought*, 247-9. Dante affords

not until the Condemnation of the thirteen propositions in 1270, in which he is explicitly mentioned, that he again appears.

The 1270 Condemnations themselves may be summarised into four subject areas: the theory that the world was eternal; the unity of the intellect; the negation of Providence; and the suppression of moral liberty.[63] The areas which aroused the greatest controversy or discussion were the claims that the world was eternal and that there was only one intellect for all humans. For the purposes of this chapter the latter holds the most significance, because one corollary of it was the belief that the separated soul could not experience the punishment of corporeal fire. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the chronology of events that led up to the Condemnations of 1270, and briefly examining the arguments surrounding the eternity of the world thesis, before looking in detail at the arguments concerned with the separated soul, for there is some evidence to suggest that masters of theology and masters of arts held similar ideas to one another on both of these issues. This may further suggest that distinctions between the philosophically-motivated theology practised by some masters of theology and the radical interpretations of Aristotle held by masters of arts were blurred.

Siger the honour in his *Paradiso* of placing him alongside Aquinas, pseudo-Denys, Isidore of Seville, Richard of St. Victor and Albert the Great: F. van Steenberghen, *Maître Siger de Brabant* (Louvain, 1977), 11.

[63] Mandonnet, *Siger*, 160. The thirteen condemned theses are as follows: 1.Quod intellectus omnium hominum est unus et idem numero; 2.Quod ista est falsa vel impropria: Homo intelligit; 3.Quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate vult vel eligit; 4.Quod omnia, que hic in inferioribus aguntur, subsunt necessitati corporum celesium; 5.Quod mundus est eternus; 6.Quod nunquam fuit primus homo; 7.Quod anima, que est forma hominis secundum quod homo, corrumpitur corrupto corpore; 8.Quod anima post mortem separata non patitur ab igne corporeo; 9.Quod liberum arbitrium est potentia passiva, non activa; et quod necessitate movetur ab appetibili; 10.Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia; 11.Quod Deus non cognoscit alia a se; 12.Quod humani

However, masters of theology clearly saw it as their duty to attack the Averroists. The first directed attacks against the positions of the philsophers in the Arts Faculty appear to have come from Bonaventure in his Lenten sermons of 1267-68.[64] He attacked three theses: the eternity of the world, the unity of the intellect and the idea that a mortal may not become immortal. Bonaventure called the first a perversion of sacred scripture, saying it denied that the son of God was incarnate. To posit that there is one intellect for all human beings is to deny the truth of faith, the salvation of the soul and one's respect for the Commandments. This, he said, is what comes from the perverse undertakings of philosophical investigation.[65]

Aquinas also became involved in the movement against Averroism. He returned from Viterbo to take up his second session as regent master of theology at Paris in January 1269 [66] and was apparently prompted by the interventions of Bonaventure to mount his own attack against the Averroists.[67] Aquinas' reply to the positions of the Averroists took the form of a polemical treatise, the *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas Parisiensis*, written before the 1270 Condemnation.[68] In spite of attempts by the great Sigerian specialist Fernand van

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actus non reguntur providentia Dei; 13.Quod Deus non potest dare immortalitatem vel incorrupcionem rei corruptibili vel mortali: *Chartularium*, i, 486-7.

[64] Van Steenberghen, *Maître Siger*, 34-5.

[65] 'Ponere enim mundum aeternum, hoc est pervertere totam Sacram Scripturam et dicere quod Filius Dei non sit incarnatus. Ponere vero quod unus intellectus sit in omnibus, hoc est dicere quod non sit veritas fidei, nec salus animarum, nec observantia mandatorum...Hoc igitur ponere provenit ex improbo ausu investigationis philosophicae': *Collationes de decem praeceptis*, ii, 25, *Opera Omnia*, v (Quaracchi, 1902), 514-515.

[66] Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino*, 352.

[67] Van Steenberghen, *Maître Siger*, 57.

[68] Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino*, 277. The colophon of the Oxford Corpus Christi ms. 225 from the early fourteenth century states: 'Haec scripsit Thomas (ms taliter) contra magistrum Sigerum de Brabantia (ms. Barbantia) et alios plurimos Parisius in philosophia regentes anno Domini 1270.': F. van Steenberghen, *Maître Siger*, 58.

Steenberghen to prove Aquinas's dependence on Siger, it looks unlikely that Aquinas knew of Siger's commentary on the third book of *De anima*.[69] Siger, on the other hand, may have known and used Aquinas's works in his own treatise. This will be discussed systematically with regard to the works of both men below.

ii. Eternity of the World

The theory that the world was eternal was not considered only by masters of arts. The thesis was tackled by Aquinas at various stages in his career, notably in his *Commentary on the Sentences* (1253-57), in part one of the *Summa Theologiae* (1266-68), and in his treatise *De aeternitate mundi* (*c.*1270).[70] In his second book on the *Sentences*, Aquinas outlined his position as to whether or not the world was eternal. His overall conclusion was that everything apart from God began to be, but this cannot be demonstrated by human reason. Only by revelation can we know that the world was created.[71] In the *De aeternitate mundi*, written probably in the Spring of 1271,[72] a few months after the Condemnation, Aquinas went further than in previous works. He presented two positions which objected to the possibility, and pointed to the absurdity, of something being created and having existed forever. First, Aquinas argued, there is an absence of passive potency

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[69] Van Steenberghen admits that it is not easy to establish that Aquinas knew of the *Quaestiones in III de anima*, and that all one can do is show that some of the positions in Siger's work are refuted by Aquinas in his treatise: *Maître Siger*, 60.
[70] F. van Steenberghen, *Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism* (Washington D.C., 1980), 10.
[71] *II Sent.*, d.1, q.1, a.5: J.F. Wippel, 'Did Thomas Aquinas Defend the Possibility of an Eternally Created World (The *De aeternitate mundi* Revisited)?', *JHP*, 19 (1981), 24.
[72] Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino*, 385.

from which an eternally-existing creature might be formed. Second, it is absurd and intrinsically contradictory for something to be created and to have always existed. In his answer to the first proposition, Aquinas argued that we cannot prove the existence of any passive potency, but this does not rule out the possibility that God caused it to be. The implication here, as John Wippel points out, is that creative production does not need a pre-existing passive potency. Aquinas stated that whatever answer is correct, if God allowed that something created by him could have existed for eternity, then it would not be heretical to maintain that possibility of eternal creation. If creation and eternity are not incompatible in this way, then not only would the assertion of an eternally-created world be not false, it would be possible.[73]

Giles of Rome appears to have held a similar position to Aquinas which, in turn, led to his condemnation and expulsion from the faculty of theology around 1279.[74] Godfrey of Fontaines also followed a similar line.[75] So it would appear that various masters of theology argued that the possibility of an eternal world

[73] Wippel, 'Did Thomas Aquinas', 30-1. The problem with the study of the text of *De aeternitate mundi*, as Wippel points out, is the existence of textual variants in regard to this passage. In some manuscripts *possibile* has been substituted with *impossibile*. The fact remains, however, that Aquinas believes that one cannot establish, or deny, by reason the existence of an eternally created world.

[74] In his second book on the *Sentences*, d.1, p.1, q.4, a.2, Giles wrote: 'Concludamus ergo et dicamus quod rationes factae...videntur nobis solubiles et non esse demonstrationes; tamen ut supra tangimus quia multa sunt vera quae demonstrari non possunt et multa sunt demonstrabilia ad quae non sunt inventae demonstrationes, ideo non tenemus quod mundus potuerit esse ab aeterno, nec quod non possit demonstrari, sed quod rationes ad hoc factae non videntur nobis esse demonstrationes. Si ergo in hac quaestione aliquando visi sumus dicere quod mundus potuit esse ab aeterno, non tanquam asserentes diximus sed gratia disputationis hoc assumebamus, ut possemus ostendere rationes contra hoc factas non concludere. Certum est tamen quod Deus potuit facere mundum ab aeterno quia ab aeterno potentiam habuit et non accepit eam in tempore': E. Hocedez, 'La condamnation de Gilles de Rome', *RTAM*, 4 (1932), 45.

[75] J.F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines* (Washington D.C., 1981), 168-9.

could exist. In any case, it could not be demonstrated by reason that it had not existed for eternity.

The view taken by Aquinas shows some correlation with the position held by the master of arts Boethius of Dacia in his own *De aeternitate mundi*. Boethius made various distinctions between faith and reason, and also between the various branches of philosophy, mathematics and metaphysics. In so doing, he concluded that in no way can any of these branches demonstrate that the world began to be. He carefully avoided contravening Christian belief by saying that if natural philosophy cannot demonstrate that the world began to be, then natural philosophical conclusions surrounding this issue should be denied. The implication here is that Christian belief exists apart from natural philosophy; he did not deny Christian belief. Conversely, Boethius argued that one cannot prove by reason that the world is eternal either.[76] The position seems to be very close to that of Aquinas. Moreover, this may support the view that Aquinas' *De aeternitate mundi* was not directed against the Averroists, but against a disputed question by John Peckham during his inception as a Master of Theology.[77] Peckham had argued that God pre-existed before creation and thus the creation of the world was demonstrable by reason. However, it is important to recognise that certain masters of theology were deploying philosophical reasoning to understand theological issues in similar ways to some masters of arts.

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[76] *Ibid.*, 156-8.

[77] I. Brady, 'John Pecham and the Background to the *De aeternitate mundi* of St. Thomas Aquinas', *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974 Commemorative Studies*, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1974), ii, 141-78. Weisheipl thinks, however, that the treatise was directed against nobody in particular, but rather against the common position in Paris. He also thinks it may have resulted from Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics VIII*, in which Aquinas thought he had found evidence for Aristotle's belief in eternity of motion, time and the world: *Friar Thomas d' Aquino*, 484-5.

It appears that masters of arts also used similar methods of argument to masters of theology when they discussed theological issues. Siger of Brabant was concerned with defining spheres of study to achieve understanding of apparently conflicting issues. A question concerning the differences between theology as a part of philosophy and theology based on sacred scripture appears in two manuscripts attributed to Siger, both of which are commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[78] There is evidence that Siger was influenced here by Aquinas, even borrowing some of his language.[79] The first main difference, as we would expect, is that philosophical theology relies on knowledge from the senses, memory and experience and from the light of natural reason. Theology concerned with sacred scripture, on the other hand, comes from divine revelation.[80] The fifth difference has particular significance. The theology of sacred scripture is more certain than philosophical theology because it relies on divine revelation and thus cannot err. Philosophical theology, on the other hand, is conducted through the route of human cognition, which can err.[81] Aquinas voiced a very similar belief in the *Summa Theologiae*.[82] There is much evidence to suggest that

[78] The manuscripts are Vienna ms.Lat.2330 and Peterhouse, Cambridge ms. 152: W. Dunphy and A. Maurer, 'A Promising New Discovery for Sigerian Studies', *Mediaeval Studies*, 29 (1967), 364-9.

[79] *Ibid.*, 365.

[80] 'Primo quantum [differunt] ad modum considerandi seu procedendi. Nostra enim theologia tantum procedit ex principiis cognitis lumine rationis humanae et habitis via sensus, memoriae et experimenti; alia autem procedit ex principiis cognitis lumine divinae revelationis': *ibid.*, 366-7. I have taken this quotation from the Peterhouse manuscript. Notice how Siger calls the philosophical theology 'ours'.

[81] 'Quinto differunt quia alia est magis certa quam ista [ie. philosophical theology]. Certitudo enim scientiae est ex certitudine principiorum. Principia autem illius modo certiori accepta sunt quam principia hujus, quia quoniam principia illius accepta sunt modo tali in quo non potest accidere error, scilicet per revelationem divinam, principia autem hujus accepta sunt per viam cognitionis humanae, in qua potest error accidere': *ibid.*, 368.

[82] 'Ad ea etiam quae de Deo ratione humana investigari possunt necessarium fuit hominem instrui revelatione divina; quia veritas de Deo per rationem investigata, a paucis hominibus et per longum tempus et cum admixtione multorum errorum provenerit': *ST* Ia, q.1, a.1. For Aquinas

Siger was using Aquinas when he was disputing theological issues. Siger's awareness of the limitations of human reason and his separation of philosophical theology from theology based on scripture should be borne in mind.

iii. Monopsychism

The other main tenet of the Averroist commentators was that of the unity of the intellect, otherwise known as monopsychism. The theory was that there was one soul in all people, and thus the active and passive intellects were one and the same for all. This meant, of course, that there could be no individual immortality after death.[83] Instead of individuals thinking for themselves, the individual soul was believed to think in them, using human phantasms in the abstraction of ideas.[84] The starting point for the controversy was Averroes' commentary on *De anima* III, 5, 430a10-25. In this passage, Averroes described the intellect as separable, impassible, unmixed, eternal and immortal.[85] This was a logical extension of the ideas of Aristotle. Aristotle believed that intellectual activity was immaterial in nature. The intellectual soul had therefore to be an immaterial substance. Aristotle also taught that immaterial substances were eternal and incorruptible. The soul was thus perceived by Averroes to be eternal and unique.[86]

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and Albert the Great's views on theology, see: R. McInerny, 'Albert and Thomas on Theology', *Albert der Große: Seine Zeit, Sein Werk, Seine Wirkung,* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 14; Berlin and New York, 1981), 50-60.

[83] Although individuals would share in some sort of impersonal immortality, they could in no way exist after death as individuals: F.C. Copleston, *Aquinas* (Harmondsworth, 1955), 176-8; Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, 172ff.

[84] Copleston, *History of Philosophy*, vol.2, 435; Van Steenberghen, *Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism*, 29.

[85] Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino*, 275.

[86] Van Steenberghen, *Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism*, 33.

Siger of Brabant discussed the unity of intellect thesis in his *Quaestiones in tertium de anima*, probably written in 1269. In this treatise, Siger described the intellect as a single separated substance. It unites to the body as a power, rather than a substantial form, for if it were to perfect the body by its substance, then it could not be separate.[87] The intellect is also eternal,[88] ungenerated and impassible.

If Siger already believed that the separated soul was impassible, then the question of passibility and whether the separated soul could suffer from corporeal fire are issues which appear rather outside the parameters of the unity of the intellect thesis. The second issue, as Siger himself stated, has not really anything to do with the philsophical discussions about the intellect; it is more theological in content:

> Consequently, we inquire about the soul in a state of separation. The question is not very philosophical, that is, whether the separated soul can suffer from some natural element like fire.[89]

The interesting point is that he would include it at all. Van Steenberghen seems to think that Siger included this question almost to deride the theologians.[90] He

[87] 'Solutio. Intellectus perficit corpus, non per suam substantiam, sed per suam potentiam, quia, si per suam substantiam perficieret, non esset separabilis': Siger de Brabant, *Quaestiones in tertium de anima*, ed. B. Bazán (Philosophes Médiévaux, xiii; Paris and Louvain, 1972), q.7: 'Utrum intellectus sit perfectio corporis quantum ad substantiam', 23.

[88] qq.2-3, *ibid.*, 4-10.

[89] 'Quaeritur consequenter de anima in statu separationis, et est quaestio non multum philosophica, scilicet utrum anima separata pati possit ab aliqua natura elementari, ut ab igne': q.11: 'Utrum anima separata pati possit ab igne': *ibid.*, 31-35.

[90] 'In a word, according to the Averroist point of view, the question of sanctions in the life to come does not even arise and the problem of hell-fire is simply a false problem. But before arriving at this conclusion, Siger permits himself the pleasure of criticising different views held by the theologians': Van Steenberghen, *Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism*, 40. Van

also claims that the question is treated in purely philosophical terms, without any explicit reference to the theological doctrine of hell.[91] Although Siger did not explicitly mention hell, van Steenberghen's claim is misleading. A detailed comparison of Siger's answer to this question with Aquinas' same question in the treatise *De anima* will serve to illustrate that Siger was aware of accepted theological conclusions of the time. Moreover, it would appear that Siger's own conclusion to the question was closely dependent on the arguments of Aquinas. The texts of each have been placed side by side in order that the maximum effect of close comparison may be made.

Siger of Brabant	**Aquinas**
'Utrum anima separata pati possit ab igne': *Quaestiones in tertium de anima* (Philosophes Médiévaux, xiii; Louvain and Paris, 1972), 31-5.	'Utrum anima separata possit pati poenam ab igne corporeo': *Quaestiones de anima* (Toronto, 1968), q.21, 264-73.
1. Ad quaestionem istam dicunt quidam quod anima separata potest pati ab igne; non autem patitur quia comburitur, sed quia videt se in igne esse. Contra hoc arguitur. Et licet anima videat se in igne, non tamen percipit quod ei noceat ignis. (p.34)	1. Quidam enim dixerunt quod anima separata patitur ignem hoc ipso quo videt; quod tangit Gregorius, in IV *Dialogorum*, dicens: Ignem eo ipso patitur anima quo videt. Sed cum videre sit perfectio videntis, omnis visio est delectabilis in quantum hujusmodi. Unde nihil in quantum est visum est afflictivum, sed in quantum apprehenditur ut nocivum. (p.269)
2. Nam , si anima patitur ab igne quia videtur ei quod comburatur ab igne, tunc anima non patitur ab igne, sed a specie ignis. Item passio non esset passio, sed deceptio, quod videtur esse falsum, nam Aristoteles in hoc tertio dixit quod intellectus ille, qui est sine materia, non est falsus, sed semper verus. Quare, si iste intellectus non decipitur, nec anima separata decipitur. (p.33).	2. Et ideo alii dixerunt quod anima videns illum ignem et apprehendens ut nocivum sibi ex hoc affligitur; quod tangit Gregorius, in *IV Dialogorum*, dicens quod anima cremari se conspicit cum crematur. Sed tunc considerandum restat utrum ignis secundum rei veritatem sit nocivus vel non. Et si quidem non sit animae nocivus secundum rei veritatem, sequeretur quod decipiatur in sua aestimatione qua apprehendit ipsum ut nocivum. Et hoc videtur inopinabile...Oportet ergo dicere quod secundum rei veritatem ille ignis corporeus animae sit nocivus. (p.269)

Steenberghen's claim that Siger considers the problem as false, is not found in the text. He does, however, voice the position of Aristotle.

[91] 'Le problème est traité en termes purement philosophiques, sans aucune référence explicite à la doctrine théologique de l'enfer': F. van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant* (Louvain, 1977), 52.

2a. Forte, si quaeritur ab Aristotele utrum anima intellectiva esset passibilis, ipse responderet quod ipsa intellectiva separata impassbilis est, et forte ipse cum Commentare eius diceret quod ipsa inseparabilis est, et si separetur ab hoc corpore, non tamen ab omni corpore simpliciter separatur...Ideo intellectus unicus in omnibus est et secundum substantiam suam et secundum suam potestatem. (p.34).

3. Item Aristoteles primo huius dicit quod non quaelibet ars utitur quolibet instrumento, sed solum instrumento sibi conveniente...Quare, ut videtur, non poterit esse instrumentum suae punitionis nisi ab eo cui unitur in principio...**Dico** [my emphasis] quod unietur ei non sicut forma materiae, sed sicut locatum unitur loco, quia operatur in eo...Anima ergo ita detinetur ab igne, detenta tristatur, et in hoc patitur, cum ipsa desideret alibi operari, et non possit. Dicit enim Averroes quod omnis voluntas est delectabilis. Quod ergo impedit voluntatem animae ei unire, in quo quidem delectaretur, si eam compleret, facit eam tristari, et **sic** [my emphasis] anima patitur ab igne. Rationes evidenter possunt solvi per iam dicta. (pp.33-4).

3. Potest autem pati anima [separata] ab igne corporeo secundo modo passionis, in quantum per huiusmodi ignem impeditur a sua inclinatione vel voluntate; quod sic patet. Anima enim et quaelibet incorporalis substantia, quantum est de sui natura, non est obligata alicui loco se transcendit totum ordinem corporalium. Quod ergo alligetur alicui et determinetur ad aliquem locum per quandam necessitatem est contra ejus naturam et contrarium appetitui naturali...Et sic verum est quod ignis ille, in quantum virtute divina detinet animam alligatam, agit in animam ut instrumentum divinae iustitiae, in quantum anima apprehendit illum ignem ut sit sibi nocivum, interiori tristitia affligitur...(p.270).

Siger's solution to the question begins with how Aristotle would tackle the Pythagorean idea that fire is in the centre of the earth. Next, however, he turns to the question in hand (Siger paragraph 1). Some people, in fact it is Gregory the Great,[92] argue that the separated soul can suffer from corporeal fire, not by burning, but because it sees itself in the fire.[93] Siger's argument against this is that even if the separated soul were to see itself in the fire, it could not perceive the fire as damaging to it.

Aquinas responded to the same point in his *Quaestiones de anima* (Aquinas paragraph 1). Like Siger, he criticised the idea that visual perception of the fire

[92] And not Gregory of Nyssa as the editor of this volume claims.
[93] Gregory the Great, *Dialogorum Liber*, iv, cap. xxix, *PL* 77, 365-368.

can cause suffering. Sight is the perfection of seeing and, as such, will cause pleasure. There can be no affliction except in that the soul apprehends the fire as being afflictive. How is this to occur? Aquinas offered Gregory the Great's opinion that the soul sees itself burning and this is what causes the suffering. (Aquinas paragraph 2) But he argued that there must be some consideration taken as to whether the separated soul suffers from something in reality, or not. If it does not suffer in reality then it follows that the soul is deceived in its estimation of apprehending the fire to be harmful. This is untenable, so it must be said that corporeal fire is really harmful to the separated soul.

Siger's discussion of the same passage is almost identical (Siger paragraph 2). His argument continued that if the soul suffers because it seems to it that it is burned by the fire, it is not the fire itself which causes the affliction, but a *species* of it. If this is the case, then there is no *passio* (suffering), but *deceptio* (deception). But this cannot be the case because Aristotle stated that the intellect can never be wrong, that is, deceived in this way, because it is always right. And if the intellect is not deceived, neither is the separated soul. The implication here is that the soul must suffer from fire in reality.

So what is Siger's final conclusion? As historians of Siger have noted, his final words on the subject refer to Aristotle (Siger paragraph 2a). If Aristotle were to answer this question, said Siger, then he would probably reply that the separated intellect is impassible. However, what has been ignored is Siger's own conclusion about whether the separated soul can suffer from corporeal fire. As was discussed above, Siger appeared to be dividing what he deemed a theological

question, from the theories of Aristotle on the soul. In his conclusion to this particular question, he appears to offer a solution.

(Siger paragraph 3) Siger quoted Aristotle who stated that no quality can use any instrument it likes, but only an instrument which relates to it. Fire can only be an instrument of punishment by uniting to the separated soul by principle. Siger argued that this is not a union like that between matter and form, rather it is place to situation, because the fire acts in the separated soul. The soul is detained by the fire, in the sense that it cannot perform its operations. This detainment causes the separated soul suffering, because it desires to perform, but cannot. Siger, capped this argument by quoting Averroes, who claimed that all will is pleasurable. Hindering this will can only lead to sadness. It is thus, argued Siger, that the separated soul suffers from corporeal fire. This formulation of the argument suggests very strongly that Siger had his own conclusion to the question and that his beliefs were very similar to those used by theologians.

(Aquinas paragraph 3) Aquinas, as we have seen previously, offered an almost identical solution. He also explained that the separated soul can suffer from the material fire in that it is detained by the fire and cannot exercise its natural appetite, nor go where it pleases. This will cause the soul, or intellect, to interpret the fire as harmful and this will lead to interior sadness.

Two main points of interest emerge from the foregoing analysis. In offering his own conclusion to this tricky issue Siger was airing an orthodoxy, which, as we have seen in the previous section, masters of theology had established some two

decades before the 1270 Condemnation. Siger's own conclusion was not in doubt on this score. He did not deny that the separated soul could suffer the pains of corporeal fire. It would appear instead that he was condemned for this thesis as a result of the context in which the question was set. Second, despite attacks on the so-called Averroists by such mainstream masters of theology as Aquinas, Bonaventure and Albert the Great, the overlap between areas where certain masters of arts and certain masters of theology agreed is striking. At times, the way in which masters of theology expressed their arguments in the period before the condemnation was analogous to the mode of expression used by the so-called Averroists. Furthermore, Siger of Brabant did not present his conclusion to the question about the suffering of the separated soul at one point in terms of faith and at another point in terms of reason.[94] He did not even appear to advance two different plausible conclusions. Although he did not explicitly quote from patristic authority, his own solution was based upon reasoned argument with the authority of Augustine, who first mooted the idea of fire being bound to the soul. Siger did not conclude in a derisory fashion, but followed the arguments of a respected master of theology and concluded himself that the separated soul could suffer in this way.

[94] Averroist texts are generally acknowledged as such by the detection of questions which base themselves almost entirely on the authority of Averroes and which end with a formal declaration of faith. Z. Kuksewicz has used this premise to question whether Giles of Orléans was really an Averroist. See Z. Kuksewicz, 'Gilles d'Orléans était-il averroïste?', *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 88 (1990), 5-24, esp. 21-2.

Conclusion

Lack of consistent opinion on many different levels about the nature of the separated soul provoked much interest into whether it could experience information which normally came through the senses. Chief among such debates, it seems, was whether the soul could suffer from the pain of corporeal fire. This was an important consideration because the soul might spend its time in purgatory or hell, separated from the body, until the end of time. It was generally believed by patristic authorities, and even later commentators, that the soul would suffer in some way from material fire. However, theories which existed before the thirteenth century were unsatisfactory for the masters of theology. They did not conform to their ideas about the human composite, nor to their theories about suffering. The question may also have received renewed impetus in the late 1260s when masters of arts at Paris also discussed whether it would suffer and appeared to deny that it would. However, close inspection of the question casts some doubt on this theory.

The language of suffering depended on the presence of both soul and body. The separated soul thus fell outside its normal remit. Certain short phrases about pain, culled from the works of a discrete group of authorities, provided the essential model to demonstrate that pain, properly speaking, depended upon the existence of both soul and body. In this sense, attributing pain to the separated soul was not possible. However, extension of the conceptual framework which described pain was possible. The suffering of the separated soul was explained in terms of a

compositional arrangement between material fire and the incorporeal soul. Unlike the union of soul and body where the soul received information through the senses, this 'punitive' composition of soul and fire prevented the soul from performing its natural operations. This was an attractive and plausible argument. It conformed to theories about union between incorporeal and corporeal substances. The impediment of the soul's operations was another means of describing pain and suffering.

6

Defining the Corporeal: Suffering in Hell according to Masters of Theology at Paris, *c.*1230-*c.*1280

Defining the nature of corporeality in hell and its relation to eternal suffering was an important concern for masters of theology. The masters asked questions about the bodies of the damned because certain passages of scripture were traditionally held to be significant where the suffering of the body in hell was concerned. Furthermore, in many instances, the nature of different kinds of punishment was disputed or left ambiguous in later commentaries by key authorities. Part of the métier of a theologian was to resolve apparent conflicts in his main authorities. However, by debating these issues themselves, other debates and questions arose as a logical consequence. In discussing the natures of the fires of hell and the worm of conscience, theologians wanted to know which would cause most suffering to the damned. Their interest in applying scales or levels of suffering was thus an important impetus here. These issues form the background to the first section on the nature of pain in hell.

The second section examines the nature of the resurrected body in hell. The issue of the continuity of the self-same person, evident in so many treatises on resurrection through the centuries, influenced debate on the nature of the resurrected body itself. Masters asked whether bodily deformities would remain after death because the maintenance of personal continuity of the self-same body

was steeped in tradition. New theories imbued with Aristotelian influences caused this issue to be vigorously debated.

The third section explores the effects of bodily suffering. Theories of sense perception also influenced masters' beliefs about the eternal suffering of the resurrected body. However, the idea that only the spiritual attributes rather than the material action of hell-fire would be experienced, which was proposed by such theories, became a source of some dispute. Increasingly conservative approaches to theological study influenced debate from the late 1270s onwards. The supposed effects of bodily suffering forms the final section of this chapter.

Ultimately, this chapter seeks to explore new dimensions to the history of the body in the Middle Ages.[1] Intellectual conceptions of the body in hell appear to have involved the need to create a multi-layered conceptual framework of body and corporeality. How ideas about pain and suffering were used to create these layers is an important concern throughout.

1. The nature of pain in hell

i. Fire

> Paris theologians of the thirteenth century sought to prevent popular religion from confusing or contaminating the rational exposition of doctrine. One way they did that was to de-emphasise the corporeal

[1] Recent studies on attitudes to the body in the Middle Ages have given scant attention to theological attitudes. This has been partly rectified by a recent collection of essays: P. Biller and A.J. Minnis (eds.), *Medieval Theology and the Natural Body* (York Studies in Medieval Theology I; York, 1997).

> aspects of Hell and to stress instead the spiritual effects of its torments on the damned.[2]

The nature of the the fires of Hell and Purgatory[3] have been analysed by Alan E. Bernstein with reference to a theologian of the early thirteenth century, William of Auvergne, who was bishop of Paris from 1228 until 1249.[4] Bernstein contends that William considered the fires of Hell to be incorporeal. Hell-fire was the metaphorical fire of passion, desire and anguish, and just as the burning bush experienced by Moses was not consumed, neither were the bodies of the damned.[5] On this issue, William of Auvergne distinguished between this explanation of the kind of punishment from fire experienced by the damned and another explanation which was that the souls of the damned would be burnt by real, material fire. He considered this latter explanation to be worthy of the common man who was not conversant with theology. The first, 'esoteric' explanation was reserved for the students of theology, whilst the 'exoteric' version was that which would eventually end up being disseminated to the masses through popular preaching.[6] However, there seems to be much more to

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[2] A.E. Bernstein, 'The Invocation of Hell in Thirteenth Century Paris', *Supplementum Festivum: Studies in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller*, ed. J. Hawkins, J. Monfasani and F. Purnell (New York, 1987), 22.

[3] There has been a considerable amount of research done on the idea of purgatory and purgatorial fire. The present chapter seeks to explore the nature of eternal, punitive suffering, and consequently discussion of the nature of purgatorial fire exceeds the parameters of this particular section. On purgatory, see J. Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory*, trans. A. Goldhammer (New York, 1990); G. Edwards, 'Purgatory: 'Birth' or Evolution?', *JEH*, 36 (1985), 634-46; A. Gurevich, 'Popular and Scholarly Medieval Cultural Traditions: Notes on the Margin of Jacques Le Goff's Book', *JMH*, 9 (1983), 71-90; R. Ombres, 'Latins and Greeks in Debate over Purgatory 1230-1439', *JEH*, 35 (1984), 1-14; idem, 'The Doctrine of Purgatory according to St. Thomas Aquinas', *Downside Review*, 99 (1981), 279-81.

[4] A.E. Bernstein, 'Esoteric Theology: William of Auvergne on the Fires of Hell and Purgatory', *Speculum*, 57 (1982), 509-31.

[5] Bernstein, 'Esoteric Theology', 513.

[6] *Ibid.*, 515. For further discussions concerning esoteric and exoteric theology see Bernstein's article on William of Auvergne's refutation of the Cathar denial of the doctrine of hell: 'Theology between heresy and folklore: William of Auvergne on Punishment after Death', *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, 5 (1982), 5-44.

this particular debate than the mere distinction between what was to be believed by an educated élite and what was to be preached to the masses.

William of Auvergne appears to have started a series of debates, that became common in theological circles during the course of the thirteenth century. Theologians were interested in discussing the nature of the fire of hell because the notion of punishment by hell-fire was a traditional belief and the works of certain authorities, especially Augustine, had introduced some ambiguities in the nature of corporeality and corporeal suffering. This will be examined in detail below. It is argued here that ideas about the corporeality of suffering in hell were not waning; they were beginning to receive greater and more sophisticated attention from theologians. Moreover, defining the nature of 'body' and 'corporeality' was central to the way in which debates were conducted and how they determined the nature of suffering in hell.

One theologian who was almost contemporary with William of Auvergne, in the sense that he took up his Franciscan chair of theology whilst William was still bishop of Paris, was Alexander of Hales.[7] Alexander addressed a quodlibetal question concerning the corporeality of hell, or hell-fire.[8] There is no precise dating for Alexander's quodlibets, but they certainly fall within the years 1231 x 1238.[9] Alexander began by using the authority of Augustine in *De Genesi ad*

[7] Alexander took the first Franciscan chair of theology at the University of Paris in 1231.
[8] 'Utrum ignis infernalis sit locus corporalis': quodlibet I, q.15, Oxford, Bodl.292, fos.321-323^{v}. A similar question is found in two manuscripts: 'Queritur ultimo de igne gehennali utrum sit corporeus aut incorporeus': qdl.I, q.15, Paris, BN Lat. 15272 fo.170ra and BN Lat. 16406, fo.40^{vb}. Transcriptions of each of these questions are to be found in Appendix II , 281-2.
[9] P. Glorieux, *La Littérature Quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*, 2 vols. (Kain and Paris, 1925-35), ii, 57.

Litteram to demonstrate the proposition that the fires and location of hell are not corporeal, but likenesses of corporeal things.[10] Next, the contrary position was put forward. Here, Augustine's *De civitate Dei* is quoted to argue that the sulphur-producing fire of hell is corporeal and will torment the material bodies of the damned and the aerial bodies of demons.[11]

So what was Alexander's reply to this question? In a similar fashion to William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales concluded that there are two ways of talking about the fire of hell. On the one hand it is called corporeal, on the other incorporeal. In comparison to bodies which are here now, this fire can be called straightforwardly (*simpliciter*) incorporeal. In comparison to God, however, it is also called corporeal.[12] So the fire of hell was understood to be either incorporeal or corporeal, depending upon what it is being compared to.

Alexander of Hales appears to have been in agreement with William of Auvergne with the suggestion that there are two ways of talking about fire. However, there is an important new development in his thinking: Alexander was not distinguishing between esoteric and exoteric explanations of fire, but interpreting

[10] For example, 'Deinde queritur utrum ignis infernalis sit locus corporalis. Et videtur quod non. Augustinus super Gen[esi ad Litteram] libro xii: inferiorum subiectum spiritualem essentiae arbitror non corporalem': Bodl. 292, fo.323^{r}.

[11] 'Contra idem in eodem quaestionem defunctorum anime infernis digne carnis amore peccauerunt hoc est perillas corporalium rerum similitudines exhibeatur quod ipsi carni solet ut sub terram recondatur ex quo apparet ignis gehenne corporeus est. Item augustinus *de civitate dei* xxi: *At uero gehenna stagnum* (ms. stangnum) *ignis et sulphuris corporeus ignis erit et cruciabit corpora dampnatorum et hominum et daemonum, solida hominum, aeria daemonum, corpora hominum cum spiritibus daemonum autem sine spiritibus similitudo sumendo penam non imperciendo uitam corporalibus ignibus.* [Et] *Unus quippe utrius ignis erit sicut Veritas dixit* (Matth.xxv,41)': BN Lat. 16406, fo. 42^{vb}.

[12] 'Et dicendum quod ignis ille uno modo dicitur corporeus, alio modo dicitur spiritualis quia in comparacionem corpori que hec agunt dicitur incorporeus simpliciter. Tamen dicitur corporeus

the notion of corporeality in a new way. By using comparisons, Alexander was able to explain what he meant by corporeality. He also seemed to be suggesting that corporeality after death is not the same as it is on earth. As far as attitudes towards the body and the corporeal are concerned, it would appear that there is more than one meaning attached to body and corporeality.

In the late 1240s, Albert the Great also asked whether the fire of hell was corporeal.[13] Albert tackled this question in a slightly different way. He set up the propositions for the existence of a corporeal fire in conjunction with the location of a physically defined place for hell. Hell-fire is corporeal, argued Albert, because souls are said to be punished by the corporeal flames of material fire. Also, hell is underneath us, and in the earth, as is seen in a passage from Isaiah.[14]

Albert was quite adamant that beyond the testimony of the saints, there is no more to be said on this question because reason has nothing to do with it. It is the testimony of those who have received the holy spirit that the fire of hell is corporeal and hell is in the earth, and thus this is to be followed and believed. Albert did, however, discuss Augustine's views on the matter. Albert contended that Augustine does not make any specific assertions regarding this subject, but ponders them. Perhaps, in addition, argued Albert, the subject was not fully

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[ms. coporeus] sicut dicit Augustinus quod angelus in animam simpliciter est incorporeus in comparacione ad deum dicitur corporeus': Bodl.292, fo.323^{r}.

[13] *IV Sent.*, d.44, a.38: 'An ignis infernalis sit corporeus', 859. An almost identical question is to be found in Albert's *De Resurrectione*. See *De Sacramentis, De Incarnatione, De Resurrectione*, Opera Omnia ad fidem codicum...Bernardo Geyer praeside, ed. A. Ohlmeyer, I. Backes, W. Kübel, xxvi (Aschendorff, 1958), Tract. 3, q.5, a.1, 312-3.

[14] 'Ratione quidem primae partis: quia statim in sequenti cap. dicet, quod constat animas igne materiali corporalibus flammis esse cruciandas: ergo scitur cuiusmodi sit. Pro secunda autem parte dicitur Isa.14: Infernus subter te conturbatus est in occursum aduentus tui. Ergo infernus est subtus: ergo est in terra': *IV Sent.*, d.44, a.38, 859.

revealed to Augustine as it was to other saints. Alternatively, it might be said that Augustine did not doubt the *species* of hell-fire itself, but rather the way and virtue in which it afflicts the soul.[15] It can be inferred from this gloss on Augustine that Albert was referring to the work *De Genesi ad Litteram* seen above, in which Augustine stated that the fire and location of hell are not actually corporeal, but likenesses of corporeal realities. Augustine's theory was that the souls of the wicked were to be punished in Hades by an immaterial fire which could be perceived by the likenesses of bodies which the soul carries with it.[16] For Albert, however, there was absolutely no doubt at all that bodies and hell-fire are corporeal.

Albert did not agree with either William or Alexander that the fire of hell could be discussed in different ways. He argued that there was no reason to doubt that it is corporeal absolutely. However, in mentioning the problems caused by using Augustine as an authority in this case, Albert appeared to be hinting that the painful effects of hell-fire are at the root of the difficulty in determining the nature of something as corporeal or incorporeal.

With regard to attitudes to the body, there would appear to have been a turning-point in the debates on this question with Albert the Great. Albert seemed to be

[15] 'Dicendum, quod in ista quaestione ultra dicta Sanctorum nihil est dicendum: quia ratio nihil omnino facit hic, sed in toto standum est dictis illorum qui reuelationem a Spiritu sancto acceperunt. Illi autem dicunt, quod ignis sit corporeus, et infernus in terra. Et hoc ideo tenendum et credendum est. Ad dictum autem Augustinus dicendum quod ipse dicit non asserendo sed tamen ipsemet magis putat ita esse, quam aliter et forte quod Augustini non fuit plene reuelatum, aliis Sanctis plene reuelatum fuit. Vel dicatur, quod Augustinus dicit non esse dubitandum de specie ignis, sed de modo et virtute qua affligit animas': *ibid.*

[16] A.E. Bernstein, *The Formation of Hell: Death and Retribution in the Ancient and Early Christian Worlds* (London, 1993), 329.

shifting the emphasis of debate about the corporeality of hell-fire from the idea that corporeality and incorporeality are comparative terms to the belief that it is the suffering to be experienced in hell which is the crucial issue. Moreover, it is suffering which is the focus for defining the nature of corporeality, and by extension, the nature of the body in hell.

Sometime between 1252 and 1256,[17] Aquinas debated whether the fire of hell was corporeal in his *Commentary on the Sentences*.[18] He examined various positions held by certain philosophers regarding the kind of fire that was to be experienced in hell. For example, philosophers such as Avicenna who did not believe in bodily resurrection, but only believed in the punishment of souls after death, perceived it to be incongruous that an incorporeal soul is to be punished by corporeal fire. Therefore, they denied that corporeal fire was the means by which the damned are punished. Furthermore, just as the joy and delight of good souls is not in any corporeal thing, but only in spiritual things, likewise the affliction of the damned will only be spiritual in the sense that they suffer from being separated from their end in God.[19] Another position which Aquinas attacked was the assertion by Avicenna and also by Augustine that souls are not punished through bodies, but through likenesses of bodies, just as one might imagine or

[17] J.A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works* (Washington D.C., 1983), 359.

[18] *Divi Thome Aquinatis Super Quarto Sententiarum*, 4 vols. (1520), iv,q.3,a.3, q^{a}2: 'Utrum ignis inferni quo corpora damnatorum cruciabuntur sit ignis corporeus': fos. 569^{r}- 571^{v}. It is necessary to use an early edition of Aquinas's *Sentences* because the Mandonnet-Moos edition only reaches distinction twenty-two of the fourth book.

[19] 'Respondeo dicendum ad primum questionem quod de igne inferni fuit multiplex positio: Quidam enim philosophi ut Auicenna resurrectionem non credentes solius anime post mortem penam esse crediderunt et quia eis inconueniens videbatur ut anima cum sit incorporea igne corporeo punirentur negauerunt ignem corporeus esse quo mali punirentur...Sicut enim bonarum animarum delectatio et iocunditas non erit in aliqua re corporali sed spirituali tantum...ita afflictio

experience punishment in sleep.[20] This is not correct, says Aquinas, for the imagination is a power which uses a bodily organ. There cannot therefore be visions of imagination in the soul when separated from the body, as there is in the soul of somebody who is in a state of slumber.[21]

Aquinas's own position was clear: whatever is said about the fire which causes suffering in separated souls, the fire which punishes bodies of the damned after resurrection must be said to be corporeal because the punishment cannot easily adapt to the bodies unless it is corporeal. On the other hand, it might be conceded that it is not material in the way in which we understand the term. Alternatively, it could be said that this fire does not materially alter bodies; rather it performs with a certain spiritual action in the punishment of them. It is not called material in terms of substance, but in terms of its punitive effect in bodies and to a greater degree in souls.[22]

Aquinas thus agreed with Albert that the debate over the corporeality of hell-fire was centred around the kind of suffering the bodies in hell would experience.

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malorum erit spiritualis tantum: in hoc scilicet quod tristabuntur de hoc quod separantur a fine': *ibid.*, fo.570ra.

[20] 'Auicenna alterum modum superaddit dicens quod anime malorum post mortem non per corpora sed per corporum similitudines punientur sicut in somnis propter similitudines predictas in imaginationem existentes videtur homini quod torqueatur penis diuersis. Et hunc etiam modum punitionis videtur ponere Augustinus in 12 super Genesim ad litteram': *ibid.*, fo.570^{rb}. On the claim by Augustine that souls are punished through likenesses of bodies, see Bernstein, 'Esoteric Theology', 517-19.

[21] 'Sed hoc videtur inconuenienter dictum esse. Imaginatio enim potentia quedam est utens organo corporali unde non potest esse quod visiones imaginatiue fiant in anima separata a corpore sicut in anima somniantis': *ibid.*

[22] 'Quicquid autem dicatur de igne qui animas separatas cruciat: de igne tamen quo cruciabuntur corpora damnatorum post resurrectionem oportet dicere quod sit corporeus, quia corpori non potest conuenienter pena aptari nisi corporea...Ergo dicendum quod Damascenus non negat simpliciter ignem illum materialem esse sed quod non est materialis talis qualis apud nos est. Vel dicendum quod quia ignis ille non materialiter alterat corpora sed quadam spirituali actione agit

However, he also developed the idea that there were two ways of talking about corporeality and the body, as witnessed in questions by William of Auvergne and Alexander of Hales. Aquinas's comparison was that heil-fire is not called material in terms of its own substance, but in terms of the effect which it has in the bodies it punishes.

For this to make sense, it was necessary to rethink the nature of corporeality in hell. For Aquinas, having only one concept of body was insufficient to explain what was meant by corporeality in hell. There was a need to develop different levels of meaning for body and corporeality. Aquinas dispensed with previous models developed to understand what corporeality was and developed further Albert's suggestion that the effects of fire could define its corporeality. Furthermore, the nature of the corporeal as a concept was defined by the type of suffering. How bodies suffered in hell could be used to define their corporeality.

This section has demonstrated that masters were interested in discussing the corporeal nature of hell-fire because the corporeal and physical aspects were expounded in scripture. Augustine, however, doubted the corporeal nature of hell-fire, describing it as a likeness of corporeal realities. So there was a tradition of discussing this issue.

Most masters were in agreement that there was a certain ambiguity in what could be termed corporeal or incorporeal. William of Auvergne and Alexander of Hales

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ad ea ad punitionem...ideo non dicitur materialis quantum ad substantiam, sed quantum ad punitionis effectum in corporibus et multo amplius in animabus': *ibid.*, fo.570va.

agreed that there were two ways of talking about corporeality. Aquinas, on the other hand, argued that hell-fire was not corporeal in terms of its nature, but according to the way in which it caused suffering.

So what attitudes to the body emerge out of the foregoing analysis? First, there is clear evidence that theologians held no single definition for body or the corporeal. Second, ideas about the 'body' after death and resurrection appear to change. Third, most masters could not apply one definition of 'body' in their discussion of corporeality in the afterlife, so they used two different ways of talking about corporeality to create different levels of what body meant. This led to further intellectual development through which notions of the 'bodily' were related to ways in which the body suffers. Thus, by describing the effects of suffering, the nature of corporeality could be defined more easily. From the sources in this section, the following arguments may be derived: 'corporeality' could be understood on various levels. On earth, 'body' meant the soul-body composite. After resurrection it could mean something corporeal in comparison to God, but incorporeal in comparison to bodies on earth. Alternatively, corporeal could denote a 'way of suffering'.

Bernstein identified the importance William of Auvergne attached to using two definitions for the fires of hell and purgatory. Bernstein's extrapolation of William's words was that this debate was crucial to the societal and pastoral concern of masters in general. However, the analysis presented here concerning the same issue later into thirteenth century shows that having two ways of talking about fire was a method masters employed to discuss the corporeal nature of hell

with greater sophistication, which ultimately enabled them to define the corporeal in terms of pain and suffering. If they were doing anything consciously, they were strengthening belief in the corporeality of hell-fire, rather than 'de-emphasising' it. Moreover, the two ways of talking about fire did not relate to two different audiences, as Bernstein has argued. In this way, corporeality and the corporeal nature of hell remained high on the agenda of theologians.

ii. Worm of conscience

Interest in the nature of the worm of conscience was traditional, but fraught with ambiguity owing to the unresolved position of certain key authorities. The worm of conscience as a medium for punishment in hell owed its existence to a passage in Isaiah, where it was written about the damned: 'Their worm shall not die, their fire shall not be extinguished.'[23] Augustine entered a debate on the subject of the worm of conscience and hell-fire, and left speculation open on whether each one was primarily applied to the body or soul, or both:

> Now as for this fire and this worm, there are some who want to make both of them refer to the pains of the soul, not of the body. They say that those whose penitence is too late, and therefore ineffectual, those who have been separated from God, are burnt in the fire of the soul's sorrow and pain; and therefore, they maintain, 'fire' is quite appropriately used as a symbol for that burning pain...Those, on the other hand, who feel sure that in that punishment there will be pain of both soul and body declare that the body is burnt by the fire while the soul is, in a sense, gnawed by the

[23] 'Vermis eorum non moritur, ignis eorum non extinguetur, et erunt ad satietatem visionis omni carni': *Isaiah* 66:24. For many theologians the gloss on Isaiah by Jerome was cited often: 'Vermis est conscientia peccatorum quae cruciat in suppliciis constitutos': *PL* 24, 676.

> 'worm' of sorrow...And yet for my part I should be more ready to ascribe both of them to the body than neither of them, and to assume that the scriptural statement is silent about the pain of the soul for this reason, that, although it is not stated, it is taken as implied that when the body is thus in pain, the soul also will be tortured with unavailing remorse.[24]

Bonaventure tackled this debate in his *Commentary on the Sentences*.[25] He alluded to the passage in Augustine's *City of God* stating that there are two opinions concerning the worm: one that it is material, the other that it is spiritual. Bonaventure believed, however, that the worm was spiritual. He added a new dimension to this position by stating that just as materially afflicting fire torments the body and the soul united to it, so grave suffering and remorse of the soul overflows into the body. Therefore, Bonaventure argued, there will be great remorse of conscience and suffering in the damned and this will overflow into the flesh. So in addition to arguing for a spiritual worm, Bonaventure was able to support the passage in Isaiah which asserted that God 'gave them a worm in their flesh'.[26]

For Bonaventure, the worm is incorporeal in itself, but the suffering it caused has corporeal aspects. With reference to the previous section, the notion of corporeality in this case was defined by Bonaventure in terms of the suffering

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[24] *The City of God*, trans. H. Bettenson (London, 1984), xxi.9, 984. See also Bernstein, *Formation of Hell*, 380.

[25] *IV Sent.*, d.50, p.2,a.2, q.1: 'Utrum damnati habeant vermem materialem', 1050-1.

[26] 'Dicendum, quod Augustinus vigesimo de Civitate Dei ponit circa hoc duas opiniones. Quidam enim voluerunt intelligere, vermem illum esse materialem propter verbum Scripturae; alii vero, rationem sequentes, voluerunt dicere, quod vermis ille sit spiritualis. Et horum opinionem dicit sibi magis placere; et ex quo sibi magis placet, et nobis similiter debet placere. Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quod vermis ille non sit materialis...Dicendum, quod sicut ignis materialis affligendo corpus affligit et punit animam ei unitam; sic vehemens dolor et remorsus sive tristitia animae redundat in corpus...Quoniam igitur erit in damnatis magnus conscientiae remorsus et

which the worm was thought to cause. The body here is the composite of soul and body similar to that on earth. The relationship between each part of the composite is stressed in terms of 'overflow' from one part to the other. The worm's corporeality is defined by the corporeal effects it has during punishment.

In his *Sentence Commentary* and in a question from his *Quodlibets*, written between 1252 and 1256 and at Christmas 1256 respectively, Aquinas addressed the same question[27] and also concluded that the worm of conscience was a spiritual form of punishment. Nevertheless, it also had effects on the body because of the body's association with the soul. This was felt in the experience of tears. The mechanism of overflow from soul to body was used to explain both the physical and spiritual forms of suffering inflicted by the worm of conscience.[28] Aquinas was in agreement with Bonaventure that the worm was to be understood as incorporeal in itself, but that there were to be aspects to the punishment which were corporeal.

As in the previous section, there is a conscious effort to explain the nature of 'corporeality' in terms of the effects experienced in suffering. Although the worm is spiritual, it can be defined as corporeal through the way in which it causes physical suffering. The body in hell appears to function in the same way as it does on earth in terms of how spiritual and material suffering are

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dolor, ita etiam, ut redundet haec moestitia in carnem; ideo vere dixit Scriptura, quod daret Deus vermem in carnem eorum': *ibid.*, 1051.

[27] *IV Sent.*, d.50, q.2, a.3, q[a] 3; Qdl.7, q.5, a.3: AQQ, 145.

[28] 'Unde sequentes Augustinum, dicimus, quod vermis ille erit spiritualis, ut ipse remorsus conscientiae interius animam corrodens, vermis dicatur; et similiter fletus erit spiritualis ut ipse dolor fletus dicatur. Aliquo tamen modo posset dici corporalis fletus, etiam sine lacrimarum

experienced by each part of the composite. Corporeality may be defined according to the nature of suffering.

The ambiguity present in key authorities concerning the nature of the worm of conscience is a major factor in leading to debate of this question. In addition, current ideas on the composite nature of the human body are applied to the discussion of corporeality in hell. Both Bonaventure and Aquinas agreed that the worm can have spiritual and physical effects in hell. They used the concept of the human body-soul composite to explain the idea of 'overflow' between body and soul.

iii. Intensities of suffering: worm versus fire

As was argued in previous chapters, spiritual pains were believed to cause a greater amount of suffering than physical.[29] This was one reason why theologians tackled a question concerning the relative effects the worm of conscience and hell-fire would have on the damned. Moreover, the question itself appears to follow logically from previous questions on the fire and the worm. Chronologically it occurs quite late on in the thirteenth century, suggesting a further development in thought from earlier questions.

Some time in the early 1270s, Gauthier of Bruges[30] tackled a disputed question which asked whether the damned were afflicted to a greater degree by the worm

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emissione; ut fletus dicatur non solum dolor animae, sed dispositio qua corpus disponitur, anima dolente': AQQ., 145.

[29] See chapters 1 and 3.

[30] Gauthier was born in 1225 in Zande, near Ostende. He entered the Franciscan Order in Bruges in 1240 and then went to Paris, where he was eventually made a Master of Theology at the Franciscan school between 1267 and 1269. He was made Provincial minister of France and

of conscience than the fire of hell.[31] His answer is striking in that the spiritual suffering caused by the worm of conscience is frequently described using corporeal imagery. In his initial arguments for the superiority of the punishment by the worm, Gauthier employed an analogy to explain the effect it will have on the damned. Whilst there is the fire which causes suffering to the bodies of the damned, there is a hotter fire, like one in a furnace, which causes suffering in the mind of the damned. [32] Augustine used this analogy, but it is also to be found in the *Liber Moralium* of Gregory the Great, in which the mind is described as being burned and devoured by the fire of internal suffering (*dolor*), whilst the body is burned by the fire of hell. [33] Gauthier argued that the worm of conscience was more intimate; it was present in the soul *per se*, whereas the fire was only in the soul through the mediation of divine justice (when the soul is separated from the body), and by dint of the body's relationship to the soul after resurrection.[34]

Gauthier was in agreement with earlier masters debating the natures of the worm and fire of hell, and how each one would afflict soul and body. Like earlier questions, he also included the idea that there is some sense of overflow between

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governed in this position until 1279. He died in 1307. See *Quaestiones Disputatae du B. Gauthier de Bruges*, ed. E. Longpré (Les Philosophes Belges. Textes et Etudes, 10;Louvain, 1928), i-ii; P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des Maîtres en Théologie de Paris au XIIIè siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1933), ii, 84-6. Glorieux does not give a date for Gauthier's disputed questions, but they must surely come post-1269 when he became a Regent Master of Theology.

[31] 'Quaeritur an damnati magis affligantur verme conscientiae quam igne gehennae': q.22, 171-178.

[32] 'Sicut ignis clibani est calidior quam ignis exterior non inclusus, ita ignis, qui est dolor interior, est gravior quam ignis gehennae qui exterius devorat; unde concludit quod per dolorem, qui est ignis clibani, ardent in mente, et per ignem, qui exterius devorat, cruciantur in corpore': *ibid.*, 171.

[33] 'Clibanus namque intrinsecus ardet, is vero qui ab igne devoratur, ab exteriori incipit parte concremari...Per ignem crucientur in corpore, et per dolorem ardeant in mente': Gregory the Great, *Moralium Liber XV*, cap. 29, *PL* 75, 1098-1099.

[34] 'Poena videtur ignis inesse animae, non a se nec secundum se, sed mediante exteriori instrumento divinae justitiae, scilicet materiali igne, et post judicium inerit ei etiam mediante

each element of the composite. However, his ideas about suffering are more precisely described in order to separate each type of suffering and explain which one was greater.

In terms of his attitudes to the body, Gauthier used the language of the corporeal to describe both incorporeal and corporeal beings. In some sense, his argument for two types of fire is reminiscent of William of Auvergne. However, in this question it is pain or suffering which is decribed variously as corporeal and incorporeal fire. The bodies of the damned also appear to be receiving more nuanced treatment. Although the composite was an important medium for understanding suffering, a move towards separating each element of the composite and examining them individually can be detected in Gauthier's arguments.

Later on in the 1270s, Matthew of Aquasparta also examined whether the worm of conscience afflicted the damned to a greater extent than the fires of hell.[35] Although the actual question concerned the separated soul, the frequent references to the condition of the body after resurrection makes it certain that his conclusions would apply in that case as well. Matthew's response to this question has four parts: first, he asks whether there is a worm in hell; second, whether it is to be construed as a physical or spiritual worm; third, what the worm is and what is its cause; and fourthly, whether it causes more suffering than the pain of hell-

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corpore...propter quod Gregorius, XV *Moralium*, 2, g: 'Reprobi, inquit, per ignem cruciantur in corpore et per dolorem ardent in mente': *ibid.*, 175.

[35] Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima separata, de anima beata, de ieiunio et de legibus* (Quaracchi, 1959), q.7: 'Quaeritur quae poena erit gravior in inferno animabus separatis vel acerbior: vermis conscientiae vel ignis gehennae', 120-34.

fire.[36] That there is a worm in hell, Matthew proved with reference to Scripture, especially Isaiah. Secondly, he examined the discrepancies between authorities about whether the worm is meant corporeally or spiritually, and had to concede that there is a likelihood that there are two worms in hell: a spiritual worm and a corporeal worm, according to the testimony of the saints. Thirdly, the worm of conscience represents the memory of all the sins of the damned, and they see the privation of good which they are missing and their conscience argues against them and accuses them. The reason why it is called a worm is because the suffering is similar to the worm which emerges from putrefying wood: it lives there and corrodes it. In the same way suffering from the worm grows out of the putrefaction of sin.[37]

In answering whether the worm caused more suffering than hell-fire in the damned, Matthew believed that it did for four reasons. Firstly, the worm is more directly linked to guilt. It is separate from the pain of fire; in fact there can be suffering from the worm without the punishment of fire, and the suffering from

[36] 'Circa istam quaestionem quatuor attendenda sunt. Primum, utrumne sit aliqua poena in inferno quae vocetur aut dicatur vermis. Secundo, utrum sit poena corporalis vel spiritualis, hoc est dictu: si ad litteram vermis intelligendus est aut spiritualiter secundum aliquam metaphoram. Tertio, quid est ille vermis et quare sic appelletur et unde causetur. Et tunc demum, iuxta propositum, patere poterit quae sit poena gravior et magis affligens animam separatam': *ibid.*, 124.

[37] 'Esse autem in inferno poenam vermis testatur Scriptura prophetica: Is.51,8: Sicut vestimentum, ita comedet eos vermis, loquitur de damnatis; et cap. 66,24: Vermis eorum non morietur et ignis eorum non extinguetur, et erunt usque ad satietatem visionis omni carni...Utrum autem vermis erit spiritualis, metaphorice dictus, intus animam crucians, vel corporalis, corpus corrodens, puto utrumque vermem ibi esse: et spiritualem, interius animam affligentem moerore et dolore, ut videbitur, et corporalem, corpus corrodentem et dilacerantem...Erit igitur iuxta Sanctorum doctrinam in inferno ad damnatorum poenam vermis corporalis, corpus corrodens et dilacerans; erit et spiritualis, spiritus interius moeore crucians...[Tertia] vermis est dolor ex actuali memoria peccati animam deformantis veniens, conscientia arguente vel accusante. Quod patet sic, quoniam in inferno erit actualis memoria omnium peccatorum. Ergo damnati omnia peccata sua actualiter considerantes, attendentes naturam suam tam deformem maculis peccatorum, videntes se peccatorum merito omni bono privatos, arguente eos conscientia et accusante...incomprehensibili moerore et dolore torquentur...Iste autem dolor ideo vocatur vermis, quia sicut vermis nascitur ex ligno putrefacto et in ligno, a quo oritur, habitat et illud

the worm would be sufficient to punish guilt. Secondly, in terms of the suffering it causes, the worm causes more discord. This is an essential part of the mechanism of suffering: where there is greater *dissensus*, there is greater suffering.[38] Thirdly, the pain of the worm is more intimate. Here Matthew echoed Gregory's analogy of the furnace. The internal fire of interior suffering is more intense than the exterior suffering caused by fire.[39] Lastly, Matthew argued that spiritual punishments are more intense than sensual by drawing a comparison with the intellectual joys of heaven:

> For just as in the beatified interior pleasure and the spiritual good are much more intense than external and corporeal good, so in the damned, *dolor* and affliction from interior and spiritual things are much more intense than from exterior and corporeal things. And thus I say, without prejudice, that *poena vermis* is much more bitter and grievous in the damned than *poena ignis*.[40]

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continue corrodit, sic ex peccato damnatorum, quod quasi putridum est...iste dolor nascetur; et quia peccatum semper durabit, ideo iste vermis semper manebit et semper corrodet': *ibid.*, 126-7.

[38] See Chapter 5, 193.

[39] 'Prima est, quia poena vermis est poena principalior et radicalior et directius respicit culpam et quia poena redditur culpae, illa maior est quae principalius culpam respicit; ideo poena vermis gravior et maior est. Hoc autem patet, quoniam si poena ignis nonnisi propter culpam infligitur, tamen dolor ex illa poena non est dolor de culpa, sed dolor, qui est in poena vermis est dolor de culpa. Huius autem signum est, quoniam potest esse in damnatis poena vermis sine poena ignis; et est poena qua sufficienter culpa punitur...Secunda ratio est, quia poena vermis est poena essentialior et magis habet de ratione poenae. Nam ut dicit Augustinus, XIX *De civitate*, cap.28, sicut vita aeterna essentialiter consistit in pace, ita poena aeterna essentialiter consistit in dissensione. Et idem dicit, XIV, quod dolor proprie dissensus est; ubi autem est dissensus maior, ibi est poena acerbior...Tertia ratio est, quia poena vermis est poena intimior. Nam dolor interior interius cruciat, sed ignis exterius molestat. Ideo Gregorius, XV Moralium...comparat poenam dolor interioris, quia dicitur vermis, igni incluso in clibano, sed poenam ignis exterioris igni exteriori. Poena autem quanto intimior tanto intensior, sicut ignis inclusus quam ignis exterius appositus. Et ideo poena vermis vehementior et acerbior est quam poena ignis': Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones de anima separata*, q.7, 127-8.

[40] 'Sicut enim in beatis delectatio interior et in bono spirituali multo est intensior quam in bono exteriori et corporali, ita in damnatis dolor et afflictio ex re interiori et spirituali multo est intensior quam ex re exteriori et corporali. Et ideo dico, sine praeiudicio, quod poena vermis est multo acerbior et gravior in damnatis quam poena ignis': *ibid.*, 129. My translation.

However, of greater importance to this thesis, is the way in which Matthew used the concept of contrariety in a more detailed way than it had been employed before. The importance of this development was that it represented a new level of control in talking about suffering in hell, and pain and suffering in general. There are two levels to his explanation, and they concern the description of harmony and disharmony, on the one hand, and contrariety and diversity on the other. As far as harmony and disharmony are concerned, Matthew argued that they arise for two reasons. First, whether or not things belong to the same genus. Thus, corporeal and incorporeal things are most distant from one another, whilst two things of the spiritual *genus* are most harmonious together. However, this first distinction will only cause joy or sadness by accident. The second reason for harmony or disharmony is caused by the appetite or desire. This is the essence behind the cause of joy or sadness. The damned are more horrified and distressed at themselves because of their sin, than by the burning fire. So this explains why the damned suffer and how the disharmony or discord, which is the hallmark of suffering, arises.[41]

Matthew also distinguished between diversity and contrariety. Diversity is greater between things belonging to a different *genus*: spiritual or corporeal, for example. Contrariety and repugnance, on the other hand, are more evident between things of the same *genus*. Matthew illustrated this concept with an

[41] 'Dicendum quod convenientia vel disconvenientia duplex est. Una est per conformitatem vel diversitatem in genere, sicut corporeum et incorporeum maxime distant, et spirituale et spirituale magis conveniunt...Prima...non facit ad delectationem vel tristitiam nisi per accidens... Alia est per appetitus vel voluntatis placentiam vel displicentiam...secunda convenientia vel disconvenientia est de ratione et essentia delectationis vel tristitiae. Ita est in proposito, quia damnati magis horrent, ut dictum est, semetipsos propter peccati deformitatem et magis displicent sibi ipsis quam ignis urens, et ideo [haec displicentia] magis eos contristat': *ibid.*, 130.

example: the contrariety between hot and cold, which are of the same *genus* (a spiritual *genus*) is greater than that between body and spirit, which are not of the same *genus*, although the diversity is greater. Thus, the spiritual worm as a contrary to the soul will cause greater suffering than between the soul and hell-fire. In this way, the soul will suffer more from the worm of conscience than fire.[42] By defining what is meant by 'contrary things' in the framework of explanation for suffering, Matthew could distinguish more precisely between the corporeal and incorporeal elements of suffering in hell.

Matthew of Aquasparta agreed with Gauthier that the worm of conscience would cause more suffering in the damned than hell-fire. Their reasons are similar: the worm is more intimately related to the soul. Also, both theologians believed that just as spiritual delights were greater than the physical pleasures of the elect, so spiritual suffering would be of greater detriment to the damned than its physical counterpart. However, Matthew developed this way of separating discussion about the physical and spiritual elements of the resurrected body with his theory of contrariety. This theory was his tool for defining how the corresponding punishments of hell can have differing effects on the bodies and souls of the damned.

Matthew's attitudes to the body appear to demonstrate some level of change in thinking. Although, like other theologians of his time, he believed in the

[42] 'Praeterea, differt diversitas et contrarietas. Diversitas enim maior est rerum diversorum generum, sed contrarietas et repugnantia maior est rerum existentium in eodem genere. Nam et 'contraria sunt, quae posita sub eodem genere, maxime a se distant.' Unde magis repugnat calidum frigido quam corpus spiritui vel e converso, quamvis illa magis diversa sint; et ideo,

composite model of the body, even in its resurrected state, the preceding question has shown that there was some attempt to discuss each element of the composite separately. In this way, Matthew was developing new ways of looking at the body. Also, it suggests that the composite model in hell was different to the body on earth. Furthermore, in using a complex theory of contraries to explain different types of suffering, Matthew allowed the body in hell to be viewed and discussed in new and more nuanced ways.

In the academic year 1282-1283, Gervase of Mont-St.-Eloi was asked in one of his quodlibetal disputations whether the worm of conscience punished more severely in hell than the pain of fire.[43] Gervase assessed the question based around the severity of punishment which the soul will experience in itself and from connection with the body, which is punished by fire. He said that the pain of the worm of conscience is more severe in itself than the punishment from fire because the worm represents interior suffering and comes from that which is repugnant to the interior appetite in itself. In contrast, the *poena* of fire, which is external suffering, is repugnant to the appetite because it is repugnant to the body. That which is repugnant in itself will always exceed that which is repugnant through another. The suffering caused by fire is less than the

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quando inter spiritualia est contrarietas, maior est repugnantia et contrarietas quam inter corporale et spirituale, sicuti est hic. Et ideo, quia maior repugnatia, maior afflictionis vehementia': *ibid.*

[43] Qdl. I, q.10: 'Utrum vermis conscientie gravius puniat in inferno quam pena ignis': Paris BN Lat.15350, fos.271^{rb}-271va. The full transcript of this question is in Appendix III, 283-4. For the dates of his quodlibets see P.Glorieux, 'Les quodlibets de Gervais de Mont-Saint-Eloi', *RTAM*, xx (1953), 129-37, especially 132-4. Gervais came from the abbey of Mont-St.-Eloi, neighbouring Arras. He incepted as a Master of Theology between1277 and 1279, after which he obtained the chair of theology at Paris from his former teacher Etienne du Fermont. He was Regent Master in 1282 and again in 1286 as is recorded in the disputes between the seculars and the mendicants, because he was involved in the discussions. In around 1291 he succeeded Etienne as abbot of Mont-St.-Eloi. He died on 27 January 1314. See Glorieux, *Répertoire des Maîtres* ii, 286-7.

punishment of the worm which is more intimate and more troublesome by causing loss, which leads them to fight against themselves. Thus, this loss, which comprises the worm of conscience is joined to the soul in as far as it really causes affliction to the soul and causes it to move against itself.[44]

Like his predecessors involved with the same issue, Gervase shared the notion that there was a degree of 'overflow' between each part of the composite. However, he made no mention of the internal fire as a description for the spiritual suffering of the damned. Nevertheless, the masters who discussed this issue agreed that suffering was greater when there was direct contact. Corporeal suffering from the worm of conscience could only occur in the soul according to the soul's union with the body. The soul, however, could receive direct contact with the punishment of the worm. Its suffering was consequently greater. Ideas about suffering helped to explain the links between the corporeal and spiritual effects of punishment in hell.

Theologians were compelled to discuss the nature of suffering which the worm and the fire of hell caused in the bodies of the damned because each type of suffering was one addressed by biblical authorities and the church fathers. However, interest in determining which kind of suffering was greater was a new

[44] 'Dicendum est quod pena vermis gravior est, per se loquendo, quam pena ignis, quia pena vermis que est dolor interior est ex hoc quod aliquid repugnat appetui interioris per se. Sed pena ignis, que est dolor exterior, est licet ex hoc quod autem repugnat appetitui quia repugnat corpori. Semper autem excedit hoc quod est per se illud quod est per aliud...Pena vermis est intimior et inportunior semper faciens dampnum contra se pugnare...Dicendum quod dampnum in quo consistit vermis conscientie per apprehensionem suam est coniunctum anime in tantum quod realiter affligit eam et movet eam contra se': ms. BN Lat.15350, fos.271^{rb-va}.

issue which developed as a logical consequence of their treatment of these earlier theological discussions.

The issues which are evoked by this particular question display an agreement in the approach towards suffering in the afterlife. There was a general consensus that the spiritual and physical parts to suffering in hell were related in some way. This is evident in the idea that the physical action of material fire also had spiritual effects. The mechanism employed to explain this was that of 'overflow' between each element of the body composite. However, despite this reliance on the composite model, theologians seem to have been increasingly interested in viewing spirituality and physicality, and concomitantly, corporeality and incorporeality, as separate spheres of discussion. The affinity of ideas between Gauthier of Bruges and Matthew of Aquasparta is perhaps related to their order affiliation: they were both Franciscans. It is also noteworthy that no Dominicans entered debate on this issue. However, a similar approach by another master, Gervase of Mont-Saint-Eloi, suggests that this was the way in which thought was moving at this time. In any case, by the 1270s the composite as a model for the human body was commonly accepted among theologians.

This question would seem to offer yet another dimension to the multi-levelled notion of corporeality which was developed by theologians during the thirteenth century. A being's corporeality could be defined by the way in which it caused an effect on something else, for example, the worm of conscience although incorporeal in itself, was 'corporeal' in terms of the suffering it caused. What all these different notions of corporeality have in common is their dependency on

the conceptual framework of suffering to define them. Indeed, as earlier chapters have demonstrated, the mechanisms for understanding the suffering of pain were being consistently applied across various different theological contexts. Ideas about suffering were used to define what corporeality could mean. They were also used to define the nature of the damned body itself. The composite model appears to have been a limiting factor in the sense that it hindered what was termed 'bodily' or corporeal from being absolutely clear cut. The use of suffering as a theory of explanation for corporeality not only made theories of the composite more comprehensible, it also changed the way in which the composite was perceived.

2. The nature of the resurrected body

All people arise with the bodies they now wear.[45]

This affirmation by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 provoked much discussion in theological circles. However, the nature and timing of Resurrection was by no means a new issue. Caroline Walker Bynum has shown that there was an ongoing debate surrounding the way in which resurrection was perceived.[46] The core issue she identified was the continual debate, over the centuries, of the

[45] Fourth Lateran Council 1215, Mansi, xxii, cols.954-1086.

[46] C.W. Bynum, *The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336* (Washington D.C., 1995). See also O. Cullmann, *Unsterblichkeit der Seele oder Aufstehung der Toten?* (Stuttgart, 1964). On the theological developments surrounding the Last Judgement, see C. Viola, 'Jugements de Dieu et Jugement Dernier: Saint Augustin et la scolastique naissante (Fin XI^{e}-milieu XIII^{e} siècles)', *The Use and Abuse of Eschatology*, ed. W.Verbeke, D.Verhelst and A. Welthenhugsen, *Mediaevalia Louvaniensia*, Series 1, Studia xv (Louvain, 1988), 242-98.

acceptance and rejection of the Pauline 'seed metaphor.'[47] It was in the second century that Athenagoras first concluded that personal identity was crucial to the resurrection. He believed that it would not occur unless the same body was re-united with the same soul.[48] By the fourth century, writers such as Augustine maintained that complete bodily material and wholeness would be recovered. People would arise with gender and they would be distinguished by their differences and rank. For example martyrs would arise with the scars they had received in the course of their martyrdom.[49]

The relationship between the continuation of the person and the resurrected body was brought into sharp focus in the thirteenth century. The Aristotelian metaphysical explanation of the relationship between body and soul had an important impact on perceptions about the resurrected body. The idea that the soul would remain immortal and that the same body would once again be joined to it was problematic on the levels of natural science, philosophy and theology.[50] In purely philosophical terms, Aquinas's belief in the soul acting as the substantial form of the body and creating the composite by informing prime matter meant that even with new or different prime matter, the soul would inform it in the same way: it would thus be the self-same body.[51] In fact, Aquinas's adherence to the idea of identity and soul being related led to

[47] 'Sic et resurrectio mortuorum. Seminatur in corruptione surget in incorruptione. Seminatur in ignobilitate, surget in gloria. Seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute. Seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spirituale': *Biblia sacra iuxta Vulgata*, I Cor. 15, v.42-44.
[48] Bynum, *Resurrection*, 32.
[49] *De civitate Dei*, bk. 22, c.15 and c.19; Bynum, *Resurrection*, 98.
[50] M. Schmaus, 'Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele und die Auferstehung des Leibes nach Bonaventura', *L'homme et son destin d'après les penseurs du moyen âge, Actes du Premier Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale 1958* (Louvain and Paris, 1960), 505-19, at 506.
[51] J.G. Hanink, 'Recovering the Resurrection', *The New Scholasticism*, 57 (1983), 146.

opposition and condemnation of this thesis which was not lifted until 1336 with the Bull 'Benedictus Deus'.[52] The problem with explaining the continuation of person which resurrection was meant to maintain was that death came in the way. If a material thing passed away and then came back to life, could it be said to be the same object? Is it, in other words, numerically the same? This was an issue which was also applied to the resurrection of Christ's body.[53] It would seem that Aquinas believed the 'being' of an individual to be present in the soul. This 'being' created the composite. At death, the union of soul and body may corrupt, but the essential principles which made up the body would not. In this sense, then, Aquinas could maintain belief in a temporal gap between death and resurrection, and yet still not fall into the trap of asserting that the soul was the person.[54] However, this argument still left open the question of how important the material body was as a medium for suffering after Resurrection in Hell. The bodies of the glorified were to possess the gifts (*dotes*) of agility, impassibility and clarity. In contrast, the bodies of the damned were to be heavy, opaque and capable of suffering. The corporeality of suffering which was to be experienced by the reprobate in Hell was to be individual and related to the sins of that person.[55] With the idea of material continuity in mind, theologians felt themselves obliged to ask whether the bodies of sinners which possessed

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[52] Bynum, *Resurrection*, 10.

[53] For example, see Aquinas, qdl.II, q.1, a.1: AQQ., 22. For the metaphysical question of a human body being resurrected without quantity, see Godfrey of Fontaines, *Les Quodlibets cinq, six et sept*, ed. M. de Wulf and J. Hoffmans (Les philosophes belges. Textes et études, 3; Louvain, 1914), qdl.VI, q.16: 'Utrum si corpus humanum resurgeret sine quantitate esset idem numero quod prius', 254-9.

[54] J. Kearey, 'St. Thomas on Death, Resurrection and Personal Identity', *Angelicum*, 69 (1992), 3-22, especially 10-16. Aquinas makes his own position clear in his Commentary on II Corinthians in which he criticises the position of Tertullian who believed that the soul has corporeal form and members. See *In Omnes D. Pauli Apostoli Epistolas Commentaria*, 3 vols. (Leodii, 1857-58), ii, lectio 5.

[55] Bynum, *Resurrection*, 135.

mutilations or defects in this life would be resurrected with those same mutilations.

Masters wanted to know if the body which was resurrected in hell was identical to the body on earth. The issue at stake for masters was the extent to which body was equal to person. The traditional view of bodily resurrection was that exactly the same person was resurrected. However, as was displayed above, Aristotelian theories of continuity concerning matter and form produced new problems in the belief that the individual person and exact bodily continuity after death were mutually dependent. Moreover, a further question which theologians were trying to answer was whether suffering required a numerically identical body.

In the fourth book of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Albert the Great asked two questions about this issue. First, he asked whether the damned would be resurrected with mutilation of their bodily parts.[56] Albert concluded that pain or punishment is caused in two ways: from nature and from guilt in the will. The first kind of punishment, which meant some kind of mutilation of the body, will be corrected, for it was not instituted by man. The second kind of punishment, which will not be corrected, is guilt. This guilt was perceived by Albert in two ways. In one way, it comprised the disobedience of the flesh to the spirit; in another, it referred to fire and the worm of conscience in the will of the person.[57] So, Albert distinguished between the bodily defects which are caused by nature

[56] *IV Sent.*, d.43, a.24: 'An mali resurgent cum mutilatione membrorum', 826-7.
[57] 'Dicendum quod poena causatur dupliciter, scilicet ex natura et ex culpa voluntatis. Prima poena corrigitur: quia non est homini imputanda. Secunda autem non. Dico autem ex culpa voluntatis remotae, aut propinquae: remotae, sicut est inobedientia carnis ad spiritum, quae manet

and the personal defects introduced to the will by a personal lapse into sin. Punishment will be received for the latter but not the former, argued Albert.

In the following question, Albert asked whether pains caused by an inequality of the humours in the body would remain in the resurrected bodies of the damned.[58] Albert argued, drawing on the authority of Bernard of Clairvaux, that hell-fire was the punishment for guilt and not nature. The inseparable link between guilt and the fire meant that the fire was eternal. Such eternal suffering for guilt cannot occur if the bodily complexion is destroyed by inequalities; a balanced complexion is required so that any inequality of the humours will not lead to infirmity.[59] Furthermore, Albert stated that flesh that was corrupted in fact suffers less. In order for the damned to suffer to a maximum extent, it was necessary that their flesh was not corrupted.[60]

Albert therefore believed that the bodies of the damned were physically different from their living versions on earth. Any bodily defect, even for the damned, would be removed at resurrection. Albert's main argument for this was that a perfectly-formed body was required in order for it to suffer the punishments of hell. This meant that in terms of the continuity of the individual in hell, numerically identical continuity is less important than the presence of individual

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in damnatis: propinqua autem, sicut est ignis, et vermis conscientiae et huiusmodi, quae causantur ex peccato voluntario inquantum voluntarium voluntate personae, et non naturae': *ibid.*, 826.

[58] 'An dolores causati ex inaequalitate humorum manebunt': *IV Sent.*, d.43, a.25, 827.

[59] 'Item, Bernardus dicit quod ignis inferni insequitur culpam, non naturam: et quia culpa inseparabilis est, ideo perpetuus erit ignis. Ideo necesse est eos in igne perpetuari: sed hoc fieri non posset, si destrueretur complexio propter inaequalitatem. Ergo necesse est, quod complexio aequalis servetur. Ergo nunquam habebunt infirmitatem ex inaequalitate humoris causatum': *ibid.*

[60] 'Item, caro corrupta minus dolet cum ergo impii maxime doleant secundum sensum, necesse est quod semper caro viva et incorrupta perduret': *ibid.*

guilt. Personal guilt, rather than an identical body, appears to be a key factor in defining the person after resurrection.

Bonaventure also asked whether deformities would be resurrected in the bodies of the damned in his *Commentary on the Sentences*.[61] However, he came to a different conclusion. Bonaventure argued that the bodies of the damned would be resurrected with their deformities. He pointed out that Augustine left this question unsolved, but in Bonaventure's opinion the bodies resurrected for the purposes of damnation will be in a worse condition, rather than a better condition. In terms of their bodily resurrection, then, the damned will receive no beauty, and no deformity which they possess will be removed. In other words, the bodies of the damned will not be perfected in the same way as the bodies of the elect, for example. God, argued Bonaventure, is the reforger, or re-moulder, because he gives back to the bodies the same form which nature gave to them at their first generation. God possesses the wisdom (*sapientia*) to 'repair' the bodies of the damned to their original state, but he acts according to justice: those who merit a beautiful body, the elect, will be rewarded with beauty. Those who sin, however, should be punished in this terrible state. This punishment of deformity ought to be confirmed, not taken away.[62] Bonaventure is thus clearly asserting a

[61] 'Utrum deformitates resurgant in corporibus damnatorum': *IV Sent.*, d.44, p.1, a.3, q.2, 915-17.
[62] 'Corpora damnatorum resurgent cum suis deformitatibus. Dicendum quod Augustinus in Enchiridio istam quaestionem dimittit insolutam...si enim ad hoc resurgunt, ut damnetur, non ut melioris, sed ut peioris sint conditionis; manifeste non habuerunt, nec auferetur deformitas, quam habuerunt. Unde Deus quantum ad eos est purus *reformator*, quia secundum eandem formam reformat, quam eis natura dedit in generatione primaria. In qua reformatione apparet Dei sapientia et iustitia: sapientia, quia scit omnino eodem modo reparare, sicut ante fuit; iustitia, ut, sicut qui meruit in corpore pulchro, remuneretur in eius pulchritudine; sic qui in turpi peccavit in eius turpitudine cruciari debet; nec debet auferri, sed potius confirmari': *ibid.*, 916.

material continuity between the suffering of the body in this life, and the state it was to possess after resurrection.

In comparison to Albert the Great, Bonaventure seemed to be following a more traditional line of argument. Bonaventure argued for a direct material continuity of the resurrected body and that all factors which could contribute to maximise the suffering of the damned should remain. Unlike Albert, he could not accept the existence of a perfect body for the damned; for him, this was a gift of the bodies of the elect in heaven.

The attitude to the resurrected body expressed by Bonaventure argued for complete continuity and identity with the living body. Aquinas, however, did not agree with this position. He tackled this question in his *Commentary on the Sentences*.[63] It also appears in the *Supplement* to the third part of the *Summa Theologiae*[64] and a more succint question is to be found in his *Quodlibets*.[65] Aquinas distinguished between two types of deformity. The first is any defect in a bodily member, like a terrible mutilation, for instance. This kind of defect cannot be in the bodies of either the elect or the damned because both groups are resurrected with intact bodies. The other kind of deformity, is the possession of an illness or a fever, for example. Aquinas stated that modern scholars are divided on the issue of whether the damned have this kind of defect in their bodies, or not. Some maintain, he explained, that this sort of defect will remain

[63] 'Utrum damnatorum corpora cum suis deformitatibus resurgant': *IV Sent.*, d.44, q.3, a.3, q^a1, fos.566^v- 569^r.
[64] S.Thomae de Aquino, *Summa Theologiae Supplementum Tertiae Partis* (Ottawa, 1941), 411a-412b.
[65] Quodlibet VII.,q.5, a.2: AQQ, 144.

in the damned and that it should be counted as the sum of misery; they argue, in fact, that nothing causing disharmony to the damned should be taken away. Aquinas responded that this explanation is not rational. The resurrected body resembles the perfection of nature to a greater degree than it did previously when it was alive. Those who had natural defects in their bodies when they were alive will have these repaired when they are resurrected unless sin impedes this. Aquinas argued that punishment is measured according to guilt and he points out the absurdity of the damned possessing such deformities by arguing that some person with less sin and more deformities would suffer to a greater extent than another who had sinned more, but who had no bodily defects. This would mean that the *poena*, the pain or punishment, would not correspond to individual guilt, but would rather reflect the punishments which the person was subject to on earth. Such a position was absurd, stated Aquinas.[66]

The other opinion held by scholars, and the one to which Aquinas himself adhered, was the idea that the author who fashioned nature repaired the nature of the body in resurrection to an intact state. Every defect caused by corruption and

[66] 'Respondeo. Dicendum quod in corpore humano potest esse deformitas dupliciter. Uno modo, ex defectu alicuius membri, sicut mutilatos turpes dicimus...Et de tali deformitate nulli dubium est quod in corporibus damnatorum non erit, quia omnia corpora, tam bonorum, quam malorum, integra resurgent. Alio modo deformitas contingit ex indebita partium dispositione...sicut sunt febres et huiusmodi aegritudines quae interdum sunt deformitatis causa. Sed apud doctores modernos est duplex super hoc opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod huiusmodi deformitates et defectus in corporibus damnatorum remanebunt, considerantes eorum damnationem, qua ad summam miseriam deputantur, cui nihil incommoditatis subtrahi debet. Sed hoc non videtur rationabiliter dici. In reparatione enim corporis resurgentis magis attenditur naturae perfectio quam conditio quae prius fuit...Unde et illi qui aliquos defectus naturales in corpore habuerunt, vel deformitates ex eis provenientes, in resurrectione sine illis defectibus vel deformitatibus repararentur nisi peccati meritum impediret...Modus autem poenae est secundum mensuram culpae. Contingit autem quod aliquis peccator damnandus minoribus peccatis subiectus aliquas deformitates vel defectus habeat quas non habuit aliquis damnandus peccatis gravioribus irretitus. Unde si ille qui in hac vita deformitates habuit cum eis resurgat, sine quibus constat quod resurget alius gravius puniendus qui eas in hac vita non habuit, modus poenae non responderet quantitati

disability of nature was to be completely removed at resurrection. Such defects were understood to be fevers and rheums, for example. On the other hand, defects caused by natural principles in the human body, for example weight and passibility, remained in the bodies of the damned. They were, however, removed from the bodies of the elect.[67]

Aquinas was in agreement with Albert that the body required perfection in order to suffer. In his denial of the belief that the resurrected body was identical in all its attributes to its counterpart on earth, Aquinas disagreed directly with Bonaventure. Aquinas held it to be irrational and unjust for a person to suffer according to the course of nature. It was the sin and guilt of the individual which merited punishment.

The person could thus be defined through their suffering in as far as this suffering pertained to personal guilt. Thus, suffering was not only used by Aquinas as a model to define the nature of the body, but also to define the individual being punished. It is possible therefore to extrapolate from Aquinas's argument that just as bodily suffering was personal to each individual who had sinned, so this very suffering could define the individual who was resurrected.

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culpae, sed magis videretur aliquis puniri pro poenis quas in hoc modo mundo passus fuit; quod est absurdum': *Supplement*, 411b-412a; *IV Sent.*, fo.567^{v}.

[67] 'Et ideo alii rationabilius dicunt quod Auctor qui naturam condidit, in resurrectione naturam corporis integre reparabit. Unde quidquid defectus vel turpitudinis ex corruptione vel debilitate naturae sive principiorum naturalium in corpore fuit, totum in resurrectione removebitur, sicut febris, lippitudo et similia; defectus autem qui ex naturalibus principiis in humano corpore naturaliter consequuntur, sicut ponderositas, passibilitas et similia, in corporibus damnatorum erunt, quos defectus ab electorum corporibus gloria resurrectionis excludet': *Supplement*, 412a; *IV Sent.*, fo. 568^{r}.

This particular issue arose out of a tradition which had been interested in establishing exactly how the body would be re-formed at resurrection. Theories introduced by Aristotle's theories of matter-form relations and their application to the composition of the human body led to a renewed angst among theologians trying to explain the resurrection. The particular issue which has been analysed above arose as a direct result of these concerns. It was also important at the level of defining individual responsibility for sin and the punishment deserved for it.

Two different areas of explanation emerged in response to this issue. Albert the Great and Aquinas both believed that the individual should be punished according to the individual's acts of will and its resultant guilt, and not according to defects imposed by nature. For these reasons, the resurrected body needed to be re-formed intact and perfected. The other opinion, which Aquinas attacked directly, and was held by Bonaventure, upheld the belief in absolute bodily continuity for the bodies of the damned. He argued that any punishment which could contribute to the misery of the damned was to remain.

This series of debates demonstrates that the nature of the resurrected, damned body was contested. A process of discussion and re-definition was occurring on the subject of the body after death. There was clearly more than one way to understand the body at this time. With regard to previous strands which have emerged in this chapter, although they did not all agree on the nature of the body which was to be resurrected, all three theologians used suffering to define what they thought the nature of the resurrected body would be. Bodily suffering defined the individual in different ways. For some masters, physical defects

defined the individual. For others, it was personal guilt which defined the person. This second position used a perfected body as the tablet on which to inscribe suffering and guilt. Once again, the body after death was disputed and subject to changes in definition.

3. Effects of bodily suffering

Ideas about bodily suffering in hell were imbued with notions of the suffering body in this life. But the human body was mortal and subject to change, while the pains of hell were to be experienced for eternity. The application of theories of sense perception was clearly problematic to the extent that anything sensed was liable to change bodies and bodily organs. Masters therefore debated the effects which hell-fire would have on the bodies of the damned. Augustine had also tackled a similar issue, which gave further impetus to this discussion. These were all important considerations which incited interest in how incorruptibility, despite the sufferings of hell, could be explained.

Albert the Great debated whether the bodies of the damned could burn, but not be consumed.[68] Albert stated that sensibles act in the sense organ in two ways: according to natural action and according to the action of the soul. In the first case, the natural action of the fire will cause the body to corrupt and lead to the presence of contraries. However, the second case, the action of the soul, occurs with a reception of the *intentio* of the fire which causes pain or joy. The *intentio* referred to is the spiritual action experienced in sense perception. This, says

[68] 'An corpora damnatorum ardeant et non comburantur?': *IV Sent.*, d.44, a.34, 855-6.

Albert, is the action in hell which leads to a change in the sense, without the consumption of substance.[69]

Albert thus used a specific theory of sense perception to explain how the damned body will remain uncorrupted by material fire. The theory has two aspects to it: material and spriritual reception of the sense object. Albert argued that the bodies of the damned must only experience the spiritual form of sense perception. So, the physical action of the fire was not experienced by the body. The bodies of the damned reacted to suffering in a different way from the bodies of the living. Application of the theory of sense perception permitted this explanation.

Bonaventure debated the same question[70] and argued that the bodies of the damned are indeed afflicted by fire, but they are not corrupted in their substantial being, that is, according to their material substance.[71] He proceeded by arguing that it is easy to negate the belief that the bodies of the damned are consumed by fire, but if it is inquired whether the bodies are corrupted, then this requires some element of distinction. In one sense, corruption is equal to the defect of things according to substantial being, which is the same as consumption. However, the bodies of the damned are not corrupted in this way because they do not die. The

[69] 'Dicendum, quod in veritate est quae dicuntur in litera, fidelia et vera sunt, et absque dubitatione tenenda. Conseruans autem damnatorum corpora, est iustitia Dei in poenis: et haec credenda sunt potius quam discutienda. Ne tamen omnino nihil videamur dicere, sciendum quod sensibilia dupliciter agunt in organa sensuum, scilicet actione naturae et actione animae. Actione naturae est cum consumptione et contrarietate: et puto bene, quod talis non potest esse in aliquod corpus, nisi ipsum corpus consumatur. Sed actio animae est per receptionem intentionis ad affectum doloris vel delectationis...et talis est actio in inferno, quae est ad sensus immutationem, sine consumptione substantiae': *IV Sent.*, d.44, a.34, 855.

[70] 'Utrum ignis inferni consumat corpora damnatorum': *IV Sent.*, d.44, p.2,a.3, q.1, 928-30.

[71] 'Corpora damnatorum ab igne affligentur, sed non corrumpentur quoad esse substantiale': *ibid.*, 929.

other form that corruption takes is the privation of the disposition of goodness. This disposition of good and rest is taken away from the bodies of the damned. Thus, the corruption of affliction, but not of destruction or consumption, is present through the burning of fire.[72]

Bonaventure supported this conclusion with various examples and with certain rational explanations. There are, for example, some things which can live in fire and not be destroyed, such as the salamander which lives in fire, as mentioned in Book 21 of Augustine's *De civitate Dei.* However, it could be said that the nature of this animal is similar to that of the fire, whereas the nature of the human body is altogether dissimilar. Bonaventure said that the response to this could take two forms. On the one hand, although the nature of the human body is consumable by fire in its present state, nothing would prevent God from giving humans a body which would not be consumed by fire. Bonaventure drew a comparison with the body of Adam which was potentially mortal before the lapse into sin, but not actually mortal in terms of corruptibility.[73] On the other hand, he again gave various examples of precious metals and animals which may be burned, but not consumed by fire.[74] The fire, he went on to argue, is not

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[72] 'Dicendum, quod si de corporibus damnatorum quaeratur, utrum ab igne affligantur, simpliciter est concedendum. Si autem quaeratur, utrum consumantur, simpliciter est negandum. Sed si quaeratur, utrum corrumpantur, hoc est distinguendum. Nam corruptio uno modo dicit defectionem rei quantum ad esse substantiale, et hoc modo idem est quod consumtio; et tali modo non corrumpantur, cum non moriantur. Alio modo corruptio idem est quod privatio bonae dispositionis; et hoc modo, quoniam a corporibus damnatorum auferetur quies et bona dispositio...Est igitur corruptio afflictionis, non interemptionis sive consumtionis, et haec fit per adustionem ignis': *ibid.*

[73] Compare with Chapter 2, 79-87.

[74] 'Si autem quaeretur, quomodo istud possit capi et intelligi; possumus ad hoc manuduci et exemplo et ratione. Videmus, quaedam in igne vivere et non deficere, sicut ponit Augustinus exemplum de salamandra in vigesimo primo de Civitate Dei...quia natura illius animalis conformis est igni, natura vero humani corporis omnino difformis; responderi potest dupliciter: uno modo, quod quamvis natura humani corporis secundum statum praesentem sit ab igne

directed towards consuming, but towards igniting. In addition to this, the damned have been given the potential nature to suffer, but not die. Moreover, just as the bodies themselves are burned and not consumed, so also the composite made up of body and soul, is afflicted and does not die. Bonaventure says there is both an example and a reason for this. His example is that the immortal soul is afflicted in the body, because the suffering (*dolor*) is more properly attributable to the soul than the body. However, the soul does not die. It is, after all, immortal. Bonaventure also considered the precise nature of pain itself. In this life, suffering can cause death, but not because the pain (*dolor*) is contrary to life, for if you suffer, you feel, and if you feel, you are living. The soul and body are, nevertheless, not bound to one another by an indestructible link. For this reason, intense suffering can lead to the separation of the soul from the body. Bonaventure then explained that, for the soul in this life, the body is a temporary prison. But in hell, circumstances were different. There, the body will be the soul's prison for eternity.[75] The impact of this last statement is clear: the bodies of the damned are undying, like the immortal soul. No amount of suffering will weaken the relationship between the bodies and souls of the damned.

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consumtibilis, nihil prohibet, quin Creator, qui naturam, quam voluit, omnibus et singulis dedit, talem naturam homini dare possit [Cod.K addit] ut eius corpus ab igne consumi non possit. Nec mirum, cum homo ante lapsum alterius dispositionis et naturae corpus habuerit quam post lapsum, quia prius possibilie ad mortalitatem, modo necessarium ad mortem': *ibid.*

[75] 'Ex quibus etiam possumus colligere rationem huiusmodi...Isti enim igni data est virtus ad inflammandum, non ad consumendum; et corpori data est natura possibilis ad patiendum, non ad deficiendum...Et sicut illa corpora uruntur et non consumuntur, ita etiam compositum ex anima et corpore affligitur et non moritur. Et tamen ad hoc similiter possumus manuduci exemplo et ratione; exemplo: quia anima immortalis in corpore affligitur, quia dolor est anima proprie, et tamen non occiditur...Quod enim homo moriatur dolore, hoc non est, quia dolor sit contrarius vitae, cum dolor non sit nisi in substantia vivente- unde sequitur: si dolet, sentit, et si sentit, vivit- sed quia anima non est indissolubili vinculo corpori alligata; ideo intensus dolor eam expellit de praesenti habitaculo. Nunc enim est carcer temporalis, sed tunc erit perpetuus': *ibid.*, 930.

Bonaventure differed from Albert in the way in which he approached this question. He made no mention of the theory that the bodies of the damned could experience the *intentio* of the fire, rather than its real action. On the contrary, he believed that the fire would have natural action in their bodies. Unlike Albert also, Bonaventure used Augustine to buttress his arguments to a large degree. However, there is agreement between the two theologians that the body will react differently to punishment after death, than it did when alive.

What comes across very clearly in these two questions is that masters believed that the resurrected body would react in a different way to suffering. There is a fundamentally different view about how the composite would respond to the action of fire. Unlike the living body, the composite of the resurrected body cannot be separated into its constituent parts by intense pain. Once again, ideas about pain were used to define the body's nature.

Aquinas's response to this question was reminiscent of his teacher Albert the Great and is to be found in his commentary on the *Sentences*, the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and the Supplement to the *Summa Theologiae*.[76] Aquinas explained that the main reason why the bodies of the damned are not consumed is due to divine justice. However, he used rational explanation to explore the types of suffering possible for a body. He argued that the living body suffers according to natural passion, through which it will experience the heat of the fire, or according to a

[76] 'Utrum corpora damnatorum futura sint impassibilia': *IV Sent.*, d.50, q.2, a.3, qu[a] 1; *Supplement*, 86, 3, 414a-415b; 'De qualitate corporum resurgentium in damnatis': *SCG*, IV, cap.89.

passion of the soul, through which there is the reception of the *intentio* of fire. Aquinas stated that after resurrection, the motions of the heavens would cease which would mean that no body will be altered from its natural equilibrium. Thus, the damned body would not be able to suffer from the first kind of passion, but could suffer from the second. The senses of the damned will be perfected, and suffering will be experienced without changing the natural disposition of their bodies.[77]

Aquinas also described how the bodies of the damned will suffer, but not be destroyed, in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Here, he described it in terms of the relationship of soul to body, as form to matter. In the case of the living, if suffering is excessively intense, it will cause the soul to be separated from the body. However, this occurs when matter changes from one form to another form. The human body after resurrection will not be able to change from form to form, neither into good nor evil, because in both cases it is completely perfected by the soul with regard to natural being.[78] However, the resurrected body is not always

[77] 'Dicendum quod principalis causa quare corpora damnatorum ab igne non consumentur, erit divina iustitia, qua eorum corpora ad poenam perpetuam sunt addicta...Quia cum pati sit recipere quoddam, duplex est modus passionis, secundum quod aliquid in aliquo recipi potest dupliciter. Potest enim aliqua forma recipi in altero aliquo secundum esse naturale materialiter, sicut calor ab igne recipitur in aere. Et secundum hunc modum receptionis est unus modus passionis, qui dicitur passio naturae. Alio modo aliquid recipitur in altero spiritualiter per modum intentionis cuiusdam...et haec receptio similatur illi receptioni qua anima recepit similitudines rerum. Unde secundum hunc modum receptionis est alius modus passionis, qui vocatur passio animae. Quia ergo post resurrectionem, motu caeli cessante, non poterit aliquod corpus alterari a sua naturali aequalitate, ut dictum est, nullum corpus pati poterit passione naturae. Unde quantum ad hunc modum passionis corpora damnatorum impassibilia erunt, sicut et incorruptibilia. Sed cessante motu caeli, adhuc remanebit passio quae est per modum animae...Unde et secundum hunc modum passionis corpora damnatorum passibilia erunt. Et quia in tali passione sensus perficitur, ideo in corporibus damnatorum sensus poenae erunt, sine mutatione naturalis dispositionis': *Supplement*, 414b-415a.

[78] 'Videmus enim quod, si corpus diu in igne permaneat, finaliter consumetur; dolor etiam si sit nimis intensus, anima a corpore separatur. Sed hoc totum accidit, supposita transmutabilitate materiae de forma in formam. Corpus autem humanum post resurrectionem non erit transmutabile

totally subject to the soul. It will be afflicted by corporeal fire according to the perception of contraries of sensibles in as far as the quality of the fire, according to its excellence, is contrary to the equality and harmony which is natural to the senses.[79]

Aquinas followed Albert in his explanation of the way in which resurrected bodies can perceive the action of hell-fire through its *intentio*. However, he developed this notion with the introduction of a new element: the cessation of the heavens. Once the motions of the heavens have ceased, there can be no alteration and thus no corruption of bodies. However, Aquinas agreed up to a point with Bonaventure: he also argued that the soul could not be expelled from the resurrected body under intense pain.

Theories of sense perception were used and developed further to formulate precise notions about the resurrected body. The way in which the resurrected body reacted to suffering was different to a living body's reaction. The argument was put forward by the Dominicans that external factors such as the cessation of the heavens affected how it experienced suffering. The Franciscan Bonaventure, on the other hand, thought that a different kind of body was created by God, which could withstand any amount of suffering. The nature of the body itself determined how it experienced suffering.

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de forma in formam, neque in bonis neque in malis, quia in utrisque totaliter perficietur ab anima quantum ad esse naturae.': *SCG*, IV, c. 89.

[79] 'Sed quia damnatorum corpora quantum ad aliquae conditiones non erunt animae totaliter subjecta, affligentur secundum sensum a contrarietate sensibilium; affligentur enim ab igne

The secular master Ranulphe of Hombliéres was asked whether the bodies of the damned were corruptible in a quodlibetal question from the academic year 1275.[80] Ranulphe argued that the bodies of the damned are corruptible in the sense that they contain contraries. Also, every mixed substance (containing body and soul) is naturally destructible. However, the bodies of the damned cannot be consumed by hell-fire. He provided four reasons for this. Firstly, bodies exist in hell for the purpose of suffering, not dying. To support this first reason, he gave references to various works by Augustine which cite the example of the salamander which lives in fire. Secondly, the fire which causes the suffering requires no fuel on the part of the body which it is afflicting, that is, it can burn without using the substance of the body to burn. Thirdly, as soon as the motion of the heavens has ceased, so will any alteration to the bodies. The last reason had its roots in divine justice: just as the Lord was able to give a body which could not corrupt to Adam in the state of innocence, so he can provide bodies which can be afflicted, but not be consumed.[81]

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corporeo, in quantum qualitas ignis, propter sui excellentiam, contrariatur aequalitati complexionis et harmoniae quae est sensui connaturalis...': *ibid.*

[80] 'Queritur ut probatur utrum corpora dampnatorum sint corruptibilia': qdl.II, q.20, ms. Paris Arsénal 379, fos.224^{v}- 225^{r}. Ranulphe was already a regent master in the early 1270s. In 1280, he was appointed Bishop of Paris by Nicholas III, to succeed Etienne Tempier. He died on 12th November 1288. This manuscript, dated as 1274 by Glorieux, has the incipit: 'Hoc est quodlibet magistri ranulphi normanni canonici parisiensis de natali anno domini MCCLXXIIII': Glorieux, *Répertoire des Maîtres*, i, 379-81; Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, i, 264-6. My own transcription of this particular question not only puts the date in doubt, but also the author. At the beginning of fo.225^{r}, which is the end of this particular question, the line reads: 'Quodlibet est determinatum a fratre Ferario Iacobota, feriale de paschate anno domini milla cco lxxa quinto'. Not only is this date a year later, but it also suggests that a certain Ferarius Iacobota determined the question. However, this may have been inserted by the scribe as a reference to someone else who determined on the same question besides Ranulphe. The full transcription of this quodlibetal question is in Appendix IV, 285-7.

[81] 'Ad istam quaestionem dicendum est quod quamvis sint corruptibilia eo quod ex contrariis sunt composita, quia omne quod mixtus est natura dissolubile est, nonquam tamen consumentur. Et prima ratio est ex parte corporis positioni data est uerus pro patiendi non deficiendi. Et ponit exemplum de Augustino de civitate [Dei] 21; de Vermibus; de anima ccl: salamandra qui vivit in ignis. Alia ratio est ex parte ignis affligentis que ignis pabulum non requirit ex parte corporis quod affligit (ms. afligit). Tertia ratio est ex parte penis alterantis quia tantum cessabit motor propter mouentis primo cessabit alteratio...Quarto sumitur ex parte divine justicie sic ordinantis

One glance at his conclusion demonstrates that Ranulphe was influenced to a large extent by the theories put forward by both Aquinas and Bonaventure. In one respect he agreed with Aquinas in the assertion that the cessation of heavenly motion would prevent any alteration in corruptible beings. In another respect, he supported the idea adhered to by Bonaventure that the body after death will be different in certain respects.

In his approach to understanding the body, Ranulphe appears to follow both groups. Two distinct ways are used to define the body: the creation of a new body by God, which will not perish; and the influence of external factors which will protect the body's equilibrium. These two models of explanation had become accepted as common and parallel methods for explaining the body's composition after resurrection.

The nature of sense perception in the experience of suffering in hell was again addressed in two questions from the early 1280s by the Franciscan master Richard of Middleton. Richard asked whether the bodies of the damned could be heated by hell-fire.[82] He stated that the bodies of the damned could be heated in an immaterial way (*intentionaliter*) and perhaps also materially, because they will not be impassible in the future (in hell).[83] However, he then identified the key approaches to this question. Some thought that the bodies of the damned

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sicut dominus potuit dare corpori Ade in statu innocentie ut posset non corrumpere. Ita prout facere et dare corporibus ut non possint consumere tamen affligere': *ibid.*, fo.224^{v}.

[82] 'Utrum corpora damnatorum ab igne infernali califient': *IV Sent.*, d.44, a.2, q.6, 587-8.

[83] 'Damnatorum corpora ab igne illo, et intentionaliter, et forte et materialiter calefient cum impassibilia non sint futura': *ibid.*, 588.

were not heated by hell-fire, but could nevertheless suffer from it. Their bodies are passible either materially or immaterially (*intentionaliter*). Richard then rehearsed the arguments which we have seen already in the works of other masters concerning the cessation of the motion of the heavens and what effect this will have. He went on to explain that, according to this position, just as the perception of an object proportionate to the senses causes them delight, so the perception of an disproportionate object will cause suffering. Hell-fire is what causes the perception of disproportion.[84]

The other main position held by theologians which Richard elucidated was the belief that because the bodies of the damned are composed of four elements, they will be vehemently heated and susceptible to the fire, but not consumed by it. Those who hold this particular thesis, argued Richard, could oppose the group of philosophers who believed in the idea that fire would have no action following the cessation of the heavens. The belief that the cessation of heavenly motion would prevent the fire from having action was condemned by Stephen Tempier.[85] So, some of the ways which had been employed to understand the

[84] 'Ad istam quaestionem dicunt quidam, quod corpora damnatorum ab igne infernali non calefient, et tamen eo cruciabuntur, passiuum enim potest dupliciter recipere formam agentis aut materialiter, aut immaterialiter seu intentionaliter secundum quem modum recipit formam sensibilis...Quamvis ille ignis non sit calefacturus corpora damnatorum affligentur tamen ab eo, quia sicut obiecti proportionati sensui proportionata receptio delectat sensum sic improportionata receptio contristans...': *ibid.*

[85] 'Ideo dicunt aliqui, quod corpora damnatorum ab illo igne calefient vehementer, quia cum illa corpora sint ex quatuor elementis composita. Nec fient impassibilia, non tantum caliditatem sentientia sed etiam caliditatis susceptiua: neque tamen per illum ignem consumentur, ut declarabitur in quaestione sequenti. Qui vult tenere hanc secundum opinionem potest dicere ad primum, quod intentio Philosophi non fuit vel esse debuit, quod si coelum staret quod ignis nullam actionem posset habere unde a domino Stephano Parisiensi Episcopo excommunicatus est iste articulus scilicet, quod si celum staret, quod ignis in stupam non ageret.': *ibid.* This is one of the condemned theses in the 1277 Condemnations: '156. Quod si celum staret, ignis in stupam non ageret, quia Deus non esset': *Chartularium*, i, 552.

nature of the resurrected body faced a challenge in 1277. Richard of Middleton was unwilling to stake his claim for either side in this particular question.

However, in the following question, Richard stated his position quite clearly when he asked whether the bodies of the damned were consumed or corrupted by fire.[86] Richard did not believe that the argument that the damned only received the *intentio* of the fire was sufficient explanation for their incorruptibility. If it is true what certain philosophers put forward, stated Richard, this is not a sufficient argument to explain why these bodies do not corrupt in this fire. In Richard's opinion, there were three reasons why the bodies of the damned are not corrupted in this way: the disposition of the matter into which the fire is incorporated; the state of the bodies; but principally according to divine justice.[87] With regard to the first two reasons, Richard provided many examples of elements which are composed of fire, which heat, but do not burn, and he explained that there were animals which could stand extreme heat without dying. The principal reason, however, was the order of divine justice. It was this that allowed the bodies of the damned to suffer from the eternal punishment of hell-fire and be heated, but without being destroyed by it.[88]

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[86] 'Utrum corpora damnatorum per illum ignem consumentur, vel corrumpentur': *ibid.*, q.7, 588-90.

[87] 'Sed haec ratio non est conueniens...tum quia si illus esset verum, quod supponunt, adhuc non sufficeret ad ostendendum illa corpora ab illo igne non corrumpi, quia sicut dicit Philos. 2 de anima...Ideo videtur mihi dicendum, quod ratio quare illa corpora non consumentur ab illo igne partim est ex parte dispositionis materiae in qua incorporatus est ignis ille et partim ex parte dispositionis illorum corporum quam accipiet in resurrectione, principaliter est ex ordine diuinae iustitiae': *ibid.*, 589

[88] 'Ex parte tamen ordinis diuinae iustitiae sumi debet ratio principalis. Ille enim ordo exigit illa corpora in eternis suppliciis fore permansura, et ideo assistente Dei influentia generali ad hoc ut ignis infernalis illa corpora fortiter calefaciat et affligat non adest tamen ad hoc ut consumat...': *ibid.*

Richard of Middleton highlighted the way in which discussion surrounding the issue of the incorruptibility of the resurrected damned body had fragmented into two distinct camps: those who used the '*intentio* thesis' of sense perception, and those who believed the fire had real, material effects on the bodies. The condemnation by Stephen Tempier of a thesis closely associated with this question meant that Richard was very tentative in his conclusions. The '*et forte*' in his own conclusion to the first question might have enabled him to avoid being embroiled in controversy. However, he emphasised the power of God in conjunction with the action of fire. Rational frameworks of explanation to define the body became a sensitive issue following the condemnations. Some ways of looking at the body were deemed inappropriate and more conservative explanations were favoured. After the condemnations of 1277, more conservative approaches to theology took hold and the integration of purely philosophical and theological explanations broke down to some degree.[89]

On the surface, beliefs surrounding this issue appear to have been split according to the religious order a master belonged to. The Dominicans, Albert and Aquinas, favoured the use of rational, 'Aristotelian' theories of sense perception to explain why the resurrected body could not corrupt. The Franciscans, Bonaventure and Richard of Middleton, on the other hand, emphasised the power of divine justice as the paramount reason for post-resurrection incorruptibility. The chronological development of this important question demonstrates how different theories were

[89] For this view, see G. Leff, *Gregory of Rimini: Tradition and Innovation in Fourteenth Century Thought* (Manchester, 1961); G. Leff, 'The Changing Pattern of Thought in the Earlier Fourteenth Century', *BJRL*, 43 (1960), 354-72.

with the corporeal. The eternal nature of hell necessitated new ways of looking at the body. An alternative conceptual system was needed to understand an eternal, unchanging entity, which by its very definition, was corruptible and changing. New theories were created in the development of this system. The resurrected body was also described as a different body altogether; created by the divine for the purposes of suffering. However, of crucial significance to the definition of the body in hell was an understanding of the way in which the body suffered. Conceptual levels of 'body' may be extrapolated from the masters' use of ideas about pain and suffering to explain what they meant by the corporeal. Furthermore, these ideas allowed them to define exactly what was meant by corruptibility, mortality and ultimately eternity.

Conclusion

It would appear that masters were interested in discussing the nature of bodies and corporeality in hell. Related to these issues was the question of bodily continuity and thus whether the bodies of the damned were identical, similar or different to the bodies of the living. One important method masters employed to understand the nature of the body in hell was to explain how it suffered and whether it would be corrupted by hell-fire. Ideas about pain and suffering were thus tools of explanation used to understand the damned body.

There were various reasons why masters were interested in debating these issues. Some arose out of the conflict of authorities, or were traditional points of inquiry. However, new theories of sense perception, influenced by Aristotle, also had

their role to play. The way in which the human body experienced sense data was a constant concern for masters. The damned body as a sense-receptive being also required attention. There were other reasons beyond the internal workings of individual debates which ultimately may have had an effect on their conclusions. The condemnations of 1277 certainly had an impact on the thought of at least one master. Nevertheless, it can also be argued that masters were concerned to discuss these various issues because they impinged upon the conceptual framework of pain and suffering.

Masters agreed and disagreed about certain areas which concerned the damned body in hell. Whether there was material continuity of the living body after death was one issue which saw masters differ. Another area involved the reason for the incorruptibility of the damned body when it was afflicted with material fire. Some masters believed that the reason the body in hell could not corrupt was because it only received the immaterial *intentio* of the fire. For other masters, the real action of fire was necessary in order for the body to suffer. More important for the way in which masters used their ideas about pain and suffering are the points upon which they all agreed. All masters agreed that there were different ways of talking about corporeality. At the beginning of the century, they differed as to what the different ways of talking about the body might be. By the middle of the thirteenth century, however, masters were using their theories about suffering in order to explain different levels of corporeality. This was demonstrated in their debates about hell-fire and the nature of the worm of conscience. The latter, for example, was not corporeal in itself. However, it could be said to possess corporeality from the corporeal suffering it caused to the

damned. In this way, different ways of talking about body did not relate to the audiences masters were addressing. Nor was the notion of hell tending more towards the incorporeal. Rather, ideas about corporeality were receiving refinement and a new complexity. The application of a conceptual framework for pain and suffering enabled this refinement to occur.

So what do these sources say about attitudes to the body in hell? The definition of the body was not static. Ideas about the body after death were different to the those about the living body. Masters used two different ways of talking about corporeality to suit which body it was they were discussing. Moreover, notions of what body and corporeality were became inextricably linked to the way in which the body in hell suffered. By describing pain and suffering and their effects, masters could more readily explain corporeal natures in hell. Some masters created the idea of a body perfected for eternal suffering. Indeed, the identity of the resurrected body appeared to become less dependent on an identical material continuity from life to after-death, than on how it was perceived to suffer. During life corporeality denoted mortality, decay and corruption. After death, corporeality was unchanging and eternal. The masters' language of suffering helped them to define this difference. Issues about pain in hell developed and enhanced the ways in which the body and corporeality in hell were understood and discussed.

Conclusion

Ideas about pain and suffering were developed by masters of theology into a coherent technical language supported by a conceptual framework, which helped them to elucidate important areas of discussion within their theological treatises. This was achieved in various ways: the attention to and interpretation of a discrete group of biblical, classical and patristic authorities; their use of new theories which affected theology and the framing of specific questions about pain and suffering within important areas of theology concerned with this life and the afterlife. The language which masters developed was common to a variety of contexts within their theological debates.

The authorities which masters used during theological debate provided the skeletal frame upon which they developed their ideas about pain. Part of any theologian's profession was to resolve the differences which were present in his main authorities. In this way, when masters asked questions about pain and suffering, they were obliged to consider what authorities had stated previously. This was seen, for example, in relation to the development of limbo. As with other areas of development within their conceptual framework of pain, masters re-interpreted the beliefs of Augustine in order that they could deny that unbaptised children were eternally damned, whilst, in other respects, they were able to maintain allegiance to one of their key patristic authorities. However, masters also employed their authorities in a way which helped them develop their language of suffering more

exactly. Short phrases were gleaned from authorities, especially Aristotle and Augustine, which could be used as formulae for describing the nature of suffering. For example, these authoritative pieces of language were used to develop understanding about the suffering of the separated soul. These phrases were then used as a hook upon which masters could hang their own theories about suffering in a variety of theological contexts.

Masters were also influenced by specific new theories which affected their study of theology. One important development in theology concerned the application of Aristotelian theories of sense perception to their debates. This newly-acquired theory enabled masters to analyse the human body and soul with greater precision. It also allowed masters to explain the differences between physical and spiritual suffering and suffering after death. In every chapter, the reliance which masters placed upon their understanding of the theory of sense perception is striking. For example, this theory was used to describe both human suffering and the suffering of Christ and ideas about sense perception were remoulded to explain suffering in the state of innocence and the pain of the separated soul. Therefore, the conceptual framework which masters created for their discussions of pain and suffering achieved a significant degree of credibility and authority because it was imbued with ideas about sense perception and the language of authorities. These were the two main elements of a language of suffering.

In general, therefore, masters possessed a common understanding of what pain and suffering were and how they applied to different areas of their theology. The points of debate where masters agreed are testament to the existence of this common language. Where masters disagreed, there tended to be reasons beyond the debates themselves which influenced an individual master's conclusion. On the other hand, the way in which pain was expressed as a language was not static. Indeed, as more masters debated certain issues, the way in which pain was understood and expressed was refined and developed. Nevertheless, key elements in this language can be identified throughout.

How, specifically, did masters create and apply this language within a variety of spheres of theological discussion? As this thesis was broadly divided into two sections: pain in this life and pain after death, it would seem appropriate to conclude how ideas about pain were developed by masters in each of these areas, whilst also paying attention to common strands which permeate the thesis as a whole.

In chapter 1 it was demonstrated that the conceptual framework for understanding pain and suffering in this life was very complex and was deliberately created by masters to elucidate their understanding of the relationship of the human body to the human soul. This relationship could be destroyed by pain, but it could also be strengthened by it. So pain was an important key which unlocked certain aspects of the links between body and soul, and allowed masters to explain them with greater precision. The nature of human suffering was also a critical element in explaining

the humanity of Christ. Again, the application of theories of suffering within the soul-body composite clarified a vigorously debated subject such as this. The human and divine natures of Christ and how they were related were critical topics of theological debate. Theories about the hypostatic union explained important issues about the links between his humanity and divinity, but they also provoked some degree of confusion. The language which masters of theology created to understand human suffering and the links between the human soul and body helped to resolve the difficulties which theories about Christ's human and divine natures had produced because suffering was a human trait. Thus, theories of suffering were used in discussions about Christ to help reveal the extent of his humanity.

A language for understanding pain and suffering was also central to theories about sex difference as chapter 2 showed. Men and women had different types of punishment which were related to the Fall. Masters of theology used the specific punishments of pain for each of the first parents to examine the differences between them. Pain was thus an important indicator of sex difference. However, the experience of pain was devoid of gender. Masters employed a gender-specific structure for their arguments when they debated the nature of suffering in the state of innocence. However, the conclusions which the masters reached demonstrated an equivalent experience of pain for both sexes. Although this equivalence of experience existed, the use of a gender-specific structure of suffering, in which masters only asked certain questions about Adam and others about Eve, served to demonstrate the model of sex difference which resulted from the Fall. On one level,

therefore, pain was an indicator of sex difference. On another level, it could demonstrate gender equivalence.

In chapter 3 it was seen that the theological application of theories about pain also demonstrated its beneficial and restorative effects. Physical suffering not only had damaging effects on the relationship between soul and body, it could also improve the links between them. It was thus necessary for masters to add a new dimension to their conceptual framework for suffering. The links between physical and spiritual suffering allowed masters to explain more clearly why fasting and penance were important elements in spiritual improvement. Although pain, in itself, was deleterious to the body and soul and the relationship between them, the definition of contritional suffering as an additional branch to their language, within an existing conceptual framework for suffering, made such suffering intelligible and worthwhile in penitential practice. The creation of a typology of pain and suffering for this life was thus central to the understanding and underpinning of key areas of theological discussion.

Ideas about pain and suffering after death were used to define the locality, experience and nature of those who were subject to eternal punishment. In chapter 4 it was demonstrated that the location and nature of limbo were defined by debates which addressed the kind of sin which unbaptised children possessed. Masters applied this to their understanding of the punishment due for such sin. The exact

definition of pain and suffering permitted the creation of a separate abode in the afterlife.

Chapter 5 examined another important case study in thirteenth-century theology, the suffering of the soul when separated from the body. The separated soul presented difficulties for the masters because their language for suffering was dependent on the interaction between body and soul together. It was for this reason that their language necessitated a new conceptual dimension. In other words, suffering, which was explained with the help of theories about sense perception, had to be explained where sense perception, strictly, could not occur. Unlike the questions studied in earlier chapters where the potential suffering of a body without sin could be used to understand the suffering of an incorporeal nature, the separated soul was deemed to require the real action of hell-fire. Masters developed the idea that the separated soul could suffer on account of a special union with the corporeal fire of hell. Masters thus created a type of 'punitive composite' structure. The link between the composite of body and soul allowed the soul to perform its natural functions, whereas the union between soul and fire hindered the soul in these same operations. The language of suffering which was based upon the soul-body union thus also provided the model which enabled masters to explain the suffering of an incorporeal nature.

The language of suffering and the constant interaction between the issues of suffering and the body also formed the basis of masters' analysis of corporeality in

hell, as chapter 6 showed. Masters developed a way of expressing the corporeal nature of hell through the suffering which was experienced there. The language of suffering which described how incorporeal punishments could also affect the bodies of the damned permitted masters to explain why both the fire of hell and the worm of conscience had corporeal aspects. The conceptual framework of pain and suffering was thus a tool which helped them understand the precise nature of hell and its suffering.

This thesis has demonstrated how masters developed a technical language and ideas for understanding pain and suffering. These developments took place in debates about distinct theological issues. Pain was a theme which ran through many areas of theological study. Understanding masters' ideas about pain is thus crucial if we are to understand their theological work as a whole.

Some of the conclusions which have emerged out of this study are supplementary to the main aims of this thesis and they indicate future areas of study. In creating a system for understanding pain and suffering, masters were seemingly influenced by events outside the immediate milieu of their intellectual disquisitions. For example, the statements made by masters about the suffering required to complete penance also appeared in confessors' manuals from the same era. The events which led to the Paris condemnations of 1270 and 1277 were also shown to have had an effect on the debates about the suffering of the separated soul and the fires of hell; although, as we have seen, Siger of Brabant did not significantly challenge or deny the way in which

the separated soul was thought to suffer. The opinion of masters also appears to have been sought in relation to the fate of children in the Christian community who had died unbaptised. In a number of ways, therefore, there are reasons to believe that the ideas of masters affected and were influenced by events and circumstances in other areas of society. What routes of inquiry does this suggest? One project might undertake a comparative assessment of disputations with other sorts of media, such as preachers' manuals, for example.[1] Alternatively, an assessment of the ways in which ideas prevalent in intellectual circles permeated sermon literature might also yield fruitful results. For both of these approaches, key questions would involve exploring the ways in which ideas emerged and were expressed in other media and whether there is any cross-pollination with ideas emanating from intellectual circles. Where did specific ideas originate? How were they disseminated? How does this affect our perception about intellectuals in society, or the way in which ideas were articulated within it? All these are questions which, it is believed, follow logically from the present study. It is hoped that the clarification of the ways in which a distinct group of Parisian masters of theology created a technical language for pain and suffering, supported by a conceptual framework which masters applied to a wider theological context, will be of assistance to students of thirteenth-century intellectual thought and its impact on society.

[1] For a work which has compared a range of different sources, including preachers' manuals, in the study of ideas about public penance, see M.C. Mansfield, *The Humiliation of Sinners. Public Penance in Thirteenth Century France* (Ithaca and London, 1989).

Appendix I

BN Lat. 16297 Gerard of Abbeville

fo.160^{rb}

Quodlibet XVIII

q.13: Utrum parvuli baptizati ante usum liberi arbitrii possint dampnari.

Et ostendebat quod sic quia anima parvuli susceptibilis est virtutis. Virtutes enim conferuntur in baptismo ergo susceptibilis est vitii.

Contra parvuli baptizati non habent usum liberi arbitrii sicut supponitur ex theumate quia compressi sunt usque ad longam etatem. Sed dicit Augustinus de vera religione: *omne peccatum adeo est voluntarium quod si non est voluntarium non est peccatum.*[1] Ergo non possunt peccare ergo non possunt dampnari.

Dicendum quod parvuli baptizati non possunt dampnari in illa etate sed pertinent ad sortem bonorum quadruplici rationes: Primo propter fidem offerentium in quorum fide salvantur unde Augustinus de baptismo parvulorum: *ad remissionem originalis peccati prodest eorum fides a quibus offeruntur ut quascumque maculas a quibus nati* (ms.orti) *sunt contraxerunt* (ms. extraxerunt) *aliorum interrogationem ab eis purgentur.*[2]

Secundo propter fidei sacramentum unde Augustinus in eodem parvulos: et si non fides illa que nec credentium voluntate consistit prima iam tamen ipsius fidei sacramentum fideles facit. [Ad] Romanos 6 : *quicumque baptizati sumus [in] Christo [Iesu].*[3] Glossa dicit quod *mors Christi causa est huiusmodi purificationis.*[4]

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[1] 'Nunc vero usque adeo peccatum voluntarium malum est, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium': Augustine, *De vera religione*, c.14, *CCSL*, 32 (Turnhout, 1962), 204.

[2] Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum ad Marcellinum libri tres*, Operum, x (Antwerp, 1700). The text can be also be found at *PL* 39, 1537.

[3] 'An ignorantis quia quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in morte ipsius baptizati sumus?': Epistola B. Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos, 6, *Biblia Sacra iuxta Vulgatam Clementiam*, 6th Edition (Madrid, 1982), 1099.

[4] The full text of this part of the gloss is as follows: 'Mortui peccato quod sit in baptismo non debemus ei iterum vivere ut iterum mori sit ei necesse. Quia in morte Christi et in similitudine mortis Christi et sicut semel mortuus est carne et semper vivit ita non semel mortui malo per baptismum semper vivamus

Tertio propter meritum dominicae passionis quia merito sue passionis iram dei patris mitigavit per oblationem et immolationen hostie reconciliantis et placantis. Offensam divinae maiestatis de qua offensa in psalmo dicitur: *tu terribilis es; et qui[s] resistet tibi? Ex tunc ira tua,*[5] scilicet ira peccatis originalis inflicti pro offensa primae praevaricationis de quo placatione divina [est]. [Ad] Ephesios 2: *eramus nulla filii ire.*[6] Glossa: necessarius erat mediator id est reconciliator qui hanc iram singularis sacrificii sui oblatione placaret.[7] Augustinus in 4 libro de trinitate c.13: *factum est ut vincula peccatorum multorum in mortibus multis per unius unam mortem quam peccatum nullum praecesserat soluerentur quantum propterea dominus indebitam pro nobis reddidit ut nobis debita non noceret.*[8] 13 librum de trinitate c.12: *Si commissio peccatorum et iram dei iustam hominem subdidit dyabolo, profecto remissio peccatorum pro reconciliationem dei begninam* [ms. legntimam] *eruit hominem a dyabolo.*[9] Dicit ergo quod per fidem offerentium suscepit sacramentum fidei et per fidei sacramentum (f.160va) efficitur Christi membrum et tanquam membrum Christi participat merito Christi -scilicet - illo excellentissimo merito sue passionis quia filii sunt dei per fidem. [Ad] Ephesios, 3: *Per fidem enim habitat Christi in cordibus nostris.*[10] [Ad] Galatas 4: *Omnes filii dei estis per fidem.*[11] Per fides offerentium impertrat divinam complacentiam et favorem. Ecclesiasticus 1: *beneplacita sunt domini fides et mansuetudo.*[12] Hanc fidem habent parvuli in munere per sacramentum fidei unde Augustinus de parvulorum baptismo quis nescitit credere esse infantibus baptizari non credere autem non baptizari.

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bono vel in morte quia mors est causa huius purificationis.': *Biblia Latina cum Glossa Ordinaria.* Facsimile Reprint of the Editio Princeps Adolph Rusch of Strassburg 1480/81, 4 vols. (Turnhout, 1992), iv, 285.

[5] Psalms 75:8.

[6] Epistola B. Pauli ad Ephesios, 2. *Biblia Vulgata*, 1134.

[7] *Glossa Ordinaria*, iv, 371.

[8] Augustine, *De trinitate libri xv*, bk. iv, c.13, *PL* 42, 899).

[9] Augustine, *De trinitate libri xv*, bk.13, c.12, *PL* 42, 1026). The scribe appears to have had a problem with the word *begninam*, perhaps suggesting that firstly he was not familiar with the particular quotation and secondly that he had copied it incorrectly from another manuscript.

[10] 'Per...Christum habitare per fidem in cordibus vestris.': Ep.Pauli ad Ephesos, 3.

[11] 'Omnes enim filii Dei estis per fidem quae est in Christo Iesu.': Ep. Pauli ad Galatas,3. The ms. attributes this phrase to chapter 4.

Quarto ex virtutum decore et munere quas accipit in baptismo, accipit complacentiam et favorem divine voluntatis propter quam adoptatur in filium regni. Ecclesiasticus, 23: *Sic et mulier etc.*[13] Glossa: *deus sibi animam in baptismate copulavit et ornamento virtutum decoravit.*[14] Et ita transit in amplexus sponsi tanquam sponsa et tanquam filius in hereditatem regni et ita patet solutio quaestionis.

Ad argumentum dicit quod susceptibilis est virtutis in munere et decore non in exercitio et opere vitii autem non potest esse susceptibilis nisi exercitio et opere et ideo quamdiu non est capax doli non est susceptibilis vitii non enim habent parvuli usum liberi arbitrii quia usque ad longam etatem sunt compressi ut declaratur in prima quaestione.

Ad id autem quod arguebat de parvulo quandoquidem et blasphemo quem demones rapuerunt inter manus patris sicut recitat gregorius in dyalogo. Dicit quod iam erat capax doli quia malitia illa etatem supplevatur a patre enim illa blasphemare didiscerat et ideo dominus iniquietatem patris in filio vindicavit. Exodus 20: *Ego sum Deus zelotes vindicans iniquietates patrum in filios huius qui oderunt me.*[15] Hic est ....tatoribus patrum facinoris et sic patet plene solutio quaestionis.

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[12] 'Sapientia enim et disciplina timor Domini; et quod beneplacitum est illi, fides et mansuetudo, et adimplebit thesauros illius.': Ecclesiasticus 1: 34-35.

[13] 'Sic et mulier omnis relinquens virum suum et statuens haereditatem ex alieno matrimonio.': Ecclesiasticus 23: 32.

[14] 'Mystice autem hereticorum synagoga vel anima heretica pravita te decepta abominabilis est deo quia relinquit virum priorem quod sibi eam in baptismate copulavit et ornamento virtutum decoravit': *Glossa Ordinaria*, 768.

[15] 'Ego sum Dominus Deus tuus fortis, zelotes, visitans [ms. vindicans] iniquitatem patrum in filios, in tertium et quartum generationem eorum qui oderunt me: et faciens misericordiam in millia his qui diligunt me et custodiunt praecepta mea.': Exodus 20:5. There is another discrepancy with the words here. The *Biblia Vulgata* clearly shows that the correct word is *visitans* and not *vindicans*. This, again, may suggest a scribal error in copying. Alternatively, it may be a genuine mistake, given that the verb *vindico* appears in the previous line.

Appendix II

1. BN Lat.16406 Alexander of Hales

fo. 42^{vb}

Quodlibet I

q.15: Queritur ultimo de igne gehennali utrum sit corporeus aut incorporeus.[1]

Et primo uidetur[2] augustinus super xii de genesi ad litteram: ad spiritualia loca pro meritis fertur aut ad loca penalia similia corporibus.[3] Item in eodem loquens de inferno dicit in locis uidetur esse non corporalibus sed corporum similibus.

Contra idem in eodem quaestionem defunctorum anime infernis digne carnis amore peccauerunt hoc est perillas corporalium rerum similitudines exhibeatur[4] quod ipsi carni[5] solet ut[6] sub terram recondatur ex quo apparet[7] ignis gehenne corporeus est. Item augustinus *de civitate dei* xxi: 'at uero gehenna stagnum (ms. stangnum) ignis et sulphuris[8] corporeus ignis erit et cruciabit corpora dampnatorum et[9] hominum et daemonum, solida hominum, aeria daemonum, corpora hominum cum spiritibus daemonum autem[10] sine spiritibus[11] similitudo sumendo penam non imperciendo[12] uitam corporalibus ignibus.'[13] [14]'unus quippe utrius[15] ignis erit sicut Veritas dixit.'[16]

Respondeo sicut angeli in se sunt incorporei sed comparati ad deum (f.43ra) circumscripti et corporei, secundum quod dicit augustinus iiil *de anima et spiritu*[17] et bernardus *super cantica canticorum* similiter, ignis gehenne in se corporeus est, tamen incorporeus[18] dicitur[19] relatione ad corpora que hic sunt.

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[1] The same question appears in BN Lat. 15272, fo. 170ra. I indicate where textual variations occur. [2]uidetur] *add.* quod incorporeus [3] *De Genesi ad Litteram*, 12, cap.32, *PL* 34,480. corporibus] corporalibus [4]exhibeatur] exhibebatur [5]carni] *add.* mortue [6] ut] *add.* sit [7]apparet] *add.* quod [8]sulphuris] sulphureus [9]et] *om.* [10]autem] aut [11]sine spiritibus] spiritus sine corporalibus [12] imperciendo] impertinendo [13]*De civitate Dei*, xxi, c.10, *PL* 44, 724-5 [14] *add.* et [15]utrius] utriusque [16] *Matth.* 25:41. [17]Alcherus Claraevallensis, *De spiritu et anima*, cap. 18, col. 793. [18]tamen corporeus] unde corporeus. There is clearly some confusion here at the end of the conclusion in the two mss. Reference to another ms with a similar question, Oxford Bodl.292 demonstrates that it should be *incorporeus* and not *corporeus*. When compared to the bodies of the damned, fire is called incorporeal. When, however, it is compared to other things, such as angels, or God, it is called corporeal. See Appendix II.2. [19]dicitur] *add.* in.

2. Oxford Bodleian 292 Alexander of Hales

fo.323[r]

Quodlibet I, q.15

Deinde queritur utrum ignis infernalis sit locus corporalis. Et videtur quod non. Augustinus super Gen[esi ad Litteram] libro xii: inferiorum subiectum spiritualem essentiae arbitror non corporalem.

Contra, de civitate [Dei]: Iehenna illa que stagnum (ms. stangnum) ignis et sulphuris ignis erit et cruciabit corpora dampnatorum [aut] corpora hominum cum spiritibus daemonum nec spiritus si non corporibus herentes ignibus ad non imperciendo uitam.[1]

Et dicendum quod ignis ille uno modo dicitur corporeus, alio modo dicitur spiritualis quia in comparacionem corpori que hec agunt dicitur incorporeus simpliciter. Tamen dicitur corporeus [ms. coporeus] sicut dicit Augustinus quod angelus in animam simpliciter est incorporeus in comparacione ad deum dicitur corporeus.

[1] 'At vero gehenna illa, quod etiam stagnum ignis et sulphuris dictum est, corporeus ignis erit et cruciabit corpora damnatorum, aut et hominum et daemonum, solida hominum, aeria daemonum, aut tantum hominum corpora cum spiritibus, daemones autem spiritus sine corporibus haerented sumendo poenam, non impertiendo vitam corporalibus ignibus.': *De civitate Dei*, xxi, c.10, CCSL, 48, 776.

Appendix III

BN Lat. 15350 Gervase of Mont-Saint-Eloi

f.271^{rb}

Quodlibet I

q.10: Utrum vermis conscientie gravius puniat in inferno quam pena ignis.

Videtur quod vermis conscientie. Augustinus *de vera innocencia* dicit quod graviores pene sunt pene conscientie. Item, graviores pene sunt interiores quam exteriores sicut maius est gaudium interius quam exterius, non enim est oblectamentum sibi cordis gaudium. Ecclesiasticus xxx: *Sed pena interior est pena vermis.*

Ad oppositum, magis punit que sui meritatem (nervitatem?) et realem coniunctivum est, unitum punito quam quod non. Huius est ignis non vermis.

Solutio. Dicendum est quod pena vermis gravior est, per se loquendo, quam pena ignis, quia pena vermis que est dolor interior est ex hoc quod aliquid repugnat appetui interioris per se. Sed pena ignis, que est dolor exterior, est licet ex hoc quod anima repugnat appetitui quia repugnat corpori. Semper autem excedit hoc quod est per se illud quod est per aliud. Signum huius est quia homo sepe suscipit dolores exteriores et etiam [f.271va] vitam que maxime diligitur contempuit et morti se traditur ut vitet dolores interiores.

Praeterea, vermis conscientie est de amissione summi boni set pena ignis est de commissione mali non summi et ideo ignis cruciativi et id minus nati contristantur pena vermis est intimior et inportunior semper faciens dampnum contra se pugnare. In Psalmis: *arguam te et statuam contra faciem tuam*[1] debet verme loquitur. Bernardus in *libro de colloquio simonis ad iesu* caput L: *Immortalis* [ms. In mortalis] *factus internus* [ms. in terminis] *ille conscientie*

[1] 'Haec fecisti et tacui existimasti in igne quod ero tui similis arguam te et statuam contra faciem tuam': *Biblia Sacra iuxta vulgata*, ps. 49:21.

vermis tota malignitate corrodet [ms. corrodens] *sed non consumet animam infelicem nec erit omnino dissimulationis locus aut spes nulla consolationis. Quid enim tanti est quod ne modo* [ms. nec inter] *quidem conscientie stimulos* [ms. tum dos] *sustinere aliquatenus possunt, sed avertunt oculos cordis et ad consolationes miseras convertuntur, aut certe simulationibus* [ms. dissimulationibus] *aliquibus* [ms. alibus] *decipiuntur semetipsos et mentitur iniquitas sibi nisi quod intollerabilis ille est cruciatus*, etc.[2]

Ad oppositum ignis reali coniunctione magis est coniunctus. Dicendum quod dampnum in quo consistit vermis conscientie per apprehensionem suam est coniunctum anime in tantum quod realiter affligit eam et movet eam contra se. In tantum quod non potest adicere se a consideratione fediditatis peccatorum suorum et dampni quidam est per huius patet quia incurrit.

[2] Gaufridi Abbatis, *Declamationes ex S. Bernardi sermonibus de colloquio simonis sum Iesu*, c.50, *PL* 184, 469B.

Appendix IV

Paris Arsénal 379 Ranulphe of Homblières

fo. 224^{v}

Quodlibet II, q.20.

Queritur ut probatur utrum corpora dampnatorum sint corruptibilia. Ostenditur quod sic. Omne quod situs ex contrariis est corporalis, sed illa corpora post resurrectionem erunt ex contrariis composita. Ergo corruptibilia.

Ad idem: *passio magis facta abicit a substantia.*[1]

Contra: Job 20 de dampnato: *Lucet quae fecit nec tamen consumetur.*[2] Ergo, etc.

Ad istam quaestionem dicendum est quod quamvis sint corruptibilia eo quod ex contrariis sunt composita, quia omne quod mixtus est natura dissolubile est, nonquam tamen consumentur. Et prima ratio est ex parte corporis positioni data est uerus pro patiendi non deficiendi. Et ponit exemplum de Augustino *de civitate* [*Dei*] 21; *de Vermibus*; *de anima* ccl: salamandra qui vivit in ignis. Alia ratio est ex parte ignis affligentis que ignis pabulum non requirit ex parte corporis quod afligit. Tertia ratio est ex parte penis alterantis quia tantum cessabit motor propter mobilis primo cessabit alteratio nulla licet sed remaneat actio aliis. Quarto sumitur ex parte divine justicie sic ordinantis sicut dominus potuit dare corpori Ade in statu innocentie ut posset non corrumpere. Ita prout facere et dare corporibus ut non possint consimis tamen affligere. Exemplum ponit Augustinus 21 *de civitate* [*Dei*] circa de carne pauonis que iusto tempore prout siccioris(?) ut consimis sed sit corpulentiae [ms. corpulancie] rarioris.[3]

[1] Aristotle, *Topica* VI, c.6.
[2] Job 20,18.
[3] *De civitate Dei*, 21, cap. 7.

Ad argumentum dicendum quod licet sit corporis de se, non tamen corporis propter ordinatione divine justicie. Item licet remaneant conceditur elementa verumtamen non agat in alterationem licet omnia agant in corpora. Ad aliud cum dicitur passio magis facta, etc. est quod abicio ab essentia sed ibi erit abicio a bene essentia et ibidem nec sequitur consumptio substantiae.

[fo.225^{r}]

Quodlibet est determinatum a fratre Ferario Iacobota, feriale de paschate anno domini milla cco lxxa quinto.

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